Underground gunsmiths. The best Soviet torpedo appeared in violation of all conceivable rules

17
The article is dedicated to the past 30 August 2014 of the year Eugene Barybin, author of the main shock torpedoes of the Soviet Navy. AT stories this development in varying degrees, reflected the typical problems faced by talented designers both in Soviet times and now. When the main thing is not business, but departmental ambitions, career considerations and unwillingness to take risks.

By the beginning of the 70s, a catastrophic situation with shock torpedoes had developed in the Navy of the USSR because of the failure to develop a “super torpedo” 53-65. At disposal fleet there were:

* oxygen 53-56 and peroxide 53-57 without homing systems (CCH) with an effective firing distance of the order of 3,5 kilometer;
* peroxide 53-61, 53-61MA with a three-month period of maintenance on submarines and all the troubles with hydrogen peroxide;
* electric SAET-60 with SSN since the Second World War and, besides, in insufficient quantities.

Outdated straight torpedoes were included in the ammunition even of second-generation submarines. A surface ship there was only mossy 53-39 (leading its history from the developed in the early XX century Italian 53F) in three versions: 53-39PM, 53-51 (the same, but with the proximity fuse), 53-56V (the same, but with a new name). The effective firing range for the 53-39 two-torpedo salvo is less than three kilometers. Closer - just go on the ram. The situation, frankly, deplorable. And who started the case with shock torpedoes in such a dead end? Military 28 th Scientific Research Institute and Central Research Institute "Gidropribor". Torpedo institutes large mistake.

Academic institutions are often carried away into the clouds of their imagination, although they are very convincing in justifying the need to develop new torpedoes. But naval commanders do not have the right to make mistakes. Their miscalculations manifest themselves in 10 – 15 years in a critical situation. So it happened.

Alma-Ata "Kalashnikov"

Thank God, there were those who saved the situation at a critical moment. And there were no scientists from specialized research institutes at all ...

There are three such people. The first is the director of the Machine-Building Plant named after SM Kirov (MSC) in Alma-Ata, Peter Rezchik. The second is Grant Akopov, head of the torpedo department of the Directorate of Anti-submarine Weapons (UPV) of the Navy. The third is the head of the UPV, Boris Kostygov.

At the beginning of 60-ies MZK serially manufactured torpedoes 53-56 (oxidizer - oxygen), 53-57, 53-61 (oxidizer - hydrogen peroxide). Engineer Evgeny Barybin, a torpedo from God, worked in the experimental workshop of the plant. He was familiar with the strong and weak nodes of all thermal torpedoes. In the talented head of the designer and artist in the soul (and, by the way, according to a hobby) the idea was born to assemble all the successful units in one simple and reliable sample with good characteristics:

* oxygen tank from the torpedo 53-56;
* turbine from 53-61;
* a number of successful sites from 53-65, 53-58.

It was assumed that the speed and range of the torpedo will be close to the torpedo 53-61.

Barybin reported to the factory director Rezchik. That idea was not just approved, he took an active part in its implementation. The resolution of Peter Kharitonovich, who initiated the work on the torpedo, is amazing. The main protagonist in the creation of a torpedo 53-65K himself Barybin considered it Carver. By order of the director, a group of eight designers was formed, headed by Konstantin Selikhov, head of the plant's design bureau (after his retirement, Daniel Ginsburg). Every business is argued, if enthusiasts are taken for it. Designers of KB Ginzburg, Barybin, Shubin, Zikeev, Gormin, Shtoda, Chukanov, Krivulin, Popova developed technical documentation. The production of the material part began, as soon as the drawings were ready, and sometimes simply from sketches.

In the 1963 year, Selikhov and Barybin went to Grant Akopov for the first report in Moscow, in the Directorate of anti-submarine weapons. MZK’s offer was as follows: create a torpedo of the most reliable components, assemblies and assemblies of other torpedoes — oxygen, single-mode, speed — 40 – 50 nodes, range — about 20 kilometers. The plant will be able to make three prototypes at its own expense.

Akopov supported the MSC, proposing to carry out work under the legend of the “modernization of the 53-56 torpedoes under the homing optical system”. Coordination of the work of the UPV - plant was carried out through the military mission (subordinate to the UPV in those years). This was done in order to give the factory workers at least some official status.

In the success of the work, the military acceptance of the MSC and its future leader, Peter Kolyadin, played a very important role.

Less than a year, as the first torpedo was ready. True, it could only be called a torpedo conditionally: for the time being, she did not have homing equipment — essentially a running model. Barybin set off with his brainchild to the proving ground on the Issyk-Kul lake, where prototypes literally immediately showed good results. Further planned shooting on the Black Sea, but ...

We learned about the “underground” work of the plant in the 4 General Directorate of the Ministry of the Judicial Industry (curator of the “torpedo direction”) and sent a telegram with a request to stop testing homemade products. To solve the problem in Moscow detachment Ginzburg. History is silent as he managed to resolve the situation, but the work continued. The torpedo was up to the mark: at the Black Sea training ground during launches from the torpedo boat and from the submarine it went well and more than once.

The production of a small series of three pieces of almost full-fledged torpedoes with an optical homing system began. Made Shot at the site. And they were upset about impossibility - the torpedoes stubbornly did not want to be aimed at the target.

Then one of the three replaced the homing equipment, taking it from the 53-65 torpedoes, and in the summer of next year Barybin again arrived in Sevastopol.

From the point of view of the usual development algorithm, to go out to sea trials with just three torpedoes is an adventure: you can lose samples and throw tests. But as the ancient Romans said: “Happiness protects the brave.” And the torpedoes did not let down their creators: both from the submarine and from the torpedo boat they worked out regularly. Although optical SSN refused and in the sea ...

In the 1965 year, having on hand concrete results of work, confirmed by firing from warships, a delegation led by plant director Peter Rechik went to Moscow for a second report to the head of the UPV, Vice Admiral Kostygov.

Enthusiasm against the system

The need to replace the CLO was obvious, but the main thing was to solve the problem of financing further work. Engineers can still work "at free capacity": draw, invent, rely on their fairly modest salary. And the plant as a whole - no. Volgograd for no reason will not make forgings for the manufacture of an oxygen tank, Kiev will not give the instruments of course and leveling ... There are dozens of these plants. In short, we need money, and underground, about which three or four people need to know, no more, because the torpedo is illegitimate.

Underground gunsmiths. The best Soviet torpedo appeared in violation of all conceivable rules
Andrei Sedykh collage


How is the law? Interested organizations are preparing a resolution of the Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee in a coordinated manner. The contractor undertakes to develop a torpedo with the specified characteristics. Funding is being opened, money is being allocated, the use of which is observed by military representatives under the contractor. They, in turn, are watched by the financiers of the Ministry of Defense. They do not understand the technique and therefore can act only formally: legally or illegally.

In the situation with the future 53-65K, for its development we need at least comparatively small, but illegal (since there are neither decisions of the CM and the Central Committee of the CPSU, nor TTZ) money. Where to get them?

Kostygov with Akopov gave the go-ahead to make 10 torpedoes from an experimental batch. But the main risk of this illegal operation was assumed by the deputy senior military representative of the MSC, Peter Kolyadin. It was he who put his signature under a false financial document - the factory “made it look like” for the fleet, and the military acceptance “as it took” the 10-53 torpedoes from the 65 plant, and the UPV (customer in those years) paid the plant money for them. This money was used to further develop the torpedo and its tests.

Less than a year and a half later, ten practical torpedoes from an experimental party set off for the sighting ground. And the shooting went flawlessly. Three months later, a report with positive test results was submitted to the head of the UPV Navy, the head of the Mine Torpedo Institute and the director of the Hydropribor.

They frowned at the military institute: we didn’t develop a justification, did not issue a technical assignment, didn’t participate in the tests, and in general it was some kind of homemade product. The “Gidropribor” has 70 nodes (torpedo 53-65) at the exit! And why this torpedo on 45 nodes? The Naval Institute withdrew from the plant, did not take the bastard torpedo under its scientific wing.

Smuggling maneuvers

1967 year became black in the development of a new torpedo. The optical homing system was not able to bring to a healthy state. However, by this time there were acute problems with the “official” 53-65 planned for the fleet. Start firing on the Black Sea Fleet. The first shot - and rupture of the oxidizer tank. It is good that it is already at sea, and not in a torpedo tube, or - God forbid - in the compartment of the boat. The commission faltered: any understanding person would be led to a sense of the prospect of getting almost half a ton of hydrogen peroxide in the compartment. Another design of the oxidizer reservoir with a new peroxide displacement system into the combustion chamber, the pump, is urgently being developed. Failure. The next development of a tank with a new peroxide delivery system - a piston. Failure…

In this situation (taking into account the departure of Kostygov and the appointment of a new chief of the UPV) Akopov showed perseverance and wisdom. He advised the plant to send several torpedoes from an experimental batch to fleets, to go there to plant specialists and perform two or three combat exercises. Get the support of fleets. Plus a non-standard move - write a letter to the commander-in-chief of the Navy.

Navy Commander-in-Chief Sergei Gorshkov, who himself went through the war and knows the price of trouble-free arms, I read the letter of a group of engineers of the torpedo plant carefully. The design bureau of the plant is serious power. And the results are there. And imposed a resolution: "APPROVE".

This is exactly what Akopov needed. From his side it turned out, one might say, a grandmaster move. After such a resolution, the opponents died down and did not speak out in the open against the torpedoes.

By this time, the first excellent results of firing on fleets by modernized 53-61MA torpedoes with homing equipment E. Parfyonov (planned for 63-65) became known. The corresponding decision on equipping the pilot batch with the future 53-65K with the same equipment was agreed with Akopov in working order.

The situation with the legitimate 53-65 literally stalled. The first batch entered the Pacific Fleet, where a group of specialists led by chief designer Kokryakova taught torpedoists of the arsenal for three weeks, people who are quite knowledgeable about this kind of technique. But they could not prepare a torpedo for a shot. Refusal for failure - and this despite the fact that the shot should be immediately after the preparation of the torpedo. And what will happen when she lies on the boat promised year?

The chief of the MTU TOF captain of the 1 rank M. Brodsky got acquainted with the torpedo device, looked at the efforts of the brigade of the chief designer, spoke with his experts and the torpedoes of the arsenal. Here, the Black Sea Fleet also received information about the rupture of the oxidizer reservoir when fired. Brodsky, who himself lost people in the explosion of hydrogen peroxide, sent a telegram to the UPV: "Mastering the 53-65 torpedoes by the fleet is inappropriate because of extreme difficulty in preparation and low reliability." And ordered to ship the received torpedoes to Sovgavan and lay them in the farthest dead end of the arsenal. There they all waited safely for disposal.

State Prizes Are Not All Deserving

In this situation, the future 53-65K was a salvation for UPV and the fleet (as Akopov later said, “it would not exist, and I would not be in this position”). In 1968, the joint decision of the Navy and 4 of the first SME was made to conduct state tests. It was then that the chief designer was appointed Daniel Ginzburg. The torpedo was born absolutely illegally (before the “state” torpedo had not only the chief designer, but also the tactical-technical task, and about the “non-standard” financing of the development mentioned above). Scientific institutions are categorically against it, and the torpedo goes and walks. State tests were successful.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (and not the Minister of Defense) No. 0115 of 22 of April 1969, the 53-65К torpedo was accepted "for supply" and launched into mass production. With her new “name” - “53-65 with the letter K” “homemade” MSC as it was “covered” the failure of the Navy and the Ministry of the Industry with 53-65 and began to confidently win their positions in the fleet.

The application for the invention of the torpedo was filed in June 1965 of the year, and a month later the author's certificate and monetary reward were received - 1700 rubles for nine authors. The state award for the development of 53-65K came only after 11 years and not from the first approach (they did not let the specialized institutes pass). Leonid Smirnov, Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission, played a decisive role in this.

At the meeting of heads of military-industrial complex enterprises in Kazakhstan, Smirnov was in detail interested in the affairs of the largest enterprise of the republic - the MSC. The head of the military mission, Kolyadin, reported to the chairman of the military-industrial complex the essence of the 53-65K torpedo:

* decent technical characteristics with good prospects for their improvement in the order of modernization;
* the cheapest - on the order! - in the world among torpedoes of similar purpose;
* its mass production has been established and thus the problem of providing the fleet with anti-ship torpedoes has been removed;
* mastered by all fleets, replacing the previous four samples of torpedoes;
* Developed not by the Gidropribor Institute, but by the design bureau of the plant. Perhaps that is why the development team is not awarded the State Prize.

Leonid Smirnov took note of this. Less than two weeks later, a team followed from both the military industrial complex to the Ministry of the Judiciary and from there to the 4 commander and also to the UPV of the Navy: submit the 53-65K torpedo team to the State Prize.

So, “Present a team ...” And where is this team? In KB plant. The industrialists, representing the development team, included the military, who took an active part in the development. As agreed by the plant managers from military laureates, S. Butov became the head and M. Bersudsky, who took an active part in torpedo trials, and most importantly, with great pressure, reported to Butov about his merits. For Peter Kolyadin, who consumed this award, who risked the most, and also the author of a number of important technical decisions, there was no place in the laureate's list. But this is a common naval practice: rewarding the uncomplicated and punishing the innocent.

Although civilians had similar problems. No, not at the factory. Everyone there knows who is worth the development and testing of a torpedo. The events with the list in the head office developed in approximately the same way as the military. From the plant's design bureau on the list was Deputy Chief Designer Yevgeny Barybin, the author of the idea of ​​this torpedo, and more than any other of the engineers who invested the energy of mind, soul and hands in its creation. Was. Well, that's enough. The winner was a completely different person - the employee of the cupola, who oversaw the work of the plant. Namely - the author of the telegram with the requirement to stop the tests of "homemade" Yuri Gryaznov.

And the fairy tale could turn out

From the height of the present day, it is possible to give an objective assessment of the creation history of the 53-65K torpedo itself. The fleet received a massive, simple and cheap shock (anti-ship) torpedo with a worthy for its time TTX.

However, we must admit that these performance characteristics could be significantly higher.

For the fleet, the usual “table” TTX torpedoes, including speed and range, have only theoretical significance. The main parameter in the assessment is the effective firing distance.

In the case of 53-65K, this effective distance could be significantly increased by increasing the speed due to the range (for example, increasing the speed to 50 nodes from 45 by reducing the range from 19 to 16 km). The technical realization of this for a torpedo with a turbine powerplant was not difficult. The idea was not only in the air, but was also implemented in practice by local torpedo commanders - indicating the installation of a pressure regulator at the upper level of technical conditions (to achieve maximum speed). But at the same time there were no “official consequences”. Perhaps the reason was that the theoretical “effective distances” (in quotation marks, since the torpedo was not in ammunition for a single day) legitimate 53-65 markedly exceeded 53-65K due to greater speed. “High-speed modification” 53-65K at the same time reached the level of 53-65, being much simpler, cheaper and more reliable. What would “science” look like in this case, substantiating and promoting peroxide 53-65? Of course, hydrogen peroxide theoretically provides more torpedo energy than oxygen, but 53-65 “super characteristics” required the installation of a double set of large-sized power plant units, thereby eating the energy gain of the oxidizer. As they say, there was a lot of “science”, but little common sense.

Significantly raise the characteristics of 53-65K installation could more modern CCH. With the torpedo that existed, it lost much speed when it reached the target, spending a large part of its energy on it. Already in the beginning of the 80-x, the installation of more advanced SSN and an increase in salvo distances were possible, but to this day the torpedo survived with the Parfenov 60-s system ...

In the middle of the 80-x, the UIP Navy gave up for the disposal of 120 torpedoes TEST-71. Transferring them to the MSC would give the possibility of implementing telecontrols on the 53-65K, and most importantly, obtaining large firing statistics (i.e., dispose of the old materiel, while at the same time ensuring the development and testing of the new one). The stocks for the installation of telecontrol in the 53-65K were at least due to the replacement of the antique hydrostat 53-65K, which came back from the “Fium” 53F, with a modern small-sized one.

While enthusiasts remained at the plant and in military acceptance — Carver, Kolyadin, Ginzburg, Barybin and others, work with the 53-65K torpedo continued in the form of the Magot initiative (with the prospect of creating a cheap universal torpedo). Having improved the turbine in four positions, Ginzburg received an increase in horsepower in 100 with the same expenditure of power components. There was a solution for using 20 percent “dead” (unused) oxygen supply. As a result, it was possible to increase the energy of the torpedoes by about 40 percent. The torpedo is ripe for serious modernization, moving almost to the level of Mk48 (and significantly surpassing USET-80) in transport characteristics. But the time of anti-ship torpedoes, as well as anti-submarine, has passed. The time has come universal torpedoes on targets.

The most effective solution would be to use the reserve of the discontinued development of the TAPIR UGST. It was not possible to create a reliable solid fuel source of energy for it, however, “Tapir” had a low-noise exhaust turbine power plant, an excellent telecontrol system. Replacing the exotic solid fuel installation with a relatively simple oxygen was quite possible. And then the positive that has been developed in the UGST is realized. Specifications will be slightly lower than those promised in the UGST, but remain within acceptable limits.

The plant has successfully completed bench tests of the power plant. They submitted a report to two institutes and in the OLA of the Navy: it may be that a universal torpedo on targets for cheap energy was developed, albeit with somewhat lower technical characteristics than those promised by the UGST. The military institute gave a positive conclusion. That's it all over.

Still in 1974, the decisive director of the plant Carver died. In 1984, UPV lost Akopov - he retired to the reserve. His successors inherited the chair and problems, but not wisdom and experience. In 1985, Peter Kolyadin, for his further service, departed for Leningrad.

So the cutter triumvirate, Akopov, Kolyadin collapsed, and the possibilities of developing a good practical torpedo were missed. And this omission lies on the conscience of the leaders of the UPV Navy and the Torpedo Directorate of the Military Institute of Weapons.

Then perestroika began, and in December 1991 of the year, the MSC itself turned out to be outside the country.

Forty years already in the ranks of the torpedo 53-65K. Both on ships and submarines of the second generation there is no replacement for it yet. As part of the torpedo is the development of "Gidropribor", this is normal and the merits of the plant does not diminish. 53-65K was not born thanks to our scientists, but rather contrary to them.

The creation of this torpedo and the arming of the Soviet and Russian Navy with it is a rare example of competition and subsequently cooperation, albeit forced, monopolistic developers — on the one hand, and the manufacturer’s design bureau with military representation, on the other.

Like the best Tanks and aircraft, the 53-65K torpedo deserves its pedestal. And on a pedestal it would not be bad to have bas-reliefs of the founding fathers, or at least to list these people and their merits.

Evgeny Barybin - the author of the idea, actually the creator of this torpedo.

Peter Carver - Director of the Machine-Building Plant named. Kirov, who supported the idea of ​​Barybin, the organizer of the creation of 53-65K.

Daniel Ginsburg is the chief designer of the 53-65K.

Boris Kostygov - Head of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate, who supported the development and its "non-standard" funding.

Grant Akopov - head of the UPV torpedo department, who supported the development, and the author of the idea of ​​addressing the commander-in-chief of the Navy at a critical moment.

Peter Kolyadin - Head of the Military Representation of the MSC, who personally took responsibility for the illegal financing of work.

Sergei Gorshkov - commander-in-chief of the Navy, who evaluated the prospects and gave torpedo life to the fleet, despite its non-standard pedigree.

Already today, the story of the initiative development of torpedoes for the Navy was continued at Dagdizel OJSC. The large statistics of successful tests says that there are Barybin and Carver here. Will there be Gorshkov, Kostygov, Akopov to complete this development?
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17 comments
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  1. +2
    30 October 2014 09: 17
    Unfortunately, now the situation with new developments differs little from the above ... our Kulibins work on the same enthusiasm crying
    1. +1
      30 October 2014 09: 19
      I fully share your opinion. Nothing has changed since and will not change.
  2. 0
    30 October 2014 09: 57
    T-34 Koshkina, KV Kotina, and Taubin's AGS were also clandestine developments ...
    1. +3
      30 October 2014 13: 42
      What kind of nonsense? T-34 from start to finish is a development made as part of the competition.
      1. 0
        30 October 2014 21: 47
        Quote: Estrendor
        What kind of nonsense? T-34 from start to finish is a development made as part of the competition.

        yes you sho ??? learn mate part Estrendor...
        Do not know the story, do not go ... in short, the sofa - Moscow - Kashchenko and those plus him ...
        By the way, yes, you have the right epaulet, it is negative - that is, democracy and Europe.
        Initially A-20, not T-34 (A-32), was supposed to be a wheel-caterpillar based on the BT-7 - with less armor and this is according to the GOZ ...
        Beginning in 1931, the Red Army received wheeled and tracked high-speed tanks of the BT type (BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, etc.), created on the basis of the American prototype M1931 American tank designer Walter Christie. These tanks were designed to equip independent tank and mechanized formations. Taking into account the experience gained in the operation and combat operations of serial and experimental tanks of the BT series, the Main Automobile Armored Directorate (GABTU) in 1937 to the tank design bureau of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant (KhPZ) named after The Comintern (Plant No. 183) was given the task of designing a new wheeled-tracked tank capable of replacing BT tanks in the future, which subsequently received the A-20 index. Working designing was started at the end of 1937 in the design department, headed by M.I. Koshkin, preliminary development was carried out under the guidance of A. Firsov, who was repressed in 1937. The new tank was supposed to equip a 45 mm tank gun, install 30 mm armor protection. It was envisaged to use a V-2 diesel engine as a power plant on the tank, which was supposed to reduce the vulnerability of the tank from enemy fire and reduce the fire hazard of the vehicle. Unlike the BT-7, which had one driving wheel on each side, the A-20 had to drive three wheels on each side due to the vehicle’s mass increased to 18 tons. This complicated and complicated the design of the machine.

        1. 0
          30 October 2014 22: 04
          http://ww2history.ru/4074-istorija-sozdanija-tanka-t-34.html
  3. +1
    30 October 2014 10: 29
    It is good that there were people who understood the existence of the problem and possessed the courage to make risky, but necessary decisions. Unfortunately, the bulk of officials from ministries and commanders are concerned only with their personal situation and condition, and not with the results of the assigned case.
    As one character from the collection of A. Pokrovsky's short stories said: "They make a lot of dandy, they teach them at public expense, and then they send people to heal and defend the Motherland!"
  4. 0
    30 October 2014 11: 08
    Evgeny Barykin reasoning correctly. This is how one should act in all types of weapons: collect and compile on the basis of the best ideas and designs from all over the world. This is how Mikhail Timofeevich Kalashnikov acted, and this is how we must act now. On the example of shooters, it is more clear to me than on torpedoes. There are some of the world's best designs on different platforms. Let's take from the shooters conditionally: AK-74M, M-16/4 (latest modifications), G-36 and VSS "vintorez" / "Shaft". Each sample has successful nodes and solutions in the design and its own weaknesses. Having correctly compiled on the basis of several successful ready-made and proven units and ideas embedded in the design of these samples, adding other necessary ones, you can get a modern analogue of AK, which will become promising for the coming decades.
    How many rummaged information on the topic, a bundle of patents and concluded that everything is already there. Only this "Everything" is scattered in different samples and is waiting for competent use in the complex. And AK, and M16, and G-36, and "Vintorez" were created at one time, too, on earlier patents and ideas, and not from scratch.
    Barykin would agree with me wink
  5. 0
    30 October 2014 11: 44
    Once again, the idea is confirmed that only the one who burns out can move something ... Almost all the best in the world of technology, architecture, art, etc. created not by order, but on the initiative of enthusiasts and ascetics who "burned" with their Cause! They act in accordance with the "goal reflex" (as defined by I.P. Pavlov), wading through misunderstandings, obstacles, failures, prohibitions ... And in the end they achieve their goal! True, at the same time, they are often bypassed by awards, recognition, glory. That is why it is imperative to talk about such ascetic people (collectives), repaying them a debt for the Deed done!
  6. +7
    30 October 2014 12: 27
    I read it with great interest. And what is the article about? About the torpedo? No .. ABOUT PEOPLE !!! Those who were sick for their cause, true patriots of the Motherland who accomplished a feat. Engineers are technical. Military (Kolyadin) - civilian. And how else to call the signing of fake financial statements, in other situations it could well sit for a decent period! He knew what he was risking, but deliberately took the risk to provide the fleet with weapons ... There were PEOPLE, not "effective managers". Are they there now? ...
  7. 0
    30 October 2014 12: 31
    Quote: drags33
    Once again, the idea is confirmed that only the one who burns out can move something ... Almost all the best in the world of technology, architecture, art, etc. created not by order, but on the initiative of enthusiasts and ascetics who "burned" with their Cause! They act in accordance with the "goal reflex" (as defined by I.P. Pavlov), wading through misunderstandings, obstacles, failures, prohibitions ... And in the end they achieve their goal! True, at the same time, they are often bypassed by awards, recognition, glory. That is why it is imperative to talk about such ascetic people (collectives), repaying them a debt for the Deed done!

    I agree, but for some reason at some point in our history they were noticed and promoted.
    It may be worth restoring those times (more precisely, laws, starting with the constitution)?
  8. +1
    30 October 2014 15: 54
    Quote: Estrendor
    What kind of nonsense? T-34 from start to finish is a development made as part of the competition.


    RS for BM-8 was also developed for state funds, only Korolev because of her left the stage, like children, to school.
    1. anomalocaris
      +1
      31 October 2014 01: 07
      Korolev had a very indirect relation to MS, or rather he had nothing at all. And the stage he went for a completely different reason.
  9. +2
    30 October 2014 16: 13
    a good article about real people, but the Kirov plant is very sorry, now another "temple of consumption was built" http://www.matritca.kz/uploads/posts/2014-08/1409293545_a.jpg
  10. tkhonov66
    +2
    30 October 2014 17: 45
    Glory to the real Engineers of Russia.
    Specialists and people with a BIG capital.
  11. +1
    30 October 2014 19: 19
    The topic of torpedo is very close to me. It was the instrument department of the Leningradskaya Korabelka that made us specialists in torpedoes in the late 70s. The echoes of Gidropribor's "workers' squabbles", military customers and the fleet still reached us. This technique, against the background of modern missiles, even then seemed often archaic. After all, many developments of torpedo systems, unfortunately, and their own and "trophy", were old, like "d .... mammoth". To the author - Respect for burning material about technical and personal struggles. And about the often invisible Heroes who created weapons even in these conditions. Often contrary to trend am
  12. +1
    30 October 2014 19: 30
    Great article. Respect to the author. More such articles here, about the unknown moments in the creation of military equipment and about little-known samples
  13. 0
    30 October 2014 21: 50
    Tale of the Lefty.
    Nothing seems to change.
  14. 0
    1 November 2014 17: 14
    Good article, read with pleasure. Thanks to the author.

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