Sergey Kolerov: Russian (counter) revolution against "color revolutions"

Sergey Kolerov: Russian (counter) revolution against "color revolutions" The 20 anniversary of the August coup of 1991 of the year and the collapse of the USSR that followed it intensified discussions in the post-Soviet space on the prospects of the former Soviet republics and summing up the independent period of their existence. Disappointing for the most part. Vigorous, optimistic declarations of some leaders and "founding fathers" of the countries of the former Soviet Union, proclaiming independence under their leadership and pompously celebrating its 20 anniversary, writing off all subsequent failures and the current catastrophic situation (of course, "temporary" and "surmountable") on today's successors, are refuted by their very people. The results of opinion polls (where they were conducted and where sociology can in principle exist) show that “independence”, contrary to the statements of national leaders, is of no value for a significant part, and where (for example, in Bessarabia) and for the majority of the population ready to sacrifice the "sovereignty" of its elites in favor of anyone - Russia, the EU, NATO, and the closest, more successful neighbors.

Much of its former citizens still dream of restoring the USSR. And the matter is not only and not so much in Russians and pensioners who are nostalgic for the "scoop", as official propaganda is trying to present. Residents of neighboring countries without any opinion polls "vote with their feet" in favor of Russia, which remains the main center for migrant workers and immigrants from the majority of the post-Soviet republics. At the same time, the vast majority of migrant workers are by no means retired or Russian on their passports.


However, the obstacles for real reintegration processes around the former metropolis are not only the national elites, but also Russia itself, which still does not have a clear position and policy in the near abroad - a zone of its historical destiny and therefore of historical responsibility and interests. The demand of the residents of the post-Soviet space for reintegration comes up against the lack of adequate proposals from the Russian elite. And this is a much more serious obstacle than the unstable regimes of the Russian neighbors, which, as practice shows, are crumbling from the slightest push from the outside and from the inside, like a house of cards. And the problem here is not only in the quality of the Russian elite, in its throwings and contradictory declarations, determined by private, momentary and often illusory benefits. In its Komsomol-stagnant origin, it differs little from the national elites of its neighbors. The only difference between them is that the Russian elite is anti-national. And quite officially. There is no nation in Russia. Those. there is nothing that is the basis of any state. There is no national policy. There is only a metropolis, torn by contradictions from the USSR, the population of which the newly-made 20 elite called “Russians” years ago and hasn’t raised a finger since then to at least try to fill this word, increasingly perceived by the Russians as an insult, somehow real content. The absence of a nation in Russia makes it impossible for the reintegration of the wreckage of the former empire, moreover, to be one of the main reasons for the increasingly progressive disintegration of the Russian Federation itself.

Russia, I recall, is the only federation of all the republics of the former USSR. In all the others, immediately after the collapse of the Union, regimes were established from moderately nationalist to semi-Nazi. Moreover, none of them, like Russia, can boast of an ethnically homogeneous population and the absence of interethnic, interfaith and intercultural contradictions. Nevertheless, even having lost de facto (as in the case of Azerbaijan and the former Moldavian SSR) and de jure (as in the case of Georgia) parts of the territories that they formally inherited from the USSR, the elite of these countries still hear they do not want about the federation and the need to sacrifice part of the interests of the "titular" majority. Although a few years ago (now - no) this could be a solution to their territorial and ethnic problems.

In Russia, on the contrary, the federation, in the form in which it now exists, is an unexploded bomb that has been stuck since the war in the foundation of a dwelling house and can detonate at any moment. The main flaw of this "federation" is that its ethnic majority - Russians - has no status in it, and, in fact, is deprived of its name. At the same time, most other ethnic groups of the Russian Federation have either their own statehood in the form of national republics, or are represented by other institutional and organizational forms. As a result, Russia has on its territory a whole bunch of states in the state — nationalist regimes like post-Soviet ones, where the remaining Russian population is subject to discrimination comparable to the realities of, if not the Baltic states, then Bessarabia or Ukraine. Similarities are added and subsidies to the North Caucasian republics, Tatarstan, Kalmykia, Chuvashia, etc., their size more reminiscent of the tribute paid by Moscow from the federal budget, i.e. from the pockets of the same Russian taxpayers, while a number of areas of central Russia are on the verge of demographic and economic survival. At the same time, both subsidies to neighbors from the near abroad and the financing of nationalist regimes on the territory of Russia are motivated by only one thing - to ensure their alleged loyalty to Moscow. The Russian population is also not protected in the places of its historical compact residence, where it makes up the majority. Terrorized by visitors from the outskirts of Russia and from abroad, “voting feet” against their own poverty and for Russian opportunities, the Russians themselves not only receive no protection from the authorities, but even lose their right to self-defense, constantly being guilty in the course of local natural disasters. always destructive - speeches. Thus, after 20 years of state-owned "Russian", it has become unprecedented for Russians, it is unprofitable, or simply dangerous, not only in the near abroad, but also in Russia itself.

An experiment to remove "Russians" would be justified and would have at least some chance of success only in the event of the abolition of all national republics and administrative-territorial reorganization. In other words, if the right to national statehood would be denied to all the peoples of Russia, and not just the Russians. If Moscow is not ready to deprive the titular statehood of Tatarstan, Dagestan, Chechnya and others like them, there is only one way - to declare Russia as a whole the Russian state, and consolidate this provision in the Constitution. There will be no discrimination against other peoples of the Russian Federation in this, since the largest of them already have their own statehood within the federation in the places of their historical compact residence. In addition to the fact that constitutional status will finally give the Russians the opportunity to feel their own at least in the part of the state remaining in the form of the Russian Federation, which they have been creating for centuries, it will also create legal mechanisms to protect our rights in national federation subjects.

The inevitable in the event of such a decision accusations of "Russian great-power chauvinism", "Russian fascism" and "imperialism", which will sound both in Russia and abroad, should be responded the same way as, for example, the authorities of the Baltic members of the European Union and NATO - "standards" in the observance of human rights, react to accusations of discrimination against Russians, who in most of these countries are deprived of elementary civil rights. Those. no way to ignore. Since any timid attempts by Russia at least somehow, somewhere, in some way to protect their interests, have traditionally met the storm of indignation of the “world community”. Moreover, there is no talk about the violation of the rights of other peoples of the Russian Federation, it is only about the restoration of the rights of the Russian people. Russian, constituting about 80% of the population of the Russian Federation, have earned the right to the state, founded by them a thousand years ago. Real Russians, it is worth emphasizing, unlike, say, the mythical 78% of "Ukrainians" in Ukraine and 76% of "Moldovans" in Bessarabia, who for 20 have been debating for years on the verge of a civil war about their own identity and statehood, which they owe exclusively to the USSR, half and more people who speak either Russian, or surzhik. The identity of the Russians does not cause any doubts among the Russians themselves or among all the others, with the exception of zoological Russophobes and professional fighters against “Russian imperialism.” It should be emphasized that it is, of course, not about ethnic and racial "purity." About it, at least, it would be foolish to argue in the former empire, in whose territory for more than a hundred ethnic groups coexisted, interacted and mixed. Russian - the one who considers himself as such. Whether by birth or by deliberate choice is irrelevant.

The state status of the Russian people (perhaps the most divided people in the modern world) in the Russian Federation will provide the basis and necessary tools for the protection of Russians abroad. Instead of abstract "compatriots" and Russian citizens living abroad, who, as practice in Transnistria shows, are for Moscow only a momentary argument and a bargaining chip in political games, the Russian state, whose very statehood is provided by its Russian majority, will defend the interests first of all, Russians, who made their choice in the main thing - in identity, language and culture, and not just and not only citizens of the Russian Federation. For examples of state support for such true compatriots, there is no need to go far; they can be found among the former social camp bloc, and now the EU members are Romania, Hungary, Poland. All these countries support not anonymous citizens or "compatriots" abroad, namely, Romanians, Hungarians, Poles - those whom these states consider as such, and those who identify themselves abroad as such. They are granted them citizenship and voting rights, turning them into a serious factor not only in foreign but also in domestic politics. Suffice it to recall that it was Romanian citizens from abroad who gave Traian Basescu a half-percentage point advantage over Mircea Joanne and the victory in the last presidential elections in Romania. In the event that Russia becomes a Russian state, the result will be a complete reformatting of the post-Soviet space.

The Russian state will be able to consolidate Russians both abroad and in Russia itself, and complete the process of forming Russians as a nation throughout the entire space of the Russian world, interrupted by the Bolshevik revolution of the year 1917. In this case, it is not only about the percentage of Russians who remained in the republics of the former USSR according to their official censuses. The state support of the diaspora, first of all, gives a real prospect of reunification of the Russian people with their broken-off parts, now called Ukrainians and Belarusians. Despite 17% of "official" Russians in Ukraine and 8% in Belarus, Russian prefers at least half of the population in Ukraine and up to 70% in Belarus. What will remain of the Ukrainian and Belarusian “nations” created by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the German headquarters, Stalin and Kaganovich, if Russia helps to remember the Russians who have signed up for Ukrainians and Belarusians about their true identity? And the current "Russian" - that they are only an artificial ethnographic fragment of a large people. And what fate awaits in this situation the “independent” projects called “Ukraine” and “Belarus”? Moreover, in the case of Ukraine, the identification split has a geographic border, and the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism - the west of the country - pushes the south-east and the Crimea away from itself, calling the population of these regions “moskalyami” and “under-Ukrainian”. A similar situation is observed in Bessarabia, where the minority that identifies itself as a “Romanian”, currently in power, calls ethnic Moldovans, many of whom are Russian-speaking, “Russophones” or simply “Russians”. In contrast to the "Bessarabian Romanians", the Romanian Romanians themselves do not allow such "generosity". However, they (for the time being) are deprived of the opportunity to resolve this issue administratively. And they can finally lose it if Russian Russia competes with them.

In the meantime, Russia is “rossiyanskaya” only silently watching how the “neutral Republic of Moldova”, despite “common spiritual foundations” and “fraternal bonds”, is rapidly drifting in the Euro-Atlantic direction. Moreover, she tries to facilitate her journey, forcibly and unnaturally, against stories and against the clearly expressed will of the united Transnistrian Russian people (the current Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians) having pushed Russian Transnistria into it for the sake of the western “partners”. Similarly, "Russian" Russia is watching the Euro-Atlantic "choice" of Ukraine and other "brothers."

The Customs Union and the SES, regardless of whether Ukraine or anyone else, like any integration projects proposed by the Russian Federation, whatever economic benefits and prospects they might have, will join it are doomed to failure if they are based on traditional for the last 20 failure years of deals with national elites. Since the very meaning of the existence of these elites, regardless of the principles and beliefs they declare and easily changed, is in opposition to Moscow. So it was all 20 years of their autonomous existence, and will be as long as Russia does not destroy them, or does not disappear itself. The backbone of Russia's reintegration projects in the former Soviet republics can only be their population, and, above all, Russians.

And the organizational and conceptual expression of this reintegration should be formal and informal, political, and not ethnically-ethnographic "Russian parties" abroad. First of all, where a significant percentage of the Russian (in a non-ethnic sense of the word) population is preserved - in Ukraine, Belarus, Bessarabia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states. Russian parties that rely, in addition to the ethnic and linguistic segments of the population, on the pro-Russian electorate as a whole, are an alternative not only to the backstage feeders of “professional Russians” and “compatriots”, but also Lukashenko, Yanukovych and Voronin with their parties that use and betray their electorate under the guise of pro-Russian slogans. At the same time, of course, the activities of Russian parties can only be effective if it is coordinated and supported from Russia. The negative experience of the Russian parties of the Baltic states, which, being unclaimed in Moscow, plunged into the internal political struggle for survival, having no relation to the problems of the Russians proper, this is confirmed. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the creation of the Russian party is necessary in Russia itself. As the change of the elite in general. It is clear that neither the Komsomol-oligarchic "United Russia" with Gryzlov, nor Medvedev with his administration, nor Lavrov with the Foreign Ministry, being, like their ideological predecessors Gorbachev and Yeltsin, ethnic Russians, expressions of the interests of Russians, however, are not the reintegration of the Russian world will not be engaged. Since their "partners" set themselves the exact opposite task.

One fact of belonging to the Russian nation and the feeling of comprehensive support of the Great Motherland can transform Russians abroad from a humiliated and passive minority into passionaries. And the party status will endow them with a fairly wide arsenal of both domestic and reintegration actions - from representation in government and the possibility of initiating referendums, including on foreign policy priorities, to a revolutionary change of post-Soviet puppet regimes. And the number of the party is not important. For example, the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania is the party representing the 6-percentage national minority, without going into all the nuances and difficulties of its relationship with Budapest and inside the Hungarian movement in Transylvania, for almost 2 years has been almost the decisive factor in the domestic political life of Romania, playing on the contradictions between the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling coalition with which it makes up, and the opposition. Similarly, the Gagauz, who constitute 4,4% of the population in Bessarabia according to official data (this is even less than the "official" Russians), when they manage to overcome internal divisions, they are able to resist Chisinau.

The inevitable revolutionary nature of the process of shaping the Russian nation and its geopolitical consequences is due not only to the historically - revolutionary denationalization of the Russians and the destruction of the Russian empire, launched in 1917 year. It is also determined by the revolutionary nature of the current state of affairs in the post-Soviet space — the general crisis of identity and statehood for him. The crisis is on the verge of a global catastrophe. And in this context it becomes obvious: the only thing that can be opposed to the "color revolutions" in the territory of the former Russian empire, including, in the near future, the Russian Federation, is the Russian revolution. Or counter-revolution, if you will. No less obvious is the fact that if this formula - the Russian (counter) revolution against the "colored" ones - will not be realized in the near future, and more specifically, by the Russian government that is formed in the spring of 2012, then it risks finding completely different content and form. Namely - the very "senseless and merciless", against which the post-Soviet conflicts "frozen" at the moment "unfreeze".


For this reason, no half measures, such as the introduction of an article of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which states that "the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation is its multinational people," the additions are "... the core (foundation) of which the Russian people historically ", as suggested, in particular, by the leading research officer of the think tank of the Russian presidential administration, RISI, Vladimir Kuznechevsky, suggesting in this way" to restore the authority of the Russian people in an ideological (only) plan, " ut situation from a dead end. Today, it’s even less than the purely ideological (non-legal) definition of the Russian people as an “older brother” adopted by the Bolsheviks under the leadership of Stalin as the war approached, which became Patriotic and temporarily abandoned bold experiments in national politics and world exports proletarian revolution. This ideological construction, which had already been audited by Khrushchev and accompanied by the selection and cultivation of national elites in the republics of the Soviet Union and the RSFSR, finally went bankrupt by the year 1991. Attempting to pull the ideological Russian “elder brother” out of the “Russians” in the conditions of the modern Russian Federation is akin to the March 17 referendum on the preservation of the already doomed and de facto dead USSR. Only the Russian people and the Russian state can restore the imperial Russian world.
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