Inkerman battle. Part of 2
Pavlov's offensivePavlov's detachment made a speech at night and arrived at the Inkerman bridge in the early morning, as planned. However, he could not move further, as the sailors who restored the bridge, although they worked together, did not have time to complete the work before the 7 hours. When Pavlov's troops came out, there was a rumble of artillery cannonade from the direction of Sevastopol, a Soymonov detachment began the battle. Pavlov's detachment was advancing in three directions. The first attacked the enemy Tarutinsky and Borodino regiments. Okhotsk, Yakut and Selenginsky regiments with all the artillery of the detachment came later.
When the frustrated forces of the Soymonov detachment were already withdrawing, the forward battalions of the Pavlov detachment began to climb the heights occupied by the enemy. Two battalions of the Tarutinsky Regiment, despite the accurate fire from the British Adams brigade and the steepness of the climb, clinging to stones and bushes, reached the top of the plateau and hit the right flank of the enemy. Two other battalions of the Tarutinsky Regiment and the Borodinsky Regiment also attacked the enemy. The Adams brigade began to depart. Tarutintsy attacked the battery number 1, on which the British installed two guns. The British artillerymen fired a salvo with grapeshot at close range, a lot of people fell, but the rest closed ranks and broke into the battery. All the British were killed.
The battle took on an extremely fierce character. The British proved to be a strong opponent. The Adams brigade was not going to retreat, the British retreated, rebuilt and opened heavy fire, taking advantage of the superiority of their small arms. Then the British went to the counter. Our rangers suffered great losses, so the British were able to fight off the battery. Tarutinsky and Borodinsky regiments retreated, rebuilt and again overturned the enemy. But at that time reinforcements approached the Adams brigade - six fresh battalions of the Bentinka Guards brigade. In addition, knocking over Soymonov’s squadron, the Pennefazer brigade headed for the Adams brigade to help. The Russian Kammer 17 division, already frustrated by the previous battle, retreated first to the Quarry Ravine and then to the Inkerman Valley. The devastation in the officers' ranks and a huge decline in two regiments forced General Pavlov to abandon the idea of again leaving the Tarutinsky and Borodinsky regiments into battle.
Reflecting the attack of the advanced Russian regiments of the 10th and 17th divisions, the British retreated somewhat. The Bentinka Guards Brigade was on the right flank, the Adams and Pennefazer brigades, which suffered heavy losses in battle, in the center. The Buller team was on the left flank. Codrington's team remained on the left bank of the Kylen beam. Lord Raglan, arriving at the scene of the battle at 7 o'clock, was convinced of the complete exhaustion of the 2nd English division, and ordered to speed up the movement of the units of Cattart and England. The Kartkart division was supposed to strengthen the right flank, and John Campbell's brigade was to strengthen the left flank. Thirty 9-pound guns fired with batteries from the Soimonov detachment. Artillery and armory skirmish was replaced by violent hand-to-hand fights. The gun servants of the Russian guns suffered heavy losses, and not so much from the English guns, but from the fire of the gunners-nippers.
The French General Bosque, who realized by cannonade that the British had attacked, immediately led the troops of the observational corps into full combat readiness and, in 8 hours, sent a brigade of African rangers, part of the infantry and two batteries to help the allies. Boske offered assistance to Generals Brown and Katkart. The proud British refused at first, saying that they had enough strength. But then they asked to support the right flank of the English army. Bosque sent to the right flank two reinforced infantry battalions with two horse-drawn artillery batteries. Later, realizing that there was no threat from the Chorgun detachment, he began to prepare the main forces for the transfer to the most dangerous sector, the positions of the British army. Peter Gorchakov did not dare to attack the Sapun Mountain, and thus gave the French General Bosque the opportunity to support British troops. A participant in the Crimean War, General Alexander Khrushchev, in his Notes, said: “Probably the boss, who was more enterprising and imbued with a high sense of patriotism, would have decided to sacrifice himself and part of the squad for the success of the main attack,” ". Others noted that Gorchakov was personally a brave man (for example, on Alma he personally led soldiers to the attack), but the general did not appreciate the benefits of his position and missed the chance to change the course of the battle in favor of the Russian army.
Meanwhile, the shelves of the second line of Pavlov's squad (11-I division) went to the attack. The ascent to the plateau was extremely difficult, so the artillery lagged far behind. The head units did not wait for the artillery to approach and attacked the enemy. The first to attack the enemy was the Okhotsk regiment. The hunters were met with dense artillery and rifle fire and suffered heavy losses. But they were supported by the sappers of the 4 th battalion, and the Russian soldiers knocked over the enemy’s rifle chain, making it possible for the rest of the troops to line up. The Okhotsk regiment was in the forefront in two lines, followed by the Yakut and Selenginsky regiments. Russian artillery concentrated fire on the battery number 1, which was previously taken tarutintsy.
The fight again took an extremely stubborn character. The hunters broke through the crossfire of the enemy and, despite the huge losses from the fire of the British riflemen, hit the enemy's battery. Here the defense was kept by the English Guards. A violent hand-to-hand fight ensued. They shot at each other at close range, fought with rifle butts, bayonets and stones. As a result, the Russian soldiers knocked out the English Guards and captured 9 enemy guns (three were thrown into a ravine, the others were riveted). The British in this battle rubbed around 200 people. The Okhotsk regiment also suffered greatly. The regimental commander, Colonel Bibikov, was seriously wounded, and most of the officers and privates were out of action.
At this time reinforcements approached the British. Fresh troops of the Katkarta division arrived. Katkart himself with the Torrens brigade attempted to bypass the bloodless Okhotsk regiment, but the English rejected the Selenginsky regiment. Katkart, not knowing about the fall of the battery number 1, and approached her with several mouths, to reinforce the guards. The British attacked the Yakut regiment from one side, and the Selenginsky regiment from the other. Katkart died, Colonel Seymour was injured and brigade commanders Torrens and Goldi were badly injured. In general, the British troops suffered heavy losses. Brown's Light Division and Lesiavens 2 Division suffered significant losses, up to a quarter of people lost the 4 Division. The English commanders suffered heavy losses. Generals Browne, Adams, Codrington, Bentink and Buller, Colonels McIntosh, Gembier, Pakengam, Blair and others were fallen or were injured.
Russian General Prokofy Yakovlevich Pavlov ((1796 — 1868)
The French save the English
Raglan, realizing that it smells roasted, forgetting about pride, asked for help from the French. First, a detachment of General Bourbaki arrived on the right flank to help the British. However, this small detachment could not stop the decisive offensive of the Russian 11 division. The French were met with strong fire, suffered heavy losses, and the commander of the 6 regiment, Colonel Kam, was among those who fell and retreated. The French, mingling with the British, rolled back. Okhotsk, Yakutsk and Selenginsky regiments crowded the enemy.
Both sides suffered heavy losses, were extremely weary, but it seemed that the victory was left to the Russian army, who defeated the British troops. At that moment, a strong sortie from Sevastopol and the blow of Gorgakov’s Chorgunsky detachment, which had numerous cavalry, could finally decide the outcome of the battle. Prince Gorchakov from the very beginning of the case deprived himself of the opportunity to deliver a strong blow to the enemy. Showing excessive caution, he left half of his squad on the right side of the Black River. The remaining forces were strongly stretched out and entered with the enemy only in an artillery exchange of fire, which had no meaning. The British, making sure that their shooting was not effective, soon ceased to fire at all. Shooting continued until 9 hours, then both sides were limited to observation until 16 hours.
The sortie from Sevastopol was made around 10 in the morning. The old artilleryman, Major General Timofeev led the 4 battalion of the Minsk regiment to attack. The attack developed successfully. The Russian soldiers, in spite of the strong enemy fire, pushed aside French advanced posts, bypassed the enemy from the left flank and broke into batteries No. 1 and 2. Soldiers riveted 15 guns. The French moved to the neighboring batteries.
The French went to the counter. General La-Motruj sent two rifle companies and four companies of the Foreign Legion to the left flank, while he himself with three companies of the 20 of the light regiment went to the rescue of the lost batteries. At the same time, the brigade of Lurmel moved towards the Russian troops, and the brigade of d'Orel was ordered to bypass the Russian troops from the right flank. As a result, over 4 Russian battalions threw 10 more than the battalions, which were propped up by the 14 battalions of the Levallian division. Therefore, General Timofeev, having solved the task - to divert the enemy siege corps to itself. He began to withdraw troops. At the same time, he retreated "so slowly and in such an excellent order" that he took away not only his wounded, but also part of the French. Moreover, Timofeev drew the enemy under the crossfire of the fortress batteries. General Lurmel, fascinated by the battle, approached too close to the Shemyakina battery and fell under the brutal fire of the Russian artillery. The French suffered heavy losses. The commanders of both battalions of the 2b th regiment and many officers (in the 19 line regiment of 20 and 15) were out of action. Lurmel himself was mortally wounded. The French retreated in complete disarray. Timofeev solved his task brilliantly. But the sortie from Sevastopol could not have decisive consequences due to the small number of Timofeev's detachment.
The French command, making sure that there was no threat in the center, gradually transferred a large part of its corps to the aid of the British. In 10 hours Bosque himself arrived at Killen-beam. Behind him came the Zouawes, the Algerian (African) arrows, the 4 regiment of the African horse rangers. Then to the dangerous direction of the profit team of Monet (from the division of Prince Napoleon) and the 1-th regiment of African horse rangers. Around 11 hours before the Chorgun detachment Gorshkov there are only five battalions of the Espinass brigade, a little more than 3 thousand people. The rest of the French troops threw in to help the British.
Initially, Russian troops continued to crowd the enemy. The regiments of the 11 Division fearlessly greeted the French and even walked around them from the rear. Bosque almost died. However, the constantly arriving French troops turned the tide of battle. The bloodless Russian regiments were forced to retreat under the fire of enemy artillery.
Dannenberg had on hand more 16 fresh battalions of Butyrsky, Uglitsky, Vladimir and Suzdal regiments. However, he decided to retreat. The situation was unfavorable. Fresh troops because of the peculiarities of the terrain could not be deployed, they were subjected to vain execution by enemy artillery and rifle-gunners. Moreover, with the approach of the French troops, the situation on the left flank of the Allied army radically changed in favor of the Anglo-French troops.
The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments pushed to replace the battered units in battle, they covered the departure of Pavlov's detachment. The advanced battalions of the Vladimir and Suzdal regiments conducted a strong counterattack and made it possible for the Okhotsk, Yakutsk, and Selenga regiments to be retreated. In this attack, the brigade commander Colonel Delvig was seriously wounded. The artillery was difficult to take over the Inkerman Bridge, which was cluttered with wounded, so Dannenberg sent it to Sevastopol.
The enemy did not pursue the Russian troops, limiting himself to artillery and rifle fire. True, when most of the troops of the 10th division entered Sevastopol, and the artillery had not yet hit the city, the enemy arrows tried to repulse some of the guns. Colonel Totleben saved the situation. He led the company of the Uglitsky regiment that met along the way, and carried along the battalions of the Butyrsky and Vladimirsky regiments. While the soldiers were fighting with the enemy, Totleben put forward several guns to the position, bought time and saved the artillery. To carry the damaged guns, two naval battalion and sappers. In the evening, the last guns were brought into the city fortifications. The enemy failed to capture a single weapon, not a single wagon. In addition, the fire of the steamers "Chersonesos" and "Vladimir" contributed to the successful withdrawal of the Russian troops over the highly rugged terrain.
Russian General Nikolai Dmitrievich Timofeev (1799 — 1855)
Results
It was one of the bloodiest battles of the Eastern War. Of the 35, thousands of people who were in the units of Soymonov and Pavlov lost 10,7 thousand, that is, almost a third of the personnel. From 3,5-th. Timofeev’s squad also lost nearly a third, over 1 thousand people. Chorgun squad, which actually did not participate in the battle, lost an 15 man. The Sevastopol garrison from the fire of enemy artillery (the whole day the artillery batteries of Sevastopol and the artillery of the enemy were dueling) lost more than a hundred people. On the whole, Russian troops lost about 12 thousand people that day (including more than 3,2 thousand people killed). True, as noted by the military historian M.I. Bogdanovich, in this number recorded previously died of disease, lost and lagged behind their parts. Some of those who were considered missing, and all who were lightly wounded joined the army a few days later. Therefore, the real losses of the Russian army on that day reached 10 thousand people.
Accurate data on the loss of allies is not. According to official data, from the reports of Canrober and Raglan, the French lost more than 1,7 thousand people killed and wounded. Among those killed were General de Lurmel and Colonels Kama and de Boisse. Kanrober was injured. The British lost 2,6 thousand people. Kathart and Strangweis were killed; Generals Browne, Torrens, Adams, Goldie, Codrington, Buller and Bentink were injured. According to official data, the Allies lost 4,3 thousand people that day. However, it is known that the English corps, a few days before the battle of Inkerman, numbered more than 18 thousand people. And after the battle, about 12 people remained. Therefore, it is obvious that the British lost about 6 thousand people, some of them died in the days preceding the battle from diseases and the actions of the artillery of Sevastopol.
Russian losses on this day were higher than those of the Allies. This was due to several factors: 1) the crowding of significant forces in a small space convenient for battle; 2) the location of enemy artillery in convenient, dominant and inaccessible positions. Allied artillery met Russian troops with powerful fire; 3) Russian artillery, unable to climb steep climbs, was forced to fight in unfavorable conditions, and could not fully support the infantry; 4) the best small arms of the enemy.
I must say that the Russian troops, despite all the unfavorable factors, acted so bravely that they almost defeated the English army and did not win the battle, despite the mistakes of command. The allied army was saved by the mistakes of the Russian command and the promptness of the French generals who helped the British in time.
The main reason for the failure was the indecision of Prince Menshikov. The Russian commander-in-chief left more than a third of his army inactive. Significant forces, including all cavalry and naval crews, did not participate in the battle. Menshikov did not dare to start a general battle with the participation of all the available forces. Private mistakes were also made. So, Menshikov gave very ambiguous instructions to General Soimonov. General Dannenberg also found himself in an ambiguous position. They made a mistake in determining the time of movement of detachments of Soymonov and Pavlov. As a result, both squads entered the battle separately.
In addition, Gorchakov did not use his impressive forces for a powerful strike at the center of the enemy's position, which could turn the tide of the battle in favor of the Russians. The French would have to repel the attack on Sapun-gore and they would not be able to support the British in full force. The left flank of the allied army in such a situation was doomed to defeat. And after the defeat of the British, the observational building of Bosquet, attacked from two directions, would not have stood up. Commander Menshikov, who could put pressure on Gorchakov, did not. It is also worth noting that Timofeev, who acted brilliantly on the enemy’s right flank, could have allocated large forces so that he could give a serious battle to the enemy. As a result, it was possible to count on a complete victory in the battle and the complete defeat of the English corps, who had shot almost all the ammunition and was on the verge of complete exhaustion of forces.
After the battle, Menshikov was completely taken aback, telling the war minister, Prince Dolgorukov, that Sevastopol would not stand after this defeat. The prince even predicted not only the loss of Sevastopol, but also the loss of the whole Crimea.
The battle had serious strategic implications. The liquidation of the siege of Sevastopol, which could have taken place in case of victory in the battle of Inkerman, failed. True, the battle of Inkerman led to the fact that the Allies abandoned the immediate assault on Sevastopol, it was again postponed. In this case, the Russian High Command had to abandon his thoughts to resume fighting on the Danube. While the enemy was standing in the Crimea, there was no talk of resuming the offensive in Moldova and Wallachia.
The morale of the Russian army was seriously undermined. The Russian army retained combat capability, but lost faith in the command, stopped waiting for success and hoped for some setbacks. The Russians fell into self-criticism, many anecdotes and stories spread throughout the army, which mercilessly ridiculed all plans and intentions and differed in malicious self-judgment.
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