We are ours, we will build the old fleet
If you look closely at our army and air force, you can see that they are more and more like NATO. There is no longer a former admiration for the “eternally relevant” experience of the Great Patriotic War, and generals do not measure the strength of armies by the quantity tanks. Our T-50 is similar to the F-22, and they have the same concept. And the president demands to study the experience of NATO. Another thing is the Navy, where not only is the concept of the Soviet fleet, but also extolled as the only true for modern Russia. It turns out that the admiral is really smarter than the general. But how else to explain that only Soviet naval thought survived the death of the USSR? I would venture to disagree with this, and an informant will help me, whose name I will name, but later, and with his permission, I will publish something that has never been published. And I will begin by recalling the origins of our naval existence. And yet, this article is not primarily about ships and admirals, it is about you and me, for each people is worthy not only of its government, but also of its army.
ORIGINS
History The Navy of the Russian Federation is taken from the decree of the Boyar Duma and Peter I. The form is true, the content is not. The fact is that in 1930, the continuity with the imperial fleet was irretrievably lost. In the 1926 year, the fleet was finally remembered, before that it was not up to him, and they adopted the first shipbuilding program. While the minimum. And at the same time there was a discussion on which fleet to build next.
This dispute took place between the old and the young school. The old men wanted to build a small fleet, but consisting of all classes of ships, trusting that such a fleet would be a school for creating powerful naval forces in the future. Young people believed that war should happen from minute to minute, since at any moment the world revolution or capitalist aggression could be struck. Consequently, there is nothing to spend on large ships and long hikes, you need to build and improve only light forces. The fact that the main young were the new red commanders, the former sailors and heroes of the Civil War, such as Ivan Ludri, Alexander Yakimychev and others, and the old men - the royal captains of the 1 rank Boris Gerva and Mikhail Petrov were spicy to the dispute. As the former sailors clearly lacked knowledge, they lost the argument. It was then that a means tested earlier in the Red Army was used — the translation of the dispute on an ideological plane, with the subsequent accusation of the opposing side of bourgeois reactionism.
The denunciation lay down on the fertile ground - the RKKF had long wanted to clear it, there were still a lot of old-time officers in it. And in 1930, Gervais and Petrov were arrested. Gervais was later released, and he managed to die in the 1934 year, and Petrov rotted out in prison. Their names were forgotten and defamed. Here, for example, is an excerpt from the 1965 work of the year: “Based on the reactionary theory of Mehen and Colomb, dominant in the west, Professor B. B. Gervais and M.A. Petrov developed the doctrine of possession of the sea in the old, classical sense. " The persecution of the former, some of them were fired, others were fired, and civilian heroes were put forward in their place, having completed accelerated courses, which they didn’t really learn. The remaining ex quickly realized that silence and longevity are synonymous.
At the head of the fleet (1931 – 1937) stood the proven Bolshevik and Commissar of various sea levels, Vladimir Orlov. And all anything, if not Spain. Since the fall of 1936, Soviet ships have begun to deliver weapon to Spain, and the Franks to drown them. As a result, until 4 in May 1937, when it was decided to stop deliveries by our vessels, we lost seven vessels. It turned out that the Soviet fleet could not even cope with half of the Spanish. This revelation was unexpected for Stalin, and fatal for the leadership of the fleet. The next 22 of the month was replaced by five commanders of the Navy! Until, finally, Stalin did not find the one he was looking for — Nikolai Kuznetsov.
As a result, three Soviet "virtues" took root in the navy. Leaderism at the top spawned the leaders on the ground, hence the virtue - "you are the boss - I am a fool." Domestic political struggle at the cost of life forced the leaders to look for infinitely loyal subordinates who understood everything and didn’t ask unnecessary questions, hence the virtue “to guess, please”. Rightly believing that each leader gathers his squad, the leader answered for the mistakes of the leader, for the leader's mistakes - the whole squad, and the measure of responsibility for you and for your family was one - death, hence virtue - "mutual responsibility." Knowledge of these "virtues" is necessary to understand the further ills of the fleet.
All this is called the Stalinist repression, I am against such a term. This term appeared at the beginning of perestroika, when they tried to write off all the vices of the system to certain people. The repressions did not begin in 37, but in 18, and if we were to search for the founder, then Lenin and Trotsky are better suited for this role. Stalin and the Civil Heroes were looking for "simple solutions." You can understand them if you look at their origin and education. But how can you understand us, burdened with knowledge, the presence of free media and, most importantly, the Internet?
BARS TO THE PORTRAIT
The role of Khrushchev in the development of the armed forces is usually assessed as either negative or terrible. Khrushchev suffered from rocket addiction, almost eliminated the strategic Aviation, was an opponent of the construction of large surface ships and, in particular, aircraft carriers. It was on the basis of disagreement with this and Kuznetsov was dismissed.
Let's start from the end. Kuznetsov was dismissed for the same reason as Zhukov. Khrushchev's authority in the officers was, to put it mildly, weak. My grandfather (officer) told how they laughed even in the presence of the political officer over Khrushchev and drank the health of Stalin's marshals. Under the conditions of Soviet reality, to keep in the service generals and admirals whom the army loves more than the secretary general, for Khrushchev it was literally deadly. Khrushchev was shot in 1964, and did they immediately rush to design a new strategic bomber? Or maybe began to build large surface ships? Yes, all of them - the ships of the class cruiser and TAKR - from 1964 to 1991 year built 13 units, less than in the first post-war decade. Khrushchev demanded: "We must build a fleet, but above all build a submarine fleet armed with missiles." Did APRK still not considered to be the backbone of the Navy and did not the sailors themselves fought with the aircraft carrier?
Here is what the General Directorate of Shipbuilding wrote in 1960: “... Ship fighter aircraft are not a promising means of air defense. Combat stability of the units should be provided by the air defense system of the ships ". Indeed, in 1962, the revolutionary 61 ships, which had the Volna air defense system, appeared in the Navy. But here's a bad luck: considering all the tricks, “Wave” could not hit a plane flying below 50 m. The appearance of “Storm” did not change the situation. Knowing this, the American pilots practiced the attack at an altitude of 25 m. Therefore, based on the experience of the Falklands War, to destroy any of our BOD required three to four Skyhawk aircraft with conventional bombs. Cheap and angry. And only in 1976 year, having modernized the air defense system, we began to shoot down low-altitude targets. So the hope for the omnipotence of the air defense system in the 1960 year is utopia. Did sailors understand this? Maybe they understood, but in order to please the leader they wrote without complaint what he wanted to hear. Like 10 years before, amusing Stalin, they justified the need for battleships. Reading the "scientific" confirmation of his ideas, the leader sincerely believed in their correctness.
A society transformed into uncomplaining sheep gave birth to ram leaders, and rams bred sheep. So close the circle. And today, how much has changed?
1976 YEAR
This is a very important year, because this year there were two events, without which this article would not have been equally. First, the author of the article was born, and secondly, the author’s father, Vladislav Ivanovich Nikolsky, became a listener at the Navy Academy. Now, I hope you understand who my informant is. My father is a very valuable source, since after graduating from the Academy he served in the 1 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, being the leading CAD specialist for surface ships (NK). Through his hands and head passed all the characteristics and models of combat use: ships, naval aircraft, satellites and other things that were used or intended to be used in the fleet. He closely interacted with 30 NII VVS and 24 NII NII. Of course, the father knows about the laser and other "X" weapons, but for obvious reasons we will not talk about it, and this has nothing to do with the case, as we and the Americans have not left this weapon experiments. But the other, which is no longer secret, with his permission, I will try to reveal.
DOCTRINE GORSHKOVA
The father met the doctrine of the USSR Navy in 1977 year, after reading the secret book of Gorshkov “The USSR Navy” and the closed version of the magazine “Sea collection”. In them, especially in the book, the entire maritime strategy of the USSR was spelled out: a nuclear war with the extensive use of SSBNs to destroy ground targets, the defeat of enemy surface groups by striking the anti-aircraft missile defense missile defense submarine with APRS and naval missile-carrying aircraft. The secondary role was played by the strikes of NK. The main purpose of the NK, as well as torpedo submarines, was the constant tracking of the enemy SSBNs and their destruction with the start of the war. All other tasks — such as amphibious or anti-mine — were considered secondary. Participation in local conflicts was not considered at all, and the fleet was not prepared for them. In the end, all these views were set forth in the “Military Regulations of the Navy of the USSR”. The sudden outbreak of war was considered the only true one. And the very beginning of the war was expected in the near future. This led to the secondary importance of repairs and modernization of ships. It became clear why in the Soviet fleet little was invested in the repair base, and the operating voltage coefficient (KOH) was significantly lower than that of the US Navy. At the same time, the question of combat training and rafting of Gorshkov’s crews didn’t particularly bother, since the war was seen as a fleeting nuclear missile, in which we had to preempt the enemy in a strike. And when you first launch a rocket, the level of your training is no longer important, as long as there are more rockets.
In the light of this Gorshkov doctrine, the paradox of the Soviet surface fleet becomes clear. We had by the 1985 year (Gorshkov's resignation) large NK (1135 project and larger) 102 units, which would be enough for the 15 carrier-based strike groups, and yet did not have a single aircraft carrier. Therefore, our NK could act only under the cover of coastal fighter aircraft. And this, according to the exercises held in 60-s, not further 120 km from the airfield. At such a small distance from the coast the use of large NK is redundant. But if we beat the first, then the Americans will not have time to use their aircraft. That is why our BOD and cruisers fearlessly went to the ocean alone.
At the same time, I ask you not to think that the Central Committee of the CPSU and Gorshkov personally wanted for at least a second to start a nuclear war. The blow should have been struck only in the event of an extreme aggravation of the situation, when war would be inevitable, but the problem was how to know that the tension had reached its apogee and it was time to strike? The leaders did not think about it. Just taken for the law and followed it. And why be surprised? In the Soviet history of such bulk. Recall communism for the 80 year, housing problem for the 2000. In a sick country, sore heads and not only among top leaders, but also on the ground. This is what my father remembers. “I once said in a smoking room (in 1-th Central Research Institute) to the captain of 1 rank L.Yu. Khudyakov (a theoretical theorist of the underwater forces): “Well, APRK is, of course, good, but what will it do if the aircraft carrier starts to launch strike aircraft into the air, and the war has not yet begun. It will be too late to shoot at an empty aircraft carrier. Well, to act as an aggressor and be the first to start a war? ”Not finding a decent one, Khudyakov began to say duty things. "This is a question for politicians ... We will have time to transfer the command on time ...". In general, I didn’t argue with him, we were then too different weight categories. In addition, I respected and admired this man. "
Savings on crew training and repairs, as well as the supply of Dmitry Ustinov, collusion with the industry (see below) led to a high accident rate of the Navy. Unfortunately, the system created by Gorshkov and Ustinov outlasted its creators, continuing to multiply funerals. From 1956 (the beginning of the Gorshkov rule) to the present day, the Navy lost among the combat-ready ships sunken (but then raised), as well as the dead, including those that cannot be restored after the monstrous accident in Chazhma: one BOD, one MRK, six DPL and eight submarines, including Kursk. During the same period, only two submarines and one submarine submarine suffered such a fate in the US Navy. Such a striking discrepancy cannot be attributed to the numerical superiority of the domestic fleet and, in particular, the nuclear submarine.
Firstly, the numerical ratio between the constructed American and Soviet nuclear submarines is not 1: 4, but approximately 1: 1,27. Secondly, KOH, as already mentioned, was lower in our fleet, and therefore our boats were less likely to go to sea. If you carefully read the available results of investigations of our catastrophes, you will see that in most cases the blame lies either on the crew or (and) the fleet command, or on the industry, and more often on those and others. This is the result of the “cheap fleet”. Of course, many piously believe that it was the Americans who secretly set fire to and submerged our submarines, and Putin hides all this, because the State Department has pushed him well. Well, in the West there are a lot of people who believe that bears roam our streets and Russians are guilty of killing Kennedy, in the explosions of two towers, in unleashing World War II, etc. So what are you better at? There will be those who say: The Soviet Union could not afford to spend big money on the fleet and did the right thing when it saved on repairs and combat training. Well, you do not burn and do not sink, but, incidentally, it is your business to see in this a positive or negative side. I had the opportunity to serve and I was lucky - I am writing these lines, but my fellow classmate Denis Kirichenko, the engineer of the Kursk survivability division, doesn’t have a good friend ...
GENIUS USTINOVA
Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov - a unique personality. For those who say that Serdyukov is the first civilian minister of defense, I advise you to familiarize yourself with Ustinov’s career. Ustinov, who did not even command a detachment of the day, nevertheless reached the marshal's stars and died as minister of defense. Ustinov’s career began during the years of the Great Patriotic War as minister of military industry, which left an imprint on his mind. When and under what circumstances he came to terms with Brezhnev is difficult to say, but it is known that he had a tremendous influence on the Secretary General. A year after Brezhnev’s appointment, Ustinov’s career — an already successful one — starts off like a Proton rocket. In 1965, he was already secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the military-industrial complex, and from 1976 to 1984 a year - Minister of Defense. Starting from the 1965 year and until his death, it was he who defined the military doctrine of the USSR, entering the "small political bureau" as the main expert on military science. The more Ustinov grew older, the more he frightened the aging Brezhnev with the danger of NATO and the more militarized the industry of the USSR grew. If conversion was under Khrushchev, then under Brezhnev it was a reverse process. It was Ustinov, originating from the military industrial complex, and not from the army, who subdued the Ministry of Defense industry.
But this was his explanation. Ustinov introduced the concept of limited war in Soviet military science. He believed that the Americans would not be the first to launch a nuclear strike, therefore the USSR should not be in a hurry with the use of a nuclear baton in the event of a conflict, but should try to achieve victory in Europe with conventional weapons and on the coast of the English Channel to bargain for peace. Consequently, ATS troops should have a minimum of one and a half superiority in conventional weapons, and since the allies of the USSR were not like the United States, the USSR had to compete with the leading economies of the world almost alone. To win this competition, we went to the collusion: the military turned a blind eye to the imperfection of the weapon, and the industry promised to over-fulfill the plan, that is, as during World War II.
We will not touch the army, the Air Force, the Strategic Missile Forces, I am not an expert in these areas, but this is what affected the fleet - we will consider.
First about the quality and accidents. Here are two examples. 30 August 1974 of the year due to the explosion of the aft cellar of the missile system, the Brave BOD was killed. The midshipman who was in the post of the stern cellar had 1,5 minutes before the explosion to activate the irrigation system. But instead, he simply escaped, condemning the ship to inevitable death. Why? Because in the cockpit below the deck the repair valve of the irrigation system was closed. Why? Because the fire pumps installed on the 61 project were of unsatisfactory design and were inferior in reliability to those previously used in the fleet. Therefore, the pressure in the fire line often jumped, and imperfect sensors automatically turned on the irrigation of the cellars. After several such accidents, the Black Sea Fleet command issued a tacit order to close the repair valves. My father, who served at the same time on the similar ship "Sharp-witted", also had the valve closed.
The second example relates to the shameful accident K-429. It is widely known that on K-429 not only emergency pop-up buoys (AVB), but also a pop-up camera (VSC) were welded. However, they forget that this is not only the result of eternal neglect in our fleet to the possibility of an accident, but also the imperfection of these products. VSK and AVB broke down during sea trials, AVB often surfaced during combat service, so they were welded so as not to surface. But until the trouble happened to K-429, the industry somehow was in no hurry to correct its flaws. This is unthinkable in the US Navy, since there the manufacturer is directly financially responsible for its creations. And when the Senate and Congress investigated the death of Thresher, no one hesitated to call mistakes. In the USSR, in terms of collusion and "virtues", rubbish from the hut was not carried out. And even now you can hear a lot of insulting speeches of participants in those events. Serving in the navy, I often heard from senior officers about the unreliability of our equipment. And having appeared in various design bureaus, I learned that crews who could not exploit were to blame, and also with concrete examples. The truth is not that our crews are completely slobs, and the industry is bouncers, but in the wickedness of the Soviet government with all its “virtues” and collusion discussed above.
Now about the perfection of ships. Participating in collusion, the fleet was often forced to order not what he wanted. Here are some examples. The Navy wanted to abandon the battle-turbine installations (KTU) on warships, as the US Navy did, but this went against the opinion of the industry. In Leningrad, the full cycle of KTU production was carried out and, as a result, the fleet was forced to install KTUs on the 956 project. Thus, not a single miracle of the Soviet shipbuilding industry appeared in NATO fleet - the steam destroyer of the end of the 20th century, and this is in the country where the gas turbine destroyer (61 project) was created for the first time in the world!
The second example. The fleet waited so long from the industry for boats that would have caught up with the American ones by stealth, and finally he received them: first the 949 project and the 945 project, which reached the level of Los Angeles, and then the 949 project, the 945 project and 971 project, which have surpassed Los Angeles and are now second only to Seawolf, of which there are only three boats, and are comparable to the newest Virginia. The fleet wanted only these boats. But what about the Admiralty shipyards and backlog in the last submarine, the industry asked? And you transfer resources to Sevmash and ZLK, the fleet answered. You grabbed Eka, the Sovmin answered, there is no money for that. And Gorshkov had to choose: either fewer boats, but completely the best, or to supplement the deficit with erzatlods. In the second version, and agreed, the benefit of the industry, he gave more. So they continued to build the project 671, first - 671РТМ, then - 671РТМК. But the Americans also improved their Los Angeles, and as a result, even the 671RTMK project could not catch up with Los Angeles either in hydroacoustics or in secrecy.
For a fair picture, it is worth noting the positive aspects of Ustinov. In particular, he really is a good genius for our aviation. It was he who, based on the experience of the defense of Hanoi, determined that no air defense system can ensure air supremacy. And we must go on the American way, creating expensive and sophisticated aircraft, even for front-line aviation. So, the simple and cheap MiG-21 / 23 fighter was replaced by the MiG-29 and the Su-27, and the cheap Su-7 was replaced by the Su-24. It is with the filing of Ustinov begins the mass introduction of precision weapons. That says that he could learn from the generals of NATO.
However, for the fleet he is considered an evil genius. Indeed, Ustinov presented the Navy with such "wonders" of technology, such as an ekranoplan, a vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL) and ships of the 1143 project.
With Ekranoplan Ustinov introduced Rostislav Alekseev. Long before any innovations, Ustinov fell in love with a WIG and its creator, and the helpful Gorshkov, who remembered the second “virtue,” did not interfere with this love. The idea of an ekranoplan, and especially a combat one, is inherently flawed. The ekranoplan is tied to a “screen” - the flight height of the 904 and 903 projects was no more than 5 m, which imposes severe restrictions on the weather and requires the strengthening of the hull. As a result, the weight return of the 903 project is 36%, and by weight of the Tu-160 - 60%. The idea that an ekranoplan is a ship, not a plane, and they can be built cheaply on the CVD, is also flawed. They were built on the CVD, but all components came from the aviation industry. It turned out "porridge from an ax." As a result, at the cost of construction and operation one 903 project was equal to one Tu-160. As they say, comments are superfluous. But I still add. The ekranoplan is a low-speed one constrained in maneuver and a very low-flying flying seaplane, and therefore, unlike the Tu-160, it represents an ideal target for fighters. And yet more than 20 years with the tacit consent of Gorshkov fleet simply raped WIG. And only after Ustinov’s death, it was possible to cover up this eccentricity with a state account: the 904 project was closed immediately, the 903 project, saving the honor of the uniform, - a little later.
But did Ustinov alone have so much fun? And IRAs on the skeg project 1239? His idea did not come from Ustinov, but already from local naval science fiction writers. RTOs turned out to be expensive both in construction and operation, and was equal to 2,5 of the 1234.7 project, and all for the sake of speed. It was believed that allegedly on 55 nodes Harpoon would not be able to hit the MKP. But many experts of the 1 Central Research Institute and the 24 Scientific Research Institute believed that if we started the mass construction of such RTOs, then the Americans in the shortest possible time by upgrading Penguin or Phoenix will receive special highly mobile RCC. And experts, even without fear, spoke about it ... in the smoking room, because the official disagreement with the authorities did not correspond to the "virtues."
It is often said that it was Ustinov who insisted on the development of VTOL and small TAKR. This is true, but they only forget to add that it was in 1975 year, that is, when the second TAKR was already under construction. The true father of the 1143 project was Gorshkov, who liked the 1123 project, and he wanted to get an enhanced version of the PLO Moscow cruiser, which became the Kiev "TAKR". They also forget that it was Ustinov in 1981 that year, after visiting “Kiev” and getting acquainted with his infirmity, he ordered the development of the 1143.5 project begin.
So who prevented Ustinov from opening his eyes earlier?
EVERYTHING IS SO LIKE A YESTERDAY
Gorshkov was afraid that “Bolivar would not sustain two” and the program of building large TAKRs with normal takeoff / landing would eat the resources necessary for his favorite creation - “Granit-Antey”, and reduce the number of APRKs built. But the doubtful implementation of the Yak-38 fleet is really worth sharing between Gorshkov and Ustinov. They were the victims of the charm of Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Alexander Yakovlev, who promised the impossible - to replace the Yak-38 with a supersonic VTOL aircraft in the near future. And how could one not believe if it was piously believed that in the first state the workers and peasants were not only the people, but also its engineers, who could do something that was beyond the power of the decadent Western mind.
But if this error arising from the communist ideology can be understood, how can we understand today's? Do we still not believe that the USSR and its heir to the Russian Federation is the birthplace of the best weapons in the world? Do the federal media broadcast on this and the Internet is not full?
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