Vasily Grabin's tank epic

59
Vasily Grabin's tank epic


“The armor is strong, and Tanks ours are fast ... ”- these words of the march of Soviet tankers, of course, are true. Armor protection, maneuverability and speed, indeed, are very important for any combat vehicle. But for a tank, just them are not enough. Obviously, he can not do without artillery weapons. About domestic tank guns of V.G. Grabina and we’ll talk today.

ON THE EVE OF WAR

In general, an assessment of the effectiveness of a tank comes down to the question of how its three most important general characteristics are related to each other: speed and maneuverability, power of armor protection, and strength of weapons. In each historical period, and the different armies placed emphasis here in their own way. In the 30s of the last century, in the leadership of the Red Army, priorities were placed precisely in the above order. The basis of the Soviet armored forces was light T-26 tanks and BT family vehicles. Two-turret versions of the T-26 were armed only with DT machine guns or a 37 mm cannon and machine gun, and the single-turret BT-5 and BT-7 were equipped with a 45-mm 20-K tank gun with a barrel length of 46 calibers. The same guns stood in two towers of the heavy five-tower T-35 tank. It should be noted that for that time the 20-K was quite a worthy weapon in its field, surpassing many foreign guns of light and medium tanks.

The three-tower T-28 was considered the main medium tank. One of its towers was armed with a 76-mm KT-28 cannon, the same guns were placed in the main tower of the heavy T-35. The 76 mm is a very large caliber for tank guns of those years. Only here the barrel length of the CT-28 was just 16,5 caliber ... The language does not turn now to call effective gun, producing 6,23-kilogram projectile with a speed of the order of 260 m / s. Despite the prevalence of this instrument, it cannot be said that it fully satisfied the experts.

In 1936, in the Kirov Design Bureau, an 76-mm L-10 tank gun with a length of 26 caliber was designed. Led the design I.A. Makhanov. The initial velocity of the projectile was already about 550 m / s. This was certainly a step forward. But the main requirements of the leadership of armored troops to gunsmiths remained small dimensions and weight of the gun. How not to mention the strange delusion that a long cannon will be clogged with earth when overcoming a moat? The whole idea of ​​the Soviet tank building 1930-ies. lies in deciphering the abbreviations of BT tanks - “High-Speed ​​Tanks”. The tank BT-7 on wheels could reach speeds on the highway up to 72 km / h! At the same time he had a reservation in 15 mm. On such machines began to work out "jumps" through small obstacles. Created amphibious tanks, and even had projects flying.

Naturally, not only Soviet tank troops before the war went on this "evolutionary" path. German Pz.l and English "Vikkers" (a prototype of our first T-26) did not have gun armament at all and had only anti-bullet armor. But they didn’t require high speeds from them either: about 35 km / h. Yet their main goal was to support the infantry. In terms of speed, BT “American” and German Pz.III could not keep up with BT, although they developed about 60 km / h. With their 37-mm cannons, they even slightly lost in armament. Only now their armor was twice as thick ...

Of course, among the reasons for the defeat of the armored forces of the Red Army in 1941 there was an insufficient training of personnel, a very unsatisfactory technical condition of the park, and the almost complete absence of radio communications among the troops. What a sin to confess: in the design in the pursuit of manufacturability sometimes ignored the convenience of operation. But another significant mistake was the irrepressible desire for speed and mass. The policy of “cap-sacking” negatively influenced the strategy of waging tank war. Tanks were introduced to some commanders as “mechanized cavalry”: to slip (who are lucky) the line of anti-tank defense and roll enemy lines with tracks.

In the Red Army, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, there were practically no medium tanks, it’s hard to talk about heavy tanks: T-28 средних medium-sized ’tanks produced 500 units, and heavy T-35 units produced 60 units. At the same time, only light tanks of the BT-7 model were manufactured over 5000, T-26 of various modifications and more than 10.000 at all. The tactics of using tanks were incorrect - such a concept as “shooting from the spot” was simply absent. And in motion, without proper stabilization systems, accurate firing is almost impossible.



"Funeral prayer" of our tank technology 30-ies. read the war itself. She also showed the prospects of some of our pre-war developments - KV-1 and T-34. They both on booking, and on reliability, and thirty-four and on speed characteristics significantly won against any foreign counterparts. The holes in the field of medium and heavy tanks began to be gradually closed with beautiful modern equipment. Of course, the weapons on these machines were already of a different level ...

FIRST TANK GUNBREADS

But the fate of the KV-1 and T-34 weapons could have been completely different if there had not been one, seemingly unremarkable meeting at one time. In the summer of 1937, two artillery specialists meet in one of the Sochi sanatoriums. The first was a young military engineer, an employee of the artillery committee of the SAU, Ruvim Yevalevich Sorkin. The second turned out to be the chief designer of the Volga Volga plant design bureau No. XXUMX Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin. By that time, the X-NUMX-mm divisional gun F-92, the first brainchild of the young team led by Grabin, was adopted by the Red Army. He had to defend this weapon in the highest instances, thanks to which he earned the recognition of I.V. Stalin. And not just because F-76 by that time had outstanding characteristics. Sorkin, on the other hand, was extremely worried about the arming of tanks with low-power artillery, which he talked about with Grabin. The last meeting at the sanatorium ended with Sorkin’s request that Grabin and his design bureau should compete with the Makhanov team, who were working on the creation of X-NUMX-mm L-22 guns, intended for the armament of a new heavy tank. Opinions about the need to create powerful tank guns at Ruvim Evelevich and Vasily Gavrilovich completely coincided.



Grabin, later describing these events in his memoirs, admitted that, despite the mutual understanding reached between them, he did not believe in the success of this enterprise at that moment. And the point is not that his design bureau was not yet involved in tank guns, he was not afraid of difficulties and was completely confident in his team. He simply understood perfectly the tendencies prevailing at the time in armored control. The hope that the leadership would drastically change its policy of creating high-speed light tanks and issue a design task for a powerful, and therefore obviously heavier and bigger cannon, was very unsteady. But Vasily Gavrilovich clearly underestimated the purposeful and initiative Sorkin, who soon arrived at the plant quite officially with an order for a new gun. In the design bureau, a unit was immediately created for the development of tank guns, and the commander-in-chief of Grabin, Pyotr Fedorovich Muravyev was appointed the head. It should be noted that the chief designer while continuing to take an active part in the design of tank guns.

But the path to the creation of powerful tank artillery was not as short as we would like. After all, the designer, above all, must meet the tactical and technical requirements submitted by the customer. And the first order of Grabin was the creation of a ballistic cannon, similar to the universal Kirov L-11. The desire to arm different types of tanks with a single weapon was by itself not a good idea, although this was already implemented with the CT-28 and with the 20-K. But for the beginning, the KB had to fulfill these requirements, although Grabin considered them too low. GAU, apparently, considered these works so unpromising that it did not even determine the type of tank and, accordingly, the dimensions of the gun. The way out of this situation was found by the same tireless Sorkin, who, together with military engineer V.I. Gorokhov was able to convince the authorities and deliver the BT-7 1935 light tank to the factory. Since there was no choice, the designers reasoned that “if the gun fits into the light tank, then any other one.”



Group Muravyev set to work. The new gun received the index F-32, for its basis was taken the construction of the divisional F-22. The ballistics of the gun was fully determined by the TTT: caliber 76 mm, projectile from the divisional gun, barrel length 31.5 caliber. As Pyotr Fyodorovich recalled: “The main difficulty was that it was necessary to ensure the minimum transverse size of the tool and the shortest distance from the axle axis to the internal contour of the sleeve. In addition, the gun must be absolutely balanced relative to the axle axis. It was necessary to strive to reduce the dimensions of the tower to a minimum and avoid going beyond the front of the cradle. The distance from the breech slice to the internal contour of the sleeve determines the rollback length of the gun, which should also be as short as possible. This, in turn, created an additional difficulty in ensuring the normal operation of semi-automatics for opening and closing the shutter wedge. Something in which the design was facilitated: it was necessary to create only a swinging part and a lifting mechanism. The upper machine and gun carriage should be the tank tower. ”

About a month later, a preliminary design was prepared, later approved by the GAU. The barrel of the F-32 consisted of a free pipe and casing. The wedge is vertical wedge, its design was distinguished by its easy handling and manufacturing. Semiautomatic copier type. The brake recoil hydraulic nakatnik hydropneumatic. The initial velocity of the projectile weighing 6,23 kg was 612 m / s.



In March-May, the 1939, the L-11 and the F-32, were tested at an artillery RKKA experimental test range. Tests were carried out on T-28 and BT-7 tanks. The F-32 F-11 problems that appeared with the copper-plating of the barrel quickly resolved, while the L-32 had flaws in the recoil devices, as they say, "inborn." With a certain shooting mode, the gun was guaranteed to fail, which Grabin had pointed out more than once. As a result of the tests, in particular, a number of advantages of the Grabinsky gun over the Makhanovsky were established: “The F-11 system has the following advantages over the L-32 system for arming tanks: The F-28 allows you to have one system for both T-7 tanks and and for BT-32 type tanks. F-32 is more convenient in handling, operation, during assemblies and disassembly, more simple and reliable. F-100 does not require a special cylinder or pressure gauge on 11 atm. Recoil devices are more reliable than in L-32, have less resistance to rollback and a shorter length of maximum rollback. F-6 has a much thicker pipe (in the muzzle on 32 mm), which is more advantageous for protection from splinters. The layout of the F-11 system and its dimensions (especially transverse ones) are more advantageous than in the L-XNUMX system. ”

It is not difficult to estimate that all the difficulties surmounted by the design bureau of plant No. XXUMX only went to the benefit of the new tool. According to the test results, both guns were put into service: the F-92 as the main one, and the L-32 as the reserve one. The fact is that the L-11 was a modified and extended L-11, which was already at the stage of gross production, and F-10 had only to begin to master. Therefore, the L-32 was also placed on the first models of the KV-11 and T-1.



But Grabin did not stop at what had been achieved and almost immediately joined in the design of a new, more powerful tool for a promising medium tank. Having learned about the desire of GAU to arm a new 76-mm machine gun, he did not offer his F-32, but decided to start work on a more powerful and promising gun. And again, he was warmly supported by Sorkin and Gorokhov. The new gun received the index F-34 and, basically, was an F-10 gun elongated by 32 calibers. Ballistics coincided with the F-22USV divisional gun. Thus, the initial velocity of the projectile reached 662 m / s.

In October, 1939 passed the first tests of the new gun. There is an opinion that F-34 was originally intended to re-equip the T-28 and T-35 tanks, but was later abandoned. Grabin was given the go-ahead to link the gun with the new tank, developed under the leadership of A.A. Morozov. According to the memoirs of Vasily Gavrilovich himself, the designers really liked the new gun, and the two design bureaus reached a complete mutual understanding. But the Winter Warfare 34-1939 made adjustments to the timing of the adoption of the F-40, and the gun on the BT-7 was sent to the front. In November, the 1940 gun was tested on the T-34 tank, and the Grabin Design Bureau received the official TTT for the gun, which were nothing more than a copy of the requirements developed and already implemented by the Grabiners.

The tank gun F-34 has become one of the most massive guns of the Red Army, according to some sources, 38.580 guns were made. She was placed on armored trains, motorized armored wagons, she also armed with armored boats of the 1124 project. You can talk for a long time about the tests and the struggle of the designers for their offspring, give statistics, figures. But it is more important to note the achieved result. Assessment Grabinsky gun gave the war. And here, as you know, there is no better praise than recognition of the enemy. This is what German General B. Muller-Hillebrand wrote about the impression that the new Soviet tanks made on the German troops: “By the beginning of the campaign, the Red Army received a new T-34 tank, which the German ground forces could not oppose either an equivalent tank or appropriate defenses. The appearance of the T-34 tank was an unpleasant surprise, because it is due to its speed, high maneuverability, enhanced armor protection, armament and mainly the presence of an elongated 76-mm gun, which has increased accuracy of shooting and piercing ability of projectiles at a large, still not attainable distance, was a completely new type of tank weapons". The question was only in the number of cars, and the number of T-34, as well as the KV-1, only grew during the war, despite the evacuation of factories and people, huge losses and military failures of 1941.



Of course, the situation, when the heavy KV-1 is armed weaker than the average tank, didn’t like Grabin very much. And for a start, he decided to at least level them in power, starting the remake of the F-34 under the KV-1. The new gun received the ZiS-5 index and differed from the F-34 in the cradle design, device and fastening lock, as well as a number of small parts. Despite the designer’s further efforts, it was ZiS-5 that was “pre-written” in the KV-1 and its modifications KV-1 from the very end of the production of these tanks. Approximately 3500 ZIS-5 cannons were manufactured.

And efforts, it should be noted, were. Back in 1939, the team of Vasily Gavrilovich began, on a proactive basis, designing the X-NUMX-mm tank gun F-85 with an initial velocity of a projectile weighing 30 kg in 9,2 m / s. In the summer of 900, the gun was tested on the T-1940 tank, but it didn’t go further than the prototype KV-28 tank. But in the middle of the war they would return to the re-equipment of KB 220-mm guns with a competition between Grabin and FF. Petrov, and D-85T Petrova will win. But by then, the HF-5 will be an outdated solution. In parallel with the F-85, Grabin led work on the creation of an X-NUMX-mm tank gun, the F-30, but after successful factory tests, work on it stopped. In 85, Vasily Gavrilovich proposed the design of the X-NUMX-mm tank gun F-39, which had many units from the F-1940. In March, the 107 F-42 in the KV-39 tank successfully passed the factory tests, which was reported to GAU and GBTU, but absolutely no reaction followed. All of these tools were made in an orderly manner. What does it mean? This means that the designers did not receive the order, and therefore the money to develop these tools. And in fact, many of the Grabinsky weapons, which became legendary, were at first initiative and “illegitimate”.



But very soon the initiative came from above. At the beginning of 1941, the leadership of our country received intelligence about the creation of heavy and well-armored tanks in Germany. As it turned out later, it was a well-organized misinformation in order to weaken our field artillery. The Nazis hoped for a blitzkrieg and did not think that Soviet industry would have time to recover and restructure. Nevertheless, now Stalin himself raised the question of arming a heavy tank with a powerful 107-mm cannon before the tank crews. And no matter how paradoxical it may sound, he received a categorical refusal from them. In one voice, he argued that such a powerful, large and heavy weapon simply could not be put into a tank. After that, Stalin addresses Grabin directly by telephone with the question whether it is possible to put a powerful 107-mm cannon on a tank. Vasily Gavrilovich, referring to the experience with F-42, answered affirmatively.

Here's how, according to the memoirs of Grabin himself, Joseph Vissarionovich commented on this question: “This is very important, Comrade Grabin. Until we arm a heavy tank with such a cannon, we cannot feel calm. This task needs to be solved as soon as possible. You can see for yourself what the international situation ... "

The next day, Grabin was on the commission to create new heavy tanks, chaired by A.A. Zhdanov. Here, the indefatigable artilleryman again had to clash with representatives of the armored control and tank designers, in particular with J. Ya. Kotin. Of course, there was a sense in their arguments: tankers did not want to increase the weight and size, increase the complexity. But there were long-standing prejudices. Once again they stubbornly asserted that a long gun was buried in the ground while overcoming obstacles. They used to say about Grabin that he was ready to drag any cannon into a tank, and in the heat of disputes, he said that “a tank is a wagon for a cannon”. Anyway, the work of the commission nevertheless moved into a rational direction, and most of the issues were settled. It remained only to clarify the timing. Here Vasily Gavrilovich and stunned everyone with his statement that he would make the gun in 45 days!



What prompted an outstanding artillery designer to set himself so short a time? This is probably Stalin’s telephone message and a desire to set new rhythms in the creation of weapon systems for the rest and, above all, for himself and his design bureau. It was also a test of the progressive, unparalleled Grabin method of "high-speed design." The close intertwining of the work of designers and technologists, the maximum unification of parts and assemblies, the constant improvement of the design and technological process are the cornerstones of this method. Now any engineer will tell you that the manufacturability of the design and the maximum use of standardized parts is the law for any designer. But it wasn’t always, once these principles were not a word, but the case was proved to the whole world only by a group of designers of the design bureau and technologists of the plant. In April, 1941, even among them, far from all believed in the success of their business. But their leader believed in them, and he was able to convey his confidence to everyone.

The order to create an 107-mm tank gun ZIS-6 was issued on April 6, but the tests of the prototype on the KV-2 tank began only 38 days after the start of work! It turned out to be a world record, which has not been beaten to this day. 19 May 1941 g. Grabin already reported on the successful results of factory tests Zhdanov. As a model for the new gun, the F-42 cannon scheme was used. The same caliber allowed unify many details and components. Changes and processing were required only due to a significant increase in the power of the new product — the initial velocity of the 16,6-kg projectile was 800 m / s. In connection with a significant increase in the weight of the projectile, Grabin decided to introduce a “mechanical loader” device into the design, which greatly simplifies the crew’s work. Even in such a short time Grabin did not forget to think about the convenience of using his product. The team of the plant number XXUMX fully coped with such a difficult ordeal. The gun, even with such terms of design and manufacture, proved to be successful, reliable and convenient. But the unprecedented development of a new weapon had to be stopped first and then completely turned off. "Tankers" could not create on time the tanks KV-92 and KV-3, and during the war the work on them was stopped. KV-5 initially remained on paper.

TOOLS OPERATING ITS TIME

In 1941, Vasily Gavrilovich completed the creation of his legendary “three-inch” –76-mm ZiS-3 divisional gun. It was the first artillery gun in the world, put on a conveyor assembly, and the most massive gun of the Second World War. A simple, reliable, lightweight and powerful enough divisional weapon gained respect even among the best gunsmiths of the Wehrmacht. Here is how Professor W. Wolf, then head of the Krupp artillery department, put it: “German guns in general exceeded guns of other states, with the exception of the Soviet Union. During World War II, I tested captured French and English guns. These tests clearly demonstrated the superiority of German systems. And therefore, the opinion that the ZIS-3 was the best gun of the 2-th World War is absolutely true. Without any exaggeration, it can be argued that this is one of the most ingenious designs in the history of barrel artillery. ”



During the war, the ZIS-3 was put on several self-propelled guns. We tried to put the ZIS-3 on the base of the T-60 tank, but after producing the prototype OSU-76, the work was curtailed. The self-propelled gun based on the T-70 tank received the designation SU-12, after revision became the SU-76. The greatest contribution to its creation and modernization was made by S.A. Ginsburg. ZIS-3 was put there almost unchanged, with cropped beds. SU-76 had a number of flaws, in particular the unreliability of the gearbox and the main shaft. The ill-conceived layout and closed cabin without exhaust ventilation turned the fighting compartment into a living hell for the gunners. "The mass grave for four" - so in the hearts of her crew called. In July, the 1943 was replaced by the SU-76 by the SU-76М, with a modified attachment of the gun, a modified transmission and a cabin open from above and behind. By 1943, the tactics of light self-propelled guns changed - previously they were used as an unequal replacement for tanks. Changed the attitude of the soldiers to the modified car. The light and maneuverable self-propelled gun SU-76М has become a universal machine for counter battery combat, destruction of tanks and infantry support. Total order was released 14.000 SU-76M self-propelled guns.

In 1944, in the design bureau of the Gorky Automobile Plant under the direction of V.A. Grachev was created original wheeled self-propelled gun KSP-76. GAZ-63 all-wheel drive truck was used as a chassis. The armored hull was open at the top. The ACS had a very low silhouette, but at the same time a lack of maneuverability. KSP-76 in service with the Red Army never arrived.

By 1943, the advantage of our thirty-fours was wiped out. German tanks Pz.VI "Tiger" and Pz.V "Panther" appeared on the battlefield. The fears of Vasily Gavrilovich and some other enthusiasts justified themselves: the Germans, despite the fact that they did not have such well-armored and armed vehicles at the beginning of the war, very soon managed to create them. The Pz.V had frontal armor in 75 mm and 75-mm gun with a length of 70 caliber, the Tiger had frontal armor in 100 mm and a powerful 88-mm gun with a length of 56 caliber. The T-34, armed with the powerful X-NUMX for the F-1941, sometimes did not penetrate the 34-mm Pz VI side armor from 80 meters. A "Tiger" confidently beat thirty-four at ranges to 200 m.



As a result of the shelling of the captured Pz.VI at the Kubinka 25-30 site on April 1943, it turned out that the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun 52-K developed in 1939 by M.N. Loginov. In this regard, it was decided to arm the T-34 with a cannon with similar ballistics. First, the choice fell on the gun D-5T, which previously showed better results on the tests than the grabinskaya C-31. Proposed by F.F. Petrov gun D-5T had very good weight and size characteristics, but it was very difficult structurally, while the layout of the tower, because of the design features of D-5T, extremely difficult for the crew to load the gun. There were also frequent failures of the lifting mechanism. As a result, the creation of the cannon was entrusted to the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB) under the leadership of the then lieutenant general of the technical troops Grabin, which was formed on November 5 1942 of the year. In October - November, the 1943 team of the CACB offered two experimental tools, the C-50 and C-53, which were tested together with the LB-1 tool. For simplicity and reliability, the C-53 gun was adopted, after completion it received the ZIS-C-53 index. And again, the Grubiners were able to surprise: the cost of the new 85-mm gun was lower than the X-NUMX-mm F-76 gun! It was ZiS-C-34 that gave the T-53 a new power it needed, making it a fascist thunderstorm until the very end of the war. In all, 34-1944 produced the order of 45 C-26.000 and ZiS-C-53 guns.

In the autumn of 1943, Mr. Grabin proposed a new 76-mm cannon to replace the F-34. A gun with a barrel length in 58 calibers accelerates a projectile weighing 6,5 kg to a speed of 816 m / s. The gun with the C-54 index was recommended for use, but after the manufacture of 62 guns, production was curtailed. In addition, Vasily Gavrilovich offered his own version of a cannon for arming self-propelled guns SU-85, but for one reason or another, the D-5С gun (modernization of D-5Т) was preferred. As a result, the grabinsky version for arming the SU-100 was also rejected - the Petrova’s D-10 gun did not require re-assembly of the SU-85 case.

Even before the release of the official decree, CACB designed the 122-mm C-34-II with the ballistics of the A-19 cannon. For the armament of tanks, the IS of Petrov KB created its own version with the D-25T index. Grabin's gun had the best accuracy, it lacked a muzzle brake, unmasking shooting, which is very important for the tank. In addition, the gases from the shot can hit your own infantry on the armor and next to the tank. But the tank builders did not want to redo the turret of the EC-2 tank, which the D-25T fit into.



Among other things, during the war years, TsAKKB designed powerful 122-mm gun C-26-I with improved ballistics and an 130-mm cannon C-26 for tanks and self-propelled guns. The C-26-I cannon accelerated 25-kg projectile up to speed 1000 m / s, and C-26 33,5-kg projectile up to speed 900 m / s. 4 August 1945. Grabin's guns successfully passed the tests, but were not accepted for service. As it repeatedly happened, the power of the Grabinsky guns was considered excessive.

In 1945, the team of J.A. Kotina began designing a heavy tank, the EC-7. The tank had body armor at the front and sides of the 150 mm, and the front wall of the tower had a thickness of at least 210 mm. In the same 1945, the Grabin Design Bureau began the development of the 130-mm C-70 tank gun. The gun had a mechanized loading and, for the first time in the national tank artillery, a mechanized ammunition. The 33,4 kg projectile reached the 900 speed in m / s and the direct shot range was 1100 m. The armor-piercing projectile at the 30 degree was able to penetrate 140-mm armor at a distance of two kilometers. In 1948, on the tests of the EC-7 tank, the C-70 gun showed good results. In 1949, an order was issued for the manufacture of a batch of 50 tanks, but in the same year a decree was issued to discontinue work on all tanks with a mass over 50 tons.



I would like to cite the opinion of the well-known military historian A. B. Shirokorada: “Termination of work on the EC-7 was a blunder of our leadership, not only military-technical, but also political. Even a small (for the USSR) series of 500-2000 tanks of EC-7 would have made a great psychological impact on the likely adversary and would force him to spend many times larger sums to create the means to fight them. The use of EC-7 in Korea, during the blockade of West Berlin and in other local conflicts would have a great military and political effect. The refusal of the C-70 gun was generally an unforgivable mistake ... "

In 1949, Grabin presented a design for the 100-mm tank gun with the “0963” index for arming the T-54 tank, which was stabilized in two planes. But for unclear reasons, the gun "0963" was not adopted. Note that in 1951, the Central Research Institute-173 (now Central Research Institute AG) a Horizon device was developed to stabilize the D-10Т gun only in the vertical plane. The production of a gun with this device began in 1955, although Grabin had proposed a gun stabilized in both planes even after 6 years before.

ANTI-TANK GUNS

After highlighting the contribution that VG Grabin with his team contributed to the development of domestic tank technology, attention should be paid to the means of anti-tank combat developed by him.



Back in 1940, Vasiliy Gavrilovich proactively imposed an 85-mm barrel on the already-mentioned Loginov anti-aircraft cannon on an F-28 gun carriage. A new gun with the index F-30 successfully passed factory tests at the beginning of 1941, but with the start of the war, the work was curtailed.



Work on anti-tank guns with anti-aircraft 52-K anti-aircraft guns was resumed by the Grabin team at the end of 1942. In 1943, the anti-tank gun C-8 was developed at 8 and tested at the end of the year. From the manufacturer, the gun received an additive to the index and was called ZiS-C-8. During the tests, a number of shortcomings were revealed, in particular, the low strength of the muzzle brake, poor extraction of the liner and the unsatisfactory performance of the recoil devices. These were not too serious shortcomings for the experimental system — they were always eliminated in the process of refinement. But ZIS-C-25 had two competitors: gun BL-44 and D-8 with the same ballistics. And they revealed similar shortcomings. Here is what AB writes about this. Shirokorad: “Test data for all guns were about the same. It should not be forgotten that the Grabin cannon outstripped competitors by a year and a half. And in the course of testing both competitors revealed the same diseases as ZIS-C-8 ... The very idea suggests itself that the troubles of the ZIS-C-1946 cannon are not due to technical, but to subjective reasons, including Ustinov’s dislike for CACB and Grabin personally. " After a long development in 85, the X-NUMX-mm divisional gun D-44 was adopted.



In the prewar period, the main anti-tank gun of the Red Army was the 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K, developed by Loginov in 1937, by superimposing an 45-mm barrel on the gun carriage of the German 37-mm anti-tank gun. 53-K fully complied with the concept of pre-war armored troops: small and light, it perfectly hit tanks with anti-bullet armor. After all, the main requirement in conditions when the level of the enemy is not sufficiently unknown is the ability to hit their tanks. Of course, this is a very simplified view: exploration is under way, the enemy’s industry is being assessed, and much more. The basis of the Soviet armored forces, as already mentioned, were light and maneuverable tanks. Therefore, with the enemy light tanks 53-K coped well. But with the same Pz.III the situation was different. Although the machine was capable of striking these machines, it was already with great difficulty: at a distance of 1 km, the armor penetration rate of the gun was 28 mm at a meeting angle of 30 degrees to normal. Therefore, our gunners and had to let the German tanks at a distance of "dagger" fire - to confidently hit the enemy tank. Another acute problem in the fight against the fascist Panzerwaffe was the lack of armor-piercing shells, and the quality of the existing ones left much to be desired. In some batches, every second projectile, when hit the target, did not pierce it, but cracked. More effective armor-piercing sabots in the Soviet Union appeared only in 1942 year.



In the Finnish campaign, we demonstrated our newest KB tanks, and it was naive to believe that our likely opponents would ignore the appearance of such machines. By the beginning of the war, the Germans had both sabot and cumulative projectiles, but kept them to great need in secret.



But we ourselves had to support the concept of matching our anti-tank weapons to our tank weapons. Grabin adhered to this opinion. At the beginning of 1940, Vasily Gavrilovich was set to create the first domestic anti-tank gun capable of piercing armor in 50 – 70-mm. Initially, he and his team engaged in research in the field of cannons with a tapered barrel, because such a solution allowed to get more power with a relatively small barrel length. However, the manufacture of such barrels proved to be extremely difficult, as well as the device used shells. Therefore, in 1940, Vasily Gavrilovich limited himself to research work and experiments with a single barrel. In parallel with these studies, Grabin led work on the creation of an anti-tank gun with a conventional, cylindrical barrel. The designer enlisted the support of Commissar of Weapons B.L. Vannikova and received the go-ahead for the design of a powerful anti-tank gun according to his own requirements. After research and meetings with the Artillery Committee of the GAU and the Artillery Academy. Dzerzhinsky KB chose the most profitable caliber for a relatively light anti-tank gun - 57 mm. The new gun received the index F-31. His TTT Grabin approved in September 1940, when the work was already in full swing. The basis of the gun was based on the design scheme of the 76-mm regimental cannon F-24. In addition to the imposition of 57-mm barrel length 73 caliber required processing only the nakatnik and some other nodes. A new armor-piercing projectile weighing 3,14 kg was adopted for the gun, the initial velocity was 990 m / s. At the beginning of 1941, this gun Grabina received the index ZIS-2.



In October, 1940 began factory testing, which resulted in an error in the choice of the steepness of cutting the trunk. But Stalin trusted Grabin very much and gave permission to launch the gun into production. The designer did not let him down - with the new cutting, the accuracy of the gun became brilliant, like the rest of its characteristics. In parallel, Vasiliy Gavrilovich led the work on other lengths of trunks, but all of them were soon discontinued. At the beginning of the 1941, the ZiS-2 gun was officially adopted. But already during the war, in December 1941, the production of the gun was suspended. Such a long barrel was extremely difficult to manufacture, and the first months of the fighting showed the excessive power of the cannon — the ZiS-2 “pierced” enemy tanks through and through. It was, perhaps, the first case when the gun was rejected because of excess power! The armor penetration of the ZIS-2 at a distance of 1 km at a meeting angle of 30 degrees to the normal was 85 mm, and when using streamlined snapping shells, this figure increased by one and a half times.



The appearance of the "Tigers" forced the military to place accents in a new way, 15 June 1943. The gun ZiS-2 was again adopted. However, a small number of these beautiful guns shifted the main burden of fighting the German "menagerie" to the same ZiS-3 division, which was clearly not intended for this. The armor penetration of the ZIS-3 under similar conditions was only 50 mm.

With its outstanding power, the ZIS-2 was a very lightweight weapon - just a little more than 1000 kg. For example, the German 75-mm Cancer 40, which is close to it in power, turned out to be one and a half times heavier, and the 38 Cancer, which is close in mass, was almost twice less powerful. In 1943, the Allies asked the leadership of the USSR to provide them with a ZIS-2 gun for research. For all the time it was made about 13.500 guns ZIS-2. To this day, the modified ZIS-2 are in service with a number of countries.



At the end of 1940, Mr. Grabin proposed creating self-propelled guns with ZiS-2. Light installations based on the semi-tracked all-terrain vehicle ZiS-22M and the tracked tractor Komsomolets along with the gun ZiS-3 were presented to Marshal Kulik 22 on July 1941 from which the designer received a categorical refusal. This time it seems that this refusal was for the better, because the ZIS-30 (based on Komsomolets) turned out to be very unstable due to the high height of the firing line with low weight and overall dimensions. However, an experimental batch was made from 104 self-propelled guns. The second self-propelled gun did not even run in the series. But Grabin's next idea turned out to be noticeably more promising. In the autumn of 1940, the designer suggested inserting the ZIS-2 barrel into the swinging part of the F-34 tank gun. In just a few days 15, the ZiS-4 gun was already in the metal. After processing, according to the test results, the plant received an order for manufacturing, and in September 1941 began its mass production. But only 42 guns were made for the T-34 tank - the ZiS-4 gun was waiting for the same fate as the ZiS-2. In 1943, Mr. Grabin will try to reanimate the project, but only a small series of ZiS-4 will be released. It would be somewhat pompous to say that the mass production of T-34-57 tanks would completely change the whole course of the war. But, of course, even relatively small batches of these fighter tanks could consolidate the superiority of our armored forces back in the 1942-43 years, “breaking off the fangs” of the Panzerwaffe.



The appearance of "Tigers", "Panthers" and "Elephants" (originally called "Ferdinand") led not only to the re-equipment of the T-34 and the resumption of production of the ZiS-2. Su-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, although they successfully fought with heavy tanks, but this was corps assault artillery - the destruction of tanks was not part of its immediate tasks. In 1943, Mr. Grabin set about creating an anti-tank gun based on the X-NUMX-mm naval gun B-100. The September 34 prototype gun with the C-14 index was sent to the Sofrinsky test site. This was followed by improvements at the Bolshevik plant. The gun received the index BS-3. 3-mm gun with a barrel length 100 caliber gave 59-kg projectile initial speed 15,6 m / s. The muzzle brake absorbed 900% recoil energy.



15 April 1944 was fired from captured Tigers and Ferdinand at the Gorokhovetsky testing ground. From a distance of 1,5 km, the tank confidently made its way, the SAU armor did not make its way, but the Elephant was guaranteed to fail due to the armor's spalling from the inside. In relation to the BS-3 to Hitler's "zoo", it would be appropriate to say: "What I do not eat, then bite." That is why the BS-3 and nicknamed "grabinsky hunter." From a distance in 3 km at an angle of meeting 30 degrees to the normal, the armor penetration rate of the new field gun was 100 mm. Until the very end of the war, the enemy could not oppose the BS-3 of any tank other than the Pz.VIII "Maus", but she could easily hit even his new cumulative projectile. However, taking the "Mouse" into account is a tribute to the formalities: only two of these 200-ton monsters were made.



Prior to the start of the 1960-s, this 100-mm field gun mod. 1944 could successfully penetrate the armor of any Western tank without cumulative projectiles. Production of these guns was discontinued in 1951. Approximately 3800 BS-3 guns were manufactured. Until now, these weapons in small quantities are in service with a number of countries, including the Russian Federation.

On the same gun carriage as the BS-3, TsAKKB in parallel developed a powerful 85-mm C-3-1 cannon and 122-mm C-4 cannon with ballistic A-19 cannon. The C-3-1 ballistics were significantly superior to the X-NUMX-mm D-85 cannon ballistics. But work on both guns was stopped.

In 1946, Grabin began to develop the 85-mm high-power anti-tank gun C-6, which had the ballistics of the C-3-1 gun. In 1948, a prototype was made and ground tests were started. Despite the successful development, in 1950, preference was given to the F-48 tool. Petrova with similar ballistics, but things were not going well for her either. D-48 was accepted into service only in 1953, and only 28 of them were manufactured.



In the same 1946, Vasily Gavrilovich tried to create an even more powerful 85-mm cannon by imposing an OPS-10 experimental trunk on the 152-mm howitzer ML-20 gun carriage. The barrel had a length of 85,4 caliber, that is, much longer than any anti-tank guns then available. The initial velocity of the 9,8-kg projectile was 1200 m / s, which was also a brilliant result. In 1948, field tests were carried out, but no further work was carried out anymore - such power seemed excessive to the military.

Grabin was ready for such a turn of events and in 1947 he produced a prototype 100-mm lightweight field gun C-6-II. It weighed one and a half times less than the BS-3, but at the same time it was inferior in power only by 16%. However, this instrument was rejected without giving any reasons.



In 1946, CACB returns to work on cannons with a tapered barrel. The reason for this was getting captured German 75 / 55-mm conical guns RAK 41. The caliber of the chamber was 75 mm. and in the muzzle of the 55 mm, the barrel length was 4322 mm. In fact, the trunk was divided into three sections: a threaded cylindrical at the chamber, a smooth conical and a smooth cylindrical to the barrel. Based on these trophies, Grabin began designing the 76 / 57-mm regimental anti-tank cannon C-40. The carriage for the new gun was taken from an experienced gun ZiS-C-8. The prototype C-40 passed ground tests in 1947. Grabin managed to create a system that is one and a half times more powerful than the German prototype: armor in 500 mm penetrated through the 285 m. But the armament system did not come, affected the complexity of manufacturing and a small resource trunk.



In the second half of the 1950's. KB Grabina, since the end of 40-x referred to as SRI-58, led the development of the project under the affectionate title "Dolphin". And this project was, as much as a radio-controlled anti-tank missile. The designers did an excellent job with the new task, and in 1958 the tests of the finished product began in parallel with the wire-guided ATGM AE. Nudelman. At a distance in 3 km, the Dolphin confidently hit the shield with dimensions 10 × 10 m, and its cumulative warhead confidently penetrated the armor in 500 mm. The Grabin ATGM was inferior to the Nudelman complex only by its large dimensions, and because of the presence of the radio control it was clearly superior to it. But the age of the Grabinsky collective was coming to an end, the works were interrupted and the products of Alexander Emmanuilovich were accepted for service at the beginning of the 1960's.



Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin was a very talented and visionary designer, an excellent organizer and an unsurpassed innovator. Before the war, his F-22 and F-22US guns made up half the fleet of the Red Army divisional artillery, the F-22 won the Germans fame for their excellent anti-tank guns and was serially placed on the Kunitsa ACS. His battalion ZIS-3 enjoyed the love of artillery for its simplicity, reliability and unpretentiousness. The tank F-34 provided our tanks with sufficient power in the early stages of the warriors, and the anti-tank ZiS-2 and BS-3 did not know their equal on the battlefields. Its 180-mm C-23 cannon successfully replaced tactical missiles in Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the 57-mm automatic anti-aircraft C-60 became a thunderstorm of American pilots in Korea and Vietnam. His invention was the method of speed design, which reversed all ideas about the development of technical systems. Grabin's design thought was ahead of its time by years, and sometimes even decades: the design of some of its tools was declassified only in the early 1990s.

But many of his guns were not put into service, among them were absolutely unique samples. Such an enterprising, principled and independent designer simply could not fail to make himself influential enemies, which, ultimately, led to the elimination of his design bureau. Colonel-General, Hero of Socialist Labor VG Grabin was dismissed in 1959. Even he could not publish his memories during his lifetime. Until the very end, he honestly could be comforted by the fact that he served the Motherland with his team.
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

59 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +9
    1 October 2014 10: 16
    Grabin’s memoirs are one of the best memoirs about that period.
    1. +1
      2 October 2014 06: 05
      I don’t understand how there can be an "excessively powerful gun". If it is piercing through an enemy tank - great! This is a guaranteed defeat from the first shot, shoot at the engine, at the mechvod, at the ammunition, at the tower, and anywhere! after 1 hit, the tank died. and we have a saving of ammunition.
      1. +1
        2 October 2014 13: 00
        You forget about the complexity of the production of this tool. In the USSR, not many plants could make this barrel, and it was not in vain that it was taken out of production in the first year of the war — too complicated.
        In addition, the 57 caliber was too small for field artillery, and in the field, instead of forty, it was too heavy. The carriage then weighed wow!
        In fact, it turned out to be a purely anti-tank gun.
        You can compare it with a sniper rifle, an excellent weapon for units, but you can’t arm an entire army, it’s expensive, difficult, and you also need machine guns, machine guns and so on.
        Therefore, the choice was in favor of ZIS-3 in the field better, structurally easier and stamping can be almost in the basement.
        1. xren
          0
          2 October 2014 17: 34
          from ZIS-3 ZIS-2 differed almost exclusively in the barrel
        2. xren
          0
          2 October 2014 21: 12
          and more

          in what the ZIS-3 was more difficult - see the angles of vertical aiming.
          Yes, and heavier by 150 kg.

        3. -1
          3 October 2014 15: 57
          Robbed designed the guns taking into account production, there is more a political decision, they did not like him much
    2. 0
      3 October 2014 15: 57
      I agree, this is my handbook.
  2. The comment was deleted.
  3. +3
    1 October 2014 10: 30
    what
    In the Red Army, by the beginning of the Second World War, there were practically no medium tanks, and there was no need to talk about heavy ones: “medium” T-28 tanks in all were produced 500 units, and heavy T-35 - 60 units.

    the author, but how many HF and 34ok were at the beginning of the war?
    or didn’t understand something?
    This was perhaps the first time that a gun was rejected due to excess power! Penetration ZiS-2

    a well-known myth, here, on the top var already a hundred times understood


    . In November 1941, a decision was made to suspend serial production of ZIS-2. This decision was caused by several reasons:

    -low manufacturability and high cost of tools;
    - the loading of the Stalingrad Barricades plant with the production of 76-mm USV divisional guns, in connection with which the plant was forced to stop production of ZIS-2 barrels, and plant No. 92 could not cope with the production of barrels;
    -problems with the release of ammunition - there was no production of 57-mm shells before in the USSR, the deployment of their manufacture after the outbreak of war was fraught with a number of difficulties, in particular, with the evacuation of the ammunition plant.



    At the end of 1940, Mr. Grabin proposed creating self-propelled guns with ZiS-2. Light installations based on the ZiS-22M semi-tracked all-terrain vehicle and the Komsomolets crawler tractor along with the ZiS-3 cannon were presented to Marshal Kulik 22 on July 1941, from which the designer was categorically refused.

    to put it mildly, not a very brilliant idea.
    ps. Zis2 and not Zis3, right?
    1. +2
      1 October 2014 11: 13
      The appearance of the Tigers, Panthers and Elephants (originally named Ferdinand)


      but the "elephant"

      ????????????
      Elephants, they actually were in Italy, and before that Fedi, and 99% of Soviet literature calls him that
      Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin was a very talented and visionary designer

      no doubt, unlike the author of the article.

      Before the war, his F-22 and F-22USV guns made up half of the Red Army’s division artillery fleet, the F-22 gained the glory of the Germans as an excellent anti-tank gun and was placed on the Kunitsa self-propelled guns in series


      A. Significantly modernized for itself
      B. There are certain rules for the name of technology, German technology, like all proper names not translated, marder, elephant,
      The following groups of proper names are also transcribed: personal names of people, abbreviations, nicknames, surnames, animal names, place names, astronomers, names of ships, planes, spaceships, names of organizations and institutions, magazines, books, movies, etc.
    2. +1
      1 October 2014 12: 44
      "author, and how many KV and 34ok were at the beginning of the war?" ////

      By the beginning of the war, the Red Army
      there were 967 T-34 and 508 KB.
      This is in addition to the 500 pieces of the T-28 and 60 of the T-35.
      Total 1467 medium tanks and 568 heavy.

      For comparison, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR
      there were PZ-III 966 pieces and PZ-IV 439 pieces (total 1405 medium)
      , the rest are light tanks (1500 pieces).
      1. xren
        +2
        1 October 2014 13: 13
        Have you forgotten about self-propelled guns?
        1. 0
          1 October 2014 14: 35
          And I forgot about motorcycles with machine guns! winked
          Self-propelled gun was about 250 knock, not
          anti-tank (short-barreled).
          Therefore, they are more likely to refer to field artillery.
          1. +2
            1 October 2014 15: 55
            Quote: voyaka uh
            Self-propelled gun was about 250 knock, not
            anti-tank (short-barreled).
            Therefore, they are more likely to refer to field artillery.

            winked
            bully bully
            1. 0
              2 October 2014 11: 37
              Quite a Jpz-1, Bizon normal self-propelled guns based on the PzKpfw-I, any Soviet tank in the forehead could take, including KV.
            2. The comment was deleted.
          2. Codename49
            0
            1 October 2014 16: 26
            Pohrena direct fire can make any fool a hole the size of a house !!!
          3. +2
            1 October 2014 20: 23
            I forgot about captured tanks
            For example, the captured British destroyed the Red Army in 1941 near Brest.
            1. +1
              1 October 2014 20: 26
              French tank S-35, destroyed by Soviet troops.
            2. 0
              2 October 2014 00: 07
              Thank you, interesting photo. About English light tanks in the service
              The Wehrmacht did not know.
              When storming Sevastopol in 1942, they used exclusively trophy
              French medium and heavy tanks - it was them who were knocked out by sailors with bundles of grenades.
              1. +2
                2 October 2014 00: 46
                Quote: voyaka uh
                Thank you, interesting photo. About English light tanks in the service

                http://www.wio.ru/tank/capt/axis-for.htm
                1. +1
                  2 October 2014 10: 30
                  Thanks again for the nice site www.wio.ru
              2. 0
                2 October 2014 11: 23
                Something is hard to believe that the S-35 can be knocked out with grenades. Unless to break the caterpillar.
          4. xren
            +2
            1 October 2014 21: 08
            Yeah, the same as on the PZ-IV, and the armor was comparable.

            By the way, the guns on the T-28 and T-35 were even shorter, and on most T-34 and KV-1 they were not much longer.
          5. xren
            +2
            3 October 2014 12: 59
            And I forgot about motorcycles with machine guns!

            Well, if they have the same 30-50 mm reservation and tank gun, then we must count them ... smile
      2. +1
        1 October 2014 17: 58
        Well, yes, the Germans had far fewer tanks, BUT they had a strategic initiative on their side, many times better command and control of troops, the best practices and betrayal of some of the top leaders of the Red Army like Pavlov, and even the glaring insecurity of the KV and T-34 at the beginning of the war. ( to the unreliability of new machines not yet brought, the absolute lack of repair units and subunits at the beginning of the war is still layering) At T-34 these problems were partially observed until the end of the 1942 year. A HF even facilitated something to avoid damage to the CP. (made KV-1 with which at the moment it was justified, but in the distant future it was a mistake) Yes, and in Israel itself it was exactly the same in the 1967 and 1973 wars. Israel did not have superiority in tanks and in the 1973 of the year, even at the beginning in aviation, but still the Arabs were gouged to pieces. And all because of the best preparation and organization.
        1. +1
          1 October 2014 18: 13
          Yes, one quantity will not go anywhere. Although "... big battalions are always right ...", this is when the opponents do not differ too much in quality.
          Quote: nedgen
          the betrayal of some of the top leaders of the Red Army like Pavlov

          I don't think he was a traitor. The cleaning was already very comprehensive. Probably did not match the position with his abilities and experience, and the initiative was punishable.
          1. +4
            1 October 2014 19: 03
            Well do not tell. Not bringing the subordinate military district into combat readiness number one despite receiving orders from the General Staff as early as June 18? Is this what you think is called? Moreover, the withdrawal of 3's divisions to field camps from Brest even despite the plan approved in a few months? Did they have to go to field camps BEFORE the 21 of June? Eto what to call? And the very receipt of the order from the General Staff on the 18 of June was confirmed by the chief of communications of the military district during the process of Pavlov. Non-dispersal of aviation at field aerodromes despite an order from the General Staff back in early June ?? What is that? In peacetime, it is called malicious violation, and during the war a betrayal. Incidentally, however, such large losses on the ground on the first day of the war, the Red Army aviation suffered ONLY at the call and nowhere else. And the tales and the fact that the airdromes, you see, were not built tales for idiots. This modern jet aircraft cannot land without concrete, and then the field aerodrome was simply a large and relatively flat field with plain T at the beginning of the strip. Everything else was on trucks and simply unloaded on the ground and disguised itself. The only thing that needed to be done was to level or roll the strip and nothing more. But in the call, they didn’t even disperse and disguise the aircraft in the parking lots. In all other districts, they did it, but Pavlov has NO. And what else to call? It can be called incompetence. Your right, but during the war, incompetence resulting in losses is equated to TRIED. So for me it doesn’t matter whether he specifically acted in this way or was just a dumbass. (Although personally, I doubt that he was a dumbass.)
            1. -1
              1 October 2014 21: 23
              Yes, but do not forget the situation. Stalin categorically did not believe that the Germans would attack, considered the incoming information about the possibility of an attack a provocation, and demanded that the generals not provoke the Germans. Somewhere, the military commanders took initiative and were not afraid of the consequences, but somewhere they didn’t. Kuznetsov, for example, brought the fleet into combat alertness with his power, while the same Rokossovsky prepared his mechanized corps for the start of operations (as he could).
              I doubt very much that under conditions of almost total cleaning, spies on such tops could remain. The opportunists and too cautious - yes, and even with insufficient experience of especially highly maneuverable actions - of that same blitzkrieg. Read about Konev from Rokossovsky and Zhukov regarding the collapse of the Western Front in 41, because he was lucky, I think Stalin had already sentenced him, Zhukov actually ousted him. But Konev was not a traitor, he simply burst, although this was reflected in the death and capture of millions. And this is not, of course, the only case in the war, and, of course, this was not only with the Soviet military commanders.
              1. 0
                2 October 2014 11: 30
                Quote: sevtrash
                But Konev was not a traitor, he simply burst, although this was reflected in the death and capture of millions.

                Well, not millions, we didn’t have such an army. But the collapse in the Kiev operation was, the loss was only captured in KIUR 800 thousand people. - unequivocal gross error of command. In fact, the Red Army lost 50% of the regular army.
              2. +2
                2 October 2014 17: 31
                But the fact that Stalin did not believe that Hitler would attack, I do not believe. Everything is too muddy there. It is unlikely that Stalin was an idiot. It seems to me that the tales that Stalin did not believe in Hitler's attack were composed later, maybe even after his death (poisoning). Well, what about the order not to provoke the Germans, yes it was, but then how to explain the fact that just before the war, at EVERY frontier post, trenches of a full profile were wiped out and 45 were credited ???? What else can there be other than direct preparation for war? After all, before 1941, all of this WAS NOT. And German reconnaissance planes were planted by force even in June 1941. Pokryshkin even seems to have written about it. And as far as I remember, there was no direct ban on such actions. And I doubt very much about Kuznetsov's own initiative. Can you imagine how much it will cost just to transfer the entire fleet to readiness number 1? This is only direct fuel costs for millions of then (full-weight) rubles. After all, a steam turbine ship to readiness 1 also means that the steam pressure must be maintained at a high level, which inevitably means additional fuel and water. And in your opinion, Kuznetsov, on his own initiative, opened the NZ and began to burn fuel on ships? Yes, he would be arrested immediately for unplanned expenses. And the denunciation would have come to the Special Department directly from the Headquarters of the Navy. And how else to call Pavlov's actions if not a betrayal if ONLY at the ZOVO airplanes at the aerodromes were not dispersed and camouflaged (this is right on the aerodromes), not to mention the dispersal at the field aerodromes. But in other districts it was done. By the way, however, the order to disperse aviation was received (I don't remember exactly, but not on June 18, but in early June). Read the same Pokryshkin that was a field aerodrome of those years and where the regiment of Pokryshkin himself was on June 22nd. And do you see Pavlov's FIELD aerodromes to build. Yes, nothing at all on the field aerodrome needs to be built, well, it would be nice to have dugouts and shelters for aircraft, but after all, everything was simply torn off in the ground and that's it. And at the field aerodrome there was no concrete at all. This is now modern aviation needs concrete. And then no. It was only necessary to have an even field of the required dimensions (no more than 1-1,5 km long and 50-100 m wide) and a landing "T" from the canvas at the beginning of the strip.
              3. +1
                2 October 2014 17: 32
                In addition, it is NOT CORRECT to compare the situations of Konev and Pavlov. Konev burst, which could lead to the fall of Moscow, and Pavlov DIDN'T FULFILL THE DIRECT ORDER OF THE GSC ON Bringing the Call in FULL Fighting Readiness received at the district headquarters back on June 18, 1941. And he even hid the presence of this order from the headquarters. During the trial against Pavlov, the chief of communications of the ZOVO (between the same, however, is also the defendant) stated about this directly. And all the tales of Zhukov (if he wrote "his" memoirs at all) about the order to bring the troops of the border districts to full combat readiness on the night of June 22, and even the ravings of a gray mare concocted almost on his knee. There are special signals in the form of code words to raise troops on alarm (and this is what should have been done). And why does one ask exactly at the moment when, you see, a German strike is expected from minute to minute, one should sit down and write the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense, and even almost on his knees?

                About the mechanized corps of Rokosovsky is generally a separate song. He didn’t have a case in fact. Only assembled in one place, insufficiently trained and insufficiently equipped fighters. And you read Arkhipov’s memoirs about the period before the start of the Second World War and what he did there as commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the tank division.
                As for the huge cleanings, it's also a duck. Well, 7 - 8 thousand were represen- tated - but among these represen- tatives, the number of top officers was not so great even for the stealing ensigns. And no one ever succeeded in completely clearing the traitors. Especially in the higher echelons.
                And during the great purges (1937 -1938) Pavlov was in Spain.
                Regarding insufficient experience. And in what army of that period (excluding the Wehrmacht) was he? Only a little of the Red Army (Khalkhin Gol) but still Khalkhin Gol is a separate corps operation and not a large-scale war. And the lack of experience follows rather from the mobilization of the Red Army - Well, there was nowhere to take (even from the reserve) sufficiently trained (especially senior) officers. So I had to raise cash officers to 2-3 and even 4 steps for a year or even several months.
                1. +2
                  17 October 2014 21: 21
                  Quote: nedgen
                  Regarding insufficient experience. And in what army of that period (excluding the Wehrmacht) was he? Only a little of the Red Army (Khalkhin Gol) but still Khalkhin Gol is a separate corps operation and not a large-scale war.

                  Is the Winter War not a war? Or did Finland not capitulate to the inevitability of a complete defeat? Yes, a victorious march did not work out, so in a war they do not always occupy cities under timpani, often victories are gained with great blood.
        2. 0
          2 October 2014 11: 27
          I agree, if there were Koreans, Cubans or Vietnamese, the result would be different. There would be no Israel.
      3. 0
        2 October 2014 13: 19
        Quote: voyaka uh
        For comparison,

        Here, Hitler attacked faster. Until the development and coordination of the crews and units took place. According to the scale of deployment, the lag of the USSR, according to some data, reached 28 (!) Days. What is the use of tanks without fuel and ammunition, with incompletely trained crews. This is so, the first thing that came. Otherwise, it’s not a comment, but an article.
    3. xren
      0
      1 October 2014 23: 24
      In November 1941, a decision was made to suspend serial production of ZIS-2. This decision was caused by several reasons:

      -low manufacturability and high cost of tools;
      - the loading of the Stalingrad Barricades plant with the production of 76-mm USV divisional guns, in connection with which the plant was forced to stop production of ZIS-2 barrels, and plant No. 92 could not cope with the production of barrels;
      -problems with the release of ammunition - there was no production of 57-mm shells before in the USSR, the deployment of their manufacture after the outbreak of war was fraught with a number of difficulties, in particular, with the evacuation of the ammunition plant.


      Low manufacturability and high cost of guns ????
      However, but even if you do not believe Grabin, then ZIS-3 became the most massive not by chance.
      Regarding the barrel and shells, just when the power of the gun was required, these problems did not stop the release of the gun.
      1. 0
        2 October 2014 11: 03
        Low manufacturability and high cost of guns ????

        what confuses you? many excellent samples did not work with us due to the fact that the factories "could not." (see German licensed anti-aircraft guns)
        and those that went had shoals from production for several years.

        Regarding the barrel and shells, just when the power of the gun was required, these problems did not stop the release of the gun.

        and when was it needed?
        Do you feel the difference between 41 and 43? Do you know about the evacuation of industry in 41?
        Well, tell me, what for to fence at 41 on a horned ungulate animal "Russian reed button-pneumatic musical instrument with a full chromatic scale on the right keyboard, bass and ready (chord) or ready-selectable accompaniment on the left."?

        all available means at real battle distances cope, the weapon is expensive and problem-technological *.
        * Mastering serial production of guns at Gorky Plant No. 92 was difficult - compared to previously manufactured guns ZIS-2 it was notable for its increased design complexity. Particular problems were caused by the manufacture of a long barrel, accompanied by a large number of defects.

        I won’t give a tooth, but I’m sure that its production will cost as much as 2-3 for forty, and a couple of f-22,
        And most importantly, who will produce shells for the gun? due to what? abbreviations 76 and 45 mm?

        I very much doubt that the leadership of the USSR was much dumber than you and me, and taking into account both the military and the production and economic components, I did not think about the reasons for the cessation of production.

        ps. mind you, even resuming this production, it did not become mass, and was a highly specialized means of TVET in IPTAP
        1. xren
          0
          2 October 2014 22: 17
          Low manufacturability and high cost of guns ????

          what confuses you? many excellent samples did not work with us due to the fact that the factories "could not." (see German licensed anti-aircraft guns)
          and those that went had shoals from production for several years.


          Once again: It is embarrassing that the ZIS-3 which is based on the low-tech and expensive ZIS-2 has become the most massive gun. Moreover, its design was somewhat more complicated than the ZIS-2.

          Do you feel the difference between 41 and 43?

          Despite this, those models of equipment that were vital were mastered in production

          that its production will cost like 2-3 forty dollars, and a pair of f-22,


          Again ZIS-3 was much cheaper f-22. And by the way, the f-22 barrel was not much longer than the ZIS-3

          mind you, even resuming this production, it did not become mass, and was a highly specialized means of TVET in IPTAP


          at the same time in the same years, forty was released only twice as many
          1. 0
            3 October 2014 11: 37
            Despite this, those models of equipment that were vital were mastered in production

            and what vital need is a nosebleed in Zis-2?
            It is confusing that the ZIS-3 which was created on the basis of the low-tech and expensive ZIS-2 has become the most massive gun. Moreover, its design was somewhat more complicated ZIS-2.

            You can again, what’s more difficult? More expensive, more technological, more hours?
            and it is desirable to reinforce the quote.

            direct and bring the cost of the barrel ZIS-2 and ZIS-3 and the percentage of marriage in production, if not difficult.
            at the same time, in the same years, magpies were released only two times more

            Shaw, you say?
            Production of 57-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1941 and 1943 g. (ZIS-2), 1943 1855 pcs
            1944 2525 pcs

            45-mm guns of the 1942 sample g manufactured by the factory No. 172 with 1943 g - 4151 piece,
            factories No. 235, 172 12730 and 4495 in 1943 respectively.
            See Shirokorad.
            these are not counting that in 2 times in itself it is already cool for wartime.

            repeat
            ZIS-2 in 43 year 1885 pcs
            45-ok in 43 year 4151 + 12730 + 4495

            ps. that's about it you omitted
            And most importantly, who will produce shells for the gun? due to what? abbreviations 76 and 45 mm?

            who and where will produce shells, and due to what,
            I recall that in the 41 year, the reduction, appreciation or termination of the production of established and technologically advanced weapons was unacceptable.

            At the same time, I recall that the HE power of both shells is the same. 45ka completely copes with enemy armored vehicles in 41m, the release of shells is adjusted in large numbers. Despite the fact that the cost of manufacturing the barrel 45ki 7 times cheaper than Zis-2 :)
          2. 0
            4 October 2014 18: 06
            Hello xren, Well, in the first low-tech ZiS-2, it was not particularly so. It was expensive primarily because of the long 70 calibers and the thin 57 mm barrel (too much marriage during cutting rifling of the order of 90% -95%, and also the need for the incomplete assimilation of the new 57-mm shot). Yes, and it was low-tech compared to the ZIS-3 end of the 42. but in fact at the very beginning it was the same guns with very small differences, well, like a barrel and something else (all the same, the recoil force of both guns due to the ZIS-3 muzzle brake was essentially the same). But in comparison with the F-22 ZiS-2 was very technological. And indeed it was developed not on the basis of F-22, but on the basis of F-22 SPM. And despite the fact that the F-22 and F-22 SPM have the same index, the difference between the guns is huge. And then in the production process the manufacturability of ZiS-3 and after the 1943 th ZiS-2 only increased. What is the cost of just using tubes as a bed, besides replacing gun wheels with wheels from a truck, adopting the FNNXX as the main shutter; the ZIS-34 / 2 F-3 shutter made it possible to reduce the cost of production. A key moment in the fate of ZiS-34 was played by two factors - a very high percentage of defects in the production of barrels and ammunition. In 2, new machines were already delivered by Lend-Lease (accordingly, the percentage of rejects decreased significantly), and now a ZiS-43-type gun was needed for a cut.
  4. +4
    1 October 2014 11: 14
    A bit messy article. But quality in this case is offset by quantity. For example, I had no idea that SU-76 existed.
    1. +1
      1 October 2014 12: 08
      Quote: brn521
      A bit messy article
      I think you know what a "presentation" is? So this article, an almost verbatim EXPLANATION of Comrade Grabin's MEMOIR, respectively, and Grabin's conclusions ... Unfortunately, the author, being impressed by these memoirs, somehow did not bother with the questions, why was the Red Army left without a proper number of light howitzers, which are more universal systems for the infantry ... Unfortunately Grabin, in many respects - Yakovlev of our barrel artillery ...
      1. +1
        1 October 2014 15: 53
        For example, I had no idea that SU-76 existed.

        it’s immediately clear that it’s not a player in tanks, and in general you don’t get carried away with tank themes
        This product is in any book about the war, and it is well known enough, and the article is yes, unsystematic
      2. 0
        2 October 2014 05: 53
        Dear svp67. Can you give your version of the answer to the question why the Red Army was left without the proper amount of light howitzers?
        And please, explain your statement that "Grabin ... - Yakovlev" ...
  5. +3
    1 October 2014 12: 37
    It seems like the armor penetration of Soviet guns was lower than German, American due to the worst internal ballistics (you can compare the 75-76 mm guns, 85-88-90 mm), which was offset by an increase in the caliber of guns with understandable negative effects. What was the flaw, perhaps as a barrel manufacture? I do not think that Grabin or Petrov did not know this.
    1. +4
      1 October 2014 13: 46
      It’s all about the manufacturability of production, this approach ensured mass production with a qualitatively low level of machine stock and relatively cheap materials (alloys). It allowed not to use complex heat treatment technologies, the bulk of the parts should be performed in a lower quartet. And all this in order to have a lower percentage defect at each stage of production. As a result, one of the 8 barrels of ZiS-3 was rejected, and of the 11 barrels for the barrels PaK-43-gun only one became! An example is not quite correct, but clearly shows the day l questions.
    2. +2
      1 October 2014 17: 47
      as far as I know, the problem of armor penetration of Soviet guns of the caliber 76 and 85 mm is essentially the amount of gunpowder in the shells. After all, the 76-mm shot was taken from a three-inch 1902g. and the shot of the 85-mm gun was essentially a shot of the 76-mm anti-aircraft gun with an increased projectile caliber. At one time, Grabin suggested using a shot of the 76-mm anti-aircraft guns for the F-22, but he was ordered to return to the 76-mm three-inch shot. For the division, this is, in general, something that can be considered justified. Indeed, for a divisional, a shot of a German field 75-mm gun with separate loading is much more suitable. But for the anti-tank definitely 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. For the 85mm anti-aircraft gun, the powder charge in the sleeve of the 76-mm anti-aircraft gun shot is still suitable, but for the tank and especially anti-tank there is already not enough. To this, it is worth adding better spent shells from the Germans and Americans. But the leadership of the USSR can also be understood. There were a lot of stocks of 76-mm rounds for guns of the 1902 model of the year, but not so much for the 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition, during the war, practicing and adopting a new ammunition is fraught. Therefore, developed cannons and howitzers on the basis of spent samples of ammunition. But the idea of ​​re-compressing the shell of the 76-mm shot for divisors and getting the famous 57-mm shot for the ZiS-2 is very justified and you can even say a brilliant solution. Therefore, the 57-mm ZiS-2 ballistics turned out to be the best for the entire WWII in their caliber. And even surpassed some 57 and 75mm anti-tank guns. During the Second World War, it seems that only one completely new model of ammunition was brought into service, and this is the 76mm cartridge of the 7.62 model. He has both a new bullet and a cartridge case - although the caliber is old :) but it seems that they also created an 1943mm shot based on a cartridge case from an 23mm cartridge. But there they increased the diameter of the barrel sleeve. But the sleeve, after all, was essentially old.
      1. 0
        2 October 2014 10: 37
        as far as I know, the problem of armor penetration of Soviet guns of the caliber 76 and 85 mm is essentially the amount of gunpowder in the shells.

        And in the qualities of the "blanks" themselves, which simply crumbled
        1. 0
          2 October 2014 16: 24
          Well, Stas, I probably incorrectly put it. I meant that ballistics primarily depends on the amount of gunpowder. And only armor-piercing shells were bombarded with 45 current and even then at the beginning of the war. I never forgot about the same problem with armor-piercing shells for 76mm-wki. And the quality of the shells is expressed not only in how these shells were made at the factory, but also how these shells were constructed. From what materials and by what technology. Well, in general, the Germans had armor-piercing shells better worked out.
  6. +4
    1 October 2014 13: 06
    "His invention was the method of high-speed design, which turned all the ideas about the processes of engineering systems development."
    I had to read the opinion that the flip side of this speed was a long period of refinement and treatment of "childhood diseases". From my point of view, the opinion is quite reasonable. If you "drive" the project, then there is simply no time left to work out the little things at the design stage. And "little things" start to come out on tests.
    Too laudatory article turned out. Grabin's contribution to the defense of the country is enormous, but along with the undoubted successes there were also failures (they could not have been !!!), but not a word about them in the article. Mentioned only rejected military designs. Moreover, it seemed that the ingenious designer was simply rotten and did not allow to turn around (Ustinov is mentioned in this vein). Or maybe the reasons were still different, in the TTX design mismatching the requirements of customers and production capabilities?

    An objective assessment of the work of Grabin and his team has long been given. In the form of his guns on pedestals.
    1. +2
      1 October 2014 18: 21
      Well, yes, little things come out, it's true, but they ALWAYS get out. Despite the design methods. All these attacks that there was no time to practice the little things in general is nonsense. Only tests help to reveal all the little things. And nothing else. And attracting technologists at the design stages is indeed a very good idea. What is wrong with the design of even an experienced product in line with technological capabilities? Yes, more money is spent at the beginning of the design, but then a HUGE economy does not appear due to much less time and money spent on putting this product into production. Here in this is the advantage of the Grabin method. And not design speeds per se. (their speed was obtained through the use of well-developed components and assemblies) And even cheaper is the creation of the most prosperous samples for food. And even greater merit of Grabin that he tried to unify production - which reduces the price of products and increases reliability. Why is it asked - for example, to produce 3 different types of shutters for the F-34, ZiS-2 and F-22USV guns? (After all, the sleeve (the diameter of the sleeve at the bottom) is the same for all three guns. But first they produced the 3 type, and then they took the shutter from the F-34 and put them on all three. Moreover, they re-opened the ZiS-2 and got the ZiS-3. As a result, we received an increase in labor productivity seems to be SIX times.
      1. 0
        2 October 2014 23: 43
        Little things always come out. I do not dispute. But the amount of these little things is very important. Sometimes the quantity goes into quality.
        At one time I had a chance to do some post-work at a good factory, where they taught me how to work properly. So, when the need arose to do something "for the house, for the family", I always thought out the design carefully and made drawings. Primitive, but drawings. And only then he used them to make parts and assemble the structure. When this principle of creating a structure was ignored and sculpted hastily, hoping that I would "fit in place", it always turned out longer and worse.
        Engaging technologists at the design stage is a great idea. Mikoyan Design Bureau worked on the same principle, incl. Grabin was not alone in this. Use in the design of finished units and assemblies is also the right approach. And again, Grabin was not unique in this.
        1. 0
          4 October 2014 18: 28
          Of course it’s important. For example, the T-64 created from scratch did not become a good and especially RELIABLE machine, but the T-72 became one because, despite the order to launch the 64 at the uralvagon, the plant was recycled using it from their own experimental and serial cars.
          And you yourself when you did your drawings - you thought how you would do everything - Really? But I often have kitchen cabinets. Everywhere and next it turns out that those who made the design did not take into account how to connect rafts, where to lay pipes and the gap between walls and cabinets very often does not leave at all. Here is an example of the lack of experience during the installation (which essentially equals the implementation of technological experience). And who said that no one except Grabin had guessed to use the fulfilled parts and assemblies in new designs? Yes, and from the very beginning it was very close to attracting technologists to the Mind, but in the USSR (and maybe the whole world) they did not DO this before Grabin. Mikoyan an incorrect example was created by his design bureau before the war itself, and Grabin worked from the beginning of the 30, and this experience Mikoyan could even get from Grabin himself (I doubt my personal transfer), because then the experience of advanced work methods was disseminated throughout the alliance at the state level. And the number of little things is much more dependent not on design methods, but on the head involved in design wink
  7. +1
    1 October 2014 13: 40
    article put a plus. But. At the time of the Second World War, Soviet armored forces were the strongest in the world.
    1. +3
      1 October 2014 16: 00
      Quote: bandabas
      But. At the time of the Second World War, Soviet armored forces were the strongest in the world.

      I absolutely disagree. The quality of equipment, the level of training of tankers, the experience, the interaction of tank forces with the rest of the armed forces - all this was higher among the Germans (probably before 1943-44), which determined the outcome of the clashes at the beginning of the war. The number of tanks in the Red Army - (25 thousand like) did not at all reflect the real strength of the tank troops - just read Rokossovsky.
      1. -2
        2 October 2014 11: 21
        Quote: sevtrash
        I absolutely disagree. The quality of equipment, the level of training of tankers, the experience, the interaction of tank forces with the rest of the armed forces - all this was higher among the Germans (probably before 1943-44), which determined the outcome of the clashes at the beginning of the war. The number of tanks in the Red Army - (25 thousand like) did not at all reflect the real strength of the tank troops - just read Rokossovsky.

        Well, where does this blizzard come from? let's write 100 thousand tanks. Do you know that due to the difference between the Russian and German approaches to accounting, such nonsense turned out that tanks that failed and exhausted their resources were not written off?
        Modern tanks:
        "However, on the eve of the war, the factories managed to produce only 636 heavy KV tanks and 1225 medium T-34 tanks - Zhukov", add 500 relatively modern and combat-ready T-28 and 50 T-35. A total of 2401 modern tanks were made on June 22nd. More than half of the T-34 and KV were not in service, i.e. they were not combat-ready, as in general, the T-35 was permanently combat-ready no more than half of the vehicles at one time, because the car was very damp.
        Other tanks:
        All of the tanks were in service with 14,2 thousand, of which 73% was unavailable due to exhaustion of resources, they required medium and major repairs (in Germany, these were decommissioned, and they did not fall into statistics). Those. in fact, there were about 4,3 thousand tanks, i.e. approximately 2000 BT, T-26, T-40.

        There was also a reserve of VGK 8,4 thousand tanks, these were partially complete and outdated and substandard tanks that did not pass the acceptance of the military, the repair of which was impractical. For example, it is known that approximately 50% of T-26 manufactured (for the most part the first series) did not pass military acceptance due to production defects, an idle or missing engine, and incomplete completeness. It was a good reserve of spare parts, but not tanks.

        “On 1 June 1941 in Germany, the number of all tanks and assault guns taken from factories and transferred to the troops of the army and reserve army, as well as under the control of artillery and technical supply offices, was 5639 units. Of these, TI - 877, 35 (t) -187, T-II - 1072, flamethrower - 85, 38 (t) - 754, T-III - 1440, T-IV - 517 tanks. Commanding - 330. Total tanks - 5362. Assault guns - 377. In the army in the east on 22 June 1941, there were only tanks (without flamethrowing) 3332. ”(B. Muller-Hillebrand. Reference book“ Land Army of Germany. 1933 – 1945 ”).
        I agree to throw out all the Pz-1 (they will be converted to self-propelled guns later), about 4485 of modern tanks will remain. Of these, comparable T-34 order of 2700 pieces. Moreover, a significant part of Pz-1 and Pz-II at the initial stage was not used eastward. But the author does not mention S-35, Matilda-II who actually fought on the eastern front, and were at least no worse than the first T-34. Also, this number does not include Allied tanks, but this is about 200-300 modern and a lot of obsolete tanks.

        Those. in the battles of the summer of the 1941 year, and even more so, of the entire 1942 year, the German command could put more tanks in the field than the Soviet troops.

        Command: It’s quite at the level in individual divisions, for example, Maslov’s 9 Motorized Division, fought very effectively with limited resources from the first days of the war, much more effective than many TDs. Do not forget that following the results of incidents with the Japanese and Finns, adequate conclusions were drawn, exercises were held to identify skills in accordance with the updated requirements for command. Errors were detected, but not all were working on errors equally effectively. Still felt the consequences of cleaning the command staff. Those. the command level in the Red Army was normal, but not all commanders were able to master it on 22.06.1941. By the second half of 1942, the average level of command was quite equal to the German one.
        1. 0
          2 October 2014 21: 35
          Passed juggling with numbers.
          Custom fit class.
          I haven’t seen this for a long time, they deigned to throw out little ones, generously, while I didn’t see a word about t26, where, why did the deuces and prags remain on the list?
          1400 three-ruble note, olyaulyu, 965 was actually set against us, and 439 fours.
          No, well, the fit on the chill is generally a set-off, og.
          You are chicanes. Maximally catch up with the German tanks, and cut down the Soviet ones as much as possible.
          Moreover, all the same Muller-Gillebrand clearly indicates the forces used, and there is also Yents ...
        2. 0
          2 October 2014 23: 28
          goose
          And why did you have to rivet so many tanks before 1941?
          Lacking maintenance, staff. Yes, it’s just stupid to add to this enormous amount even more other automobile means. What was simply not in nature.
          It was just that it was necessary to preserve most of it ... once they had broken so much firewood.
          But this mistake is worse than a crime. Which simply (as you do not try) has no logical explanation.
          In general, no matter what topic (on the eve of 1941) concerning weapons, you can see just a monstrous "miscalculation" everywhere.
          Aliens or something that were in the leadership of the USSR? So tell me. And then more like the truth will be.
      2. The comment was deleted.
    2. 0
      2 October 2014 23: 49
      The thesis is controversial. Not always the quantity goes into quality. The number of tanks in the unit is important, but NOT IMPORTANT. Do you need to cover tanks? It is necessary. Need infantry. And not given for a while from the side, but his own, under his own command and in sufficient quantity. Fuel, ammunition need to carry? Need to. Need a dowered fleet, again in sufficient quantities. A rembase? And the connection? What about engineering support? A lot of everything you need is auxiliary. And the definition of the optimal ratio of armor and auxiliary task is still that.
    3. +1
      4 October 2014 20: 55
      Well, if you count the quantity, then it can very well be. But these are only pieces of iron. And the guys from the fast Heinz fought much better.
  8. +2
    1 October 2014 19: 22
    He set the article + for the volume of the material, but the truth is its presentation is one-sided. The merits of V.G. Grabin and his contribution to equipping the Red and then the Soviet Army with artillery systems are undeniable, but different authors differ in the reasons for not adopting artillery systems developed by his team. For example, Svirin indicated that Grabin repeatedly failed to meet the deadlines and TTT of the Customer, and subsequently attracted an administrative resource to include the guns in the test program contrary to the opinion of the military.
  9. +1
    1 October 2014 19: 52
    BS-3 out in the Donbass several times lit up with the militias .. Fight ..
  10. +1
    1 October 2014 20: 47
    KSP-76 against the background of tanks is extremely unpretentious and low.
    But .. cheap and "angry". Besides, it's also fast.
    Apparently, by the end of the war, oh, I didn’t want to put this model along with all the models of equipment.
  11. +3
    1 October 2014 21: 41
    Quote: nedgen
    the betrayal of some of the top leaders of the Red Army like Pavlov


    Limited "generals" like Kulik.imho.
    1. 0
      2 October 2014 15: 59
      But the fact that Kulik was a bad commander is very doubtful (do not forget that he was the commander of Zhukov at Khalkhin Gole), although he was still the fruit. wink
  12. 0
    2 October 2014 10: 21
    Quote: crazyrom
    I don’t understand how there can be an "excessively powerful gun". If it is piercing through an enemy tank - great!

    The equipment and qualifications of the technologists of the GRAU factories at that time did not allow the mass production of ZIS-2 to be launched at that time. A small batch with a large% of marriage could come out. Imagine that instead of one ZIS-2, you can make 4 ZIS-3. Given the acute shortage of modern anti-tank artillery after the defeats of 41, the choice was clear.
  13. 0
    2 October 2014 11: 45
    Quote: Stas57
    the author, but how many HF and 34ok were at the beginning of the war? Or didn’t you understand something?

    Probably, the author meant that in the Red Army there were practically no combat-ready heavy tanks, because their production was just unfolding, they did not enter the staff of the divisions, and there were not enough trained crews to complete them. Not without reason, a significant part of the heavy tanks was captured on platforms: they could not even be unloaded on the ground, there was no supply infrastructure, and there were no shells for KV-2 guns. BC for all types of tanks was in the amount of 22% of the total number (most likely, about 100%, if we take only combat-ready). There was virtually no fuel supply.
    1. 0
      2 October 2014 21: 43
      The tank adopted by military acceptance, and put on the balance of the corps, brigade or division, is a combat-ready unit, despite your desire, the desire of the author and anyone else to come up with a different concept of counting.
  14. xren
    0
    2 October 2014 21: 34
    Quote: crazyrom
    I don’t understand how there can be an "excessively powerful gun". If it is piercing through an enemy tank - great! This is a guaranteed defeat from the first shot, shoot at the engine, at the mechvod, at the ammunition, at the tower, and anywhere! after 1 hit, the tank died. and we have a saving of ammunition.

    in general, you are right, but this is compared with the magpies
    If we compare ZIS-2 and ZIS-3 then the following points appear:
    - a decisive advantage in the armored car ZIS-2 nothing to manifest
    - ZIS-3 also a divisional gun with more powerful shells and their assortment, etc.
    - with problems with armor-piercing shells, which was at the beginning of the war, it may very well deal with high-explosive tanks, shrapnel
    - and most importantly ZIS-2 and ZIS-3 are produced at the same factory and unified, i.e. the army receives either one ZIS-2 or one ZIS-3 - the answer is obvious.

    If ZIS-2 was produced in a separate plant, then it is quite possible that production was not curtailed.
  15. 0
    2 October 2014 22: 13
    Quote: sevtrash
    Yes, but do not forget the situation. Stalin categorically did not believe that the Germans would attack, considered the incoming information about the possibility of an attack a provocation, and demanded that the generals not provoke the Germans


    Did Stalin personally tell you this?
  16. +1
    3 November 2014 16: 34
    I read with Felix Chuyev that Stalin had great respect for Grabin as a professional in his field.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned), Kirill Budanov (included to the Rosfinmonitoring list of terrorists and extremists)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev Lev; Ponomarev Ilya; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; Mikhail Kasyanov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"