Measure seven times ...
Is the United States capable of agreeing today on equal security with Russia?
The situation with START-3 has become somewhat clearer. The text of the treaty is known and even the protocol to it seems to be. And immediately a number of experts were quick to declare that the document was not so bad. At the same time, many are sure that he is essentially about nothing. They say that the United States is not reducing anything significant for their nuclear power, and in the long term we are not even “pulling out” the “ceiling” of 800 carriers and 1550 warheads. That is, a compromise has been reached that does little to oblige the parties.
WHAT TO THINK ABOUT
However, questions remain, starting with the following. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev does not rule out Russia's withdrawal from START III in the event of a US missile defense development that threatens our security.
Let's leave aside the fact that the Americans have long proclaimed as their goal the creation of such an anti-missile defense that can intercept up to 200 or more resistant warheads, and this clearly defines the anti-Russian appearance of the US missile defense system, since no other country in the world, except the Russian Federation, can provide a similar retaliation. But there is also another question.
Let's say Moscow in the future will find it necessary to withdraw from START III. Presumably, this will mean that the United States has a fully combat-ready missile defense system as an effective and integral element of ensuring its unpunished first strike against Russia. Is not it?
But then, will it be enough for the Russian Federation those 800 delivery vehicles and 1550 BB that will remain in its strategic nuclear forces in the event of the steady implementation of START-3? After all, there is such a thing as the quantitative saturation of antimissile defense (by the way, the most reliable option for neutralizing it). And we will have nothing to quantify the US missile defense system. At the same time, the fewer effective delivery vehicles Russia has, the more realistic the blow of the American nuclear "sword" from under the "shield" of the missile defense. Seduction is, you know, a serious thing.
That is why the general declaration of the President of the Russian Federation regarding the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from START-3 should be supported by concrete, tangible actions to ensure the possibility of an effective build-up of our nuclear missile potential, including through relevant R&D. Yes, this requires funds, but neutralizing the threat of war is always cheaper than an unforeseen war.
For some reason, the issue of the enormous return potential of the United States was taken out of the brackets in START III. And the question is extremely important. For example, the ground component of the American "triad" is a 3 Minuteman III ICBM with a MIRV. It is reasonable to count them all as nuclear (non-nuclear re-equipment of ICBMs is essentially a bluff). So, if we take the total number of nuclear ICBMs as 450 and consider all of them to be monobloc (with the "standard" number of BB in one MIRV - three), then the US ground component will have 450 charges on 450 carriers. But if all ICBMs remain, then the United States will have a return potential in the ground component, numbering up to 450 charges for ICBMs alone. Plus over 1350 BB on missile boats, plus ALCM, plus SLCM. What are 2000 charges there, have mercy!
And the strange offset of one strategic bomber as a carrier of one charge? In fact, one aviation component of the US "triad" is capable of raising, in principle, several thousand nuclear warheads.
And the telemetry exchange? If you are not going to intercept other people's missiles, you only need to be notified of the launch time and area, and the place where the warhead fell. But detailed telemetry on other people's launches is needed to test our missile defense. The Americans weigh their satellites with measuring-signature means, and then calibrate them according to the data we transmitted. As a result, the United States is improving anti-missile defense to intercept Russian BB under assurances of its focus on destroying ICBMs from rogue countries.
All of the above, although it refers to almost rhetorical questions for professionals (that is, they do not require an answer), were not reflected in START-3. But, as already mentioned, let us abstract from the problem of the inevitable (due to the reduction of the nuclear power of the Russian Federation) development of the US missile defense system, from the return potential, from the strange forms of control - formally "mutual", but necessary precisely for the States.
Let us ask ourselves something else: is the United States capable of reaching an agreement with Russia that would provide the parties with equal security?
There is an almost joking “office instruction”: “§ 1. The boss is always right. § 2. When the boss is wrong, see § 1. " With regard to our case, we can say that Russia should be guided by the following instruction: “§ 1. In modern conditions, the United States will not conclude even a compromise agreement with the Russian Federation, let alone an equal one. § 2. If the USA has entered into a compromise agreement with the Russian Federation, see § 1 ".
We need to understand - this is, firstly. And secondly, to look for a way out of the situation, slowly with the ratification of START III.
SIX ITEMS
I will cite six theses on START III with a few comments. I hope that acquaintance with them will prove useful for the members of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, since the problem of START-3 is now becoming, first of all, their problem.
So…
1. Any actions of Russia in the field of nuclear weapons should be based on the understanding that its military security and sovereign future depend on whether the possibility of a deep retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation against any potential aggressor (s) remains.
It should be remembered that large-scale nuclear arms reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States do not reduce the threat of war, but, on the contrary, encourage Washington's adventurous plans and pose a threat to the security of the world, that is, a threat to the security of America as well.
A sharp reduction in nuclear weapons in the context of a developed missile defense system is beneficial only to a potential aggressor. For the one who is going to strike first, it is vitally important to minimize the nuclear weapons of the future victim of aggression or the object of aggressive blackmail. Minimize even at the cost of agreeing to some of your own reductions. This, alas, is the US line.
For those who intend to respond with a blow to the first blow, who need to ensure the containment of aggression, it is more important to maintain the massing of their own strategic nuclear forces than to strive to minimize foreign nuclear weapons. This should be the line of Russia.
Deep cuts in Russia's nuclear arms do not enhance stability, but decrease it. Everything is determined by the possibility or impossibility for the Russian Federation of a deep retaliatory strike against the aggressor in response to his first strike. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.
And it is impossible for Russia to abandon the principle of containment given the geopolitical line currently adopted by the United States.
2. The division of strategic weapons into offensive and defensive is incorrect. The essence of nuclear weapons is strategic defense, or rather, strategic deterrence based on the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia's arsenal. weaponsbut not applying it.
Strategic nuclear weapons, by their very meaning, are a unique military-political means of ensuring global stability. It is not focused on the conduct of real combat operations, an offensive using it is impossible.
The term "offensive weapons" is beneficial to the United States because it imposes on us the American approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. However, from the point of view of international agreements, strategic weapons should be classified not as offensive and defensive, but as stabilizing and destabilizing. If we approach the assessment of nuclear weapons in this way, the true meaning of the US missile defense system will immediately emerge not as a defensive system, but as a dangerous and destabilizing element of Washington's overall strike forces. The essence of US missile defense is not defense, but neutralization of the threat of a retaliatory strike by Russia after an American first strike.
3. If we remember President Medvedev's warning about the possibility of the Russian withdrawal from START-3, then it is necessary to ensure the preservation and development of an appropriate military-technical base, that is, Russia's capabilities for the development and production of MIRVed ICBMs and their nuclear combat equipment.
At the first official hearings on the START-2 Treaty, which took place in the State Duma on July 18, 1995, high-ranking representatives of the RF Ministry of Defense stated that if the United States openly violated the ABM Treaty, Russia should withdraw from START-2.
The United States trampled on the ABM Treaty, but, fortunately, the conditions of the SVN-2 were not fulfilled, because it never entered into force. And if it entered and was fulfilled, and then the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty? What would we be left with then? With gaping holes in the ground in place of silos - these complex engineering structures, without MIRVed ICBMs.
Today we are told about the same about START III. But if Russia at first barbarously blows up its missile silos and physically destroys all or part of ICBMs with MIRVs, and the United States deployed a national missile defense system, then what will be left with Russia, which decided to withdraw from START-3?
That is, our responsible, nationally oriented policy should proceed from the principle of preventing the elimination of even one of our silo ICBMs with MIRVs within the framework of START-3 obligations until the extended service life is completely exhausted, as well as from the principle of complete preservation or conservation of silos of MIRVs. This point is so important that I will return to it below.
4. Our "silo" MIRVed ICBMs, and above all the "heavy" R-36M2 "Voyevoda" ICBMs, are the only reliable military-technical means of ensuring nuclear stability in relations with the United States. America today is actually held back mainly by our stationary ICBMs.
The above does not diminish the importance for ensuring global stability of our naval and aviation nuclear forces, as well as the mobile unit of the Strategic Missile Forces. However, the restraint of the United States is ensured by the presence of the R-36M2 and UR-100N UTTH ICBMs in the Russian Federation.
A few words about mobile Topoli. Their mobility is limited by the area of the positional area, and the permitted exit from its redistribution under special conditions is nothing more than an argument to calm amateurs. The transience of a hypothetical conflict (and even under the conditions of the first attack of the aggressor, when the survivability of our ICBMs is especially important) devalues such a “resolution”.
Further. In the United States, intensive and successful work has been going on for a long time to create means of electronic reconnaissance, disguised as natural objects (stones, stumps, twigs, etc.). These are the so-called smart trees, smart stones, etc. Placing such reconnaissance means operating in sleep mode in the Topol deployment zone (with data transmission to reconnaissance satellites only in anticipation of the first strike) will allow tracking the position of missile systems in real time and with accuracy that devalues their mobility.
Some experts have long argued that our mine complexes are almost completely destroyed in the first strike by the United States, and therefore it is necessary to switch completely to mobile Topol, which alone will provide a retaliatory strike due to their high survivability. The thesis is extremely dubious. You can refute it in detail, but I will limit myself to small.
There is no actual data on the effectiveness of the US nuclear strike forces in nature and cannot be available to anyone, including the US. To have reliable estimates, it is necessary to inflict no less than a real nuclear strike against Russia, which we have not had yet.
And if you guess and count the probabilities, then we must remember that the United States has never allowed its ICBMs and SLBMs on Russia and therefore many factors can affect the accuracy of shooting, including geomagnetic and weather conditions, the rotation of the Earth, failures during launches and on the trajectory, failures in the on-board guidance system, the inability to work out the trajectory parameters in preliminary experimental launches of US missiles on the territory of the Russian Federation, etc. The missile launchers are conducting experimental launches along well-studied routes, but here everything will be unfamiliar. You miss from a distance of thousands of kilometers by just an extra fifty meters, and the Russian mine has already survived. It is impossible to hit absolutely all the mines in the first blow, even theoretically, and even practically - and even more so!
Therefore, we must continue to maintain reliance on heavy "silo" ICBMs.
5. The most important question is how START-3 interprets the right of Russia to preserve our mine ICBMs and silos for an indefinite long time. There is reason to believe that they will become the first real victims of the contract, but this cannot be allowed in any way. In addition, the document is drawn up in such a way that both the rapid destruction of the R-36M2 and the UR-100N UTTH are possible, and, in principle, their operation until the expiration of the warranty period.
Section II of the Protocol to the START-3 Treaty regulates the procedures for the elimination of liquid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs. But they are available only in the Russian strategic nuclear forces. This means that physically only Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are supposed to be eliminated.
This is one of the most dangerous pitfalls of START-3. Some people believe that the treaty does not force us to cut anything, because our strategic nuclear forces, even without it, are supposedly shrinking “landslide” due to aging. However, this is not so - START-3 can become a means of beating up the most convincing part of the Strategic Missile Forces. But to destroy something in them is unacceptable! According to the Strategic Missile Forces command, the Voevoda's service life can be extended to 30 years, and at least until 2016 our “mine” ICBMs must be preserved.
If the State Duma of the Russian Federation does not reject START-3 and starts the process of ratification, then the law on ratification should specifically stipulate that the Russian Federation destroys its "mine" ICBMs not within the framework of contractual obligations, but only upon exhaustion of the resource.
6. In case of ratification of START-3, the federal law should specify to what extent the US missile defense can develop without the RF withdrawal from START-3 and upon reaching what "architecture" of the American missile defense system Russia is obliged to withdraw from the treaty.
All this should find detailed coverage and regulation in the law on ratification. This includes taking into account the deployment of sea and air missile defense elements, the deployment of missile defense systems in outer space, the characteristics of missile defense systems, and so on. For example, is the deployment of missile defense systems in Europe a reason to exit or not? Everything should be defined clearly and in advance at the level, I repeat, of the law.
The refusal to terminate the Arctic activity of the US and British multipurpose nuclear submarines can also be attributed to the factors of the RF withdrawal from START-3.
Separately, it is necessary to note the need for the United States to abandon its capabilities of "return" potential and the right of Russia to withdraw from START-3 when the United States attempts to hide this potential behind the curtain of the "non-nuclear" re-equipment of US strategic delivery systems.
The continuation of the US geopolitical activity within the Russian geopolitical space should also be referred to as possible factors for withdrawing from START-3.
EXIT EAT
The START-3 Treaty has been signed. What to do next?
The answer is obvious - to decide its fate, remembering that the United States is more clearly and clearly revealing an increasingly sinister and at the same time incompetent desire to lead the world. At the same time, Obama calls for the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles and immediately requests funds to increase funding for the US nuclear complex. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and Schultz, former Senate Arms Committee Chairman Nunn and former US Secretary of Defense Perry have talked about a "nuclear-free world" for years and are now demanding more funding to bolster the nuclear arsenal.
What should Russia do in these conditions? Immediately abandon START-3 due to its insufficient elaboration? The option is reasonable, but not the only one. Without abandoning the idea of mutual reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, the State Duma can propose to America an innovation of the START-3 Treaty. This is what is said in the monograph by A.N. Talalaeva “The Law of International Treaties” (M., “International Relations”, 1985, pp. 236-237): “States rarely simply cancel treaties. More often, the cancellation of an old treaty is accompanied by the conclusion of a new international treaty on the same subject. This is innovation. The innovation of an international treaty is the conclusion on the same issue of a new treaty instead of the previous treaty as a result of its revision (revision). Revision is not a way to terminate contracts, but a procedure through which novation is carried out. "
What the principles and conditions of innovation can be is a separate conversation, now I am simply pointing out a possible option provided by international law.
But what if the State Duma decides to ratify the treaty? Well, there are options here too. I refer the interested reader and the members of the Federal Assembly to the resolution of the US Senate on the ratification of the START II Treaty, adopted on January 2, 26 (see Congressional Record Senate dated January 1996, 27.01.96, pp. S461-S463). In it, the Senate gave "advice and consent to ratification ... subject to the conditions of subparagraph (b) and the statements of subparagraph (C)." Not being able to quote the resolution in detail, I will nevertheless inform you that it contains a number of strict conditions for the US administration "to ensure the safety, reliability and functional effectiveness of its nuclear forces." In particular, it stipulated the obligations of the US administration to implement an effective program "to maintain nuclear ammunition and production capacity", as well as "to support the United States laboratories in the field of nuclear weapons and safeguard the foundations of their competence in this area."
What prevents the State Duma from approaching the problem in the same way, but specifying the conditions in the spirit of the above-formulated six points on START-3?
Moreover, one of the conditions for ratification could be a requirement for the administration of the Russian Federation to officially raise the issue of cooperation in the reproduction of ICBMs of the R-36 type and control systems with Ukraine in Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd with the use of the capabilities of Kharkov, etc. This is by no means an adventurous idea.
First, if Russia is ready to buy weapons from France, if it is possible to officially admit the idea of cooperation with the US and the EU on a "global missile defense", then what prevents at least offering Ukraine cooperation on ICBMs?
Secondly, if the State Duma took such a step, it would only be a return of the supreme legislative body to its own idea of thirteen years ago. On April 4, 1997, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1295-II GD, approving the appeal “To the peoples, presidents and governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the Supreme Council of Ukraine”. This message directly spoke of the need for cooperation and proposed "to begin restoring scientific, technical and industrial cooperation between the two republics, primarily in the field of strategic missile systems."
Considerable funds can also be found for this - at least by giving up the huge expenditures on the Mistrals and reorienting funds for the needs of strategic defense. We also have a Stabilization Fund and other opportunities.
The situation with START-3 has become somewhat clearer. The text of the treaty is known and even the protocol to it seems to be. And immediately a number of experts were quick to declare that the document was not so bad. At the same time, many are sure that he is essentially about nothing. They say that the United States is not reducing anything significant for their nuclear power, and in the long term we are not even “pulling out” the “ceiling” of 800 carriers and 1550 warheads. That is, a compromise has been reached that does little to oblige the parties.
WHAT TO THINK ABOUT
However, questions remain, starting with the following. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev does not rule out Russia's withdrawal from START III in the event of a US missile defense development that threatens our security.
Let's leave aside the fact that the Americans have long proclaimed as their goal the creation of such an anti-missile defense that can intercept up to 200 or more resistant warheads, and this clearly defines the anti-Russian appearance of the US missile defense system, since no other country in the world, except the Russian Federation, can provide a similar retaliation. But there is also another question.
Let's say Moscow in the future will find it necessary to withdraw from START III. Presumably, this will mean that the United States has a fully combat-ready missile defense system as an effective and integral element of ensuring its unpunished first strike against Russia. Is not it?
But then, will it be enough for the Russian Federation those 800 delivery vehicles and 1550 BB that will remain in its strategic nuclear forces in the event of the steady implementation of START-3? After all, there is such a thing as the quantitative saturation of antimissile defense (by the way, the most reliable option for neutralizing it). And we will have nothing to quantify the US missile defense system. At the same time, the fewer effective delivery vehicles Russia has, the more realistic the blow of the American nuclear "sword" from under the "shield" of the missile defense. Seduction is, you know, a serious thing.
That is why the general declaration of the President of the Russian Federation regarding the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from START-3 should be supported by concrete, tangible actions to ensure the possibility of an effective build-up of our nuclear missile potential, including through relevant R&D. Yes, this requires funds, but neutralizing the threat of war is always cheaper than an unforeseen war.
For some reason, the issue of the enormous return potential of the United States was taken out of the brackets in START III. And the question is extremely important. For example, the ground component of the American "triad" is a 3 Minuteman III ICBM with a MIRV. It is reasonable to count them all as nuclear (non-nuclear re-equipment of ICBMs is essentially a bluff). So, if we take the total number of nuclear ICBMs as 450 and consider all of them to be monobloc (with the "standard" number of BB in one MIRV - three), then the US ground component will have 450 charges on 450 carriers. But if all ICBMs remain, then the United States will have a return potential in the ground component, numbering up to 450 charges for ICBMs alone. Plus over 1350 BB on missile boats, plus ALCM, plus SLCM. What are 2000 charges there, have mercy!
And the strange offset of one strategic bomber as a carrier of one charge? In fact, one aviation component of the US "triad" is capable of raising, in principle, several thousand nuclear warheads.
And the telemetry exchange? If you are not going to intercept other people's missiles, you only need to be notified of the launch time and area, and the place where the warhead fell. But detailed telemetry on other people's launches is needed to test our missile defense. The Americans weigh their satellites with measuring-signature means, and then calibrate them according to the data we transmitted. As a result, the United States is improving anti-missile defense to intercept Russian BB under assurances of its focus on destroying ICBMs from rogue countries.
All of the above, although it refers to almost rhetorical questions for professionals (that is, they do not require an answer), were not reflected in START-3. But, as already mentioned, let us abstract from the problem of the inevitable (due to the reduction of the nuclear power of the Russian Federation) development of the US missile defense system, from the return potential, from the strange forms of control - formally "mutual", but necessary precisely for the States.
Let us ask ourselves something else: is the United States capable of reaching an agreement with Russia that would provide the parties with equal security?
There is an almost joking “office instruction”: “§ 1. The boss is always right. § 2. When the boss is wrong, see § 1. " With regard to our case, we can say that Russia should be guided by the following instruction: “§ 1. In modern conditions, the United States will not conclude even a compromise agreement with the Russian Federation, let alone an equal one. § 2. If the USA has entered into a compromise agreement with the Russian Federation, see § 1 ".
We need to understand - this is, firstly. And secondly, to look for a way out of the situation, slowly with the ratification of START III.
SIX ITEMS
I will cite six theses on START III with a few comments. I hope that acquaintance with them will prove useful for the members of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, since the problem of START-3 is now becoming, first of all, their problem. So…
1. Any actions of Russia in the field of nuclear weapons should be based on the understanding that its military security and sovereign future depend on whether the possibility of a deep retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation against any potential aggressor (s) remains.
It should be remembered that large-scale nuclear arms reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States do not reduce the threat of war, but, on the contrary, encourage Washington's adventurous plans and pose a threat to the security of the world, that is, a threat to the security of America as well.
A sharp reduction in nuclear weapons in the context of a developed missile defense system is beneficial only to a potential aggressor. For the one who is going to strike first, it is vitally important to minimize the nuclear weapons of the future victim of aggression or the object of aggressive blackmail. Minimize even at the cost of agreeing to some of your own reductions. This, alas, is the US line.
For those who intend to respond with a blow to the first blow, who need to ensure the containment of aggression, it is more important to maintain the massing of their own strategic nuclear forces than to strive to minimize foreign nuclear weapons. This should be the line of Russia.
Deep cuts in Russia's nuclear arms do not enhance stability, but decrease it. Everything is determined by the possibility or impossibility for the Russian Federation of a deep retaliatory strike against the aggressor in response to his first strike. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.
And it is impossible for Russia to abandon the principle of containment given the geopolitical line currently adopted by the United States.
2. The division of strategic weapons into offensive and defensive is incorrect. The essence of nuclear weapons is strategic defense, or rather, strategic deterrence based on the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia's arsenal. weaponsbut not applying it.
Strategic nuclear weapons, by their very meaning, are a unique military-political means of ensuring global stability. It is not focused on the conduct of real combat operations, an offensive using it is impossible.
The term "offensive weapons" is beneficial to the United States because it imposes on us the American approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. However, from the point of view of international agreements, strategic weapons should be classified not as offensive and defensive, but as stabilizing and destabilizing. If we approach the assessment of nuclear weapons in this way, the true meaning of the US missile defense system will immediately emerge not as a defensive system, but as a dangerous and destabilizing element of Washington's overall strike forces. The essence of US missile defense is not defense, but neutralization of the threat of a retaliatory strike by Russia after an American first strike.
3. If we remember President Medvedev's warning about the possibility of the Russian withdrawal from START-3, then it is necessary to ensure the preservation and development of an appropriate military-technical base, that is, Russia's capabilities for the development and production of MIRVed ICBMs and their nuclear combat equipment.
At the first official hearings on the START-2 Treaty, which took place in the State Duma on July 18, 1995, high-ranking representatives of the RF Ministry of Defense stated that if the United States openly violated the ABM Treaty, Russia should withdraw from START-2.
The United States trampled on the ABM Treaty, but, fortunately, the conditions of the SVN-2 were not fulfilled, because it never entered into force. And if it entered and was fulfilled, and then the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty? What would we be left with then? With gaping holes in the ground in place of silos - these complex engineering structures, without MIRVed ICBMs.
Today we are told about the same about START III. But if Russia at first barbarously blows up its missile silos and physically destroys all or part of ICBMs with MIRVs, and the United States deployed a national missile defense system, then what will be left with Russia, which decided to withdraw from START-3?
That is, our responsible, nationally oriented policy should proceed from the principle of preventing the elimination of even one of our silo ICBMs with MIRVs within the framework of START-3 obligations until the extended service life is completely exhausted, as well as from the principle of complete preservation or conservation of silos of MIRVs. This point is so important that I will return to it below.
4. Our "silo" MIRVed ICBMs, and above all the "heavy" R-36M2 "Voyevoda" ICBMs, are the only reliable military-technical means of ensuring nuclear stability in relations with the United States. America today is actually held back mainly by our stationary ICBMs.
The above does not diminish the importance for ensuring global stability of our naval and aviation nuclear forces, as well as the mobile unit of the Strategic Missile Forces. However, the restraint of the United States is ensured by the presence of the R-36M2 and UR-100N UTTH ICBMs in the Russian Federation.
A few words about mobile Topoli. Their mobility is limited by the area of the positional area, and the permitted exit from its redistribution under special conditions is nothing more than an argument to calm amateurs. The transience of a hypothetical conflict (and even under the conditions of the first attack of the aggressor, when the survivability of our ICBMs is especially important) devalues such a “resolution”.
Further. In the United States, intensive and successful work has been going on for a long time to create means of electronic reconnaissance, disguised as natural objects (stones, stumps, twigs, etc.). These are the so-called smart trees, smart stones, etc. Placing such reconnaissance means operating in sleep mode in the Topol deployment zone (with data transmission to reconnaissance satellites only in anticipation of the first strike) will allow tracking the position of missile systems in real time and with accuracy that devalues their mobility.
Some experts have long argued that our mine complexes are almost completely destroyed in the first strike by the United States, and therefore it is necessary to switch completely to mobile Topol, which alone will provide a retaliatory strike due to their high survivability. The thesis is extremely dubious. You can refute it in detail, but I will limit myself to small.
There is no actual data on the effectiveness of the US nuclear strike forces in nature and cannot be available to anyone, including the US. To have reliable estimates, it is necessary to inflict no less than a real nuclear strike against Russia, which we have not had yet.
And if you guess and count the probabilities, then we must remember that the United States has never allowed its ICBMs and SLBMs on Russia and therefore many factors can affect the accuracy of shooting, including geomagnetic and weather conditions, the rotation of the Earth, failures during launches and on the trajectory, failures in the on-board guidance system, the inability to work out the trajectory parameters in preliminary experimental launches of US missiles on the territory of the Russian Federation, etc. The missile launchers are conducting experimental launches along well-studied routes, but here everything will be unfamiliar. You miss from a distance of thousands of kilometers by just an extra fifty meters, and the Russian mine has already survived. It is impossible to hit absolutely all the mines in the first blow, even theoretically, and even practically - and even more so!
Therefore, we must continue to maintain reliance on heavy "silo" ICBMs.
5. The most important question is how START-3 interprets the right of Russia to preserve our mine ICBMs and silos for an indefinite long time. There is reason to believe that they will become the first real victims of the contract, but this cannot be allowed in any way. In addition, the document is drawn up in such a way that both the rapid destruction of the R-36M2 and the UR-100N UTTH are possible, and, in principle, their operation until the expiration of the warranty period.
Section II of the Protocol to the START-3 Treaty regulates the procedures for the elimination of liquid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs. But they are available only in the Russian strategic nuclear forces. This means that physically only Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are supposed to be eliminated.
This is one of the most dangerous pitfalls of START-3. Some people believe that the treaty does not force us to cut anything, because our strategic nuclear forces, even without it, are supposedly shrinking “landslide” due to aging. However, this is not so - START-3 can become a means of beating up the most convincing part of the Strategic Missile Forces. But to destroy something in them is unacceptable! According to the Strategic Missile Forces command, the Voevoda's service life can be extended to 30 years, and at least until 2016 our “mine” ICBMs must be preserved.
If the State Duma of the Russian Federation does not reject START-3 and starts the process of ratification, then the law on ratification should specifically stipulate that the Russian Federation destroys its "mine" ICBMs not within the framework of contractual obligations, but only upon exhaustion of the resource.
6. In case of ratification of START-3, the federal law should specify to what extent the US missile defense can develop without the RF withdrawal from START-3 and upon reaching what "architecture" of the American missile defense system Russia is obliged to withdraw from the treaty.
All this should find detailed coverage and regulation in the law on ratification. This includes taking into account the deployment of sea and air missile defense elements, the deployment of missile defense systems in outer space, the characteristics of missile defense systems, and so on. For example, is the deployment of missile defense systems in Europe a reason to exit or not? Everything should be defined clearly and in advance at the level, I repeat, of the law.
The refusal to terminate the Arctic activity of the US and British multipurpose nuclear submarines can also be attributed to the factors of the RF withdrawal from START-3.
Separately, it is necessary to note the need for the United States to abandon its capabilities of "return" potential and the right of Russia to withdraw from START-3 when the United States attempts to hide this potential behind the curtain of the "non-nuclear" re-equipment of US strategic delivery systems.
The continuation of the US geopolitical activity within the Russian geopolitical space should also be referred to as possible factors for withdrawing from START-3.
EXIT EAT
The START-3 Treaty has been signed. What to do next?
The answer is obvious - to decide its fate, remembering that the United States is more clearly and clearly revealing an increasingly sinister and at the same time incompetent desire to lead the world. At the same time, Obama calls for the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles and immediately requests funds to increase funding for the US nuclear complex. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and Schultz, former Senate Arms Committee Chairman Nunn and former US Secretary of Defense Perry have talked about a "nuclear-free world" for years and are now demanding more funding to bolster the nuclear arsenal.
What should Russia do in these conditions? Immediately abandon START-3 due to its insufficient elaboration? The option is reasonable, but not the only one. Without abandoning the idea of mutual reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, the State Duma can propose to America an innovation of the START-3 Treaty. This is what is said in the monograph by A.N. Talalaeva “The Law of International Treaties” (M., “International Relations”, 1985, pp. 236-237): “States rarely simply cancel treaties. More often, the cancellation of an old treaty is accompanied by the conclusion of a new international treaty on the same subject. This is innovation. The innovation of an international treaty is the conclusion on the same issue of a new treaty instead of the previous treaty as a result of its revision (revision). Revision is not a way to terminate contracts, but a procedure through which novation is carried out. "
What the principles and conditions of innovation can be is a separate conversation, now I am simply pointing out a possible option provided by international law.
But what if the State Duma decides to ratify the treaty? Well, there are options here too. I refer the interested reader and the members of the Federal Assembly to the resolution of the US Senate on the ratification of the START II Treaty, adopted on January 2, 26 (see Congressional Record Senate dated January 1996, 27.01.96, pp. S461-S463). In it, the Senate gave "advice and consent to ratification ... subject to the conditions of subparagraph (b) and the statements of subparagraph (C)." Not being able to quote the resolution in detail, I will nevertheless inform you that it contains a number of strict conditions for the US administration "to ensure the safety, reliability and functional effectiveness of its nuclear forces." In particular, it stipulated the obligations of the US administration to implement an effective program "to maintain nuclear ammunition and production capacity", as well as "to support the United States laboratories in the field of nuclear weapons and safeguard the foundations of their competence in this area."
What prevents the State Duma from approaching the problem in the same way, but specifying the conditions in the spirit of the above-formulated six points on START-3?
Moreover, one of the conditions for ratification could be a requirement for the administration of the Russian Federation to officially raise the issue of cooperation in the reproduction of ICBMs of the R-36 type and control systems with Ukraine in Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd with the use of the capabilities of Kharkov, etc. This is by no means an adventurous idea.
First, if Russia is ready to buy weapons from France, if it is possible to officially admit the idea of cooperation with the US and the EU on a "global missile defense", then what prevents at least offering Ukraine cooperation on ICBMs?
Secondly, if the State Duma took such a step, it would only be a return of the supreme legislative body to its own idea of thirteen years ago. On April 4, 1997, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1295-II GD, approving the appeal “To the peoples, presidents and governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the Supreme Council of Ukraine”. This message directly spoke of the need for cooperation and proposed "to begin restoring scientific, technical and industrial cooperation between the two republics, primarily in the field of strategic missile systems."
Considerable funds can also be found for this - at least by giving up the huge expenditures on the Mistrals and reorienting funds for the needs of strategic defense. We also have a Stabilization Fund and other opportunities.
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