Russian political discussions are in a mythological impasse. The pressing issues that need to be addressed immediately do not even get on the agenda.
In the expert field of Russia there are enough strong figures, but, as Lets said, “dreams depend on the position of the sleeper”. Fear of getting into unformat drives in a flock. "State", "Imperials" and other peppers like them are opposed to "liberals" and "Westerners". Between them, as in an ice-hole, but closer to the first, the "Lefts" dangle. Everyone has their own bird language and their own mythology, the stranger is easily identified and weaned from rations. Independent intellectual gymnastics is dangerous, it requires a lot of work and is very expensive.
The author of these lines is outside the Russian expert field. This gives him a certain freedom of opinion when looking at the Russian situation.
Putin and Medvedev: in search of differences
One of the topics that raise the temperature of the Runet, were the future presidential elections in Russia. It is characteristic that the elections to the State Duma do not arouse such interest - everyone understands that the votes will be counted by the order from the top. But the future confrontation between Putin and Medvedev worries minds. While potential candidates avoid direct confrontations, passions and reproaches are seething below.
I admit, in my opinion, it looks strange. Who exactly will be elected matters, perhaps for thousands of people ... perhaps for two thousand. This is important for the inner circle of one and the second candidate, in terms of the subsequent redistribution of official crickets along the pees. But only. There is no other power other than the government to distribute benefits and troubles among the ruling elite in a slightly different way, to play up to friends and infringe upon enemies, the president of Russia does not possess. And even if, by some incredible coincidence, a third person will become president, even Nemtsov, even Navalny, even Zhirinovsky, even Zyuganov - this will not change anything. Perhaps five thousand people will change their social positions - this is the limit of the power of the Russian president, already the highest. This, of course, is about people involved in politics, money and power. Not about ordinary citizens - they can even stoke the stove, no one will notice.
In the bottoms from the change of the first person no changes are expected. The top of Russian society, one or two million of those in whose hands are real power and real money, now it is not necessary. The political, or rather, the financial and political system of Russia is absolutely stable - so the projectile, fired from a cannon, flies along a predictable trajectory, which it can no longer turn away from. And even if inside the shell of a piece of its filling, will move, changing places, it will not affect its movement in any way.
Outside the framework of a simple show, the discussion “Putin or Medvedev” is meaningless. Whoever is elected: Putin, Medvedev, or a certain H., even the brand of watches on the first-person hand may not change. And the policy of Russia, which is internal, that external, will not change in any way.
Existing mechanisms and real prospects
The power system in modern Russia copies what has already been built a century and a half ago, with minor variations. Its essence is a rigid autocratic vertical. “Democratic” decorations are cosmetic, and, little by little, are removed from public life. But the tsar in Russia never had absolute power. Stalin did not possess it either, having restored the autocratic system of government to a certain extent. Both kings and Stalin were a function of their surroundings - and nothing more. Attempts to become something big were stopped, sometimes harshly — by strangling the Guards scarf or striking the head with a snuff box ... It also happened that the ruler who did not live up to his expectations just turned away, as it happened with Nicholas II. It seems that at some point Stalin also tried to stand above the force that had given birth to him, and was destroyed by this force. Russian autocracy, today and in the past, is not at all the sole authority, not even the power of a small group of individuals. This is the power of a certain social class, obviously numerous. Today in Russia, this is a bureaucracy that has grown together with business.
In modern Russia, there is no need to remove the ruler, who risked challenging the collective will of the ruling class. Everything is simpler: none of his orders, contrary to the interests of this class, will not be executed. He will either be sabotaged or perverted, leading to the appearance of these interests correspondingly. The personalities of the future president of Russia are irrelevant. The real control system of the country is implemented in the framework of the theory of systems. A large system is always stabilized by the resultant of competitive interests, in this case, the interests of different groups within one or two million of those involved in money and power. Some of them individually can be smart, see the picture as a whole, and engage in strategic planning ... However, any strategy in the current environment does not work - all efforts aimed at its implementation are averaged and reset. The existing balance is too unstable for the implementation of long-term programs. Half a year, maximum a year, then the sum of the vectors changes, and Russia's policy makes another zigzag. With the exception of a few areas where the interests of the elites coincide, Russian policy is of a short-term tactical nature, in the framework of a direct reaction to external irritants. State development strategies are not within the zone of coincidence of interests of elites. There is no talk about long-term projects.
What is the reason for this situation? A century and a half ago, Russia, although with difficulty, managed long-term projects. And the Bolsheviks, having come to power, rather quickly moved from short-term reactions to strategic combinations. After all, the inert ruling class, in the form of officials, businessmen, party functionaries, newly-minted oligarchs and again officials, and so on — independent of the lower will, but capable of collective resistance from above, has always existed.
Repression and tightening of nuts in this situation can play only a minor role. The inert multi-vectority of the ruling class, which nullifies all strategic efforts, can be overcome only by a goal that can captivate even a small at first, but active or influential part of society, and then capture the whole society. Relying on it and facilitating the work of social elevators, the government is expanding the base on which it can rely. This allows her to carry out the rotation and gradual selection of the ruling class - and this is the only way to somehow deal with him. But the goal, the notorious "national idea" cannot be invented "out of my head" or ordered to a PR agency - Pelevin made fun of such an order in Generation P. Such ideas generate only historical global processes. For at least the last 200 years, the world is completely global, developed as an interconnected whole. The idea of building communism - the last state idea in Russian history - was a product of global processes. Russia realized the ideas exported to it from Europe - but these ideas sprouted only because they fell on fertile soil - and led it forward until they were fully realized. Despite a widespread misconception, the Soviet Union died a completely natural death: having realized all the potential inherent in his project and having exhausted the possibilities of development.
Today in Russia there is no attractive idea, in the name of which at least 10% of its citizens - and at least 1% - were ready to act actively, reshape their lives, make sacrifices, hardship and risk. The historical process of a new idea of this magnitude did not generate, and PR substitutes, as expected, do not work. There are no social elevators or democratic institutions in Russia, its elite is extremely inert. It is not surprising that all the projects of the “future” proposed by political groups turn out to be restored yesterday, when they were twenty years old, and when they were a hundred years old, not part of today's world process, but an alternative to it. Tomorrow Russia, harmoniously arising from the current world realities, generated by them and participating in them, today nobody sees. He does not see it because there is none. Russia is no longer needed in the world tomorrow, for it, in its current form, there is no place there. Any adequate analysis of Russian perspectives always leads to the same thing: the collapse and loss of the current statehood is inevitable. The terms are different - who are fifteen years old, who are fifty, but the result is always the same.
Situation assessments and action plans: virtual and real
Russian social thought is aware of the prospect of the collapse of Russia as a threat, but not as inevitable. She sees in her a catastrophe that can be avoided by leaning on the political will - not quite clear, though, whose. But there is no catastrophe, but there is a natural course of things. People are mortal. Countries and nations too. "Project Russia" developed as a part of world processes, necessary and organic. Russia has realized all the opportunities that were laid in it. I did everything I could. She played a prominent role in world history. But here, the last remark was uttered, the role was played, the curtain fell. There is a dismantling of unnecessary decorations. This does not mean that the land will open up, and one hundred million Russians will fall down somewhere, not at all. They can become part of other projects - in that, of course, if they go into them. And within the framework of the outdated project of today's Russia, they are gradually dying out, and the Russian population is dying out with the greatest speed. This is also explainable. A social organism functions in the same way as a living organism — everything unnecessary and aimless, which has no prospects, quickly leaves, freeing up space for a new life.
The conclusion that Russian experts are doing is invariably reduced to the position "it is necessary to prevent the collapse of Russia." How to do it? Different recipes are offered here, but alas - in a situation where the project as a whole has already outlived itself, they are unrealizable.
Of course, the transition to a new project, and, more likely, to several projects, is difficult and risky. But for most Russians, these difficulties and risks are exaggerated. I remember the recent discussion in RuNet, when participants were asked to think up something terrible that any occupying authorities could do in Russia, which could only be invented, and which the current Russian authorities would not have done. So: there was not a single misfortune named to which the occupiers could think of, and which would not exist in Russia today.
Why is this so? Well, the Russian authorities are entirely composed of villains who want the death of the country? Of course not! The Russian elite, 1-2 million "top", in all respects is quite representative in relation to the whole of Russian society, and, by the way, is subject to the same demographic processes. That's just the transition to new projects for her more difficult. It is fraught with the risk of losing the current positions, and they have something to lose.
For a successful transition, the elite need time and resources. It is vital for her to keep the project that has outlived itself afloat as long as possible. This decision, again, is summed up as a sum of multidirectional efforts undertaken by different groups.
In practice, all modernization projects designed to “get Russia out of the impasse” exist only in the form of informational throws generated at different levels and for different reasons: when out of self-interest, and also because of sincere delusion. The reasons for their appearance do not matter much, the other is important: none of them has been implemented in practice and will never be realized. The practical actions of the various groups in the "top two million" are completely different in nature: they all try to integrate themselves into existing global projects. For this integration, they need time and money. Supporting Russia afloat gives them a time delay and cash flow, since all such groups control various financial flows. The integration process is going well - in particular, the children and grandchildren of these people for the most part already receive education outside of Russia, are well integrated into society outside of Russia, often live outside it, or, at least, are provided with reliable alternate aerodromes outside it. The elites successfully lead themselves out of a dying project, but the fate of those who remain on a sinking ship does not interest them. In the absence of a unifying idea, they do not feel the connection between themselves and the rest of the Russian population, for them it is nothing more than the stage of the rocket, which should lead them, and their descendants to a given orbit. Each group is occupied by its own salvation. This process began - and accelerated - from the moment of the gradual exhaustion of the Soviet project and the fall of the USSR into a state of ideological coma, that is, from about the middle of 60, it gained full strength by 80, and continues to evolve in accordance with the objective development of the world situation.
Russian patriots, their role and place
It would be absurd to deny the existence of such a phenomenon as Russian patriotism. However, it must be admitted that if Russian patriots are fighting "for the salvation of Russia", then without much success. Russia can boast nothing but stable GDP growth. A close examination of GDP turns out to be an integral characteristic of the growth in revenues from the export of oil and gas and the growth in the consumption of goods purchased abroad with these funds. This is a rather controversial figure, momentary and dependent on many factors, more like the "average hospital temperature." By the real life of ordinary Russians, he has a very, very remote relationship.
Only a part of the population of large cities experienced some improvement in life, and the 2008 crisis of the year demonstrated the entire instability of their situation, which is privileged compared to the majority of Russians. This is not surprising: there are no reasons for radical and sustainable change for the better. Over the past 20 years after the collapse of the USSR, Russia has lost the status of an industrial power, becoming a mining country, living through the sale of natural resources. Russia's foreign policy positions are constantly weakening. Internal tensions are growing: interethnic strife is growing, public health is deteriorating, crime is rising, the level of education is falling .... However, you shouldn’t dwell on this in detail - all the Russian media are filled with information about the difficult situation in the country, it has become so familiar that it’s already perceived as noise background. In other words, there is not a single area in which the efforts of Russian patriots aimed at the revival of Russia would have had at least some success over a rather long, twenty-year period. The situation is objectively worsening in all respects. Russia keeps afloat due to high energy prices and a relatively stable international situation. Moreover, energy prices are formed outside of Russia, and without its participation. There are many ways to "drop" them, for a short time, or for a long time, if such a need arises. Another question is that the Russian energy complex has long become an international corporation. Russia for him is a production territory, and in that capacity he maintains it. So he won't seriously “drop” prices without extreme necessity. But investing in Russia over the necessary minimum will not be either. But there are no other serious items of income to the budget in Russia already.
As for the patriots, for most of them (I’m talking, of course, about the "top two millions" who can influence something, ordinary citizens are practically deprived of influence, the government fears only their open rebellion, not civil disapproval) patriotic slogans are a tool for lobbying for one or other cost-effective solutions. Populist patriotism, emotionally affecting the masses, is a tool to accurately destabilize the internal situation in order to influence the Kremlin. And that, in turn, maneuvers between the interests of various groups of the ruling class and at the same time seeks not to lose control over the situation in the country, not to bring the matter to the big bang of discontent. The latter succeeds with great difficulty, despite the constant tightening of the nuts.
None of the recipes aimed at strengthening Russian statehood and the growth of Russian state influence abroad is unrealizable today. The ruling class simply does not need it; it is only interested in maintaining the status quo for a long time, which gives it the opportunity to withdraw assets and adapt to the new reality, already outside of Russia. A slight imbalance of the existing equilibrium will mean the strengthening of some - and the weakening of others, and, therefore, will cause efforts to return to its original state. But a serious imbalance of power, leading to irreversible changes, is fraught with such risks for the authorities and the ruling class that no one will try to accomplish something like that. Scary because ...
As a result, funds allocated for any modernization projects will simply be eaten away, and the projects themselves will be brought to complete absurdity. The resultant efforts of the Russian ruling class in the absence of a common goal allows only such a course of action.
Thus, without denying the very fact of the existence of people seriously concerned about the future of Russia, we have to admit that there are considerably fewer of them than is commonly thought. Their ability to influence the situation tends to zero, and their political thought moves in a vicious circle, putting at the forefront the need to preserve Russia in the current state forms. They are trying to find a way out where there is none, and are in a state of organizational and ideological disorder. Of course they are, yes ... but the effect of the fact that they are somewhere there is today the same as if they were not at all.
Beautiful dreams - and the harsh reality
Modern Russia increasingly resembles Rome in a period of decline. Everything is very similar: first, the great influence on world civilization, which is much larger than that of Russia, is difficult to even compare here, the scales are completely different. Then becoming the "energy power", because the slaves were, in fact, oil and gas of the ancient world. Finally, the decline. It was not necessary to develop, and all the great projects were implemented. Get yourself slaves in the provinces - as oil is now produced in areas of little use for life, trade them and live. Citizens of Rome did not even need to work - they switched to government support. It was communism in the understanding of the post-Soviet "left": gratis food and shelter. Communism, built for all people in one particular city. The Romans didn’t consider slaves for people, they treated them about the same way as Muscovites now treat migrant workers. And finally, the fall ....
So did Rome die? As a state, yes. But Roman civilization lies in the foundation of modern: law, languages, philosophy, medical Latin - hundreds of threads link us to ancient Rome. Schi is an ancient Roman dish. And the habit of spending time in the bath comes from the same place .... The example with Byzantium is less obvious - but about the same thing happened there, albeit on a smaller scale. Much has found the way to a new world and did not perish. Yes, it changed, sometimes beyond recognition, but it continued in time and gave rise to our days! There are fresher examples: the Holy Roman Empire, Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, France and its colonies ... The same, in general, the picture.
This path is open to Russia. Yes, its statehood has grown old and exhausted itself - but the Russian world can live on, already in a global context. How fully and successfully he enters this context depends on what efforts and with what sign, plus or minus, will be made for this. For example, attempts to bring the "Russian world" under a single political roof: building, counting, supplying everyone and regularly calling Moscow to issue directives will be useless at best, but rather counterproductive. Russia barely maintains itself within its former borders, the central government has almost no control over entire regions - what kind of expansion of Russian influence can we talk about now?
So, projects related to state-building, and in general, including state structures as an actor, can be safely discounted. The maximum that can be hoped for is that the harm from them will be minimal. This, of course, complicates the situation, since the Russian state and state control have penetrated all the pores and cracks of Russian life, bringing corruption and inefficiency with them — they simply do not have other qualities today.
Russian culture for the most part degraded. We do not speak about Pushkin, Dostoevsky, folk dances and playing spoons and balalaikas - all this has long been included in the global context. And modern Russian culture is simply drying up. The level of Russian cinema, for example, has fallen even in comparison with the films of ten years ago ..... The 99% literature consists of novels for one-off reading, just to occupy the brain where there is no TV .... Television .... In In general, Russia today has little to offer in terms of culture. Exceptions, if they do happen, are extremely rare. Although they also happen - there is a narrow streamlet. To abroad, he goes mainly through the Runet.
Tongue? Of course, the Russian language in the USSR, and in the CMEA countries was a powerful tool ... Means of universal communication. But the language is good as long as it has something to say. So here, too, is the loss of positions. For example, the younger generation in Moldova often does not already know him, and when an official from thirty years and younger refuses to speak Russian, it’s not at all a fact that he does it out of principle. It is very likely that he simply cannot answer in Russian. "In Ukraine," everything is simpler - but even there, when it comes to documents, with special terminology, a dictionary is already needed. I say this from my own experience, and, moreover, not in the West, but in the Odessa region, quite a bilingual one. This loss of positions for Russia is the most unpleasant. Both Rome and Byzantium, and other empires retained influence in the new quality, largely because their language: Latin, Greek, English - and so on. - was the language of the elite, the educated part of society - once, and the language of universal communication - two. This is the point for which Russia, if it wants to give some sprouts to the future, must fight. The question is how? Express diplomatic protests about the abolition of learning Russian in school? To seek assignment of the status of "second state"? Broadcast in Russian to the country CIS? To rely on the fact that the print market mainly consists of Russian publications - from books to newspapers and magazines?
All this does not work. The first two points are just failing. Little by little, radio and broadcasting do not compete with local and western ones. Russia is less and less interesting to its neighbors in terms of content. With printed materials, the same story, and although the loss of positions here is slower, but it goes! The Russian language remains the stronghold of the Russian language - however, with the current state policy, when for any non-standard thought expressed in the blog, you can get an extremist article, it will be killed in five years, at the most. It will become as boring a swamp as Russian TV and Russian cinema.
Today, Russia is still able to expand its presence in world society - through the Runet, higher education in Russia and the diaspora abroad. However, there are serious problems. Firstly, this is the psychology of isolationism, the syndrome of a besieged fortress inherited from the USSR. And, secondly, the term "influence" in Russia is understood absolutely straightforwardly. As informing the contingent of the instructions of the authorities, the diasporas are considered in the form of fifth columns, which at the right time will raise an uprising and will applaud the Russian tanks. Such an approach is a surefire way to permanently deprive the Russian project of prospects for at least somehow projecting itself into the future.
What could be offered? Support for the diaspora - but qualitatively different than it is now. The slogan of the day today can be one: cohesion and adaptation. Diasporas should integrate into the society of the host country as much as possible, becoming the loyal part, not the fifth column of the new society, and at the same time preserving themselves as a special community within it.
The question of whether Russian-speaking citizens of this country or Russian citizens permanently residing in it, or citizens with dual citizenship — in general, all those who are part of the concept of the diaspora should not be fluent in the language of the host country — should not even be on the agenda ! They must, and if they don’t, they must learn and learn, and if they need help with this, it means they need help! You can not be second-class citizens, sit on the reservation and whimper that, they say, they do not like Russia and the Russians here. All this leads to the marginalization of the diaspora, turning it into a garbage dump and losers, into a pile of rubbish, at the top of which are enterprising crooks who are pitching money for pitiful Russian sponsors: we are such unhappy here, we are so oppressed .... Such unfortunate and oppressed, those who hope only for help from the outside, and who are not seeking to blend in with the new reality, must immediately be driven into the three necks. Let them learn to live in new conditions - and in this they can and should be helped. Can not or do not want? Then let them be killed against the wall. That is how the question should be, in an extremely rigid form. No national reservations. No ghettos. No clubs where lovers gather to cry about the beautiful day before yesterday and their unhappy fate. No nostalgia for the past - this destructive fashion makes it difficult to look to the future. No talk about the "restoration of the USSR" - this is nonsense. There will be no more USSR - he played his role and died a natural death from a great old age.
In principle, the same recipes could be recommended for Russia itself. Not to be closed from the world - from it all the same not to be closed, the fortress decayed, there are holes in the walls. To go out into the world, integrate into it: according to interests, according to parties, by conviction, by professions - into world communities and organizations. To speak in such a language that they understand you - not only in Russian. In Russian, you can talk to those who know Russian. If the topic of conversation is interesting, you see, the people will catch up, and also learn Russian ... and without an interesting topic, why teach him?
Many Russian structures act exactly like this today. And they are successful. And those who sit in a tightly closed jar, nostalgic for the day before yesterday, are steadily degrading. Particularly degraded the Russian left. CPRF, for example, it turned into an incredible ideological Volapuk from Orthodoxy, nationalism, isolationism and populist slogans in a purely Sharikovsky spirit ... Today there is simply no such thing in the CIS in the serious political field of the left. However, there are no right ones either .... confusion of minds reigns, and meanwhile, it is time to take a sober look at things. Twenty years have passed since the collapse of the USSR — and in Russia it is still dark and people are gropingly looking for yesterday ...
Diasporas - partners or servants?
However, the closer to the practice, the fewer opportunities to somehow influence the situation are seen. There are plenty of opportunities to harm and worsen Russia's already difficult situation. But with the improvement of everything is pretty bad.
There is no hope for effective assistance from the Russian state. State projects of modernization, support for diasporas and other similar undertakings have always fed crooks and bred, and will continue to feed them. About upgrades it was already underway. As for the diasporas, it is still simpler: Russian sponsors are not ready to see equal partners in them. They do not build bilateral relations. They simply hire a servant and pay her for loyalty and helpfulness, for the fact that she faithfully looks into the eyes of the owner, kisses the giving hand and says what she has been told. As a result, they attract quite a certain sort of people who faithfully look into their mouths, give them a coat, clean up their boots if necessary, and, if necessary, clean their wallet. Or, at best, they get a club of fossil fossils that can nostalize about the past - and nothing more. These fossils, perhaps, will not be robbed of them, they are brought up differently - but there will be no sense from them either. That’s the whole state support of diasporas - the way it is today.
To effectively support the diaspora, you need to abandon many of the standard approaches today. It is necessary, I repeat, to invest in their integration into the host country. We need to get away from the situation when the diaspora needs to be constantly fed: once they gave money for a project, they gave two - guys, we gave you a fishing pole, survive yourself. Actually there are no special innovations here either - the western system of grants, at least its effective part, works this way. No one is constantly fed. And not all grants are state.
Anticipating a puzzled question, from whom else, besides the state, can help come in Russian conditions, I answer: from Russian patriots! Who else? From those who cherish the Russian world. Who wants to protect, as far as possible, their living space, to give him the opportunity to exist in new conditions. Kuzma Minin, as I recall, was not a public servant - or am I mistaken? By the way, it will be possible to check - are there really many of these patriots? Those for whom the support of the diaspora is not a business and not a duty, but so that at the call of the heart ... Frankly speaking, I have not yet met such people personally. Although ... who knows. Maybe they are somewhere ...
Almost incredible happy ending
Prospects for Russia look difficult. Within the framework of the usual stereotypes, they - if we evaluate the situation objectively, without indulging in fantasies - are simply hopeless. To see the exit, you need to consider the situation impartially and flexibly. Patriots who want to do something useful for Russia should first of all review their own system of assessments and priorities. Reasonings in the categories of "military presence", Russian and non-Russian military bases, fleets and military contingents have long and hopelessly outdated. Most of the historical myths and polar assessments inherited from the USSR simply litter the public consciousness, quarrel Russia with its neighbors and prevent the situation from being objectively assessed. Russian society faces a tough choice. You can stay in the same positions, see sweet dreams about imperial grandeur - the past and the future, and, being in the power of fantasies, move to the abyss, to the final and complete withdrawal from the historical scene. You can look inside yourself for a reassessment of ambitions, for a realistic vision of Russia's place in the past and present, and a realistic — albeit very unpleasant — assessment of its future prospects. Anyone to whom Russia is not indifferent, it would be appropriate to learn how to set realistic goals. Even if they are modest in comparison with the usual messianic ambitions, they are real.
If we talk about the prospects of Russia within the existing borders, then the process of its disintegration is already underway, it is predictable and historically inevitable. Attempts to postpone the inevitable finale — by force or bribing local elites, will only aggravate the situation and lead to tragic consequences. But although disintegration is inevitable, it can be implemented very differently, from relatively soft options to very, very tough - much tougher than it was in the USSR.
I repeat, there is no hope for the state. Like any system of this kind, the state will fight for its existence and survival. And since any decay, even if mild, even harsh, means his death, it will withstand it in any way and at any cost, if it can, then until the last Russian. Russian elites have already come to terms with the coming decay and are trying to adapt themselves to new conditions. The rest of the Russian population is mostly in dreams and illusions, and does not wait for disintegration. This could have worse consequences for him than the collapse of the USSR. Which, by the way, with good awareness and competent analysis, was absolutely predictable, at least from the middle of 70's. And there was an opportunity to prepare for it, having managed with minimal losses!
But that was the era of secrets and secret information. Now information about the real situation in Russia is quite accessible. Analysis of the situation on the shoulder to any person with minimal skills in systems thinking. You can see what is going on, and assess the real possibilities. You can see what can be saved and what cannot be saved. In my opinion, the answer is quite obvious: the Russian world can still be pulled out of the impasse, bringing it into a global context, adapting its components to life in new conditions, freeing them from imperial mythology, fraught with isolationism and a state of war with the whole world, helping them find a place in a new situation. This process goes on in a natural way, but, alas, it is not sufficiently successful, and covers only a very narrow part of Russian society. Those who will not be involved in it will find themselves in a very difficult situation - up to physical death. The duty of a true patriot is to help this process, involving as many masses of people as possible. At the same time, to count on help, the patriots, in fact, from nowhere. Neither the Russian state nor the Russian elites are interested in saving the Russian world. They are interested in their own salvation — and in keeping the existing situation as long as possible, disastrous for the majority of the Russian population. So the real prospects of the Russian world look, at least, extremely difficult ...
Since the flow of Hollywood films has taught most of the readers to the happy end, where the forces of darkness are retreating, and the unkillable hero stands victorious on the ruins of the old world surrounded by the corpses of enemies. Well, I'll try to write a happy ending and me. So ... If most of the groups that make up Russian society - not just the elite, but the whole society - will be in a very short time, within one decade, and quite successfully included in the global context, there is a very small, but still different from zero probability that Russia will remain as a separate state. Having certain historical perspectives. Populated mainly by the descendants of the current Russians. Perhaps even under the same name. It is possible even within borders that at least partially resemble current ones, although many regions will inevitably be lost. It is possible that one of the state languages there will be a new-Russian, retaining 50, and even 60 percent of words from the modern Russian language. With a lot of luck, it's still possible. Russia is exceptionally lucky; it has been extremely lucky for the last 300-400 years. But in the current situation one luck will not be enough. To achieve this result, we need conscious effort.
How's that happy ending? Will fit? Unfortunately, I can offer nothing better.