"Mistral" - is it to the court of our fleet?

Not so long ago, our country could well provide itself with helicopter carriers. In the picture - the cruiser "Moscow" project 1123.

The deal on "Mistrali" can be interpreted as a distrust of its own military-industrial complex

For about a year, rumors about the prospects for the acquisition of the French UDC "Mistral" for the Russian Navy are already circulating among specialists. Now, after the president’s visit to France and the joint statements made there, it seems that the matter is ready to move onto a practical plane.

The first thing to note is that it is a rare case when there are so many opposite polarities about certain issues of promising military construction. - There are reasons for this: for the first time in almost a 70-year period (reparations is not counted), the state is openly borrowing such a large armament complex abroad. Until now, the confidence that the domestic military industrial complex knows and is ready to create everything that is required for the defense of the country has been complete.

Consequently, the Mistral deal can be interpreted as a distrust of its own military-industrial complex, which had hitherto held firm positions in the state, and as a well-known courage and flexibility in trying to follow the construction of the Armed Forces (Navy) by the shortest way to achieve several goals at once, including guided the criterion of "time - cost - efficiency" ... In addition, this step can demonstrate independence from the opinion of us as a self-sufficient, universal, previously recognized supplier to the world arms market.

So far, one thing is clear: the leadership’s move with the acquisition of a Frenchman is so uncommon that it takes not only professional, but less professional analyst observers, just amateurs to delve into the operational and operational-strategic "debris" of the consequences of this or that serious step in military construction. So much so that it causes deep doubts whether everything here is completely clear even to those before whom all the cards are open and on the professional recommendations of which the country's leadership is taking similar steps. Not to mention that only time and the development of events will give him a final assessment - it is difficult with a minimum of information to draw any final conclusions and conclusions. Meanwhile, some preliminary observations and questions are not only permissible and natural, but also necessary (due to the undoubted importance of the matter) now. Let us turn at least to some of them.

A. The crisis of naval armaments that struck us is so deep that we objectively cannot restore the ship’s personnel and the power of the navy groups to the naval forces that are adequate to the state’s commitments and statements. And to hide it further would be a crime against the country: this may be followed by the failure of foreign policy.

B. UDC, the class of ships in question, have never been built in our country, and there is no doubt that attempts to create them on domestic soil would inevitably cause a lot of insurmountable difficulties. Meanwhile on all modern fleets they are there, or they are seriously concerned about their early acquisition there, for not a single class of ships and weapons as a whole corresponds to such an extent to the trends in the development of forces and means of armed struggle in modern conditions. In this project, like nowhere else, the interests and capabilities of almost all types and even types of the Armed Forces converge. In addition, most of the happy owners of these ships resorted to foreign help or cooperation in their construction and armament.

Q. It’s easy to answer the question (it’s also asked), but it’s not easier to restore our rank I BDKs instead: it’s a little comparable ships, and UDC certainly wins first of all with its operational and tactical capabilities in the assault landing, having in the arsenal up to 16 helicopters and several KVP; In addition, the habitability conditions on the French ship are obviously much higher, which is extremely important in long voyages to maintain the combat capability of the landing force. Especially in warm waters (who swim there, he knows what is at stake).

G. At the same time, it is quite obvious that the commissioning of such ships cannot most naturally not claim the appropriate number of escort ships to provide amphibious groups at sea crossings in areas of combat maneuvering and disembarking, that is, the acquisition of UDC automatically stimulates the revival of military shipbuilding.

D. The appearance of the UDC as part of the Navy, especially in that part of the project that involves the construction of two units in domestic shipyards, given the aircraft carrier design and architecture of the latter, can not help promote (and on the right path) the design and construction processes of new domestic aircraft carriers , about which our leadership also confidently declares. Will it be decisive - time will tell, but one thing is clear: it will never be superfluous ...

This is what lies on the surface and does not need additional information, access to which for well-known reasons is limited. At the same time, in the course of our reasoning, a whole series of natural questions cannot arise, the answer to which will objectively determine the effectiveness of the entire project, regardless of what our strategists and management think about it today.

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

As for the most large-scale examples - they refer to the period immediately preceding the NAV. Not having time to execute the Shipbuilding program for the needs of the Far East on its own, Russia orders a number of ships abroad. Their grouping (from EDB, KR to EM) in aggregate amounted to 30% of the total composition of the first echelon of forces (1 of the Pacific Squadron). And these were not the worst ships!

The second goal, which was traditionally pursued by the order of ships abroad, was the natural enrichment of domestic military shipbuilding with the best international experience in order to prevent a backlog. All the best in technology, marked on the "import" ships, immediately transferred to the projects of promising LC and KR. Apparently, therefore, the post-war “Andrew the First-Called”, “Paul I” in the Baltic, “John Chrysostom” and “Evstafy” in the Black Sea were in no way inferior to the best English predrednouet.

In the interwar period (1905 – 1914 years), borrowing abroad was limited, although Russia, which had lost a huge fleet in the previous war, desperately needed modern ship personnel. Nevertheless, as an exception, the world's best armored cruiser “Rurik” for Russia was still built in England. In equipping the newest destroyer "Novik" - first of all with machines and boilers - the German experience is borrowed, and the turbines of the new dreadnoughts - English, from the firm "Parsons". Meanwhile, the lag in some technologies, primarily concerning the installation and installation of unique superheavy three-gun turrets with 14Ѕ in 54 caliber with guns length (production of running balls), the manufacture of gunpieces themselves, prevented the building and commissioning of at least some of the very promising and powerful Russian battleships like "Borodino". However, already then there was a crisis in the manufacture of especially powerful ship armor and some other technologies needed in military shipbuilding ...

In Soviet times, the beginning of the mass modern domestic military shipbuilding was laid by borrowing the Italian experience in the form of a light cruiser project, the leaders, buying an unfinished cruiser in Germany - but this was a necessary measure.

Then - just what we got on the Lend-Lease and reparations.

And then - all by yourself! Up to this day!

And what about yourself? ..

Indeed, what about yourself? Since the late 60s, and especially at the peak of its development, the Navy has become a modern fleet and cannot but command respect from its powerful opponents. Traditionally unbalanced, it nevertheless almost always differed in some kind of know-how, as they say, giving one-sided advantages, at least partially compensating for the disadvantages. Its very imbalance, as a generic disease, would be correct to attribute not so much to the problems of the technological plan as to the costs of naval thinking, which traditionally did not receive due attention on national grounds (see the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov). Take, for example, the problem of problems - aviation; firstly, it assumes a very considerable path that needs to be covered: from mastering the very principle of flights from the deck of modern combat aircraft and helicopters to achieving the necessary operational and tactical standards for the combat use of deck aviation. In addition to formally agreeing with her in the ranks of the senior management of the fleet, she should have interested, talented, and competent performers within the very living process of practical implementation of the idea. At the same time endowed with sufficient authority. The mistake of our leadership is that it is believed that the problem can be solved by a one-time event, like - they decided, built ... and flew in as it should ...

The concept of the problem of aviation is not at all exhausted by the banal absence of aircraft carriers in the Navy - here are very strange relationships that have developed among our amphibious and anti-submarine forces (to a lesser extent), strike, mine-sweeping, search and rescue and other forces with helicopters , with the most diverse purposes and in large quantities. The cost of this phenomenon is the imbalance of the fleet in all its ugliness and helplessness, that is, its inability to act independently in selected areas of the ocean theaters without restrictions.

To reinforce the impression, let us point out the absence and non-use, still in the interests of the main ship connections, LA DRLO, although the experience of the Falklands war of the 1982 of the year (with its convincing losses) put an end to the dispute about their absolute necessity. Almost 30 years separates us from these events, “... and it's still there!”

There are many such dangerous archaisms: in the fleet management structure, in submarine forces, in surface drums, and in surface antisubmarine, and in naval aviation. Only one lagging in terms of the lack of automated control systems and IBSU in modern NK and PL. Today it is directly estimated as a flaw in the combat effectiveness of the fleet forces. How significant - even difficult to say! Other things being equal! However, let us return, as they say, to “our sheep”.

So, what does the Mistral give us?

Of course, it is tempting to first learn the views of the modern command of the Navy (VS) on the use of such extraordinary, even exotic, ships for the Navy, their place in the country's defense strategy (as our new partners like to put it). However, everyone understands this is unreal! Therefore, we continue to reason from logic - from the obvious.

1. Among the already quite numerous UDC types in the world, the Frenchman looks quite attractive. By many criteria: here, and "price - quality", and a solid flight deck, and much more ...

2. Abstracting from the inevitable costs in such cases, which Russian will refrain from not adding even its own flavor to the ready-made business (more on this below), we note: UDC of this type demonstrates the ability to transport at least 450 to the place of combat use ( 1200) paratroopers with standard equipment, a couple of hundred pieces of equipment and land them in a combined way in a tempo inaccessible to the Navy and in a depth of inaccessible before (using for this purpose helicopters to 16 – 20).

3. UDC is also extremely convenient for carrying out special operations both with the help of helicopters, high-speed, radio-invisible watercraft, and with the help of an ultra-small submarine, which can be brought into the docking chamber.

4. This type of ship is extremely convenient, as the flagship of the demining forces in the organization of mine action (actions) in remote areas of the oceans, - the experience of the war in the Gulf, the earlier - demining in the Suez Canal.

5. Having a solid flight deck with a length of up to 200 m, such a ship easily transforms into a light aircraft carrier, it is enough to equip it with a forward ramp (springboard) and an aeropole finisher. Australia, which also shows considerable interest in acquiring such ships, according to the press, suggests exactly this option of its use. In the presence of SUVVP can be limited only to the ramp. By the way, the American UDC “Tarava” and “Wasp” have in their considerable air groups up to 6 – 7 such aircraft. This makes them truly versatile and self-sufficient ships in amphibious operations of any level.

6. The use of such ships within the framework of the national defense strategy makes it possible, by the possibility of conducting deep airmobile operations, to flexibly influence the situation in entire regions washed by the adjacent seas (oceans), appearing from the traditionally rear areas for the enemy. The very possibility of conducting military operations of this type with its help significantly enriches and promotes the theory and practice of the database, giving them modern features in the form of special mobility in various environments (at the borders of the environments).

REMAINING QUESTIONS

Whereupon, as they say, questions remain unavoidable in such cases.

First, when it comes to an aircraft carrier or a universal landing ship (UDC), confirmation (achievement) of its declared operational tactical capabilities, like nowhere, is determined by the fact: what kind of aircraft group and landing craft (in this case) are included in its equipment at least the standard weapons of these ships or not.

Thus, for UDC, the types and number of helicopters, the types and number of KVP, displaced landing craft transported in the docking chamber are decisive; according to accepted practice, they are also used for unloading on the unequipped coast of other amphibious and auxiliary ships, vessels of the amphibious group. In this case, the usual weapon and the armament installed on such a ship: ZRK, ZAK, and others, are relegated to second place in their importance. In the sense that without much damage it can be replaced by other, say, domestic complexes; moreover, such ships are taken to be reliably defended by specially designated warships and aircraft.

In addition, if we take the path when, buying the ship itself, we ignore borrowing its aviation and other special (landing) weapons (equipment), modern means of controlling the database, providing actions, yielding, for example, to the temptation to save naturally, we are deprived of the opportunity and to rely on the combat effectiveness declared by its creators.

In addition, I find it difficult to name the type of domestic transport-assault helicopter adapted to ship-based, especially heavy cargo helicopter, helicopter adapted to ensure special operations to a considerable depth; the main domestic attack helicopter, which is certainly part of the UDC air group, etc., is hardly adapted for these purposes either.

In addition, the design of the aircraft carrier, among which is the Mistral UDC, adapts itself to certain types of aircraft armament; efficient servicing of aircraft on board a ship requires a whole fleet of special equipment sufficiently specific for each type of aircraft. It is absolutely clear that their design features, in turn, should allow, with the same dimensions of the ship, flight deck, hangars, take on board, operate and carry out combat use without interference from the maximum number of aircraft, provided that the air group itself is balanced for typical or special tasks. . Therefore, preference is given, as a rule, to specialized aircraft, specially designed or constructively adapted for sea basing and use over the sea and from the sea. For example, the Mistral constructively has six helicopter pads on the flight deck, which are also suitable for the use of the largest sea-based helicopters ...

It is also completely clear that it is very easy to adapt for these purposes coastal-based helicopters without a significant reduction in their combat effectiveness and the entire complex, not to mention the problems of flying over the sea ...

VERDICT

Having examined all the obvious facts and circumstances related to the case, we approach the following conclusions.

The decision to acquire a foreign ship (a grouping of ships) with high combat capabilities looks interesting and worthy of attention, but leaves questions — their combat effectiveness will depend to a decisive degree on a number of conditions, the most important of which are:

- How long will the naval ships be transferred?

- Do we have time with the deployment of escort forces for their full support and support;

- what configuration of their main armament (helicopters and KVP), ACS (IHD) they will be;

- what weapons and weapons of self-defense these ships will be armed with;

- do we have time for the infrastructure for these ships, so that they will not stand in the roads for years, like their predecessors, domestic TAKRs, so as not to “cripple” them in any repairs, like their predecessors;

- what will be the structure of the crews of these ships and the system of their training, so that a soldier of military service with a service life of one year (he is also a sailor, not just a specialist, doesn’t turn a tongue to name) did not break expensive imported equipment and equipment overnight;

- Will our military science keep up with the development of modern, effective methods of using these ships and weapon systems with their high operational and tactical capabilities?

Operational and strategic feasibility, in addition, dictates a well-thought-out distribution of UDC among fleets, future theaters, as well as a rather high coefficient of their operational voltage: ships at sea, among other things, are better preserved than standing idle at the bases.

Finally, one should not think that in matters of the combat use of new ships and special forces transported on them, we have so many productive experiences - we need to prepare not only the command in advance, but also the ideologues of their modern use.

The main thing is to avoid the repetition of the “Tsushima relapse”, when the formidable wake columns of battleships were considered to be sufficient reason to intimidate the enemy, forgetting the need to also maneuver smoothly and energetically to fire at the enemy.

To do this, based on the actual diversity of the issues raised here, literally tomorrow it is necessary to begin their practical development, including the development of the necessary weapons and weapons for the new UDC.