From davli - to LIH
Al-Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood could not make their ideology dominant in the Muslim world; they are replaced by the Islamic State Destiny Iraq
History showed that among other geographic areas of Al-Qaida activity, Iraq played the most crucial role for it. Iraq was destined to become a key country for the geopolitical transformation of the Islamic world. The reason for this was a regime that had nothing to do with the Islamist movement, the Ba'athism of Saddam Hussein.
First, the union against the Americans of the "Salafi" monarchies of the Persian Gulf caused a long-term confrontation between them and the "Ikhvanites" (political and jihadist), as well as the Salafi jihadists. Secondly, these are dramatic consequences that were caused by the US invasion of Iraq in 2001, when Hussein was attributed with responsibility for supporting the September 11 attacks, which he had nothing to do with. It was the destruction of the Saddam regime that made possible the penetration of jihadists into Iraq, the consequence of which was, thirdly, the appearance of being crushed, pushing Al-Qaida from the pedestal of world jihadism.
To understand what caused the specifics of Iraq, it is necessary to form an idea of the military-political situation that has developed in the country since the beginning of the American occupation. Unlike other Muslim countries where Al-Qaida operated, Iraq is a constituent state, in which, apart from minor minorities, there are three main communities: Sunni, Shia, and religiously heterogeneous, but consolidated around nationalism Kurds. Actually, under the Ottoman Caliphate, a single Iraq did not exist, but there were three Wilayats created on the basis of the respective communities. With the creation of a united Iraq on the basis of the ideology of Arab National Socialism (BAAS), its history is the alternate suppression of one community or another. Under Hussein, in spite of the fact that independent religious figures of both faiths were suppressed, in terms of the identity of the regime were "ethnic Sunnis." Therefore, after the overthrow of Hussein, the Americans, by contrast, relied on the Shiites, who actively promoted this. Shiite formations behind the cover of the “Shiite rebels” confrontation with the Americans became the basis of the new puppet regime of Nuri al-Maliki. Taking advantage of the moment, Kurdish nationalists managed to get a de facto independent state in northern Iraq, where under Hussein Kurdish separatism was cruelly eradicated (in the 1980 during the silent disregard of the West and the USSR, about 182 thousands of Kurds were killed, including with the help of chemical weapons). But the Iraqi Sunnis actually turned out to be a group thrown off the pedestal, where, with the support of America and Iran, government units consisting of Shiites brutally played out.
The jihadists, taking advantage of this situation, began the struggle in Iraq under Islamic banners, appealing specifically to the Sunnis. But it is very important to understand that they did not act in a vacuum. For decades, there was a powerful regime in Iraq that penetrated all spheres of its life, including special services and a fairly strong army. And the support of this regime was mainly ethnic Sunnis, even if they were estranged from religion, but tacitly retained their clan solidarity (what Ibn Khaldun called "asabiya"), which was formed into the secular political form of the Ba'ath Party. Therefore, armed resistance to the Americans could not have taken place without the participation of these Baathist structures, especially since the subsequent partisan was born from the transformation of America’s regular war against the Baathist regime. On the contrary, these jihadists came later to this region, bringing with them the experience of partisan war, invaluable to such a situation. But it is obvious that in this field they had to build their relations with the fragments and cadres of the Baathist regime fighting against the same enemy.
In this regard, the question of the extent to which the jihadist movement in Iraq was and remains associated with the heirs of Ba'athism is in many ways the key to understanding the reasons for its separation from Al-Qaida. In ideological and organizational terms, the Americans ’defeat of the regime of Saddam Hussein marked the disappearance of Ba'athism as an ideology and party from the political scene of post-Saddam Iraq. In this sense, it can be said that the ideological hegemony in the fight against the Americans, Shiites and Kurdish nationalists in the Sunni environment of Iraq has passed to the Islamists and jihadists. However, not everything is so simple with the personnel component. In the opinion of many Western analysts, the staggering successes of recent years have been associated precisely with the massive infusion into their leadership (tentatively in 2010) of the experienced officers of the former Baath army and special services, who saw in ISIL the optimal force for the Arab-Sunni revenge.
Hypotheses about the Iraqi jihadists' connections with the Baathists were discussed at the very beginning of the armed resistance to America in 2003. So, it was rumored that the Ansara Sunna group, operating in the north of the country, is supported by ex-Baathists, as it actually continues their fight against Kurdish separatists and pro-Iranian Shiites. With the transition of resistance to the Americans in the partisan phase, the former Baathists formed a number of military structures, some of which (Revolutionary Command Council) are the successors of the Ba'ath, while others position themselves as traditional religious religious - the Army of Naqshbandi. Moreover, of interest is the fact that if in Syria the jihadists from ISIL who came from Iraq started and are waging an irreconcilable war not only with secular anti-Assad forces, but also with those jihadists who consider it possible to cooperate with these forces, then from Iraq there is no irreconcilable war there was no information between jihadists and “insufficiently Islamic” wings of resistance.
Iraqi jihadists immediately entered into interaction with al-Qaeda (in fact, part of them was its emissaries, apparently), but this relationship was not simple from the beginning. Their most famous leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a jihadist of a narrowly Salafi school, not a “Ikhvanov” school. Numerous sources indicate that for a long time there were fundamental disagreements between him and Bin Laden, and Zarqawi refused to obey him. In the 2004 year, he nonetheless formally united under the brand of Al-Qaida Between the two rivers with other jihadist groups, but clearly as a franchise, that is, using the Al-Qaida brand with actual independence.
The ideological differences between Zarqawi and the sheikhs of al-Qaeda were reflected in 2005 in a voluminous letter to him of the then second, and now her first person, Dr. Zavahiri. Despite the fact that many experts questioned the accuracy of this letter, based on an analysis of its content, the author of these lines is inclined to consider it a genuine and very revealing document. The main discrepancy and the main criticism and advice from Zavahiri to his regional ally - to consult not only with the "elders" (that is, with the leadership of Al-Qaeda), but also with the maximum possible circle of allies on the spot, without taking steps that could lead to a split in a single jihadist front.
Although Zarqawi was killed in the 2006 year, in fact it was this difference in attitudes that became the main reason for the official split between Al Qaeda and Iraqi jihadists in the 2013 year. Al-Qaida, the head company, not only recognized the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was proclaimed by the latter, but also considered it its de facto branch in Iraq. However, the situation has changed dramatically with the beginning of the civil war in Syria. Among other Sunni and jihadist forces, al-Qaeda supporters formed its de facto representation in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (Victory Front). He adhered to precisely those principles that the leader of Al-Qaida, Zawahiri, advised to take as a basis for Iraqi jihadists as early as 2005. Namely, to strive for the unity of the jihadist forces on the basis of the search for consensus (shura). However, at this moment, Iraqi jihadists and their Syrian and foreign supporters who were in Syria make an unexpected move for all, announcing the conversion of the ISI into the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon) and demanding from all jihadist groups in these territories unconditionally obey them.
Thus begins not just a political, but also a bloody military conflict between Al-Qaida and Dawley. Moreover, the advantage in it was clearly on the side of the pressure, under whose control the territories turned out to be comparable with which only the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was at the time of the Taliban in power. But ISIS was not limited to a local victory over al-Qaeda and decided to take away its leadership in the jihadist movement at the global level, proclaiming its territorial formation as a caliphate and renaming it from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to simply the Islamic State.
What allowed Iraqi jihadists to achieve such success and what made them take such drastic steps?
The stake was made on the creation and expansion of his state - they gave it, regardless of the price or the consequences. In this approach, there is a steel grip experienced Baathists, who for forty years have mercilessly eliminated any challenges to their power, using mass murder and genocide if necessary. Al-Qaida, being jihadists with “Ikhvanov” roots, sought to overthrow the Assad regime and move towards the establishment of Sharia rule through progressive Islamization of the people and the unification of Jihad groups. Supporters did not intend to wait for anyone and were not going to reckon with anyone - they set a goal and went to it over the corpses not only of the civilian population, but also of their recent brothers in arms - jihadists who did not accept their methods and leadership. Such an approach can not be called "Ikhvan", that is, putting the Muslim brotherhood at the forefront. Rather, in this case, there is a Iraqi-Baathist variety of imperialism, whose ideology this time instead of socialism was extreme Salafism, while maintaining the same pan-Arab claims. Moreover, as if by chance, the ideology of the presses turned out to be completely independent of the influence of both Egyptian “Ikhvanism” (and not only Brothers-Muslims from Egypt, but also such ideologists as Qaradawi and Zawahiri, as well as Saudi “Salafism”) ". Without having a single world-class Islamic scholar (including jihadists), they managed to become the face of “political Salafism” and the center of attraction of its most extreme followers.
Perspectives of ISIS and Al-Qaida
What is the potential of ISIS? It seems that the United States, overloaded with its own and world problems, could recognize the new state that has emerged de facto on the political map of the world, as it once happened to communist China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba. In the end, it really would not be able to threaten not only the security of the United States, but also their world leadership. On the contrary, the emergence of a new regional player, opposing everyone else, could allow the States to bind allies like Saudi Arabia even more.
However, it is likely that a story similar to the one that happened to the Taliban IEA in the past will repeat with ISIS. The Americans were resigned to its existence, but it was at this moment that Al-Qaida, affiliated with the Taliban, did something that did not leave the Americans any choice. Thus, international jihadists destroyed the territorial Islamic state created by the Afghans. As for ISIL, it seems that, as it once was with the Taliban in Afghanistan, its success is due not so much to the participation of international jihadists as to the fact that the military-political leadership turned out to be in the hands of people not only local, but also administrative, military and intelligence structures of Saddam's Iraq, who know the psychology of its population, geography, logistics, and so on.
On the one hand, there was no reason for such a force to reckon with chimerical in its understanding, structures and ideologues such as Al-Qaida, which have no basis under their feet. With ruthless force and spectacular consolidation of resources and territories in their hands, they managed to draw much more jihadists to their side than Al-Qaeda with theological arguments. But still, relying on a similar public, the pragmatists in ISIS, whose existence can be highly likely to assume, could not but become its hostages just as the Taliban had once been held hostage by Al-Qaida. A tired West, immersed in a crisis, could de facto close its eyes even to deliberate ethnic cleansing, public executions of dissenters and other excesses of the formation of a new state in relation to its population. However, the execution of Western journalists or threats to conquer Rome and half of Europe have about the same effect on the West as the attack on the twin towers. Such behavior can have only one explanation - the pressure deliberately provokes the West into an uncompromising war with it, which, by the way, need not be lightning fast (remember that the West destroyed the regime of Saddam Hussein over ten years before deciding on a ground operation). Actually, supporters and propagandists did not conceal this, stating that they were destined to fulfill the eschatological prophecies of Islam about the final battle of Muslims against the Romans (people of the West) and the defeat of the latter. Obviously, this behavior cannot be called a pragmatic policy, just as you wouldn’t call an al-Qaeda strike on America, based in the IEA.
In this context, it will be informative to compare the strategy of ISIS and the Taliban in the context of war with the West. The Taliban, in contrast to Dawli, had to take the brunt of a full-scale ground operation that crushed the IEA just as it had crushed Saddam’s Iraq in a matter of months. Nevertheless, having destroyed his state, America could not completely defeat the Taliban - he managed to organize a successful guerrilla war and de facto controls a significant, if not most of the territory of Afghanistan as a shadow state. Nonetheless, the colossal losses, missed development opportunities, and the years of devastating war seem to have forced the Taliban to draw serious conclusions from their mistakes. This can be judged by mitigating attitudes towards the local population in the territories under his control, and according to the latest statement by Mullah Omar, who quite clearly indicated that after the expulsion of the Americans from Afghanistan, the Taliban have no plans to cross its borders and threaten their neighbors. Such an approach contrasts strongly with the statements of the press, which promises not only to devour all the neighboring Arab countries, but also to conquer half of Europe, as it follows from its maps and constant threats to seize Rome. However, there is a significant nuance here - unlike the Taliban, the pressure has not yet taken upon itself the blow of a full-scale ground operation. So, it is highly likely to assume that outside the eschatological scenario, on which it expects, in the event of increasing pressure from the West and its allies, ISIS is waiting for the fate of the IEA with possible subsequent personnel and ideological reorganization of the national-political core.
Well, what about al-Qaeda? Whatever happens next with ISIS, for Al-Qaida in its present form, the success and take-off of those who broke with it were most likely the beginning of the end. The events not only split the jihadists all over the world, but also provoked further discrepancies between the two positions in different directions from the Al Qaeda line.
On the one hand, it turned out that under conditions of mass mobilization, when unlimited violence brings — at least in the short term — such spectacular successes, for many jihadists the Al Qaeda line looks unjustifiably moderate and hazy. LIH Speaker Adnani directly accused Zawahiri of betraying the ideals of Al-Qaida, and among supporters they were getting the idea that Al-Qaida was already “not the one” after the death of Bin Laden, who has indisputable authority among all jihadists (although, as we remember , even during his lifetime, the then leader of the Iraqi jihadists Zarkavi clashed with him).
On the other hand, there is a reassessment of positions in the opposite direction by some people who sympathized with Al-Qaida and associated with it, including those who were perceived as its ideologues. Information is now being disseminated about one of the ideologues of Al-Qa’idah’s jihadism, Abu Qatadah al-Filastini, who, along with another such master, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, spoke out about harsh criticism. Many were surprised by the appeal of Al-Qaida’s leader Zawahiri to the then Egyptian President “Ikhvanovtsa” Mursi, from whom it followed that Zawahiri considered Mursi a Muslim and gives him fraternal advice, although this contradicts the ideology of Al-Qaida itself, according to which the ruler not ruling only according to Sharia, comes out of Islam. And if the radicals considered this a betrayal of the jihadist ideology and, against this background, they reoriented themselves to the pressure, which occupies the strongest possible positions, others, on the contrary, took it with the hope of evolution away from takfiristic and terrorist jihadism.
Given the gap between these two vectors, the end of the al-Qaida era, as it was historically formed, seems inevitable to the author of these lines. Still, we must not forget that it was a product of its time and the result of combining many quite subjective factors: first, the Ikhvan-Salafi novel against the background of the war in Afghanistan, then their divorce against the background of the war in Iraq, Bin Laden's Sudan epic, inexperience in politics " Taliban "etc. Despite all the subsequent radicalization, as it is already clear, the founders and ideologues of Al-Qaida were people of the old era, when the entire Islamist movement was somehow influenced by “Ikhvanism.” This time has already passed, and how the era has changed, where already other circumstances and their confluence determine the development of real actors of the Islamic political process.
In the Muslim world, real forces are increasingly in demand, capable of achieving real success at a tangible, regional level. As for the creation of networked supranational Islamic centers capable of generating a global political strategy of the Islamic ummah, it is obvious that none of the existing international organizations, including Brothers-Muslims and Al-Qaida, have coped with this task. Whether it will turn out to be for anyone - time will tell.
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