Returning to London after the signing of the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain assured the British at the ramp: "I brought peace to our generation"
Having suffered a crushing defeat in Munich, Roosevelt began to restore his ruined position as an asphalt roller - slowly and at first glance imperceptibly, but at the same time relentlessly and inexorably. The first to embrace the United States, as we already know, was Poland, which, by its intransigence, leveled Chamberlain's Munich triumph. And soon, after England itself followed England. We must pay tribute - the Americans have perfected the gift of persuasion to perfection. Now here is his truly diabolical influence succumbed and fraternal Ukraine.
“On March 15, at six in the morning, German troops entered the territory of Bohemia and Moravia. There was no resistance to them, and that evening Hitler was in Prague. The next day ... March 16 ... German troops entered Slovakia and "took it under protection" of the Reich. ... Hitler announced the creation of a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which was to gain autonomy and self-government. This meant that now the Czechs finally fell under the rule of Hitler ”(Shirokorad AB the Great Intermission. - M .: AST, AST MOSCOW, 2009. - C. 267). In addition to the Germans, the Hungarians invaded Czechoslovakia: “March 15, 1939, the Czech troops began to leave Transcarpathia, where Hungarian troops had already entered in three columns. ... It is curious that officially Hungary announced the invasion of its troops in Transcarpathia only 16 March. On this day, Miklos Horthy officially ordered the troops to attack the Carpathian Ukraine "(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - S. 268-269).
The postponement of the official announcement of the invasion of Hungary into the Transcarpathian Ukraine, as well as the case of a claim by the representative of the “German Reichswehr ...” that immediately suspended the advance of the Hungarian troops to the Carpathian Ukraine, to which Budapest responded about the technical impossibility of meeting this requirement, concealed the true state of affairs in Czechoslovakia (Year of the crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and materials. In 2 T. T. 1. September 29 1938 g. - 31 May 1939 g. - M .: Politizdat, 1990. - C. 280). Moreover, even 17 in March the status of Slovakia was still unclear. In particular, the Polish ambassador to the USSR V. Grzybowski “expressed some concern about the uncertain position of Slovakia. Slovakia seems to remain independent under the protectorate of Germany, while maintaining its army, the command of which, however, is subject only to the Reichswehr. The German currency is introduced there ”(The Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 288). And only 18 in March, after “Hitler arrived in Vienna to approve the“ Agreement on protection ”, which 13 of March signed in Berlin Ribbentrop and Tuka,” the legal status of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine finally cleared up - “now Slovakia has become a vassal of the Third Reich” ( Shirokorad AB Decree op. - S. 268), and Transcarpathian Ukraine irreversibly departed Hungary.
After clarifying the situation, 18 in March, the USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov recognized the occupation of the “Czech Republic by German troops and the subsequent actions of the German government ... arbitrary, violent, aggressive. The above remarks relate entirely to the change in the status of Slovakia in the spirit of the subordination of the German Empire. ... The action of the German government served as a signal for the brutal invasion of Hungarian troops into Carpathian Rus and for the violation of the elementary rights of its people ”(Year of the crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 290).
England, obviously confident in the strict observance by A. Hitler of the agreements reached earlier and the beginning of the creation of the Great Ukraine, March 16, 1939, hastened to ratify the agreement concluded with Germany on the principles of future trade relations. And only by clarifying the situation with Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine and finally convinced of Germany’s refusal to create a springboard for the invasion of the USSR, March 18, together with France, stated that they could not recognize the position created by the Reich in Central Europe as legitimate. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 300). Meanwhile, the actions of Germany were not limited to Czechoslovakia alone. A. Hitler was determined to solve all the problems of Germany connected with Romania, Poland and Lithuania at once.
As a result of recent events, the alignment of forces in European politics has undergone significant changes. For collective security and the rebuff of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union continued to stand in proud loneliness. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, and France switched to the camp of Munich and actively advocated the resolution of inter-imperialist contradictions at the expense of the USSR. In view of the disappearance of Czechoslovakia from the political map of Europe, Germany began preparations for engaging France in the conflict through an attack on Poland, since the latter herself embarked on a path of confrontation with Germany. In the current situation, England had no choice but to tie its fate either to France, and continue its Munich policy of not engaging France in the German conflict with its eastern neighbors, or with Germany, and involve France in an armed conflict for its defeat by Germany and the subsequent campaign on the USSR, or from the USSR, and create a collective security system in Europe.
Even before the capture of Czechoslovakia, Germany presented Romania with an ultimatum - Germany is ready to guarantee the Romanian borders if Romania stops developing its industry and agrees to send all 100% of its exports to Germany, that is, Germany needed Germany as a market for its goods and a supplier of raw materials. Romania rejected the ultimatum, but March 17 Germany again presented the same ultimatum, but in a more threatening form. Romania immediately informed the British government of the situation in order to find out what support she could count on from England. Before making a decision, the British government 18 March decided to clarify the position of the USSR on the provision of Soviet assistance to Romania in the event of German aggression - in what form and what extent.
In the evening of the same day, the Soviet government proposed to immediately convene a meeting of representatives of the USSR, Britain, France, Poland, and Romania, moreover, to strengthen its position, it offered to meet in Romania. “True, refutations from Bucharest suddenly followed: that there was no ultimatum. But the "car" spun. One way or another, on the initiative of London, the diplomatic isolation of the USSR after Munich was lifted ”(Bezymensky LA, Hitler and Stalin before the fight. - M .: Veche, 2000 // http://militera.lib.ru/research/bezymensky3/ 12.html), which served as England’s step towards creating a collective defense against Germany. The British government supported the Soviet proposal in essence, but in March 19 form proposed the USSR, France and Poland to publish a joint declaration in the sense that all the named powers are interested in preserving the integrity and independence of states in the east and southeast of Europe. The exact text of the declaration has just loomed.
20 in March Germany presented an ultimatum to Lithuania for the immediate return of Memel, and “on March 21 for the 1939 in March, the German government offered Warsaw to conclude a new treaty. Its essence consisted of three points. First, the return of Germany to the city of Danzig with the surrounding area. Secondly, the permission of the Polish authorities to build in the "Polish corridor" an extraterritorial highway and a four-track railway. ... By the third point, the Germans offered the Poles the extension of the existing German-Polish non-aggression pact for another 15 years.
It is not difficult to understand that the German proposals did not affect the sovereignty of Poland and did not limit its military power. Danzig already did not belong to Poland and was overwhelmingly populated by Germans. And the construction of motorways and railways was generally a routine affair ”(Shirokorad AB The Great Intermission. - M .: AST; AST Moscow, 2009. - C. 279-280). On the same day, the Soviet government received a draft declaration, which the British government proposed to sign on behalf of four states: Great Britain, USSR, France and Poland, and the next day, March 22, the Soviet Union accepted the wording of the draft declaration and agreed to immediately sign the declaration as soon as France and Poland will accept the British proposal and promise their signatures.
At the same time, 21-22 March 1939, negotiations were held in London between J. Bonnet, on the one hand, and N. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, on the other. The talks took place in connection with the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany and the threat of German aggression against Romania and Poland. March 22 "The British and French governments exchanged notes containing mutual obligations to assist each other in the event of an attack on one of the parties" (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - S. 277).
On the eve of the Anglo-French talks, French Ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre advised J. Bonnet to stop the Munich policy of encouraging German expansion to the East. In his opinion, the Munich Agreement, the Anglo-German and French-German declarations provided Germany with freedom of action in the East with the tacit consent of the Western powers. The seizure of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany, as well as an attempt to occupy the whole of Slovakia and the Transcarpathian Ukraine by armed means is in line with the policy of expansion to the East, and therefore the interests of England and France.
Indignation is not caused by the German aggression itself, but by the uncertainty of the German plans engendered by Germany’s lack of consultation with Britain and France - “will the Fuhrer try to return to the concept of the author Mein Kampf (according to R. Koulondra, the author Mein Kampf and Hitler are not one the same person, and two completely different faces - SL), identical, however, to the classical doctrine of the German General Staff, according to which the Reich cannot fulfill its high destinations in the East until it defeats France and puts an end to it guschestvu England on the continent? We should ask ourselves the question: is it not too late to create a barrier in the East, and whether we should not hold back the German advancement to some extent, and should we not take advantage of the opportunity created by the unrest and anxieties prevailing in the capitals Central Europe, and in particular in Warsaw? ”(The Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 299-301).
In essence, R. Koulondr proposed to support the aspiration of the USSR and to join the creation of a collective security system in Europe by creating a threat to Germany from the West and the East — on the one side of Britain and France, and on the other side of Poland and the USSR. However, J. Bonnet did not heed his advice, continued the policy of the Munich agreement to incite Germany to the East and decided to thwart the signing of the declaration, the subsequent consolidation of England, France, Poland and the USSR to organize repulse of Germany, leave Poland alone with Germany and, with the alliance with England, From the side, quietly observe how Germany will deal with Romania, Lithuania, Poland, and subsequently with the USSR.
To implement his plan, J. Bonnet raised the question of the impossibility of a defensive union of Poland and Romania with the USSR. Since Poland and Romania were afraid of friendship with the USSR more than enmity, and without the participation of the USSR, an effective defensive alliance against Germany, England and France with Poland and Romania could not be created, Jean Bonnet quite rightly hoped that England would never agree to such a madness. As a result, according to his assumption, first Poland and Romania will give up their alliance with the USSR, then England will leave the alliance with Poland and Romania, after which France, in alliance with England, will only calmly observe how Germany dealt with Poland will attack the USSR.
The French position received a warm response and full approval in Poland. March 22 "in the hope that by doing only her own business and taking military precautions in order to repel a possible threat to her own borders, she would not attract the close attention of Germany" J. Beck decided to "think" over the proposal of England to sign the declaration "(Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - S. 316, 320). Meanwhile, “on March 22, a German-Lithuanian agreement was signed on the transfer of Klaipeda III to the Reich, according to which the parties committed themselves not to use force against each other. At the same time, rumors appeared about the conclusion of a German-Estonian treaty, according to which German troops received the right to pass through the territory of Estonia ”(A. Dyukov“ Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ”in questions and answers. - M .: Fund“Historical memory ”, 2009. - S. 29). March 23, without waiting for Poland’s response to the British proposal and not seeing Poland’s desire to help her in confrontation with Germany, Romania also accepted the conditions of the German ultimatum and concluded a trade agreement with Germany.
25 March Poland continued to persistently reject the English proposal, insisting on the impossibility for Poland to sign a political agreement, one of the parties of which would be the USSR. Having finally established itself in the impossibility of Poland joining the draft four-sided declaration on the one hand and signing the USSR a declaration in case Poland refused to sign Poland, that is, the final failure of a defensive alliance of England, France, the USSR and Poland, England sided with France and suggested that Poland conclude a satisfactory an agreement with Germany regarding Danzig, thereby implementing the second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland.
In response, 26 March, Poland immediately called for three reservist age groups. In turn, A. Hitler 28 March announced the termination of the Polish-German non-aggression pact. In view of the worsening of its position, Poland continued to reject the alliance with the participation of the USSR and, together with Romania, made it clear that it would enter the peace bloc only with firm guarantees of military commitments from Britain and France. Thus, having finally buried the USSR’s plan for collective security, Poland buried the plan of England and France about the second Munich, that is, about signing a new agreement between England and France with Germany and Italy at the expense of Poland.
In the circumstances, Chamberlain, in my humble opinion, for the sake of preserving, if not leadership, then at least the existence of Great Britain, went to betrayal of national British interests and agreed with the American plan for recognition of American global domination and defeat Germany by France first by Hitler in Mein Kampf, and then the USSR. Despite the fact that the betrayal by Chamberlain of France was secret and non-advertised, all his subsequent actions, which later led France to a military defeat, are more eloquent than any words and sworn assurances.
First of all, Chamberlain gave Poland guarantees of security for the sake of engaging France in the war with Germany. 30 in March, he convened an emergency cabinet meeting in connection with the British government receiving accurate information about Germany’s intention to attack Poland, and said that he considered it necessary to warn Germany now that England could not remain an outsider of the events. Despite the inaccuracy of the rumors about the German attack on Poland 31 March, Chamberlain, giving guarantees to Poland, confused J. Bonnet with all the cards - instead of distancing from the conflict with Germany, France unexpectedly quickly became involved in it. What immediately caused bewilderment, anger and outrage in the British establishment.
After the declaration was announced in parliament, N. Chamberlain met with Lloyd George, who was unpleasantly surprised by N. Chamberlain’s actions who dared to come up with a declaration threatening England’s engagement in the war with Germany, not only without the participation of the USSR in the bloc of peace-loving countries, but even in the open opposition of Poland and Romania attracting the USSR into it. In conclusion, Lloyd George stated that in the absence of a firm agreement with the USSR, N. Chamberlain’s statement was “an irresponsible gamble that could end very badly” (Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 353-354).
“The unheard of conditions of guarantees put England in such a position that her fate was in the hands of Polish rulers who had very dubious and inconsistent judgments” (B. Liddell Garth, World War II. - M.: AST; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999 // http://militera.lib.ru/h/liddel-hart/01.html). “The British minister, later Ambassador D. Cooper, expressed his point of view as follows:“ Never in the entire history of England has England provided the right of a secondary power to decide whether or not to enter the war. Now the decision remains with a handful of people whose names, except for Colonel Beck, are practically unknown to anyone in England. And all these strangers are capable of starting a war in Europe tomorrow ”(E. Weizsäcker, von. Ambassador of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a German diplomat. 1932-1945 / Translated by F. S. Kapitsa. - M.: Centrpolygraph, 2007. - C. 191 )
“Moreover, England could fulfill its guarantees only with the help of Russia, but so far not even preliminary steps have been taken to find out whether Russia can provide, and Poland can accept such assistance. ... Only Lloyd George found it possible to warn the parliament that it would be foolishness, like suicide, to undertake such obligations fraught with consequences without complicating the support of Russia. Poland’s guarantees were the surest way to accelerate the explosion and the beginning of a world war. They combined maximum temptation with open provocation and instigated Hitler to prove the futility of such guarantees in relation to a country beyond the reach of the West. At the same time, the guarantees received made die-hard Polish leaders even less inclined to accept any concessions to Hitler, and he now finds himself in a position that does not allow him to retreat without detriment to his prestige ”(Liddel Hart B. Ibid.).
On April 3 in Germany, the Weiss plan was adopted to defeat Poland, and “the operation could begin at any time, starting on September 1 of the year 1939”. Ten days later, Hitler approved the final plan. " Meanwhile, following Germany's efforts, its allies and their allies - by 1 April 1939, Franco was finally established in Spain, 7 April Italy invaded Albania, quickly occupied it and incorporated it into the Italian Empire, and in the Far East Japan began systematic provocations against the Union USSR of Mongolia. For England and France, Mussolini’s actions became overwhelming, as they were contrary to the Munich agreements on joint resolution of controversial issues. Thus, fascist Italy, following Nazi Germany, tore up the Munich Agreement, after which “Chamberlain complained to his sister Hilde that Mussolini was behaving in relation to him“ like a scoundrel and boor. He did not make any effort to preserve my friendship ”(Mei ER Strange Victory / Transl. From English - M .: AST; AST MOSCOW, 2009. - C. 214).
The Soviet Union coldly met the initiative of N. Chamberlain. In particular, M. Litvinov, upset by recent events, said that the USSR considered itself free from all obligations and would continue to act in accordance with its interests, and also "showed some annoyance at the fact that the Western powers ... did not attach due importance to Soviet initiatives on effective organization of collective resistance to aggression "(Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 351-255). Despite everything, N. Chamberlain 3 of April “confirmed and supplemented his statement to parliament. He said that France would come to the aid of Poland against aggression along with Britain. On this day, the Polish Foreign Minister Beck was already in London. As a result of his talks with Chamberlain and Foreign Minister Lord Halifax, the British Premier delivered a new message to 6 on April 4 in Parliament. He said that an agreement on mutual assistance was reached between England and Poland. ” In addition to Poland, 13, April, 1939, the United Kingdom provided the same guarantees to Greece and Romania. Subsequently, the UK signed a mutual aid pact with Turkey.
As we recall, England intended to retain its world leadership by knitting together the Anglo-French-Italo-German alliance and defeating the USSR. In turn, America challenged British domination and intended to put together an Anglo-Italian-German alliance, coupled with the defeat of France and the destruction of the USSR, to oust Britain from the political Olympus, and in the event of its disagreement, then destroy by joint actions of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. By giving security guarantees to Poland, Chamberlain essentially agreed with the first version of the American plan, without finally abandoning his own attempts to organize a second Munich.
The beginning of the opposition of the Chamberlain of France was a turning point in the confrontation between America and England. After all, after the destruction of France by Nazi Germany, all options for further development led unconditionally to the triumph of the United States of America. That England and Germany will lead the campaign against the USSR, that Germany and the USSR together will destroy England, that England, together with the Soviet Union, will destroy Germany — America was the winner in any case. From now on, the question was in time, as well as at whose expense the United States of America achieved the desired hegemony over the world - Great Britain, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.
It can be said that from now on the Cold War for the world leadership of America and England took a new turn, and further confrontation was reduced to clarifying the relationship between Chamberlain, Churchill and Stalin. Hitler didn’t suit the prospect of Churchill’s coming to power in Britain, so he, like a drowning man, seized on Chamberlain’s idea of organizing the second Munich and leaving France alone. But now, apparently, the fate of Germany was decided in the White House, and not at all in Berchtesgaden, and therefore all his efforts were in vain.
Having embarked on the destruction of France, Chamberlain, in fact, set about eliminating the results, fruits and achievements of the 40-year-old work of his predecessors, aimed at preserving the global influence of Great Britain, and stepped on the throat of his own idea of resolving inter-imperialist contradictions at the expense of the USSR by concluding a four-party union of England, France, Italy and Germany, and began integrating Britain as a junior partner in the Anglo-Saxon world of the United States of America.
By his actions, Chamberlain at once put an end to both the British leadership and the very existence of independent France. Since Chamberlain made his move in secret both from the British and from the French, his deed can only be qualified as a betrayal of both. As for Soviet citizens, his step prevented the defeat of the Soviet Union and allowed Churchill to subsequently come to power and lead England against himself against the Nazis. As you know, Chamberlain hated communism more than Nazism and, despite the fact that “he considered Hitler to be rude and pompous ... he was sure that he understood the motives of his actions. And in general, they caused Chamberlain sympathy ”(May E.R. Decree. Op. - S. 194). The miraculous rescue of the British expeditionary corps in Dunkirk shows how close Chamberlain was to concluding a “cordial agreement” with Hitler (S. Lebedev. How and when did Adolf Hitler decide to attack the USSR // http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit /1538787.html#ixzz3FZn4UPFz).
Unlike Chamberlain, Churchill, for all his hatred of communism, hated the Nazis even more. According to him, "if Hitler had conquered hell, I would have said a panegyric in honor of the devil." In essence, having begun a standoff with Hitler, Britain recognized the transition of its leadership to America. According to Liaquad Ahamed, “in the last months of 1939, when there was no doubt that a big war was coming, Neumann [Montague Collet, Governor of the Bank of England in 1920 − 1944. - S.L.] sadly complained to the American ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy: “If the struggle continues, the England we know it will end. ... The lack of gold and foreign assets will cause British trade to shrink more and more. In the end, we will most likely come to that ... that the Empire will lose power and territory, which will reduce it to the level of other states ”(Ahamed L. Finance Lords: The Bankers Turning the World / Translated from English - M: Alpina Publishers, 2010. - S. 447).
In return, America agreed to the defeat of its military detachment in the person of Nazi Germany by the British - Soviet Union in order to subsequently lead the West and destroy the USSR, to ensure unconditional global domination. In particular, “Winston Churchill went down in history not only as a man who led one of the victorious powers during World War II, but also as one of the creators of the post-war world order. He saw the balance of power after the war as follows: “I consider it inevitable that Russia will become the world's greatest land power after this war, since as a result of it it will get rid of the two military powers - Japan and Germany, which throughout our generation have inflicted on it such severe defeat. However, I hope that the fraternal association of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States, as well as naval and air power, can ensure good relations and a friendly balance between us and Russia, at least for the period of reconstruction. " (Kuklenko D. Winston Churchill // http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=212726&p=14).
During the November 1940 negotiations “choosing between the inevitably winning coalition of Germany with the USSR and the inevitably ending defeat of Germany with a war on two fronts with Britain and the Soviet Union, A. Hitler chose the defeat of Germany. It must be assumed that the main goal of A. Hitler, as well as of the people behind his back, was not the creation of Greater Germany and her acquisition of living space, and not even the fight against communism, but the destruction of Germany in the battle with the Soviet Union "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria // http://topwar.ru/38865-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-5-bitva-za-bolgariyu .html). According to him, on the eve of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Germans "had to die and give way to stronger and more viable peoples" (Mussky SA One hundred great dictators // http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=109265&p= 172).
“As the official position obliged W. Churchill to be more restrained, his son Randolph Churchill expressed his father’s views (by the way, he participated in election campaigns on Hitler’s 1932 plane. - S.L.), who said:“ The ideal outcome of the war in the East would be such when the last German would have killed the last Russian and sprawled dead next to it ”(quoted in: Kraminov D. Truth about the second front. Petrozavodsk, 1960, p. 30). In the United States, such a statement belongs to Senator Harry Truman, later the president of the country. “If we see,” he said, “that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, if Russia will win, then we should help Germany, and thus, let them kill as much as possible, although I don’t want to conditions to see Hitler in the winners ”(New York Times, 24.VI.1941)” (Volkov FD Behind the scenes of the Second World War. - Moscow: Thought, 1985 // http://historic.ru/books/item/ f00 / s00 / z0000074 / st030.shtml; Harry Truman // http://ru.wikiquote.org/wiki/%D0%93%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%80%D0%B8_%D0%A2 % D1% 80% D1% 83% D0% BC% D1% 8D% D0% BD # cite_note-10).
The situation was aggravated by the fact that neither England nor Germany prepared for war with each other. "As a result, at the very beginning of World War II, a paradoxical situation arose - England could not ensure the safety of its sea communications, while Germany did not have the strength to crush the British merchant fleet" (S. Lebedev America against England. Part of 8. Lingering pause // http : //topwar.ru/50010-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast-8-zatyanuvshayasya-pauza.html). According to the American historian Samuel Eliot Morison, “in his plans for conquering world domination, Hitler hoped to put off the war with England at least until 1944. He repeatedly declared to his admirals that the German navy could not defeat the British Navy.
His strategy was to keep England neutral until the European "fortress" was conquered by them, and England would not be able to take any steps against it. Even more, Hitler did not want war with the United States, staking on this issue on ... pacifists and fascist supporters and assuming that the United States will remain neutral until England is conquered and he can dictate to or another country will guarantee its existence.
... In September, 1939 of the year ... the German Navy had only 43 submarines in service, of which 25 were in 250 tons. The rest had a displacement from 500 to 750 tons. These submarines caused the most damage during the Second World War. At the same time, Germany monthly built only two to four submarines. During the interrogation of 9 on June 1945, Doenitz stated bitterly that “we lost the war before it began,” because “Germany was not prepared to wage war against England at sea. With a sober policy, Germany would have to have 1000 submarines by the start of the war. ”
... However, the pace of submarine construction was immediately increased so that the number of boats under construction increased monthly from 4 to 20 — 25. Construction plans were approved, according to which 1942 submarines (mostly with a displacement of 300 and 500 tons) and more 750 submarines were to be commissioned in 900 and by the end of 1943. This program was not implemented, but even if it were possible to carry it out, such a quantity of submarines would still not be enough ”(Morison, SE, American Navy in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic / Trans. From English R. Khoroshchanskaya, G. Gelfand. - M .: M .: AST; SPb .: Terra Fantastica, 2003. - S. 142, 144).
"In turn, Britain, in view of the small number of German submarines, has neglected the construction of anti-submarine defense ships" (Lebedev S. America vs. England. Part 8. Ibid.). The first special anti-submarine corvettes of the Flower type, which were ordered in the summer of 1939, began to be commissioned after the defeat of France in the autumn of 1940 and the redeployment of submarines of the axis countries to convenient bases in Atlantic ports in the territories occupied by Hitler’s troops. Again, I refer to the opinion of Alexander the Sick - having countered two dozen "German submarines that could operate in the Atlantic" with fifty new corvettes, England could well prevent the "Battle for the Atlantic" - the "protracted and bloody war with German submarines" (Patients A.G. The tragedy of fatal mistakes. - M .: Eksmo; Yauza, 2011. - C. 134).
Nowadays, the Germans are the most numerous ethnic group in the USA - their share reaches 17%. It is not surprising that the most common family name in the USA (2 772 200 carriers as of 1990 year) is Smith (originally German Schmidt or Schmid (German Schmidt, Schmitt, Schmitt, Schmitz, Schmid, Schmied). This second most common German surname is derived from the name of the blacksmith profession - it. Schmied. The Germans are followed by African Americans (13%), Irish (10%), Mexicans (7%), Italians (5%) and French (3,5%). The British make up only about 8% of the US population.
That is, in the modern USA, 8% of the British oppose more than 35% of the historically absolutely unfriendly nations - Germans, Irish, Italians and French. Moreover, in the first half of the 20th century, the ratio in all likelihood was even greater. It was the recognition by the Great British Empire Pax Britannica of their submission to the latter-day leader that became the initial point of the gradual end of the first cold war of the 20th century of America against England and the beginning of the formation of the modern Anglo-Saxon “American world” - Pax Americana. As well as the birth of the “Soviet world” - Pax Sovietica, the coming delimitation of the spheres of influence of the USA and the USSR, as well as the birth of the second cold war of the 20th century, in which Pax Americana collided with Pax Sovietica.
Thus, in the spring of 1939, capturing the Czech Republic, giving Slovakia a showy independence and giving the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary, Hitler refused to create a springboard for the invasion of the USSR. What, in fact, disavowed the Munich Agreement. The intransigence of Poland allowed Hitler to solve his tasks in Lithuania and Romania, and later forced Chamberlain to disregard British interests and agree with the plan of America's triumph through the destruction of France and the Soviet Union.
Stepping on the path of the destruction of France, Chamberlain radically changed the balance of power. The English plan of the English-French-German-Italian Union at once lost its relevance. There remained options for the American plan to conclude the Anglo-German alliance for the defeat of the USSR and the German-Soviet Union for the defeat of England. In order to eliminate the threat of America solving its tasks by destroying England, Churchill proposed the option of destroying Germany through the joint efforts of England and the USSR. In exchange, England, as a junior partner, subsequently agreed to assist America in destroying the USSR and in acquiring unconditional political domination.
In view of the emergence of a solution for America to solve its problems at the expense of Germany, Hitler suddenly showed interest in the conclusion of the second Munich. The heat of the struggle between England and America for leadership suddenly shifted from the leaders of England and America to Chamberlain, Churchill, Hitler and Stalin. From who wins in this clash of interests, now depended on who would pay for the triumph of America - the British, Germans or Soviet citizens. England could no longer relinquish dominion over the world - America needed a new big war in order to pay for the restoration of the German economy during the implementation of the Dawes Plan and the Great Depression, to fabulously profit from World War II, to place military bases in the heart of Europe and its end. Bind to a plan of post-war restoration of George Marshall. After Mussolini’s refusal to follow the spirit of the Munich Agreement, the circle closed, and eventually Hitler and Mussolini betrayed Chamberlain, who, in turn, betrayed the British with the French.