Why did the "Polish hyena" die?
After Lithuania, Poland returned to the Czechoslovak issue. Adolf Hitler almost immediately announced a program to restore the unity of the German nation. In the 1937 year, despite the resistance of part of the German military, who feared war with France and England and a regular defeat (the Wehrmacht was still extremely weak), Hitler pushed through the final decision on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Immediately after the Anschluss of Austria, the activity of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, who were supported from abroad, sharply increased. At the congress of the pro-German Sudeten Party in April 1938, in Karlovy Vary, there was a demand for the unification of a number of Czechoslovak border areas with Germany. Also, the Sudeten Germans demanded that Czechoslovakia terminate their mutual assistance agreements with France and the USSR.
Initially, the Czechs were ready to fight. The Czechoslovak army was a tough nut to crack. And the German armed forces were still in their infancy. The Czechoslovak government planned to defend itself, relying on powerful border fortifications. And also to move the Skoda military factories inland, start mobilizing industry and food resources, including introducing round-the-clock work at 8 aviation factories.
Thus arose the Sudeten crisis. Its result is known. At first, England, France and Italy rejected the Sudetenland in favor of Germany (Munich Agreement from 30 September 1938 of the year), and in March 1939, Czechoslovakia was liquidated. In Bohemia and Moravia, Germany sent its troops and declared a protectorate over them (a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). Slovakia remained autonomous, but in fact became a vassal of Germany.
This is known quite well. In the USSR, the Munich Agreement was explicitly called collusion and well revealed the essence of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia by the Western powers, who had previously guaranteed its security. However, they preferred not to focus on the role of Poland in these events, since Poland was an ally of the USSR, part of the socialist bloc and the Warsaw Pact.
The fact is that Warsaw had territorial claims, not only to the USSR, Germany, Lithuania and Danzig, but also to Czechoslovakia. The Poles from the very creation of the Second Commonwealth laid claim to the so-called. Cieszyn Silesia. Poland’s policy towards Czechoslovakia was based on the words of the founding father of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Pilsudski that “the artificially and deformed Czechoslovak Republic created is not only the basis of European equilibrium, but, on the contrary, is its weak link”.
Another surge of anti-Czechoslovak sentiments in Poland occurred in the 1934 year. The Polish press launched a campaign about the need to return the original Polish lands. And the Polish army conducted large military maneuvers near the border of Czechoslovakia, working out the scenario of the collapse of Czechoslovakia or its surrender to Germany. In 1935, relations between the two European countries were still at the level of the Cold War. Warsaw and Prague exchanged “courtesies”, sending ambassadors “on vacation”. In January 1938, Warsaw and Berlin held consultations on the future of Czechoslovakia. The meeting between Adolf Hitler and Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck laid the foundation for fruitful cooperation between the two countries on the Czechoslovak issue. In the 1938 year, Warsaw, copying the policies of Berlin, created the “Union of Poles” in the Tieszyn region, which set as its goal the separation of this region from Czechoslovakia.
When, after the Anschluss of Austria, Hitler came out with demands for Prague “to ensure the rights of the Sudeten Germans,” Warsaw supported him, presenting similar demands about the Teszinian Poles. When the Soviet Union 12 May 1938 declared its readiness to support Czechoslovakia under the condition that the Red Army passed through Poland or Romania, Warsaw announced that the Polish state would immediately declare war on the Soviet Union if it tried to send troops through Polish territory to help Czechoslovakia.
At the same time, the Poles were rude to their traditional allies - the French. Jozef Beck quite clearly said that in the event of a conflict between Germany and France over Czechoslovakia, Poland would remain neutral and would not fulfill the Franco-Polish treaty, since it provided only for defense against Germany, and not an attack on it. France was also reproached for not supporting Poland in March 1938, when there was a question about the future of Lithuania. At the same time, Poland categorically refused to support Czechoslovakia, which was faced with the threat of a direct German invasion.
With the Germans, the Poles were much nicer. Warsaw not only confirmed the promise not to let the Red Army through its territory, and not allow the passage of the Soviet Air Force to assist Czechoslovakia, but also offered its own plan for dividing the Czechoslovak Republic: Cieszyn region should have moved to Poland, Transcarpathia and Slovakia - Hungary, the Czech Republic and everything else Germany.
In September 1938, the Sudeten crisis reached its highest point. In early September, 300 thousand reservists were called up in France, and on the night of September 24, another 600 thousand people, vacations in the eastern garrisons were canceled, the Maginot Line was equipped with all technical means. Six French divisions were moved to the border with Germany, then their number was increased to 14. By the end of September, 1,5 million people were mobilized, and 35 divisions, 13 cavalry regiments and 29 tank regiments. In the USSR, in the middle of the summer of 1938, they were actively preparing to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia. The command has decided to form six army groups in the Belarusian and Kiev military districts. Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Zhitomir, Vinnytsia, Odessa and cavalry army groups were formed. At the end of September, the USSR was ready to send an aviation group of more than 500 aircraft to Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet government, in accordance with the Soviet-French-Czechoslovak treaty, expressed its readiness to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if Prague asks for it, and even in conditions if France remains neutral. In addition, Moscow reported that in the event of the invasion of Polish troops into Czechoslovakia, the USSR would denounce the non-aggression treaty concluded with Poland in 1932.
Poland at this time was preparing to attack Czechoslovakia in alliance with Germany. In September, the Tashin Volunteer Corps of Liberation was formed. In September, large maneuvers of the Polish army took place on Volyn, 1938, under the cover of which Polish troops began to pull over Těšín. On the border with Czechoslovakia, Warsaw deployed a separate operational group "Shljansk" consisting of three infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades. By early October, the Polish group numbered about 36 thousand people, 270 guns, more than 100 tanks and armored vehicles, over 100 aircraft.
German and Polish militants began active provocations at the border. They attacked the Czechoslovak military and police, military and government facilities. During the response of the Czech military, Polish and German gangs were hiding in their territories. Polish planes regularly invaded the airspace of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Germany and Poland launched a campaign of political and diplomatic pressure on Czechoslovakia.
At the same time, Warsaw expressed its readiness to fight with the USSR together with Germany. The Polish ambassador to France told his American counterpart: “A religious war begins between fascism and Bolshevism, and if the USSR helps Czechoslovakia Poland is ready for war with the USSR shoulder to shoulder with Germany. The Polish government is confident that within three months the Russian troops will be completely defeated, and Russia will no longer constitute even a semblance of the state. ”
It is worth noting that in 1938, the Red Army had complete superiority over the German and Polish troops and could alone defeat the combined armies of Germany and Poland. However, the Soviet government could not act alone, risking a collision with the “crusade” of the Western powers against the USSR. Independent actions of Moscow could declare aggression. In addition, it is worth keeping in mind that in the summer of 1938, the Red Army waged heavy battles with Japanese troops on Lake Hassan and was on the verge of a major war with the Japanese Empire. Moscow remembered the threat of a big war on two fronts and tried to avoid such a dangerous situation. Needed at least the neutrality of France and England. But the English and French elites simply surrendered Czechoslovakia. Paris first bent its line, but soon succumbed to the influence of London, which eventually led to the collapse of France.
20-21 September the English and French envoys in Czechoslovakia told the Czechoslovak government that if Prague did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, Paris “would not fulfill the contract” with Czechoslovakia. In addition, the British and French hinted that if the Czechs unite with the Russians, “the war can take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then the governments of England and France will be very difficult to stay away. " At the same time, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with an ultimatum about the “return” of the Cieszyn region. 27 September the Polish government repeated its ultimatum. In the end, Prague capitulated. 30 September 1938 Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini and Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. On the same day, Warsaw sent another ultimatum to Prague and at the same time with the German troops deployed its army in the Cieszyn region.
Polish Army captures Cieszyn Silesia in 1938
Thus, Germany and Poland, with the consent of Italy, France and England, began the partition of Czechoslovakia. As Churchill noted, Poland "with the greed of hyenas took part in the plundering and destruction of the Czechoslovak state." Ciesca region was a relatively small area, but had a developed industry. At the end of 1938, enterprises located in Těšín produced more than 40% of pig iron smelted in Poland and almost 47% of steel. It was a tidbit. In Warsaw, the seizure of Teshinsky region was perceived as a national victory. Jozef Beck was awarded the highest order of the White Eagle. The Polish press called for new "achievements."
In Warsaw, they did not understand that they themselves had signed the death sentence. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia dramatically increased the potential of Germany and allowed Hitler to proceed to the solution of the next task - the Polish. Already in November 1938, Hitler dismissed the Warsaw proposal for the transfer of Moravian Ostrava and Vitkovic to Poland. He no longer planned to share with Poland.
Hitler initially wanted to achieve concessions from Poland over Danzig and the transport corridor to East Prussia. However, here Warsaw made the second deadly mistake - it balked, hoping for its strength and help from England and France. At the same time, arrogant Poles rejected the helping hand offered by the USSR.
At the time of the signing of the Munich Agreement. From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Ciano
Death of the Second Polish Commonwealth
Warsaw did not protest against the liquidation of Czechoslovakia, although it was offended because the Poles got too small a piece when dividing the Czechoslovak Republic. Even before the capture of the Czech Republic, in January 1939, Berchtesgaden met with Hitler and Beck. The German Fuhrer at this meeting raised the issue of Danzig's reunification with Germany, in accordance with the will of the population of the “free city”, taking into account the economic interests of Poland. Politically, Danzig was supposed to be Germanic, and economically - to remain under the control of Poland. Hitler also raised the question of the Polish corridor. The Fuhrer noted that the link of Poland with the Baltic is necessary. However, Germany also needs a link with East Prussia. Hitler proposed to review the status of the Polish corridor. The Polish minister did not give Hitler a clear answer to these proposals.
In March 1939, the German troops occupied Memel. After this, London declared that it was ready to support Warsaw if it was attacked and resisted. In April, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced that not only England, but also France would come to the aid of Poland. Moscow offered help in the fight against the aggressor. In July, the Soviet government reiterated a proposal for a military convention. London and Paris agreed to start negotiations on this topic, but they clearly did not hurry. Their representatives arrived in Moscow only on August 11. In addition, the British mission did not have the authority of its government to sign the relevant agreements. In general, the envoys of England and France were engaged in delaying the time and wanted to shift all responsibility in the fight against Germany to the USSR.
The main problem, due to which the negotiations in Moscow finally reached an impasse, was the unwillingness of Romania and Poland to let the Red Army pass through its territory. The Soviet Union did not have a common border with Germany and could render aid to France, England, Poland and Romania only if the Red Army passed through the Polish and Romanian territories. At the same time, Moscow strictly limited the zone of passage of its troops: the Vilno area (the Vilna corridor) and Galicia. Warsaw, like Bucharest, constantly refused to accept any help from Moscow. However, Britain and France were not in a hurry to exert all possible pressure on Poland so that in the event of war with Germany it would let the Soviet troops pass.
Poland’s unwillingness to miss the Red Army at such a dangerous moment was due to several reasons:
First, it is a hatred of the USSR and the Russians in general. Warsaw did not want to cooperate with the hated Russians, let alone let Soviet troops pass through its territory. As stated by 19 in August, Polish Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly: "Regardless of the consequences, not a single inch of Polish territory will ever be allowed to be occupied by Russian troops." Poland categorically did not want Russian help and until the last moment pursued an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy, still hoping for the defeat of Russia and its dismemberment in favor of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Secondly, the Polish leadership was afraid that the West Russian population would simply rise when they saw Soviet tanks, which would force Moscow to reconsider its attitude towards Poland and seize the moment for the annexation of Western Belarus and Galicia. This was possible, since the Poles treated the Russians as “flakes” (slaves), and the Russian lands as a colony.
Third, Polish gentry once again in stories summed up arrogance and self-confidence. Thus, the French Foreign Minister Bonnet, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador to Paris, Lukasiewicz, noted that the threat of a collision with Germany makes the USSR help necessary for Poland. The Polish ambassador self-confidently stated that “not the Germans, but the Poles would break into the depths of Germany in the first days of the war!” When the French continued to insist on themselves, the Polish minister Beck declared that Poland did not want to have a military treaty with the USSR.
It must be said that such ideas that “Polish cavalry will take Berlin in a week” were very common in Poland. The idea of a victorious "march on Berlin" was based on the short-sightedness and arrogance of the Polish military-political leadership. Warsaw remembered the devastation and the economic and political weakness of Germany after the defeat in Perova World War. Then the really numerous Polish army was stronger than the German army. However, in Germany literally in a few years, fundamental changes took place. Finance and industry, thanks to Anglo-Saxon capital, strengthened. A strong Wehrmacht was created. Germany achieved the Anschluss of Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland and the elimination of Czechoslovakia, these victories inspired the army and the population. Poland in the 1930-s has not been able to achieve visible success in consolidating the people, developing the economy and improving the armed forces. Almost all plans to modernize the Polish army remained on paper.
Therefore, the invasion of the Wehrmacht in Poland will be a terrible revelation for the Polish military-political leadership, the public and the people, showing all the rottenness and weakness of the Second Commonwealth. However, it will no longer be possible to change something for the better.
Fourth, in Warsaw, they believed that "the West will not leave them." Indeed, if the powerful French army, which in 1939 had complete superiority over the Wehrmacht (especially on the Western Front) had struck, and the Anglo-French air force began to deliver powerful blows to the main political and economic centers of Germany, it would have led to political catastrophe of the Third Reich. This was known to the German generals who tried to stop Hitler, warning of the impossibility of war on two fronts. However, Hitler knew for sure that France and Britain would limit themselves to verbal threats; there would be no real war on the Western Front. So it happened. When Germany smashed Poland on the Western Front, there was a “strange war” - the British and French soldiers drank wine, played various sports games, and the Allied Air Force “bombarded” Germany with leaflets. Poland was simply merged, like Czechoslovakia, although it was shabby weapons. Western leaders believed that after the defeat of the Polish Wehrmacht, perhaps after a short pause, it would strike the USSR. However, Hitler did not repeat the mistakes of the Second Reich, he originally wanted to destroy the strong French army, which hung over West Germany. Thus, the Polish leadership miscalculated, believing that France and England would come to their aid. Poland was easily sacrificed.
The Polish leadership had two chances to save the country. Firstly, it was possible to enter into an alliance with the USSR. Joint Soviet-Polish forces, with the threat of Germany from the western direction of the French army plus the British expeditionary forces and fleetwould stop the start of a great war in Europe. Hitler was a smart man, he knew how to count. He would not go to war with such a coalition. However, Warsaw rejected the offer of the USSR for help. Seeing the attitude of Poland, as well as the frivolous attitude of England and France towards a potential military alliance, Moscow chose the only right strategy - concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany.
Secondly, PPoland could agree with Germany on the issue of Danzig and the corridor to East Prussia. As a result, Poland could join the Anti-Comintern Pact, become an ally of Hitler in the future war with the USSR. Warsaw itself had long dreamed of a joint "crusade" on Moscow. This scenario was destroyed by the pride and stupidity of the Polish leadership. In Warsaw, they did not want to negotiate with Berlin, the Poles were confident in their strength, supported by Britain and France, did not believe that Germany would start a war.
Therefore, on the threshold of the Wehrmacht invasion in Poland, Warsaw began to put pressure on Danzig. It all began with a scandal with the Polish customs, who were fond of battering, going beyond their official duties. 4 August 1939, the Polish diplomatic representative in Danzig presented an ultimatum to the president of the senate of the free city. Poland promised to cut off imports of all food products into the city, unless the Danzig government agrees to ever again intervene in the affairs of Polish customs. The city depended on external food supplies, so it was a serious threat. At this time, Hitler was not yet ready for war, so he suggested that Danzig accept an ultimatum.
In addition, pressure on the Germans began in Poland itself. In Upper Silesia, there were mass arrests of Germans. Thousands of those arrested were deported to the interior of the country. The masses of Germans tried to flee to Germany. German enterprises, trading companies, cooperatives and various organizations were closed. Poland’s German community was gripped by fear. In fact, Poland provoked Germany to intervene. 1 September 1939 was the day of judgment for the Second Polish Commonwealth.
Thus, the military-political leadership of Poland itself buried the country. At first Warsaw supported the partition of Czechoslovakia, opening the way for Berlin to solve the Polish question. As long as a united and strong Czechoslovakia existed, Hitler could not launch an offensive to the east. However, Warsaw helped roll out a strong Czechoslovak nutlet.
Then Warsaw buried two possible scenarios for saving the country. The Polish gentry refused to accept the help of the USSR, hoping that Germany would attack the USSR through the Baltic States or Romania. In the event of a German attack on Poland, the Poles hoped for their army (up to "march on Berlin") and "aid from the West." As history has shown, all these hopes were a soap bubble. Warsaw also buried the second possible scenario of preserving the country: it cost the Polish leadership a little bit of a return to reality, becoming a junior partner of Germany, and the USSR would have had to restrain the onslaught of the German-Polish forces (not counting the other German satellites). A million Polish army could seriously worsen the position of the USSR at the initial stage of the war. However, the ambitious and short-sighted Polish gentry buried this scenario.
Wehrmacht soldiers break the barrier at the border crossing in Sopot
Sources:
Meltyukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939 M., 2001. // http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html.
Mukhin Yu.I. Crusade to the East. "Victims" of the Second World War. M., 2004.
Yu. I. Mukhin. Who actually launched World War II? M., 2010.
Nalench D., Nalench T. Yousef Pilsudski. Legends and facts. M, 1990.
Poland in the twentieth century. Essays on political history. Ed. Noskova A.F. M., 2012.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2006.
William Shearer. The rise and fall of the Third Reich. T. 1. M., 1991.
Shirokorad A. Poland. Implacable neighborhood. M., 2011.
- Alexander Samsonov
- Part 1. Poland "from sea to sea." The death of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - a lesson for modern Poland.
Part 2. Pilsudski: “My dream is to reach Moscow and write on the Kremlin wall:“ It is forbidden to speak Russian ”.
Part 3. How Poland brought the big war in Europe
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