START 3: win, lose or draw?

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The success of Russian diplomacy can only be consolidated by the development and improvement of the Russian strategic nuclear forces

START 3: win, lose or draw?So, on April 8, 2010 in Prague, the presidents of Russia and the United States in a solemn atmosphere put their signatures under the document with the code name START III. However, in our country passions continue to boil over the forthcoming reduction of strategic offensive arms, and not less than during the negotiation process that preceded the conclusion of the Russian-American agreement.

By the way, in the United States, the document was perceived rather calmly. But in the Russian Federation, a completely different picture is observed. And if the official structures talk about the great victory of Russian foreign policy, a historic event, the triumph of Russian diplomacy, then the opposition political forces accuse the Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of almost betraying national interests. As always in such cases, the truth should be found somewhere in between.

IF DO NOT PRESS AND DO NOT HURRY

The Russian leadership presents START-3 as historical a step in relations between our country and the United States, as a measure to strengthen planetary stability, as an outstanding victory of our foreign policy. In Washington, such enthusiastic speeches are not heard, and Republicans naturally criticize the Democratic president for making concessions to Russia.

Let us try, however, using the method of geopolitical analysis to understand the meaning of the historical event that took place in the Czech capital. But first I want to note: the last leader of the USSR and the first president of Russia were united in their desire to sign at least some kind of treaty with the United States on the problems of strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time, they, as a rule, played on the American side against their generals, diplomats, and "defense workers".

The author witnessed the irritation of Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze when Marshal Sergei Akhromeev and his negotiating team insisted on the observance of the principle of equality in matters of accounting and reduction of strategic nuclear forces. "Are you not enough missiles?" Gorbachev asked indignantly. And Shevardnadze informed the Soviet military: “Concerning cruise missiles (as well as Anglo-French nuclear weapons, including aviation nuclear facilities. - L. I.), we have already agreed with Mr. Baker (US Secretary of State. - L. I.). " This approach led to the fact that the Soviet side, in accordance with the INF Treaty, eliminated one and a half times as many shorter and medium-range missile systems that were twice as large as the American Pershing. Plus, for the sake of "universal human values", it included in the same document a clause providing for the destruction of the world's best operational-tactical complex "Oka".

Boris Yeltsin also put pressure on specialists in the process of preparing the START II Treaty, without any expertise announced the removal of warheads from strategic missiles or their non-targeting at US targets. And all for the sake of improving relations with Washington.

The same desire to sign something almost seized the Kremlin this time too. Evidence of this is the immediate agreement with the American president's initiative, the counter plan with the desire to destroy more Russian nuclear weapons than Washington offers, and the shortened terms of the negotiation process.

Fortunately, the Russian delegation at the negotiations with the Americans turned out to be, firstly, professional in composition, and secondly, in a state responsibility. The Russian Foreign Ministry behaved with dignity, without putting pressure on it, not demanding to meet tight deadlines or to yield on any positions. At the same time, our sober experts and politicians understood that the future treaty was not critical for Russia; it is much more important to restore defense-industrial cooperation and the ability to create modern weapons systems.



PUBLIC SUPPORT REQUIRED

The main task of the Russian delegation was to prevent the reduction of the Russian strategic nuclear forces to the level at which the accelerating deployment of the US missile defense system could neutralize our retaliatory strike, because then the nuclear weapon Russia will lose its importance as a deterrent. The Russian negotiators had to solve one more, no less important task - to enable the Russian defense-industrial complex to develop the country's strategic nuclear forces. That is, not to bind the freedom of thought and action of Russian designers, production workers and technologists with the provisions laid down in the previous START-1 Treaty.

And yet, the members of our delegation at the talks needed public support to neutralize pressure from both overseas colleagues and Russian liberal pro-American forces. Therefore, the military expert community of the Russian Federation (including the author of this article) harshly criticized the proposal to go for disproportionate reductions in domestic strategic nuclear forces. For example, the question arose: from what level should we “dance”, declaring its readiness to reduce the number of Russian strategic nuclear weapons by more than a third - from the actual availability or from the figure stipulated by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty? Another question: what to do with the provisions of the START-1 Treaty that are disadvantageous for Russia? The third question is about linking strategic offensive arms with the deployment of the American missile defense system, an increase in the number of sea-based strategic cruise missiles, with a return potential.

The US delegation initially took an offensive and even somewhat aggressive stance in the negotiations. The theses of its leader clearly outlined the strategy of the negotiation process, which, alas, is basically unacceptable for Russia. Here are some of the most typical statements: “We believe that the START-3 Treaty should consolidate the provisions of the START-1 and START-2 Treaties, including the provisions on verification ... We believe that all START treaties should be indefinite ... We would like to propose strengthening control for conducting inspections at a Russian enterprise for the production of soil mobile installations. "

Further, in the American statements, command notes were sounded in general, namely, to install more modern special identification marks on the Topols, to take on an eternal obligation not to withdraw from the treaty. The Americans even put forward a proposal that the Russian President, in an official letter addressed to the US President, unilaterally undertake not to produce nuclear warheads at the enterprises in Sarov and Zaraisk. And this is only part of the "constructivism" of the transatlantic sample. At the same time, the United States actively defended its negotiating positions using congressmen, politicians, the military, and the media. Naturally, many domestic military experts and the media, including the "military-industrial complex", also joined the information struggle to support the Russian delegation. Moreover, they had to debate with the arguments of both the American side and its like-minded people in Russia.

POSITIVE MOMENTS

During the negotiations, the Russian delegation managed to cut off the flawed provisions (including increased American control) of the previous START-1, which became an unpleasant surprise for our overseas partners, to exclude the linkage of the new agreement with the START-2 Treaty, which has not been ratified by the US Senate, to simplify the logic of the document ( for example, the parties limit the total number of carriers, and not for each of the types of carriers, as before), write in it that strategic nuclear weapons should be deployed only on national territory, prohibit the deployment of missile defense systems in mines and on submarines where intercontinental missiles, to minimize the possibility of maintaining the return potential.

There are other positive points in the text of the START III Treaty. But it was not possible to stop the development of the American missile defense system and the buildup of the arsenal of conventional high-precision strategic weapons, and, in fact, it was impossible to do so. These two areas have become a "sacred cow" for the military-political strategy of Washington. In the course of negotiations, the US Congress adopted a law which clearly states: the reduction of strategic offensive assets does not limit the deployment of defensive systems. Pentagon chief Robert Gates said at a specially convened press conference: "... now, instead of intercepting several separate missiles, it is about creating a system capable of neutralizing hundreds of ballistic missiles that can come from the territory of hostile states."

Which state is capable of launching hundreds of missiles at the United States, not only in the short term, but also in the long term, is not worth guessing: only Russia. But why is Washington, despite the "reset" in relations with Moscow, "to death" stands for building up the class of high-precision cruise missiles and missile defense?

WASHINGTON DESIGNS

Let's try to get into the essence of the changes in the American military-political strategy.

2002 year. George W. Bush sets up a commission to prepare a "nuclear review". Her report contains the following findings:
 - the new Russia does not pose a more serious nuclear threat to the United States;
 - American strategic nuclear weapons are not an effective means of the US political strategy in the security sphere, they cannot protect America from terrorist threats, they do not serve the purposes of pressure on rogue states;
 - the maintenance of strategic nuclear forces requires significant financial costs, not meeting the "efficiency-cost" criterion.

In short, the US elite has rethought the role of strategic nuclear weapons in the implementation of their geopolitical idea of ​​world domination: the nuclear weapons of countries that are opponents of the concept of an American global peace (peace in the American way) are a factor hindering Washington's plans, since these countries (Russia and China) may snap back and retaliate against United States territory. Both Russians and Chinese sometimes do not act according to Western logic. Mysterious souls.

As a result of a stormy discussion of the nuclear review, a decision is made to cut costs for the maintenance and development of strategic nuclear forces and increase allocations for the development of new generation conventional weapons. As a compromise with the supporters of nuclear weapons, those who see a nuclear threat in Russia and China, a decision is made to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to deploy a global strategic missile defense system. In 2003, George W. Bush approved the concept of the "Rapid Global Strike" (BSU) and Washington officially withdraws from the ABM Treaty. The United States General Strike Command is being created; it is planned to transfer 450 installations from the strategic nuclear forces to it, modernizing them into means of launching high-precision weapons with conventional warheads. Work begins on the conversion of the four largest Ohio-class submarines to cruise missiles. Instead of 24 SLBMs "Trident-2", 160 SLCMs "modernized Tomahawk" are installed on the boats. Part of the Trident-2 SLBM is planned to be re-equipped with conventional high-precision, deep-penetrating warheads. At the same time, work is intensifying on the creation of strategic cruise missiles of a new class (range - up to 6000 km, speed - Mach 6). A large-scale program for the deployment of 1400 strategic missile defense facilities is being implemented.

The BSU concept assumes the infliction of a powerful concentrated strike with several thousand high-precision weapons on the target country within 2-4 hours, the destruction of the most important objects that determine the strategic stability of the state and forcing it to surrender. This concept became an idefix of the George W. Bush administration, as such it migrated to the Barack Obama administration. In general, the American pragmatists came to a rational conclusion: why spend a lot of money on weapons that cannot be used (due to the fact that there is a possibility of retaliation and the danger of radiation contamination of large areas).

The "problems" of Yugoslavia and Iraq were solved not by nuclear, but by conventional means of destruction. And the main role in the operations was played by high-precision cruise missiles and aerial bombs. The implementation of the BSU concept allows the Americans to break away from all other countries of the planet for at least a generation in the field of conventional weapons and become a global military-technical monopoly. That is, to turn into a power dictator of the modern world.

At the same time, just in case, the United States insures itself against retaliation from Russia and China by deploying a strategic missile defense system. To reduce the cost of solving the above-mentioned problems, the Obama administration is promoting a "pigeon" anti-nuclear program. In order to force a new political security strategy, or rather call it a policy of absolute impunity, the United States is rapidly increasing military spending, turning NATO into a planetary gendarme. And at the same time they are crucifying about a universal nuclear-free world, at the same time planning "live-fire exercises" on the territory of Iran in order to test the effectiveness of the BSU concept in practice. Such is the American-style peacefulness.

A number of important nuances

It is appropriate here to recall several episodes from the relatively recent past. Previous agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms between the USA and the USSR sometimes had dramatic consequences in addition to political positives. Thus, John F. Kennedy, who allegedly yielded to Nikita Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis and agreed to withdraw nuclear weapons from the borders of the Soviet Union, was shot dead in Texas. Richard Nixon, who launched the disarmament process on the American side, ended (I think, under the influence of the ABM and SALT treaties signed in 1972 and a general breakthrough in relations between the USSR and the United States) by forced resignation under the threat of impeachment. Soon after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Khrushchev was retired. The drop that overflowed the patience of the Soviet elite was allegedly concessions to the Americans in the Caribbean crisis and the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Mikhail Gorbachev was removed from the post of President of the USSR with the powerful support of the security officials, who did not forgive him for concessions in the INF and START treaties.

Another historical aspect of this disarmament problem is the issue of compromises. The Soviet pre-Gorbachev leadership was very cautious and attentive to the parity reduction of the country's main weapons. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze violated the principle of parity. But in conditions when the count went to thousands of carriers and warheads, one could close one's eyes to these costs - a hundred less, a hundred more, it still cost nothing to destroy the other side and die yourself. This was the main deterrent: no one wanted to die, even inflicting more damage on the enemy (our planet had never seen suicide states).

Today the situation is different. The account goes to hundreds of both delivery vehicles and warheads. In the Russian position, the main element is the carriers of nuclear warheads. Soviet missiles carried 6-10 multiple warheads each (R-36 m-2 carried 40 more false targets and broke through any missile defense). Now we have mostly "single-headed" missiles, in the future, "three-headed". With the withdrawal of Soviet carriers from the combat strength of our strategic nuclear forces and in the conditions of the Americans building up a strategic missile defense system, the situation may become critical for the Russian side.

The Russian Foreign Ministry announced the possibility of an early withdrawal from the START-3 Treaty. But what will this give us in terms of security? If the domestic defense-industrial complex manages to recover and, together with the Armed Forces, keeps the United States from the temptation to resort to a quick global strike using high-precision weapons, then it makes no sense to withdraw from the agreement. If we fail with promising means for strategic nuclear forces, then the Americans do not care about our diplomatic demarches.

But, as they say in Odessa, there are options. If the United States builds up its missile defense system and high-precision weapons to a dangerous limit, then Russia may offer China to conclude an agreement on joint counteraction against the American missile defense system. That is, about a joint launch of Russian and Chinese missiles in the event ... Such a step will sober up any American administration, make international security more balanced, and significantly enhance Russia's security from both the western and eastern strategic directions.

As for the START III Treaty, it logically fits into the new American nuclear doctrine. Does Russia need this document? It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. Our strategic nuclear arsenal, which includes 3 carriers, about 608 nuclear warheads, and the possibility of building up the former, achieved during the negotiations, retain the basis for deterrence. Powerful information and public opposition to the plans of the United States, domestic liberals, honest, responsible work of the Russian delegation at the negotiations with the constructive support of the Russian Foreign Ministry did not allow the worst intentions to come true.

But nevertheless, the contract is just paper. It records American programs for transforming the US military-political strategy. And there is confidence that Washington, under any presidential administration, will persistently implement them. For the Russian side, filling even the minimum parameters of the document with a material basis will become a serious problem. Therefore, we can state that a draw was most likely recorded in Prague. But the political sound of the treaty is beyond doubt for Moscow: even discussing the strategic nuclear forces with the United States on equal terms has already raised Russia's geopolitical status. And the support of this signing of the reputation of the Nobel Peace Prize laureate is very beneficial to us: Obama is trying to change America for the better. God grant. There are no other problems where we would be equal with the Americans: we are with them in different weight categories.

The agreement signed on April 8 in Prague is the undoubted success of Russian foreign policy. True, only theoretically affecting the security of the Russian Federation.
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