Underground Gunsmiths

22
The best Soviet torpedo appeared in violation of all conceivable rules

The article is dedicated to the past 30 August 2014 of the year Eugene Barybin, author of the main shock torpedoes of the Soviet Navy. AT stories this development in varying degrees, reflected the typical problems faced by talented designers both in Soviet times and now. When the main thing is not business, but departmental ambitions, career considerations and unwillingness to take risks.

By the beginning of the 70s, a catastrophic situation with shock torpedoes had developed in the Navy of the USSR because of the failure to develop a “super torpedo” 53-65. At disposal fleet there were:

oxygen 53-56 and peroxide 53-57 without homing systems (CCH) with an effective firing distance of the order of 3,5 kilometer;
peroxide 53-61, 53-61MA with a three-month period of maintenance on submarines and all the troubles with hydrogen peroxide;
electrical SAET-60 with SSN since the Second World War and, besides, in insufficient quantities.

Outdated straight torpedoes were included in the ammunition even of second-generation submarines. A surface ship there was only mossy 53-39 (leading its history from the developed in the early XX century Italian 53F) in three versions: 53-39PM, 53-51 (the same, but with the proximity fuse), 53-56V (the same, but with a new name). The effective firing range for the 53-39 two-torpedo salvo is less than three kilometers. Closer - just go on the ram. The situation, frankly, deplorable. And who started the case with shock torpedoes in such a dead end? Military 28 th Scientific Research Institute and Central Research Institute "Gidropribor". Torpedo institutes large mistake.

Academic institutions are often carried away into the clouds of their imagination, although they are very convincing in justifying the need to develop new torpedoes. But naval commanders do not have the right to make mistakes. Their miscalculations manifest themselves in 10 – 15 years in a critical situation. So it happened.

Alma-Ata "Kalashnikov"

Thank God, there were those who saved the situation at a critical moment. And there were no scientists from specialized research institutes at all ...

There are three such people. The first is the director of the Machine-Building Plant named after SM Kirov (MSC) in Alma-Ata, Peter Rezchik. The second is Grant Akopov, head of the torpedo department of the Directorate of Anti-submarine Weapons (UPV) of the Navy. The third is the head of the UPV, Boris Kostygov.

At the beginning of 60-ies MZK serially manufactured torpedoes 53-56 (oxidizer - oxygen), 53-57, 53-61 (oxidizer - hydrogen peroxide). Engineer Evgeny Barybin, a torpedo from God, worked in the experimental workshop of the plant. He was familiar with the strong and weak nodes of all thermal torpedoes. In the talented head of the designer and artist in the soul (and, by the way, according to a hobby) the idea was born to assemble all the successful units in one simple and reliable sample with good characteristics:

-oxygen tank from the torpedo 53-56;
-turbine from 53-61;
- a row of successful knots from 53-65, 53-58.


It was assumed that the speed and range of the torpedo will be close to the torpedo 53-61.

Barybin reported to the factory director Rezchik. That idea was not just approved, he took an active part in its implementation. The resolution of Peter Kharitonovich, who initiated the work on the torpedo, is amazing. The main protagonist in the creation of a torpedo 53-65K himself Barybin considered it Carver. By order of the director, a group of eight designers was formed, headed by Konstantin Selikhov, head of the plant's design bureau (after his retirement, Daniel Ginsburg). Every business is argued, if enthusiasts are taken for it. Designers of KB Ginzburg, Barybin, Shubin, Zikeev, Gormin, Shtoda, Chukanov, Krivulin, Popova developed technical documentation. The production of the material part began, as soon as the drawings were ready, and sometimes simply from sketches.

In the 1963 year, Selikhov and Barybin went to Grant Akopov for the first report in Moscow, in the Directorate of anti-submarine weapons. MZK’s offer was as follows: create a torpedo of the most reliable components, assemblies and assemblies of other torpedoes — oxygen, single-mode, speed — 40 – 50 nodes, range — about 20 kilometers. The plant will be able to make three prototypes at its own expense.

Akopov supported the MSC, proposing to carry out work under the legend of the “modernization of the 53-56 torpedoes under the homing optical system”. Coordination of the work of the UPV - plant was carried out through the military mission (subordinate to the UPV in those years). This was done in order to give the factory workers at least some official status.

In the success of the work, the military acceptance of the MSC and its future leader, Peter Kolyadin, played a very important role.

Less than a year, as the first torpedo was ready. True, it could only be called a torpedo conditionally: for the time being, she did not have homing equipment — essentially a running model. Barybin set off with his brainchild to the proving ground on the Issyk-Kul lake, where prototypes literally immediately showed good results. Further planned shooting on the Black Sea, but ...

We learned about the “underground” work of the plant in the 4 General Directorate of the Ministry of the Judicial Industry (curator of the “torpedo direction”) and sent a telegram with a request to stop testing homemade products. To solve the problem in Moscow detachment Ginzburg. History is silent as he managed to resolve the situation, but the work continued. The torpedo was up to the mark: at the Black Sea training ground during launches from the torpedo boat and from the submarine it went well and more than once.

The production of a small series of three pieces of almost full-fledged torpedoes with an optical homing system began. Made Shot at the site. And they were upset about impossibility - the torpedoes stubbornly did not want to be aimed at the target.

Then one of the three replaced the homing equipment, taking it from the 53-65 torpedoes, and in the summer of next year Barybin again arrived in Sevastopol.

From the point of view of the usual development algorithm, to go out to sea trials with just three torpedoes is an adventure: you can lose samples and throw tests. But as the ancient Romans said: “Happiness protects the brave.” And the torpedoes did not let down their creators: both from the submarine and from the torpedo boat they worked out regularly. Although optical SSN refused and in the sea ...

In the 1965 year, having on hand concrete results of work, confirmed by firing from warships, a delegation led by plant director Peter Rechik went to Moscow for a second report to the head of the UPV, Vice Admiral Kostygov.

Enthusiasm against the system

The need to replace the CLO was obvious, but the main thing was to solve the problem of financing further work. Engineers can still work "at free capacity": draw, invent, rely on their fairly modest salary. And the plant as a whole - no. Volgograd for no reason will not make forgings for the manufacture of an oxygen tank, Kiev will not give the instruments of course and leveling ... There are dozens of these plants. In short, we need money, and underground, about which three or four people need to know, no more, because the torpedo is illegitimate.

Underground Gunsmiths

Andrei Sedykh collage


How is the law? Interested organizations are preparing a resolution of the Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee in a coordinated manner. The contractor undertakes to develop a torpedo with the specified characteristics. Funding is being opened, money is being allocated, the use of which is observed by military representatives under the contractor. They, in turn, are watched by the financiers of the Ministry of Defense. They do not understand the technique and therefore can act only formally: legally or illegally.

In the situation with the future 53-65K, for its development we need at least comparatively small, but illegal (since there are neither decisions of the CM and the Central Committee of the CPSU, nor TTZ) money. Where to get them?

Kostygov with Akopov gave the go-ahead to make 10 torpedoes from an experimental batch. But the main risk of this illegal operation was assumed by the deputy senior military representative of the MSC, Peter Kolyadin. It was he who put his signature under a false financial document - the factory “made it look like” for the fleet, and the military acceptance “as it took” the 10-53 torpedoes from the 65 plant, and the UPV (customer in those years) paid the plant money for them. This money was used to further develop the torpedo and its tests.

Less than a year and a half later, ten practical torpedoes from an experimental party set off for the sighting ground. And the shooting went flawlessly. Three months later, a report with positive test results was submitted to the head of the UPV Navy, the head of the Mine Torpedo Institute and the director of the Hydropribor.

They frowned at the military institute: we didn’t develop a justification, did not issue a technical assignment, didn’t participate in the tests, and in general it was some kind of homemade product. The “Gidropribor” has 70 nodes (torpedo 53-65) at the exit! And why this torpedo on 45 nodes? The Naval Institute withdrew from the plant, did not take the bastard torpedo under its scientific wing.

Smuggling maneuvers

1967 year became black in the development of a new torpedo. The optical homing system was not able to bring to a healthy state. However, by this time there were acute problems with the “official” 53-65 planned for the fleet. Start firing on the Black Sea Fleet. The first shot - and rupture of the oxidizer tank. It is good that it is already at sea, and not in a torpedo tube, or - God forbid - in the compartment of the boat. The commission faltered: any understanding person would be led to a sense of the prospect of getting almost half a ton of hydrogen peroxide in the compartment. Another design of the oxidizer reservoir with a new peroxide displacement system into the combustion chamber, the pump, is urgently being developed. Failure. The next development of a tank with a new peroxide delivery system - a piston. Failure…

In this situation (taking into account the departure of Kostygov and the appointment of a new chief of the UPV) Akopov showed perseverance and wisdom. He advised the plant to send several torpedoes from an experimental batch to fleets, to go there to plant specialists and perform two or three combat exercises. Get the support of fleets. Plus a non-standard move - write a letter to the commander-in-chief of the Navy.

Navy Commander-in-Chief Sergei Gorshkov, who himself went through the war and knows the price of trouble-free arms, I read the letter of a group of engineers of the torpedo plant carefully. The design bureau of the plant is serious power. And the results are there. And imposed a resolution: "APPROVE".

This is exactly what Akopov needed. From his side it turned out, one might say, a grandmaster move. After such a resolution, the opponents died down and did not speak out in the open against the torpedoes.

By this time, the first excellent results of firing on fleets by modernized 53-61MA torpedoes with homing equipment E. Parfyonov (planned for 63-65) became known. The corresponding decision on equipping the pilot batch with the future 53-65K with the same equipment was agreed with Akopov in working order.

The situation with the legitimate 53-65 literally stalled. The first batch entered the Pacific Fleet, where a group of specialists led by chief designer Kokryakova taught torpedoists of the arsenal for three weeks, people who are quite knowledgeable about this kind of technique. But they could not prepare a torpedo for a shot. Refusal for failure - and this despite the fact that the shot should be immediately after the preparation of the torpedo. And what will happen when she lies on the boat promised year?

The chief of the MTU TOF captain of the 1 rank M. Brodsky got acquainted with the torpedo device, looked at the efforts of the brigade of the chief designer, spoke with his experts and the torpedoes of the arsenal. Here, the Black Sea Fleet also received information about the rupture of the oxidizer reservoir when fired. Brodsky, who himself lost people in the explosion of hydrogen peroxide, sent a telegram to the UPV: "Mastering the 53-65 torpedoes by the fleet is inappropriate because of extreme difficulty in preparation and low reliability." And ordered to ship the received torpedoes to Sovgavan and lay them in the farthest dead end of the arsenal. There they all waited safely for disposal.

State Prizes Are Not All Deserving

In this situation, the future 53-65K was a salvation for UPV and the fleet (as Akopov later said, “it would not exist, and I would not be in this position”). In 1968, the joint decision of the Navy and 4 of the first SME was made to conduct state tests. It was then that the chief designer was appointed Daniel Ginzburg. The torpedo was born absolutely illegally (before the “state” torpedo had not only the chief designer, but also the tactical-technical task, and about the “non-standard” financing of the development mentioned above). Scientific institutions are categorically against it, and the torpedo goes and walks. State tests were successful.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (and not the Minister of Defense) No. 0115 of 22 of April 1969, the 53-65К torpedo was accepted "for supply" and launched into mass production. With her new “name” - “53-65 with the letter K” “homemade” MSC as it was “covered” the failure of the Navy and the Ministry of the Industry with 53-65 and began to confidently win their positions in the fleet.

The application for the invention of the torpedo was filed in June 1965 of the year, and a month later the author's certificate and monetary reward were received - 1700 rubles for nine authors. The state award for the development of 53-65K came only after 11 years and not from the first approach (they did not let the specialized institutes pass). Leonid Smirnov, Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission, played a decisive role in this.

At the meeting of heads of military-industrial complex enterprises in Kazakhstan, Smirnov was in detail interested in the affairs of the largest enterprise of the republic - the MSC. The head of the military mission, Kolyadin, reported to the chairman of the military-industrial complex the essence of the 53-65K torpedo:

- decent technical characteristics with good prospects for their improvement in the order of modernization;
- the cheapest - on the order! - in the world among torpedoes of similar purpose;
- its mass production was adjusted and thus the problem of providing the fleet with anti-ship torpedoes was removed;
- mastered by all fleets, replacing the four previous samples of torpedoes;
- developed not by the “Gidropribor” Institute, but by the design bureau of the plant. Perhaps that is why the development team is not awarded the State Prize.


Leonid Smirnov took note of this. Less than two weeks later, a team followed from both the military industrial complex to the Ministry of the Judiciary and from there to the 4 commander and also to the UPV of the Navy: submit the 53-65K torpedo team to the State Prize.

So, “Present a team ...” And where is this team? In KB plant. The industrialists, representing the development team, included the military, who took an active part in the development. As agreed by the plant managers from military laureates, S. Butov became the head and M. Bersudsky, who took an active part in torpedo trials, and most importantly, with great pressure, reported to Butov about his merits. For Peter Kolyadin, who consumed this award, who risked the most, and also the author of a number of important technical decisions, there was no place in the laureate's list. But this is a common naval practice: rewarding the uncomplicated and punishing the innocent.

Although civilians had similar problems. No, not at the factory. Everyone there knows who is worth the development and testing of a torpedo. The events with the list in the head office developed in approximately the same way as the military. From the plant's design bureau on the list was Deputy Chief Designer Yevgeny Barybin, the author of the idea of ​​this torpedo, and more than any other of the engineers who invested the energy of mind, soul and hands in its creation. Was. Well, that's enough. The winner was a completely different person - the employee of the cupola, who oversaw the work of the plant. Namely - the author of the telegram with the requirement to stop the tests of "homemade" Yuri Gryaznov.

And the fairy tale could turn out

From the height of the present day, it is possible to give an objective assessment of the creation history of the 53-65K torpedo itself. The fleet received a massive, simple and cheap shock (anti-ship) torpedo with a worthy for its time TTX.

However, we must admit that these performance characteristics could be significantly higher.

For the fleet, the usual “table” TTX torpedoes, including speed and range, have only theoretical significance. The main parameter in the assessment is the effective firing distance.

In the case of 53-65K, this effective distance could be significantly increased by increasing the speed due to the range (for example, increasing the speed to 50 nodes from 45 by reducing the range from 19 to 16 km). The technical realization of this for a torpedo with a turbine powerplant was not difficult. The idea was not only in the air, but was also implemented in practice by local torpedo commanders - indicating the installation of a pressure regulator at the upper level of technical conditions (to achieve maximum speed). But at the same time there were no “official consequences”. Perhaps the reason was that the theoretical “effective distances” (in quotation marks, since the torpedo was not in ammunition for a single day) legitimate 53-65 markedly exceeded 53-65K due to greater speed. “High-speed modification” 53-65K at the same time reached the level of 53-65, being much simpler, cheaper and more reliable. What would “science” look like in this case, substantiating and promoting peroxide 53-65? Of course, hydrogen peroxide theoretically provides more torpedo energy than oxygen, but 53-65 “super characteristics” required the installation of a double set of large-sized power plant units, thereby eating the energy gain of the oxidizer. As they say, there was a lot of “science”, but little common sense.

Significantly raise the characteristics of 53-65K installation could more modern CCH. With the torpedo that existed, it lost much speed when it reached the target, spending a large part of its energy on it. Already in the beginning of the 80-x, the installation of more advanced SSN and an increase in salvo distances were possible, but to this day the torpedo survived with the Parfenov 60-s system ...

In the middle of the 80-x, the UIP Navy gave up for the disposal of 120 torpedoes TEST-71. Transferring them to the MSC would give the possibility of implementing telecontrols on the 53-65K, and most importantly, obtaining large firing statistics (i.e., dispose of the old materiel, while at the same time ensuring the development and testing of the new one). The stocks for the installation of telecontrol in the 53-65K were at least due to the replacement of the antique hydrostat 53-65K, which came back from the “Fium” 53F, with a modern small-sized one.

While enthusiasts remained at the plant and in military acceptance — Carver, Kolyadin, Ginzburg, Barybin and others, work with the 53-65K torpedo continued in the form of the Magot initiative (with the prospect of creating a cheap universal torpedo). Having improved the turbine in four positions, Ginzburg received an increase in horsepower in 100 with the same expenditure of power components. There was a solution for using 20 percent “dead” (unused) oxygen supply. As a result, it was possible to increase the energy of the torpedoes by about 40 percent. The torpedo is ripe for serious modernization, moving almost to the level of Mk48 (and significantly surpassing USET-80) in transport characteristics. But the time of anti-ship torpedoes, as well as anti-submarine, has passed. The time has come universal torpedoes on targets.

The most effective solution would be to use the reserve of the discontinued development of the TAPIR UGST. It was not possible to create a reliable solid fuel source of energy for it, however, “Tapir” had a low-noise exhaust turbine power plant, an excellent telecontrol system. Replacing the exotic solid fuel installation with a relatively simple oxygen was quite possible. And then the positive that has been developed in the UGST is realized. Specifications will be slightly lower than those promised in the UGST, but remain within acceptable limits.

The plant has successfully completed bench tests of the power plant. They submitted a report to two institutes and in the OLA of the Navy: it may be that a universal torpedo on targets for cheap energy was developed, albeit with somewhat lower technical characteristics than those promised by the UGST. The military institute gave a positive conclusion. That's it all over.

Still in 1974, the decisive director of the plant Carver died. In 1984, UPV lost Akopov - he retired to the reserve. His successors inherited the chair and problems, but not wisdom and experience. In 1985, Peter Kolyadin, for his further service, departed for Leningrad.

So the cutter triumvirate, Akopov, Kolyadin collapsed, and the possibilities of developing a good practical torpedo were missed. And this omission lies on the conscience of the leaders of the UPV Navy and the Torpedo Directorate of the Military Institute of Weapons.

Then perestroika began, and in December 1991 of the year, the MSC itself turned out to be outside the country.

Forty years already in the ranks of the torpedo 53-65K. Both on ships and submarines of the second generation there is no replacement for it yet. As part of the torpedo is the development of "Gidropribor", this is normal and the merits of the plant does not diminish. 53-65K was not born thanks to our scientists, but rather contrary to them.

The creation of this torpedo and the arming of the Soviet and Russian Navy with it is a rare example of competition and subsequently cooperation, albeit forced, monopolistic developers — on the one hand, and the manufacturer’s design bureau with military representation, on the other.

Like the best Tanks and aircraft, the 53-65K torpedo deserves its pedestal. And on a pedestal it would not be bad to have bas-reliefs of the founding fathers, or at least to list these people and their merits.

Evgeny Barybin - the author of the idea, actually the creator of this torpedo.

Peter Carver - Director of the Machine-Building Plant named. Kirov, who supported the idea of ​​Barybin, the organizer of the creation of 53-65K.

Daniel Ginsburg is the chief designer of the 53-65K.

Boris Kostygov - Head of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate, who supported the development and its "non-standard" funding.

Grant Akopov - head of the UPV torpedo department, who supported the development, and the author of the idea of ​​addressing the commander-in-chief of the Navy at a critical moment.

Peter Kolyadin - Head of the Military Representation of the MSC, who personally took responsibility for the illegal financing of work.

Sergei Gorshkov - commander-in-chief of the Navy, who evaluated the prospects and gave torpedo life to the fleet, despite its non-standard pedigree.

Already today, the story of the initiative development of torpedoes for the Navy was continued at Dagdizel OJSC. The large statistics of successful tests says that there are Barybin and Carver here. Will there be Gorshkov, Kostygov, Akopov to complete this development?
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22 comments
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  1. +8
    29 November 2014 06: 01
    Russia's wealth is its people. Designers and developers of weapons are special people, and their special Honor and Praise!
    1. Codename49
      +4
      29 November 2014 11: 22
      The estate of Russia is all people living in Russia and not only builds weapons-houses constructor, and taxes pay and work in factories, THIS IS THE REALITY OF RUSSIA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  2. +2
    29 November 2014 07: 13
    It’s great that people who contributed to strengthening the power of the Motherland are named, in fact, working not for fame, money or prestige, but for the common good.
    And how many of the same modest workers will never be named.
    But in those days, such initiative developments were an ordinary phenomenon,
    albeit not with such impressive and visual results, but in general they brought the desired result.
  3. +3
    29 November 2014 07: 40
    An interesting story, apparently each type of weapon has its own Kalashnikov
  4. +5
    29 November 2014 07: 45
    Yes, complicated feelings: you are proud of the people, and you want to swear. In general, everything is ours, everything is contrary.
  5. 0
    29 November 2014 08: 40
    And now, what is the current situation with this?
    1. +2
      29 November 2014 09: 15
      They killed the NGO, now it has become a factory. It releases hydraulics.
  6. +7
    29 November 2014 10: 26
    The situation is even worse now. It is not possible to crawl past the specialized research institutes, all the "cash flows" are saddled by the right people and the upstarts are closely watched. And institutions are interested in an endless flow of money, so they do something like a little.
  7. +2
    29 November 2014 11: 30
    I do not understand, this article is published every two weeks, it was recently
    1. +1
      30 November 2014 18: 56
      Quote: LM66
      I do not understand, this article is published every two weeks, it was recently
      And I thought only my deja vu
  8. +2
    29 November 2014 12: 51
    Great article about great people and great products. However, there should not have been another: the beloved child is always beautiful.

    Thanks to the author, deserved "+"!
  9. +2
    29 November 2014 14: 29
    The article deserves a big plus, unfortunately very often there are situations in life when due to unjustified conservatism the "big thing" suffers, and the "golden link" of the idea is lost. Specialists from specialized organizations often came to us at the Black Sea Fleet to work out and test torpedo systems, a lot of work of this kind was carried out. It's just a pity that in Sevastopol from the "torpedo Arsenal at Troitskaya" they made a branch and the main thing was taken to the mainland in Novorossiysk, but apparently soon everything will return to its place on the back of Sevastopol. The uniqueness of an enterprise with more than a century of history should get a new life!
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. 0
      29 November 2014 14: 47
      I have a video about the arsenal but don’t know how to add it.
  10. +1
    29 November 2014 16: 07
    So the question arises: who is the enemy of the fleet, and who is friend? After all, the underground in the classical sense is work on its territory but occupied by the enemy. Young men, these are always necessary to remember and often recall.
  11. +2
    29 November 2014 16: 50
    Strange, but I commented on this article at the end of October belay Repeat ???
    But the torpedo topic is very close to me. It was just that the instrument cluster of the Leningrad Ship Ship made us specialists on torpedoes in the late 70s.
  12. 0
    29 November 2014 17: 24
    good Great article, incredibly interesting story!
  13. 0
    29 November 2014 18: 02
    Excellent article !!! I didn’t even know what I had "gone through" before arriving at the fleet, the torpedo 53-65K !!!
  14. +1
    29 November 2014 18: 32
    The story is sad, albeit with a good ending. The same can be said about almost any successful example of weapons. Only in our time were added "generals Taburetkin" with women's battalions of poetesses and singers ...
  15. The comment was deleted.
  16. +1
    29 November 2014 22: 58
    NPO "Gidropribor" from St. Petersburg are still skilled at sawing. They multiplied all our developments in underwater navigation in the coastal zone from ten to twenty times in money. We were crazy about the incredible prices.
  17. +1
    30 November 2014 02: 21
    ... as to the rewarding of non-private persons and the punishment of the innocent, it was precisely noticed, as it was in reality and not only in the navy ...
  18. +2
    30 November 2014 09: 14
    Great article about the great Soviet engineers. Thank God that there were great Kulibins who forged the shield and sword of our Motherland. There they are now. But Talents need help - mediocrity will break through. Now it’s time to burn out and cheaters. How to bring a man-made idea to materialization now? If everyone has just sawed and dumped in their heads. It's a shame for the power.
  19. viruvalge412ee
    +1
    30 November 2014 15: 48
    The article is high-quality, correct and draws attention, in addition to the fact that there were many good specialists, sincere patriots before, there are now and will always be a great many in Russia!
  20. +1
    9 December 2014 13: 52
    The main thing is that these specialists have the opportunity to create!
  21. Dudu
    -1
    26 January 2015 21: 21
    Long time ago somewhere in and those I read this article. In similar recollections of other weapons creation stories, the inconsistency and indifference of officials always emerges. It’s announced that some kind of weapon is needed, the author offers and they drive him into the neck, or worse - they poison him.
  22. The comment was deleted.
  23. corval
    +1
    11 February 2015 19: 33
    A slight inaccuracy - Petr Kharitonovich Rezchik died in July 1967, and not in 1974. And among the authors of the torpedo 53-65K, if I am not mistaken, was Viktor Morozov ..
    Now there is only one name left from the plant and 400 people, against the former once 14 thousand. About 200 design engineers worked in one design bureau.
    • =Valery Korenchuk, Alma-Ata

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