Gate of Constantinople - desirable and inaccessible
Followers of the alternative stories claim: if 100 years ago Russia took the Black Sea straits, the results of the First World War would have been different, and the Second World War, perhaps, would have followed a completely different scenario. Well, if the prophetic Oleg did not fool the fool and did not confine himself to ritual priklachivaniem his shield on the Tsaregrad gates, and in spite of the arrogant neighbor in the face of Byzantium entrenched on the Bosphorus, the window to Europe, with all the geopolitical and economic opportunities arising from the torrential zone, would appear Russia is still in the tenth century, and it would be a completely different state. That's just the story, as you know, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, so there is nothing left but to study the lost opportunities - their causes and consequences.
Not so useless if you consider that recently in the West it was in this “nutrient medium” - in disputes about the historical role of the Black Sea Straits - a fair amount of research appeared that proved the alleged “natural aggressiveness of the Russian state”. However, this topic is not new, and our response to the “falsifiers of history” in Soviet times sounded regularly from every radio point: “I don’t need a Turkish coast, and I don’t need Africa!”
And how was it really? And how is our geopolitical interest regarding the Black Sea Strait zone articulated today? Especially since the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (who will move them!) Remain in their geographical coordinates and, by analogy with public transport, are something like a turnstile, which can be closed at any time, and then our fleet will be tightly locked in the Black Sea. By the way, something similar has already happened, and not once. And the story - and this is also well known - tends to repeat. I would not want to again in the form of tragedy. How can?..
CRITIQUE OF UNCLEAN MIND
The question of how Russia sought to possess the Black Sea straits and how it affected the course of world history once again rose up in the century a century since the beginning of the First World War. First of all, foreign historians were excited, trying to prove that it was Russia that was the main evil on earth, as if it was not Gavrila. The Principle, who had laid Browning off of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, launched the first world-wide massacre, namely Russia, with his intention to land troops on the Bosphorus. And although the chronicle of events testifies to a completely different thing, it is precisely this trend that prevails today in foreign historical consciousness.
Whoever from western colleagues has tried to throw mud at our past, but the American historian Sean McMeekin, who teaches international relations at Bilkent University (Turkey), has probably succeeded most of all. He wrote a book entitled “The Russian Roots of the First World War,” published by Harvard University, already on the front page of which states that it “will forever change your view of world history and the role of Russia in the First World War”.
It is clear that this role is extremely negative. Say, the Russian empire on the soil of Orthodoxy considered itself the spiritual heir of Byzantium, and since it was through the Black Sea straits the main export of Russian grain (of the order of 60% - “NVO”) and other goods went, tsarism longed for Bosphorus and Dardanelles and was going to whether on foot - along the west coast, through Bulgaria, or by means of a landing party, to capture the pouring zone, but Gavrila was ahead of the "Russian military" principle. But this, according to Shaun McMickin, means nothing, and Russia still bears the same responsibility for unleashing World War I, like Germany with Austria, or even more ...
Ask what evidence? And here begins the primitive cheating in the calculation that the majority of the townsfolk (especially Western, accustomed to comics) do not often climbs to historical sacraments.
So, Professor MakMikin argues that Russia began mobilization before Germany and Austria. But it is enough to take any encyclopedia to be sure: the mobilization of our last sovereign emperor announced 13 on July 1914 of the year, five days later than his Austrian colleague. And it was a very correct decision, because according to the Schlieffen plan, the Germans and Austrians planned to get rid of France, and then Russia, within a few months. First of all, in the hope that “the enemy will not have time to quickly mobilize”. The literary framing of this protoblitzkrieg was the famous phrase of Kaiser Wilhelm: "We will have lunch in Paris, and dinner in St. Petersburg."
Did not work out. And you can relate to the commanding abilities of the royal Nika (he is the autocrat Russian Colonel Nikolai Romanov) as you like, but didn’t take the very simple-minded to the General Staff of the Russian Empire, and Russian intelligence did not sit idly.
Thank God, Artem Krechetnikov from the Russian service of the Air Force does not argue with this, according to which the statement that Russia entered World War I, without any intelligible goals, is a propaganda fake of the Soviet type or “complete nonsense.” Another thing, according to Krechetnikov, was that these were “wrong” goals and, in general, Russia seldom carried on autocrats. For example, in the period from Catherine II to Alexander II, the Russian Empire, although it was at war with Turkey and Persia, and also conducted active hostilities in the Caucasus and the Far East, still tried to be “a loyal member of the community of civilized nations”, that is, without special needs (for example, the invasion of Napoleon) did not climb into European affairs. However, since Alexander III, the Romanovs completely broke off at the hands. Especially Nicholas II, for whom the Black Sea Straits became something of a fix idea, and Panslavism, which materialized into unconditional support for Serbia, was a moral imperative.
Subsequently, a lot of dogs were really hung on Nicholas II, but the accusation that he was supposedly the most imperialist imperialist at the beginning of the last century was a great revelation. It seems that France, England and Germany got involved in the imperialist slaughter solely out of sports interest.
Meanwhile, the Germans appeared on the Bosphorus long before the shots in Sarajevo. Back in November 1913, the German military mission of Lieutenant-General Liman von Sanders was sent to Turkey with the task of reformatting the Ottoman armed forces in the Prussian manner, and the sultan immediately appointed this military expert commander of the Turkish troops in Istanbul.
As a matter of fact, from that moment on, the Black Sea pouring zone actually came under German control, which they received without enthusiasm from the Singing Bridge, that is, in the Russian Foreign Ministry. “The straits are in the hands of a strong state - this means complete subordination of the economic development of the whole south of Russia to this state,” said the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, Sergei Sazonov, and summoned the German ambassador to St. Petersburg: “The German chancellor should have known,” he said. to Count von Pourtales, - that if there is a point on the globe on which our jealous attention is focused and where we could not allow any changes that directly affected our vital interests, then this point is Constant Tinopol, equally opening and blocking access to the Mediterranean Sea, where, naturally, all the export trade of our south ”.
View from the Bosphorus Strait to the mosque, converted
from the buildings of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople.
Photo by Arild Wagen
from the buildings of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople.
Photo by Arild Wagen
The reaction to the note was followed by a peculiar one - more reminiscent of the British diplomatic style than the German straightforwardness. Lyman von Sanders became a Mushir, that is, a Turkish marshal, and formally - because he went up - was removed from the command of the Istanbul garrison. But fundamentally this, of course, did not change anything, and Wilhelm II still grumbled from the banks of the Spree: “Either the German flag will fly soon on the fortifications of the Bosporus, or the sad fate of the great exile on St. Helena will fly.”
So we were not the first to start, and all the mind games in an attempt to shift responsibility for unleashing World War I on Russia are not distinguished by special research purity. However, we ourselves gave a reason for this.
As Natalia Narochnitskaya, head of the European Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in Paris, notes, our compatriots are members of the Institute of Red Professors and representatives of the so-called revolutionary historical “Mikhail Pokrovsky School”, for whom the class approach to history was above historical facts to justify the not too patriotic Leninist the slogan about the defeat of their own government in the "imperialist slaughter", launched into a scientific revolution the assertion that Russia invaded the First rovuyu solely for the possession of the Black Sea straits. In fact, Narochnitskaya clarifies, entering the war on the side of the Entente, our country did not have territorial claims at all, unless, of course, we consider the virtual intention to “plant an Orthodox cross on St. Sophia”.
Conversations essentially began with England and France only in the 1915 year, when it became apparent to the allies that the Black Sea Straits, if taken under control, could significantly accelerate the rout of the enemy. First, Russia, which almost all alone held the entire huge Eastern Front, could not bypass through the Far East and Transsib, which did not have a large carrying capacity, but directly receive the much-needed military and technical support. Secondly, it would be possible to quickly transfer additional Russian battalions to the stalled Western Front. This was the kind of interchange in Paris and London: living force on the inanimate ...
At the same time on the issue of the Black Sea Straits, most researchers usually display uncharacteristic unanimity: if the Germans were able to overthrow the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the war could have ended much earlier and most likely would have done without the October revolution, which changed the world beyond recognition. But the allies, as always, played unclean, and subsequent events showed that they didn’t have in mind to allow Russia to the straits.
The longtime author of NVO, writer and historian Alexander Shirokorad, said: “The straits were needed (Russia. - NVO”), but in St. Petersburg they could not know that England and France would never allow Russian control over them. And control of English instead of Turkish would be an even worse evil for Russia. Before the war in Russia, several meetings were held with the participation of the generals and leadership fleet, where a common point of view was worked out - Russia alone can never master the straits. This is a correct guess. But then the incorrect conclusion was made that the straits could be captured only in alliance with England and France. In 1916, an agreement was concluded between the Allies on the Entente that the straits would be transferred to Russia, but at the same time a secret separate agreement was concluded (between England and France. - “NVO”), under which Russia would in no case be allowed to enter these straits. ”
When the age-old dust was erased from the tsarist documents, it became known that Russia did not really count on allies and an independent Russian landing force on the Bosphorus was planned. But if it took place and was successful, it’s not a fact that England and France would have reacted to this event with great enthusiasm and after the hypothetical victory of the Entente over Kaiser Germany, we would not have gotten the cold war in retro style. Perhaps not only cold.
But it would have been a completely different story, which, however, does not cancel a truly historical fact: there was always a keen interest in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles in the Russian establishment. It can be said from time immemorial.
FROM VARYAGS - TO TURKS
According to the popular version, our first compatriot, with a firm foot to set foot on the Bosphorus coast, was the great Kiev prince of Varangian origin, Oleg, nicknamed the Prophet. But when we began to share our common history with Ukraine, Oleg was quickly Ukrainized in Kiev and is now portrayed exclusively as a Zaporozhye Cossack: an assassin, a shirt, embroidery, a curve, either Polish or Turkish saber, presumably a sample of the 12th century, and immense trousers . But judging by the illustrations from the Radziwill (Königsberg) Chronicle, in the life of Prince Oleg preferred a completely different style - like on the canvases of the painter Viktor Vasnetsov. Although this is not so important, since there is no undeniable historical evidence that Prince Oleg actually nailed his shield on the gates of Constantinople, and in general was on the Bosphorus. And certainly, he was not the first one, because - but this confirmation is available - the first was his predecessor, Prince Askold. Already after Oleg - and also not with peaceful intentions - Prince Igor also crossed the Black Sea in the direction of the straits ...
But all this is a matter of days gone by, when the Ottoman Empire still did not exist, and Byzantine Basileus ruled in Constantinople. Constantinople, later renamed to Istanbul, was taken by the Janissaries by storm only in 1453 year. And four years later, before Russia, which proclaimed itself the spiritual heir of Byzantium along the Orthodox line (“Two Romes fell, Moscow is the third Rome, and the fourth will not happen!”), Finally formulated its strategic interest in the Black Sea straits.
It is believed that the plan of the first landing expedition to the Bosphorus was developed during the war with Turkey 1806 – 1812. Alexander I was presented by the vice-admiral Pavel Chichagov, manager of the Naval Ministry, the same one who, later commanding the army, showed complete professional incompetence to conduct combat operations on land and missed Napoleon on the Berezina, for which he received a slap in fable from Ivan Krylov: “Trouble, since the cobbler will start the oven pies, // And boots for the pastry maker.” And although Chichagov wasn’t a layman in the maritime business, the landing operation did not take place, because initially there was no chance of success. According to Oleg Airapetov, one of the most respected Russian historians, the Black Sea Fleet at that time was armed only with 6 battleships, 12 of other ships of various sizes and 40 boats capable of accommodating hardly 60 people, while the Turks had sailing on the Black Sea 34 ships (including 16 battleships and 18 corvettes), not counting small warships and transports of a total of about 10 000 units.
Due to the weakness of the Black Sea Fleet, the plan of the second landing on the Bosphorus (1812 year) remained on paper, which anticipated the highest rescript: “Wanting to end decisively the war with Porto, I do not find the best means to achieve this goal, how to make a strong blow under the walls of the Tsargrad with sea and ground forces. " And in 1849, a note was laid by Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, intending to take Constantinople by the 12 battalions in the first echelon, according to historian Ayrapetov, the project of this battle "depended on too many random events", therefore it was not feasible.
On the eve of the Crimean War, Nicholas I wrote to Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich: “If the matter takes a serious turn, the 13 and 14 divisions will board the fleet for direct action on the Bosphorus and Constantinople.” The same opinion - “the Straits must be taken!” - was the future hero of the first defense of Sevastopol, Admiral Pavel Nakhimov, who was convinced that only the preventive seizure of the Russian fleet of the Bosphorus could disrupt the plans of the emerging anti-Russian coalition. Who knows, Nakhimov would not have had this landing operation to take place, to sink our ships not at the entrance to Sevastopol Bay, but somewhere across the Bosphorus, because, apart from courage and self-sacrifice, the sailing Black Sea fleet would not oppose could? ..
The problem of the Black Sea Straits under Alexander II the Liberator and under Alexander III, during the reign of which Russia, as we know, did not wage a single war, was no less of a headache. But there were plans for war. In December, 1882, an employee of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, Alexander Nelidov, presented the emperor with a note “On the occupation of the Straits”, which hinted: since the Ottoman Empire is in danger of disintegration, it is possible to seize the Bosphorus on occasion. A few years later, when he was already ambassador to Turkey, Nelidov directly demanded the capture of the entire pouring zone - since “it is senseless to have a Bosphorus without Dardanelles”. And he almost convinced: in 1885, Alexander III sent a letter to the Chief of General Staff, Adjutant General Nikolai Obruchev, stating that "Russia's main goal is the occupation of Constantinople and the Straits," but since Alexander III didn’t have a reputation of a hardened liberal, it’s not a matter of gone However, the forward-looking Nelidov had a peaceful plan for penetrating the Black Sea straits in this case by bribing Turkish officials. The details are unknown, but as a result neither the peace plan nor the military have been implemented.
Nicholas II was more attentive to the recommendations of his ambassador to Turkey. In June 1895, with the participation of Alexander Nelidov, a so-called “Special Meeting” was gathered in St. Petersburg, at which it was again about invasion: “By taking the Bosphorus, Russia will fulfill one of its historic tasks, become the master of the Balkan Peninsula, will keep England under constant blow and she will have nothing to fear from the Black Sea. ” The landing operation was planned for the next year, and a signal to its beginning was to become an outwardly innocent telegram from Ambassador Nelidov with the key phrase: “It has long been without news.” With its receipt, the Black Sea Fleet, which by that time repeatedly surpassed the Turkish fleet, was supposed to go to sea - allegedly for maneuvers to the Caucasian shores - but on the way go down the course to the Bosphorus. The possible resistance of the Turkish troops was supposed to be suppressed during 72 hours, and in the event of a practically inevitable escalation of the conflict over the Black Sea straits with Great Britain, the Russian General Staff prepared a plan for attacking India from Central Asia. And if the influential Finance Minister Sergei Witte did not dissuade Nicholas II from the Bosphorus voyage, it is quite possible that the era of imperialist battles would have begun long before the 1905 Russian-Japanese war.
THIS IS EVERYTHING THOUGHT CHURCHILL
After the defeat of the Russian Empire in the war with Japan, all sorts of plans for the Black Sea straits were frozen for almost 10 years. But Germany actively mastered the Turkish coast, competing in the region with England and France, approaching Arab oil.
The First World War found the German cruisers “Goeben” and “Breslau” blocked by the Allied fleet near the Mediterranean coast of Africa. The breakthrough into the Atlantic was excluded, and the Kaiser Admiral Wilhelm Souchon decided to go to the shores of Turkey, which did not hold neutral for long. Already in August 1914, Souchon headed the Ports Naval Forces, and “Goeben” and “Breslau”, changing the stern flags to Turkish, began to fire at Russian cities. At the same time, Russia, whose affairs on the land front did not go too well, was not up to the straits. Moreover, the Allies on the Entente did not rule out that Petrograd, which was putting off considerable Austro-German forces and suffering enormous losses, could unilaterally withdraw from the war.
And then the first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, proposed a way to stimulate the combat enthusiasm of the Russian crown - in 1915, a secret Anglo-French-Russian agreement appeared, allegedly removing the West’s unshakable objections to the right of Russia to possess the Black Sea straits. But in order not to pay obligations, in the same year, Churchill became one of the initiators of the Dardanelles operation, because of the rush and poor preparation that ended disastrously for the Allied forces. As a result, Churchill went to the front to command the battalion, and Russia in 1916 was offered another secret agreement - Sykes-Picot, to which, like the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, a map was attached that clearly demonstrates that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles are under the jurisdiction of St. Petersburg.
But there was another card, already entirely for internal use, on which the most intimate British plan was fixed in case the commitments had to be fulfilled. So that in any case, to keep Russia out of the pouring zone, England planned to create two naval bases - on the island of Lesbos and in Marmaris. This means that the First World War could not have a simple ending by definition.
However, after the Dardanelles landing operation 1915 of the year, few doubted that, despite all the assurances, the Allies did not want to let Russia go to Constantinople, and Nicholas II, concerned about this turn of events, ordered to start preparing for his own Bosporus operation immediately. The fleet was to operate from the sea, and the army to attack from the Bulgarian port of Burgas. However, the Bulgarians, who had not yet joined Germany, demanded all Serbian Macedonia for one city. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral Alexander Bubnov, such “black ingratitude, threatening to deprive us not only of the opportunity to solve our national problem, but even win the war, deeply saddened and impressed the Sovereign, to whose intercession Serbia owed everything.” As if Bulgaria did not owe anything to Russia ...
Initially, the Bosphorus operation was planned to begin in the autumn of 1916, and the leadership was entrusted to Vice-Admiral Alexander Kolchak, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who had been summoned to Mogilev the day before, where he had a long meeting with General Mikhail Alekseev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander. It was about the Black Sea straits, and after a two-hour conversation, Alekseev said that “the Sovereign himself would give final guidance when he returned after a car ride. Already during interrogations in Irkutsk Gubchek, Kolchak showed: “He (the sovereign) accepted me in the garden and for a very long time, about an hour, instructed me on the state of affairs at the front. I asked about the Bosporus operation. He said that now it is difficult to talk about it, but we have to prepare ... ”As a result, the landing on the Bosphorus was postponed to the spring of 1917, but the February revolution drew a line under the operational plans - the politicized fleet flatly refused to fight. And Kolchak himself, when they tried to disarm him, shouted to the sailors: “The Japanese, our enemies, and they left me weapon. It won't get you either! ”- and threw the golden saber, granted to him for Port Arthur, at sea.
... It would be strange if after 1945, Comrade Stalin did not return to the issue of the Black Sea straits. However, Turkey, taught by the bitter experience of the First World War, tried to be neutral and did not let the German fleet into the Black Sea, at least ostentatiously. So the force option was excluded, and it was not possible to agree with Ankara on joint control over the pouring zone through diplomatic channels. Therefore, the status of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to this day is determined by the Montreux Convention of the 1936 year.
And everything suited everyone, until the USSR built in Kiev a heavy aircraft carrier “Kiev”, that is, an aircraft carrier. Immediately, a kind of casus belli emerged: many details were specified in the Montreux Convention: how warships should pass the straits (during daylight hours, one day, etc.), how many can be in the pouring zone at the same time, what is the allowable caliber of guns they can carry, but about the aircraft carriers there was not even a mention. On this formal basis, Turkey, which was a member of NATO, could well turn “Kiev” away from the gate. But the fact of the matter is that TARK Minsk was already on the way, and Novorossiysk was on the stocks. And where to put them? ..
I had to go for a little trick. On time, an application was submitted for the passage of a pouring zone for the light cruiser of the Dzerzhinsky project 68-bis. And just on the eve, under the cover of night, painting work was carried out, as a result, the same airborne number - a figure in a figure - appeared on the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev". Everything else has become a matter of technology. The first is “Dzerzhinsky”, followed by TARK “Kiev” with escort. Just before the Bosphorus, the “Dzerzhinsky” suddenly abruptly turns aside, and the “Kiev”, without slowing down the course, is drawn into the pouring zone.
Presumably, for the Turks it was a big surprise, but there was nothing to complain about: both the Dzerzhinsky and Kiev belong to the class of cruisers, the numbers in the application and on board are completely the same. What else does? Do not fight in this regard ...
However, the straits are not only disconnected, but also connected, and the gas pipe serves as an additional clamp. Especially if you put it in two rows: one “Blue stream” and in parallel another one.
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