Measure seven times ...

Can the United States agree today on equal security with Russia?

The situation with the START-3 is somewhat cleared up. The text of the treaty is known, and even the protocol to it seems to be. And immediately a number of experts were quick to say that the document is not so bad. At the same time, many believe that he is essentially about anything. They say that the United States does not reduce anything essential for their nuclear power, and we are not “pulling out” even the “ceiling” in 800 carriers and 1550 charges. That is, some little compromise is reached to what is binding on the parties.


However, questions remain, starting with the following. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev does not rule out Russia's withdrawal from START-3 in the event that US missile defense threatens our security.

Leaving aside the fact that the Americans long ago proclaimed as their goal the creation of such an anti-missile defense system that can intercept 200 and more resistant warheads, and this uniquely determines the anti-Russian aspect of the US missile defense system, since no other country in the world, except the Russian Federation, can provide similar retaliation. But there is another question.

Suppose that Moscow in the future will consider it necessary to withdraw from START-3. This, it must be assumed, will mean that the States have a fully combat-ready missile defense system as an effective and integral element in ensuring their unpunished first strike against Russia. Is not it?

But then will there be enough for the RF those 800 carriers and 1550 BB, which will remain as part of its strategic nuclear forces in the case of the steady implementation of START-3? After all, there is such a thing as quantitative saturation of the antimissile defense (the most reliable version of its neutralization, by the way). And we will have nothing to quantitatively saturate the US missile defense system. At the same time, the less effective carriers Russia has, the more real the strike of the American nuclear “sword” from under the “shield” of missile defense. The temptation is, you know, a serious thing.

That is why the general declaration of the President of the Russian Federation regarding the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from START-3 should be supported by concrete, tangible actions to ensure the possibility of effectively building up our nuclear missile potential, including through appropriate R & D. Yes, this requires funds, but neutralizing the threat of war always costs less than an unprotected war.

For some reason, the question of the huge return potential of the USA was put out of brackets in START-3. And the question is extremely important. Say, the ground component of the American “triad” is the 450 ICBM “Minuteman-III” with an MFR. It is reasonable to count all of them nuclear (non-nuclear retrofitting of ICBMs is essentially a bluff). So, if we take the total number of nuclear ICBMs as 450 and consider all of them to be monoblock (with a “full-time” number of WBs in one HWPM — three), then in the US ground component there will be 450 charges on 450 carriers. But if all the ICBMs remain, then the States will have a return potential in the ground component, numbering up to 1350 charges only for ICBMs. Plus more 2000 BB on missile boats, plus ALCM, plus SLCM. What are there 1550 charges, have mercy!

And the strange set-off of one strategic bomber as a carrier of one charge? In fact, one aviation The US “triad” component is capable of raising, in principle, several thousand nuclear warheads.

And the exchange of telemetry? If you are not going to intercept someone else's missiles, you only need notice of the time and area of ​​launch, the place of the fall of the head part. But detailed telemetry on alien launches is needed to work out its missile defense system. The Americans load their satellites with measuring and signature means, and then calibrate them using the data we transmit. As a result, the US is improving missile defense to intercept Russian BBs, under assurances of its focus on destroying the rogue states' ICBMs.

All of the above, although it refers to questions for professionals almost rhetorical (that is, no response is required), was not reflected in START-3. But, as has already been said, let us digress from the problem of the inevitable (due to the reduction of the nuclear power of the Russian Federation) development of the US missile defense system, from the return potential, from strange forms of control - formally “mutual”, but necessary for the States.

Let us ask ourselves about something else: can the United States today go to an agreement with Russia, which provides the parties equal security?

There is an almost humorous “job description”: “§ 1. The boss is always right. § 2. When the boss is wrong, see § 1. ” With regard to our case, we can say that Russia should be guided by the following instruction: “§ 1. In modern conditions, the United States will not enter into even a compromise agreement with the Russian Federation, let alone equal rights. § 2. If the US has entered into a compromise agreement with the Russian Federation, see § 1. ”

We need to understand - this is, first. And secondly - to look for a way out of the situation, slowly with the ratification of START-3.


Measure seven times ...I will cite six abstracts on START-3 with a few comments. I hope that acquaintance with them will be useful for members of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, since the problem of START-3 is now becoming primarily their problem.

So ...

1. Any actions of Russia in the field of nuclear weapons should be based on the understanding that its military security and sovereign future depend on whether the possibility of a deep retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation on any potential aggressor (s).

At the same time, it must be remembered that large-scale reductions in nuclear armaments of the Russian Federation and the United States do not reduce the threat of war, but, on the contrary, encourage Washington’s adventurous designs and pose a threat to the security of the world, that is, a threat to security including America.

A sharp reduction in nuclear weapons in a developed missile defense system is beneficial only to a potential aggressor. For the one who is going to strike first, it is vital to minimize the nuclear weapons of a future victim of aggression or an object of aggressive blackmail. Minimize even at the cost of consent for some of their cuts. This, alas, is the US line.

To the same person who intends to respond with a blow to the first blow, who needs to ensure the containment of aggression, it is more important to maintain massing of their own strategic nuclear forces, rather than striving to minimize foreign nuclear weapons. This should be the line of Russia.

Deep cuts in Russian nuclear weapons do not enhance stability, but reduce it. Everything is determined by the possibility or impossibility for the RF of a deep retaliatory strike to the aggressor in response to its first strike. The essence of nuclear deterrence is this.

And to abandon the principle of deterrence with the geopolitical line, which is now adopted by the United States, Russia is impossible.

2. Dividing strategic weapons into offensive and defensive is incorrect. The essence of nuclear weapons is strategic defense, or rather, strategic deterrence based on the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia's arsenal. weaponsbut not applying it.

Strategic nuclear weapons, by their very meaning, are a unique military-political means of ensuring global stability. It is not focused on the conduct of real combat operations, an offensive with its use is impossible.

The term "offensive weapons" is beneficial to the United States because it imposes on us the American approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. However, from the point of view of international agreements, strategic weapons should be classified not as offensive and defensive, but as stabilizing and destabilizing. If we approach the evaluation of nuclear weapons in this way, the true meaning of the US missile defense system will immediately manifest itself not as a defense system, but as a dangerous and destabilizing element of Washington’s general strike forces. The essence of the US missile defense system is not defense, but the neutralization of the threat of a retaliatory strike by Russia after the first strike by America.

3. If we keep in mind President Medvedev’s warning about the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from START-3, then it is necessary to ensure the preservation and development of an appropriate military-technical base, that is, Russia's capabilities for the development and production of ICBMs with RFB and their nuclear combat equipment.

At the first official hearings on the START-2 Treaty, which took place in the 18 State Duma on July 1995, high-ranking representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry stated that if the US openly violated the ABM Treaty, Russia would have to leave START-2.

The United States trampled on the ABM Treaty, but, fortunately, the conditions of ETS-2 were not fulfilled, because it never entered into force. And if entered and was executed, and then the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty? What would we stay with? With gaping holes in the ground at the place of silos - these complex engineering structures, without ICBMs with a MFR.

Today we are told about the same about START-3. But if Russia first barbarously detonates its rocket mines and physically destroys all or part of the ICBMs with the MIRV and the United States deploys a national missile defense system, then what will be left for Russia who decides to withdraw from START-3?

That is, our responsible, nationally-oriented policy should proceed from the principle of preventing liquidation, within the framework of the obligations of START-3, even by one of our mine-controlled ICBMs with a MFV to the complete exhaustion of the prolonged resource, as well as from the principle of the complete preservation or conservation of the MEP. This moment is so important that I will return to it later.

4. Our “mine” ICBMs with an RCM and, above all, the “heavy” ICBM of the R-36М2 “Voevoda” are the only reliable military-technical means of ensuring nuclear stability in relations with the United States. Today, our stationary ICBMs are actually holding back America.

This does not diminish the importance for ensuring the global stability of our naval and aviation nuclear forces, as well as the mobile part of the Strategic Missile Forces. However, US restraint is ensured by the presence of the Russian Federation precisely the ICBM P-36М2 and УР-100Н УТТХ.

A few words about the mobile Topol. Their mobility is limited by the area of ​​the positional area, and the permitted output for its redistribution under special conditions is no more than an argument for calming down amateurs. The transience of a hypothetical conflict (and even in the conditions of the first strike of the aggressor, when the survivability of our ICBMs is especially important) devalues ​​such a “resolution”.

Further. In the United States, intensive and successful work has been carried out on the creation of radio-electronic reconnaissance equipment disguised as natural objects (stones, stumps, branches, etc.). These are the so-called smart trees, smart stones, and others. Placing such reconnaissance tools operating in sleep mode (with data transfer to reconnaissance satellites only on the eve of the first strike) in the deployment area of ​​the Topol, will allow you to track the position of the missile systems in real time and with accuracy depreciating their mobility.

Some experts have long argued that our mine complexes are almost completely destroyed in the first strike of the United States and therefore, we must completely switch over to mobile Topol, which alone will provide a retaliatory strike due to high survivability. Thesis is extremely doubtful. You can refute it in detail, but I will limit myself to small.

Actual data on the effectiveness of the US strike nuclear forces in nature is not and cannot be anyone, including the United States. In order to have reliable estimates, it is necessary to inflict a real nuclear strike on Russia, which we have not had so far.

And if you guess and consider the probabilities, then you have to remember that the USA never allowed its ICBMs and SLBMs to Russia, and therefore many factors can affect the accuracy of shooting, including geomagnetic and weather conditions, Earth rotation, failures during launches and trajectories, failures in the onboard guidance system, the inability to work out the parameters of the trajectory in the preliminary experimental launches of US missiles into the territory of the Russian Federation, etc. The rocket men conduct experienced launches along well-studied routes, and then everything will be unfamiliar. You miss a total of fifty meters from a distance of thousands of kilometers, and the Russian mine has already survived. It is impossible to hit absolutely all mines in the first strike even theoretically, and even practically - and even more so!

Therefore, we should continue to rely on heavy "mine" ICBMs.

5. The most important is the question of how START-3 interprets the right of Russia for an indefinitely long time to preserve precisely our mine ICBMs and silos. There is reason to believe that they will be the first real victims of the treaty, but this cannot be allowed to happen. In addition, the document is drafted in such a way that both the quick destruction of the P-36М2 and УР-100Н УТТХ, and in principle their operation until the expiration of the warranty period is possible.

Section II of the Protocol to the START-3 Treaty governs procedures for the elimination of liquid ICBMs and SLBMs. But they exist only in the Russian strategic nuclear forces. This means that only Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are supposed to be physically eliminated.

This is one of the most dangerous pitfalls of START-3. Some people believe that the treaty does not force us to reduce anything, because our SNF and without it, they say, are shrinking "collapse" due to aging. However, this is not so - START-3 can become a means of beating the most convincing part of the Strategic Missile Forces. But to destroy something in them is unacceptable! According to the statements of the Strategic Missile Forces Command, the life of the Voivode can be extended to 30 years and at least until 2016, our “mine” ICBMs should be maintained.

If the State Duma of the Russian Federation does not reject START-3 and starts the ratification process, the ratification law should specifically state that the Russian Federation destroys its “mine” ICBMs not within the framework of contractual obligations, but only after the resource has been exhausted.

6. In the event of ratification of START-3, federal law should indicate to what extent the US missile defense can develop without RF withdrawing from START-3 and upon reaching which “architecture” of the American missile defense system Russia is obliged to withdraw from the treaty.

All this should find detailed coverage and regulation in the law of ratification. This includes taking into account the placement of sea and aviation missile defense elements, the deployment of missile defense in outer space, the characteristics of missile defense, etc. Let’s say deployment of a missile defense system in Europe is a reason to exit or not? Everything must be defined clearly and in advance at the level, I repeat, of the law.

The refusal to stop the Arctic activity of multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the USA and England can also be attributed to the factors of the RF withdrawal from START-3.

Separately, it is necessary to note the need for the United States to abandon their “returnable” potential and the right of Russia to withdraw from START-3 when the United States attempts to hide this potential behind a “non-nuclear” retrofitting of US strategic carriers.

It is also necessary to attribute the continuation of US geopolitical activity within the Russian geopolitical space to possible factors of exit from START-3.


The START-3 agreement is signed. What to do next?

The answer is obvious - to decide his fate, remembering that the United States is more and more clearly discovering an increasingly ominous and at the same time incompetent desire to rule the world. At the same time, Obama calls for a reduction in strategic carriers and immediately requests funds to increase funding for the US nuclear complex. Former Secretary of State Kissinger and Schulz, former chairman of the Senate Arms Committee Nunn and former US Secretary of Defense Perry have been talking about a “nuclear-free world” for years, and now they are demanding an increase in allocations to strengthen the nuclear arsenal.

What should Russia do in these conditions? Immediately abandon the START-3 because of its insufficient elaboration? The option is reasonable, but not the only one. Without abandoning the idea of ​​reciprocal cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, the State Duma can offer America a novation of the START-3 Treaty. That is what is said in the monograph of A.N. Talalaeva “The Law of International Treaties” (M., “International Relations”, 1985, p. 236-237): “States rarely simply cancel contracts. More often, the cancellation of the old treaty is accompanied by the conclusion of a new international treaty on the same subject. This is an innovation. An innovation of an international treaty is the conclusion on the same issue of a new treaty instead of a previous treaty as a result of its revision (revision). Revision is not a way to terminate contracts, but a procedure by which innovation takes place. ”

What may be the principles and conditions of the novation - a separate conversation, I am now simply pointing out the option that is possible and provided by international law.

But if the State Duma decides to ratify the treaty? Well, and there are options. I refer the interested reader and members of the Federal Assembly to the resolution of the US Senate on ratifying the START-2 Treaty, adopted on January 26, 1996 (see 27.01.96 Congressional Record Senate, pp. S461-S463). In it, the Senate gave "advice and consent to ratification ... subject to the conditions of subparagraph (b) and the statements of subparagraph ©". Not being able to quote the resolution in detail, I will nevertheless report that there are a number of stringent conditions for the US administration "to ensure the safety, reliability and functional effectiveness of their nuclear forces." In particular, there were stipulated the obligations of the US administration to implement an effective program “to maintain nuclear ammunition and production facilities”, as well as “to support the United States laboratories in the field of nuclear weapons and protect the fundamentals of their competence in this field”.

What prevents the State Duma from approaching the problem in the same way, but specifying conditions in the spirit of the above six points on START-3?

Moreover, one of the conditions for ratification could be the requirement for the administration of the Russian Federation to officially raise the issue of cooperation on the reproduction of ICBMs of the P-36 type and control systems with Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk and Pavlograd with the connection of Kharkiv capabilities, etc. This is not an adventurous idea.

First, if Russia is ready to buy weapons from France, if it is possible to officially admit the idea of ​​cooperation with the US and the EU on a “global missile defense system”, what prevents at least offer Ukraine cooperation on ICBMs?

Secondly, if the State Duma took such a step, it would only be a return of the highest legislative body to its own idea, thirteen years old. 4 on April 1997, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution No. 1295-II DG approving the appeal “To the peoples, presidents and governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and to the Supreme Council of Ukraine”. This message directly spoke of the need for cooperation and proposed "to start restoring scientific, technical and industrial cooperation between the two republics, primarily in the field of strategic missile systems."

You can find a lot of money for it - at least due to the rejection of the huge costs of Mistral and the reorientation of funds for the needs of strategic defense. We also have a stabilization fund and other opportunities.
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