Taiwan's last chance
Once upon a time my teacher stories countries of the East, and concurrently a big fan of the Middle Kingdom, said: "As long as Taiwan is not attached to China - the civil war is not over." Two parts of the same civilization - the People’s Republic of China (mainland China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) cannot coexist peacefully with each other in a rapidly changing world.
This, of course, does not mean that tomorrow China will rush into a swift attack through the Taiwan Strait. In Beijing, they understand that war is an extreme tool of politics, when other methods of influence are either impossible or have already been exhausted. Any country, including a great power, primarily strives to achieve its goals by non-military means. In addition, there is a more banal reason: the PRC fleet is still simply not ready for such a conflict. According to the calculations of specialists in Taiwan after 2020, China will be able to perform large-scale operations far from its shores. So, the threat of purely speculative becomes quite real.
In recent decades, forces have emerged in Taiwan that cautiously advocate, if not for unification with mainland China, then for a significant rapprochement with it. These ideas, apparently, are directly financed from Beijing, and do not find broad support among the population of the island state. Residents of the Republic of China are accustomed to their freedoms and a high standard of living and are not ready to part with it all. And the elite do not want this, although under certain conditions (and if there is a direct threat of invasion), it may agree to “voluntary” accession.
Nevertheless, the military option is not excluded by Beijing. Theoretically, this is quite possible, especially in ten years, when the PRC will reach a fundamentally different level of development. Taiwan's fleet is not comparable with either the Japanese or the South Korean in terms of numbers and combat power, although it cannot be called weak. But 4 obsolete destroyers, 22 frigates and 4 submarines at the disposal of Taipei can do little in confrontation with the numerous naval forces of the PRC. Even two decommissioned American Oliver Perry class frigates, according to reliable information, hastily outbid by the Republic of China, will not rectify the situation. Such fleet not even enough to recapture any of the distant islands if the PLA is founded there.
The Taiwan Air Force is quite numerous (more than four hundred fighters of different models alone) and this can be a decisive factor in the coming conflict. Although the People's Republic of China can set up a large air armada at times, it will have to expose other areas of the country for this, and Beijing will go to this only as a last resort. Taipei also has its own anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as ground-to-ground cruise missiles.
And here everything will be decided by the skill of each of the parties. If the islanders manage to drown most of the continental neighbor's Navy, then the war can be considered over, for it is impossible in principle to restore the fleet quickly. The construction cycle of a modern frigate destroyer class ship is at least 2-3 of the year, and, as a rule, even more - about 4-6 of years. The times of the Second World War with its record shipbuilding deadlines were irretrievably gone. In other words, if a war lasts, for example, a year, then ships on both sides will die a lot more than they will be operational.
Taiwan's main misfortune is its too close proximity to the mainland. It really is much closer than, for example, Japan or the Philippines. It means that aviation The People’s Liberation Army will be able to raid directly from coastal airfields and reach any point on the rebellious island.
Great losses in equipment and pilots will not frighten Beijing, for both of them are in abundance, and the reserve is impressive. If, at first, Taiwan’s air defense manages to cope with it, then it will become much harder due to the inevitable (and irreparable) losses in equipment and personnel.
As for the Taiwan Air Force, they can be described as very impressive. There are even fighters of their own production, but in a real battle, no one has yet seen them. However, there will be practically nothing to respond to enemy raids by Taipei, unless he develops missiles capable of hitting objects in the PRC. According to some reports, such missiles are already available.
For fleet superiority is just as strong. If you imagine the Chinese Navy as a chess piece, then the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" is, of course, the queen. By the time the war began, the PLA fleet will most likely have two or three such ships, and the number of destroyers, frigates, corvettes and submarines will simply be transcendent. The mighty economy of China will draw such expenses. And if China’s carrier groups will have five or six, then the war for Taiwan will be very, very difficult, if at all possible. Aircraft carrier groups will terrorize Taiwan from the Pacific and almost completely cut off its sea trade in this direction.
In the naval war for China, it is critically important to capture the Penghu archipelago (Pescadorian islands), which will become the main base of the jump, for these islands are almost exactly midway between China and Taiwan. So the fate of this archipelago is almost solved. Located next to the continent, the Taiwan islands of Jinmen and Maztsu will be annexed almost immediately. There will simply appear "polite people" with a "Peking accent", which will explain to local people that the government has changed.
The last stage of the drama is the landing and land operation. It will begin when all the islands around Taiwan (except those belonging to Japan and the Philippines) will be in the hands of the PLA (and temporary bases will be set up there), and the air force and the PRC Navy will control all the seas and airspace around. That is, in essence, the Battle of Okinawa will be reproduced, only on an even larger scale.
Having lost a lot of people and equipment when disembarking, the PRC forces will be able to gain a foothold on the coast and begin to advance. There is a land war. The hostilities in the hostile territory for the PLA will be hard and exhausting, but for Taiwan this will be agony, because their enemy will have uninterrupted supply by sea, and they will be cut off even from those crumbs that the West supplied to them at the beginning of the conflict. Based on all this, it can be assumed that the PLA will quickly capture the flat part of the island and push the Republicans back to the mountains. A war can drag on for six months or even a year, but no one will have any doubts about its outcome. Unless some unpredictable factors intervene.
With the allies, the island of China is a big problem. Since we are dealing with an unrecognized state, its official support will also be extremely limited.
Of course, the USA, Japan, the EU and Singapore will provide some kind of help, but hardly significant. And any attempts of protest in the United Nations will break up about the reinforced concrete logic of China: “This is our internal affair. We are establishing order in our territory. ” Can not argue with that.
Let me remind you that during the first two crises of the Taiwan Strait, the US Army and Navy provided direct military assistance to republican forces, for then Washington recognized only the government in Taipei. During the third crisis, the Americans had already limited themselves to a purely symbolic demonstration of power with the help of aircraft carriers. Now support will be even less.
Another thing is that, in anticipation of the invasion, the Republic of China may proclaim itself an independent state within its current borders. If the United States and its allies recognize this act, then they will be able to assist Taiwan as a full-fledged state. However, not the fact that such assistance will be enough. And it makes no sense to talk about how China will respond to such an intervention. Therefore, official assistance to Taiwan will not be large, and the possibilities of informal assistance are severely limited. The KMT stronghold will have to get out on its own, clearly demonstrating the meaning of the sayings about saving the drowning people.
A separate topic is sanctions against China. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the international community (first of all, the United States and its satellites) will find themselves in an unenviable position. On the one hand, most of the countries of the world unequivocally recognize Taiwan as part of China with the government in Beijing. In the UN, as I wrote above, it is useless to apply. Only unilateral sanctions are possible from individual countries and hardly large-scale, for quarreling with China is more expensive. On the other hand, everyone is well aware that Taiwan is, anyway, a full-fledged state and its fall will only increase instability in Asia and disrupt Beijing’s appetites.
Total. There are still a few years before the proposed war. During this time, the Air Force and Navy of mainland China will grow quantitatively and qualitatively.
The victory of the PRC and the annexation of Taiwan will make Beijing almost the absolute master of the region. The defeat will throw him forty years back geopolitically, not to mention economic and military losses.
The consolation prize for China, in this case, will be the numerous islands in the neighboring seas, which Taiwan now owns. And this, by the way, is very extensive maritime possessions, including those located in strategic points. To beat them back, Taipei will have no opportunity, and all the other neighbors in the region will get a headache for many decades in the form of PLA bases throughout the South China Sea.
For the Russian Federation, the most logical position would be to adhere to neutrality (favorably, first of all, the PRC), if possible supplying the necessary to both belligerents (as the United States did in both world wars), but whether it turns out or not, will depend on how strong will be our country by the time the conflict in the strait begins.
This, of course, does not mean that tomorrow China will rush into a swift attack through the Taiwan Strait. In Beijing, they understand that war is an extreme tool of politics, when other methods of influence are either impossible or have already been exhausted. Any country, including a great power, primarily strives to achieve its goals by non-military means. In addition, there is a more banal reason: the PRC fleet is still simply not ready for such a conflict. According to the calculations of specialists in Taiwan after 2020, China will be able to perform large-scale operations far from its shores. So, the threat of purely speculative becomes quite real.
In recent decades, forces have emerged in Taiwan that cautiously advocate, if not for unification with mainland China, then for a significant rapprochement with it. These ideas, apparently, are directly financed from Beijing, and do not find broad support among the population of the island state. Residents of the Republic of China are accustomed to their freedoms and a high standard of living and are not ready to part with it all. And the elite do not want this, although under certain conditions (and if there is a direct threat of invasion), it may agree to “voluntary” accession.
Nevertheless, the military option is not excluded by Beijing. Theoretically, this is quite possible, especially in ten years, when the PRC will reach a fundamentally different level of development. Taiwan's fleet is not comparable with either the Japanese or the South Korean in terms of numbers and combat power, although it cannot be called weak. But 4 obsolete destroyers, 22 frigates and 4 submarines at the disposal of Taipei can do little in confrontation with the numerous naval forces of the PRC. Even two decommissioned American Oliver Perry class frigates, according to reliable information, hastily outbid by the Republic of China, will not rectify the situation. Such fleet not even enough to recapture any of the distant islands if the PLA is founded there.
The Taiwan Air Force is quite numerous (more than four hundred fighters of different models alone) and this can be a decisive factor in the coming conflict. Although the People's Republic of China can set up a large air armada at times, it will have to expose other areas of the country for this, and Beijing will go to this only as a last resort. Taipei also has its own anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as ground-to-ground cruise missiles.
And here everything will be decided by the skill of each of the parties. If the islanders manage to drown most of the continental neighbor's Navy, then the war can be considered over, for it is impossible in principle to restore the fleet quickly. The construction cycle of a modern frigate destroyer class ship is at least 2-3 of the year, and, as a rule, even more - about 4-6 of years. The times of the Second World War with its record shipbuilding deadlines were irretrievably gone. In other words, if a war lasts, for example, a year, then ships on both sides will die a lot more than they will be operational.
Taiwan's main misfortune is its too close proximity to the mainland. It really is much closer than, for example, Japan or the Philippines. It means that aviation The People’s Liberation Army will be able to raid directly from coastal airfields and reach any point on the rebellious island.
Great losses in equipment and pilots will not frighten Beijing, for both of them are in abundance, and the reserve is impressive. If, at first, Taiwan’s air defense manages to cope with it, then it will become much harder due to the inevitable (and irreparable) losses in equipment and personnel.
As for the Taiwan Air Force, they can be described as very impressive. There are even fighters of their own production, but in a real battle, no one has yet seen them. However, there will be practically nothing to respond to enemy raids by Taipei, unless he develops missiles capable of hitting objects in the PRC. According to some reports, such missiles are already available.
For fleet superiority is just as strong. If you imagine the Chinese Navy as a chess piece, then the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" is, of course, the queen. By the time the war began, the PLA fleet will most likely have two or three such ships, and the number of destroyers, frigates, corvettes and submarines will simply be transcendent. The mighty economy of China will draw such expenses. And if China’s carrier groups will have five or six, then the war for Taiwan will be very, very difficult, if at all possible. Aircraft carrier groups will terrorize Taiwan from the Pacific and almost completely cut off its sea trade in this direction.
In the naval war for China, it is critically important to capture the Penghu archipelago (Pescadorian islands), which will become the main base of the jump, for these islands are almost exactly midway between China and Taiwan. So the fate of this archipelago is almost solved. Located next to the continent, the Taiwan islands of Jinmen and Maztsu will be annexed almost immediately. There will simply appear "polite people" with a "Peking accent", which will explain to local people that the government has changed.
The last stage of the drama is the landing and land operation. It will begin when all the islands around Taiwan (except those belonging to Japan and the Philippines) will be in the hands of the PLA (and temporary bases will be set up there), and the air force and the PRC Navy will control all the seas and airspace around. That is, in essence, the Battle of Okinawa will be reproduced, only on an even larger scale.
Having lost a lot of people and equipment when disembarking, the PRC forces will be able to gain a foothold on the coast and begin to advance. There is a land war. The hostilities in the hostile territory for the PLA will be hard and exhausting, but for Taiwan this will be agony, because their enemy will have uninterrupted supply by sea, and they will be cut off even from those crumbs that the West supplied to them at the beginning of the conflict. Based on all this, it can be assumed that the PLA will quickly capture the flat part of the island and push the Republicans back to the mountains. A war can drag on for six months or even a year, but no one will have any doubts about its outcome. Unless some unpredictable factors intervene.
With the allies, the island of China is a big problem. Since we are dealing with an unrecognized state, its official support will also be extremely limited.
Of course, the USA, Japan, the EU and Singapore will provide some kind of help, but hardly significant. And any attempts of protest in the United Nations will break up about the reinforced concrete logic of China: “This is our internal affair. We are establishing order in our territory. ” Can not argue with that.
Let me remind you that during the first two crises of the Taiwan Strait, the US Army and Navy provided direct military assistance to republican forces, for then Washington recognized only the government in Taipei. During the third crisis, the Americans had already limited themselves to a purely symbolic demonstration of power with the help of aircraft carriers. Now support will be even less.
Another thing is that, in anticipation of the invasion, the Republic of China may proclaim itself an independent state within its current borders. If the United States and its allies recognize this act, then they will be able to assist Taiwan as a full-fledged state. However, not the fact that such assistance will be enough. And it makes no sense to talk about how China will respond to such an intervention. Therefore, official assistance to Taiwan will not be large, and the possibilities of informal assistance are severely limited. The KMT stronghold will have to get out on its own, clearly demonstrating the meaning of the sayings about saving the drowning people.
A separate topic is sanctions against China. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the international community (first of all, the United States and its satellites) will find themselves in an unenviable position. On the one hand, most of the countries of the world unequivocally recognize Taiwan as part of China with the government in Beijing. In the UN, as I wrote above, it is useless to apply. Only unilateral sanctions are possible from individual countries and hardly large-scale, for quarreling with China is more expensive. On the other hand, everyone is well aware that Taiwan is, anyway, a full-fledged state and its fall will only increase instability in Asia and disrupt Beijing’s appetites.
Total. There are still a few years before the proposed war. During this time, the Air Force and Navy of mainland China will grow quantitatively and qualitatively.
The victory of the PRC and the annexation of Taiwan will make Beijing almost the absolute master of the region. The defeat will throw him forty years back geopolitically, not to mention economic and military losses.
The consolation prize for China, in this case, will be the numerous islands in the neighboring seas, which Taiwan now owns. And this, by the way, is very extensive maritime possessions, including those located in strategic points. To beat them back, Taipei will have no opportunity, and all the other neighbors in the region will get a headache for many decades in the form of PLA bases throughout the South China Sea.
For the Russian Federation, the most logical position would be to adhere to neutrality (favorably, first of all, the PRC), if possible supplying the necessary to both belligerents (as the United States did in both world wars), but whether it turns out or not, will depend on how strong will be our country by the time the conflict in the strait begins.
Information