160 years ago began the heroic 349-day Sevastopol defense
160 years ago, 25 September (13 September old style) 1854, in Sevastopol, declared a state of siege. The famous heroic 349-day Sevastopol defense began. The defense of Sevastopol will break the plans of Britain, France and Turkey to defeat Russia and tear away from it a number of important lands, including the Baltic States and the Black Sea. Russian soldiers, despite their unprecedented self-sacrifice and courage, will lose the battle of Sevastopol, but will not allow the enemy to realize large-scale plans for solving the “Russian question” (striking out Russians and Russia from stories).
The question of the fate of Sevastopol. The role of Kornilov in the organization of defense
After the retreat of the Russian army from Alma (The first major land battle in the Crimean War - the battle of Alma; Part 2) a formidable question arose about the future of Sevastopol - the main base of the Black Sea fleet. The allies, who were expecting a dirty trick from the Russians and suffered heavy losses in some parts, were in no hurry to Sevastopol. A participant in the battle of Alma, the Duke of Cambridge, in front of whom Russian batteries shot the first brigade of the light division with canister, said that if the British won another such victory in the Crimea, they would be left with two victories, but without an army.
However, there was no doubt that the enemy would soon move away from the first shock and move to Sevastopol. In this most difficult period, the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet and the troops of the Northern side, and soon the actual commander of all the troops remaining in Sevastopol, Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, came to the fore. This was not surprising, given the moral and mental qualities of this great Russian man.
Kornilov, as well as Nakhimov, was a student of Lazarev, a man of that type who aroused the love of ordinary sailors and the respect of enemies. Vladimir Alekseevich had a wide special education and showed more administrative abilities for organizing the economy of the fleet and the port than Nakhimov. Pavel Stepanovich was a kind of "admiral-hero", more brilliant naval commander than a business executive. Therefore, Nakhimov, although he had seniority in the service, without the slightest hesitation in these terrible days he referred to the organization of defense to Kornilov.
Kornilov and Nakhimov became the soul of the defense of Sevastopol. Both of them were hot patriots and considered the defense of Sevastopol to be their honor. They have long warned the command of the need to develop a steam (screw) fleet, and in a hurry to strengthen the poorly protected Sevastopol. However, these warnings and reminders passed by the ears. Even 6 months before the landing of the allied army in the Crimea, Kornilov presented Menshikov with a project of fortifications, which he proposed to immediately build in Sevastopol. The officers of the Black Sea Fleet and some townspeople of the city were ready to pay for the construction of the fortifications. Menshikov "indignantly" rejected this reasonable proposal. Kornilov persisted, seeing what a terrible threat hung over the Crimea and Sevastopol. As a result, he was able to insist that Volokhov be allowed to build a contractor at his own expense (!) To protect the raid from the sea. This fortification was completed by building two days before the landing of the Allied forces in the Crimea. It is this tower that will save the raid from approaching the enemy fleet close to shore during the first bombardment of Sevastopol.
After the landing of the enemy in the Crimea in Sevastopol, work began on the construction of fortifications. Kornilov noted in his diary that the work is going with great success, people are working with pleasure and great enthusiasm. 9 (21) - 10 (22) September, Menshikov's troops, defeated on Rea Alma, arrived in Sevastopol, but did not stay in the city. Menshikov ordered 11 (23) of September to leave the city, and 12-he left Sevastopol. As a result, the fate of the city was in the hands of Nakhimov and Kornilov. The appointed Menshikov head of the Sevastopol garrison, General Moller, did not actually lead the defense, only signed orders and stayed in the rear.
The commanders of the Russian fleet were waiting for an immediate attack of the enemy on defenseless Sevastopol from the north. Sevastopol had the Black Sea Fleet - 14 battleships, 7 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brig, 11 steamboats, which would give a hard answer to any attempt from the sea. In addition, the coast was protected by 13 batteries with 611 guns. These forces were enough to repel the attack of the Allied fleet on Sevastopol. The main concern was the land defense, especially in the northern part of the city. The north side had only a thin wall, which was not an obstacle to modern artillery. In addition, the existing fortifications were located so clumsily and stupidly that the surrounding heights dominated some of them, reducing their value to zero. The north side was protected by 200 guns, but there were few large-caliber guns.
In general, the distribution of artillery weapons in Sevastopol was made ineptly. So, the key height of the defense in the center of positions - Malakhov Kurgan, defended all 5 guns. In addition, they were located in a single tower, which was not protected, and they could be buried under the rubble with a good shot. To the beginning of the fighting in Sevastopol was not made stocks weapons, ammunition and food.
Only an unexpected mistake of the Allied command saved the northern part of the city from capture. Many officers in the French and English armies were convinced that the blow would be delivered on the North side. However, in the morning of September 10 (22), British General John Bergoin (head of engineering, he helped the Turks to build fortifications in the Dardanelles before the war) came to the commander-in-chief of the English army, Lord Raglan, and offered to refrain from attacking the North side and move to the South side. Raglan himself did not make a decision and sent an engineer to the French commander, Marshal St. Arnaud. Most French generals also offered to attack the North side. But the seriously ill Saint-Arno (he had only a few days left to live), after listening to an Englishman, said that Sir John was right. Bypassing Sevastopol from the south allowed the use of the harbors of the Crimea in this part of Sevastopol. Thus, the Allied forces stretched from the weakly defended Northern side to the south.
Kornilov and Totleben believed that God's providence saved Sevastopol. If the enemy immediately after Alma attacked the North side, the city, not ready for defense, would have no chance for a long defense. Kornilov noted in his diary: “It must be that God has not left Russia yet. Of course, if the enemy went to Sevastopol right after the Battle of Alma, it would have easily taken possession of him. ” True, the Russian commanders were modest. In fact, Sevastopol was saved from an immediate fall, not only the mistakes of the Allied Command, but also the decisive actions of Nakhimov, Kornilov and Totleben.
Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov (1806 - 1854)
After Alma, Menshikov did not know what the enemy would do. 12 (24) September, he suggested that the enemy wants to cut off Sevastopol and the entire Crimea from Perekop, that is, from the rest of Russia. And he decided to stop it. In Sevastopol, the commander of the Russian troops in the Crimea left a very weak garrison - eight reserve battalions. Such a garrison could not resist the enemy army. In fact, Sevastopol was left unprotected from land. For the formation of naval formations and the organization of defense were necessary time. And the enemy could hit at any time.
Kornilov objected to the withdrawal of the army from Sevastopol. But Menshikov could not persuade. He believed that his task was to maintain contact with Russia and prevent the full taxation of Sevastopol, as his army created a flank threat to the troops of the western coalition. At the same time, he even led off all the cavalry, worsening the capabilities of the garrison of Sevastopol in reconnaissance. 13 (25) September, the army of Menshikov came to Belbek. 14 (26) Russian troops stationed on the river Kache. Admiral Nakhimov did not approve of these maneuvers and called the actions of Menshikov "blind man's buff."
Menshikov appointed Kornilov as commander in the Northern part of the city, and Nakhimov in the South. However, after the Allies withdrew from the Northern side and besieged the Southern, Nakhimov asked Kornilov to take command. Nakhimov became the main assistant to Kornilov. Nakhimov at that time believed that he was not capable of independent command on land. At the same time he told the commander that he was ready to die, defending the city. Apparently, a certain psychological depression of Nakhimov played a role. He clearly saw that the city could not be saved. The admiral was in a gloomy mood. At the same time, he tried to hide this feeling of doom so as not to undermine the fighting spirit of the fighters. Apparently, Nakhimov has already made a difficult decision - he will die with Sevastopol. It must be said that after the death of Kornilov, Nakhimov no longer showed signs of depression. He became the main symbol of the defense of the city and could not afford to weakness, undermining the morale of the defenders.
The work of Kornilov, Totleben, Nakhimov and Istomin after the departure of the army of Menshikov was simply titanic. It is not clear when these iron people slept. They did everything possible and impossible to prepare Sevastopol for a hard struggle. At the same time, it was necessary to build fortifications not only in the conditions of the constant expectation of an enemy attack, but the lack of literally the most basic things. So, in Sevastopol there were a brilliant engineer Totleben, and sappers, and dedicated workers, but there were no iron shovels and pickaxes (!). Apparently, someone for years has plundered the money released on the entrenching tool. They rushed to Odessa, but there was no pickaxe there, and shovels sent only 3 of October on horse-drawn carriages, and they arrived on 17 of October. Until that time, it was necessary to dig and peat the soil, often stony, and then daily restore the parapets destroyed by enemy artillery using wooden shovels.
Totleben significantly expanded the frontal position on the North side and actually re-equipped the defensive line on the South side. Due to lack of time, it was not possible to build powerful, long-term fortifications. It was necessary to work along the whole line, to use what the city and fleet could give. Totleben applied the following principles: he chose the convenient position closest to the city, put artillery on it; these positions connected trenches for shooters; Between the main points of defense in some places put a separate battery. As a result, Sevastopol received a fairly strong frontal and flank defense. The work was titanic. They built day and night. As a result, where before there were only separate fortifications, unrelated to each other and having large unprotected gaps, a solid defense line was equipped with artillery positions, dugouts, shelters, powder cellars and communication lines. As a result, the enemy missed the moment for an open assault and began siege operations.
Monument to General E. Totleben in Sevastopol
What to do with the fleet?
When Kornilov asked Menshikov, "What to do with the fleet?" The commander-in-chief replied: "Put it in your pocket." Kornilov still demanded instructions at the expense of the fleet. Then Menshikov answered more definitely: remove the guns, send the sailors to the defense of the city, drill and prepare the ships for flooding, block the entrance to the bay with them.
September 9 (21) Kornilov gathered a meeting and suggested, despite the enormous numerical and technical superiority of the allies, to go to sea and strike at the enemy. Death was almost inevitable, but at the same time the Russian fleet retained honor, avoiding “shameful captivity” and could cause the enemy serious damage that could disrupt the offensive of the coalition army in the Crimea. The Russian fleet could take advantage of the disorder in the location of the British and French ships at Cape Ulyukol, strike first, go to close range and board the ship. In the extreme case, when the crews had exhausted the means of struggle and the ships received serious damage, it was proposed to undermine themselves along with the enemy.
This courageous plan was supported by some, by others rejected. Kornilov went to see Menshikov and declared his readiness to withdraw the fleet into the sea and strike at the enemy. The commander categorically forbade it. He again ordered the ships to sink. Kornilov continued to stand his ground. Then Menshikov said that if Kornilov would not obey, he would be sent to serve in Nikolaev. Kornilov cried out: “Stop! This is suicide ... Why are you forcing me ... But so that I leave Sevastopol surrounded by the enemy is impossible! I am ready to obey you. ”
Admiral Nakhimov also supported the decisive actions of the fleet. But, he was forced to admit: “... The application of the screw engine finally decides the question of our present insignificance on the Black Sea ... we have only one future that can exist only in Sevastopol ... lose Sevastopol and the fleet, we lose all hope for the future; having Sevastopol, we will have a fleet ... without Sevastopol, you cannot have a fleet on the Black Sea; This axiom clearly proves the need to decide on all sorts of measures in order to bar the enemy ships from entering the raid ... ”Kornilov addressed the sailors with an order saying that they had to give up“ their favorite thought to strike the enemy on the water ”and they are needed to defend Sevastopol. "... We must surrender to the necessity: Moscow was burning, but Russia did not die from this ..."
At dawn, 11 (23) began flooding ships. In Sevastopol Bay, across the raid flooded ships - Silistria "," Varna "," Uriel "," Three Saints "," Selaphail "and two frigates -" Flora "and" Sizipol. " After some time, to reinforce the barrier, the ships “Twelve Apostles”, “Svyatoslav”, “Rostislav”, the frigates “Cahul”, “Mesemvriya” and “Midia” were additionally flooded. The importance of this event was recognized by the adversary. The French admiral Gamelin noted that if the Russians had not blocked the entrance to the Sevastopol bay, then without a doubt, the allied fleet would have entered it successfully and established contact with the land forces after the first sustained fire.
It must be said that the sinking of ships is a problem that causes controversy among researchers. Some believe that it was a necessary step and a step that was caused by military expediency. Most military historians have concluded that sinking ships was a rational act. However, there is the opposite opinion. Thus, military theorist Col. V. A. Moshnin, in a special work on Coast Defense, which was released in 1901, called this event an example of “insane, senseless destruction of his own funds ...” According to him, there is no excuse for such an act.
Military writer D. Likhachev in 1902 year concluded that the barrier to the entrance to the Sevastopol raid by submerged ships of the Black Sea Fleet was in tactical and strategic terms, negative. In his opinion, the land defense could be strengthened with ship guns and without flooding the ships. At the same time, he recognized that the Black Sea Fleet (which had 45 ships, including small ships) at sea to attack the enemy fleet (89 ships, including 50 wheeled and screw ships) had no hope of success. Likhachev believed that the hasty decision to sink ships affected the defense of Sevastopol. If the ships were saved, there would remain a serious threat to the enemy fleet and sea communications of the enemy. This forced the enemy throughout the siege to maintain a close blockade of Sevastopol from the sea in order to ensure its operational base and communications.
The sinking of ships was perceived with deep pain by all sailors. For them, the native ships were living beings, able to appreciate all their efforts. However, the sailors did not become discouraged, but, on the contrary, mobilized all their spiritual forces to repel the enemy. New units were formed, experienced commanders were put in charge, combat sections were distributed. Kornilov and Nakhimov defined the main tasks of units and divisions. Fortifications were built. Guns were removed from ships. As a result, almost the entire defensive line (except for the 6 bastion) was armed with ship guns. Thus, the Black Sea Fleet and became a defensive line, which defended Sevastopol.
September 11-12 (23-24) was formed 17 naval battalions, totaling 12 thousand people. When people were taken from ships, according to the memoirs of Lieutenant-Commander Voevodsky, the most difficult thing was to select the crew that remained on the ship. Voevodsky noted: “What can't you do with people like that?” Any praise to people will be insufficient, only in such a difficult time can they be appreciated. ”
Together with the tools and transported various shipboard items materials. So, water tanks adapted for powder cellars. Powder, shells, various artillery supplies, telescopes, etc. were transported. Day after day, the bastions of Sevastopol were reinforced by new buildings and batteries. People worked with amazing energy peculiar to Russian people in the days of the hardest trials. The difficulties and the danger made the Russians only stronger, forcing them to show their unprecedented potential. From morning till night, the sailors dug ditches, trenches, laid out the walls, carried guns and various supplies, equipment to the mountains, and at night carried out patrol service.
Every day the defense of Sevastopol strengthened. Only in three weeks of continuous work (from September 15 to October 5), which was boiling day and night, the defenders built 20 batteries. The artillery armament of the external fortifications was doubled - from 172 to 341 guns. In total, during the heroic defense of Sevastopol, 2 thousand guns from the Russian fleet were installed on land positions. At the same time, from the very beginning of the battle, the naval guns showed greater effectiveness in defeating enemy fortifications than the usual light siege and field guns.
Menshikov's army reached the North side of Sevastopol only on 18 (30) of September, when in Sevastopol, they had long ago made the decision to stand to the death and actively work on equipping positions. Up to this point there has been no news from him. Menshikov ferried three infantry regiments to the South side, which strengthened the defense of the city. But, the commander was still little interested in what was happening in Sevastopol. He located his main apartment (headquarters) near Belbek. Menshikov told Kornilov that he would try to organize “sabotage” in order to distract the enemy from the city. However, Kornilov and Nakhimov doubted the benefits of such an event and did not believe in the strategy of the commander. October 2 Nakhimov brought the remaining ships from the South Bay and placed them so skillfully that they until the end provided artillery support to the defense of Sevastopol.
In this way, Russia owes Kornilov, Nakhimov, Totleben and Istomin that a strong enemy did not take Sevastopol straight away and seized Russian ships. Menshikov did not cope with the task of organizing the land defense of Sevastopol. Only the iron will and skill of these great people saved the Russian Empire from the disgrace of the rapid fall of the city. Thus began the heroic 349-day Sevastopol defense, which became one of the brightest pages in Russian history.
Unfortunately, Kornilov, who organized the defense of Sevastopol, will die already during the first bombardment of the city - 5 (17) in October 1854. But his mission will be taken by another hero of Sevastopol - Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov.
Aivazovsky I.K. 1859 year. Siege of Sevastopol
The question of the fate of Sevastopol. The role of Kornilov in the organization of defense
After the retreat of the Russian army from Alma (The first major land battle in the Crimean War - the battle of Alma; Part 2) a formidable question arose about the future of Sevastopol - the main base of the Black Sea fleet. The allies, who were expecting a dirty trick from the Russians and suffered heavy losses in some parts, were in no hurry to Sevastopol. A participant in the battle of Alma, the Duke of Cambridge, in front of whom Russian batteries shot the first brigade of the light division with canister, said that if the British won another such victory in the Crimea, they would be left with two victories, but without an army.
However, there was no doubt that the enemy would soon move away from the first shock and move to Sevastopol. In this most difficult period, the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet and the troops of the Northern side, and soon the actual commander of all the troops remaining in Sevastopol, Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov, came to the fore. This was not surprising, given the moral and mental qualities of this great Russian man.
Kornilov, as well as Nakhimov, was a student of Lazarev, a man of that type who aroused the love of ordinary sailors and the respect of enemies. Vladimir Alekseevich had a wide special education and showed more administrative abilities for organizing the economy of the fleet and the port than Nakhimov. Pavel Stepanovich was a kind of "admiral-hero", more brilliant naval commander than a business executive. Therefore, Nakhimov, although he had seniority in the service, without the slightest hesitation in these terrible days he referred to the organization of defense to Kornilov.
Kornilov and Nakhimov became the soul of the defense of Sevastopol. Both of them were hot patriots and considered the defense of Sevastopol to be their honor. They have long warned the command of the need to develop a steam (screw) fleet, and in a hurry to strengthen the poorly protected Sevastopol. However, these warnings and reminders passed by the ears. Even 6 months before the landing of the allied army in the Crimea, Kornilov presented Menshikov with a project of fortifications, which he proposed to immediately build in Sevastopol. The officers of the Black Sea Fleet and some townspeople of the city were ready to pay for the construction of the fortifications. Menshikov "indignantly" rejected this reasonable proposal. Kornilov persisted, seeing what a terrible threat hung over the Crimea and Sevastopol. As a result, he was able to insist that Volokhov be allowed to build a contractor at his own expense (!) To protect the raid from the sea. This fortification was completed by building two days before the landing of the Allied forces in the Crimea. It is this tower that will save the raid from approaching the enemy fleet close to shore during the first bombardment of Sevastopol.
After the landing of the enemy in the Crimea in Sevastopol, work began on the construction of fortifications. Kornilov noted in his diary that the work is going with great success, people are working with pleasure and great enthusiasm. 9 (21) - 10 (22) September, Menshikov's troops, defeated on Rea Alma, arrived in Sevastopol, but did not stay in the city. Menshikov ordered 11 (23) of September to leave the city, and 12-he left Sevastopol. As a result, the fate of the city was in the hands of Nakhimov and Kornilov. The appointed Menshikov head of the Sevastopol garrison, General Moller, did not actually lead the defense, only signed orders and stayed in the rear.
The commanders of the Russian fleet were waiting for an immediate attack of the enemy on defenseless Sevastopol from the north. Sevastopol had the Black Sea Fleet - 14 battleships, 7 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brig, 11 steamboats, which would give a hard answer to any attempt from the sea. In addition, the coast was protected by 13 batteries with 611 guns. These forces were enough to repel the attack of the Allied fleet on Sevastopol. The main concern was the land defense, especially in the northern part of the city. The north side had only a thin wall, which was not an obstacle to modern artillery. In addition, the existing fortifications were located so clumsily and stupidly that the surrounding heights dominated some of them, reducing their value to zero. The north side was protected by 200 guns, but there were few large-caliber guns.
In general, the distribution of artillery weapons in Sevastopol was made ineptly. So, the key height of the defense in the center of positions - Malakhov Kurgan, defended all 5 guns. In addition, they were located in a single tower, which was not protected, and they could be buried under the rubble with a good shot. To the beginning of the fighting in Sevastopol was not made stocks weapons, ammunition and food.
Only an unexpected mistake of the Allied command saved the northern part of the city from capture. Many officers in the French and English armies were convinced that the blow would be delivered on the North side. However, in the morning of September 10 (22), British General John Bergoin (head of engineering, he helped the Turks to build fortifications in the Dardanelles before the war) came to the commander-in-chief of the English army, Lord Raglan, and offered to refrain from attacking the North side and move to the South side. Raglan himself did not make a decision and sent an engineer to the French commander, Marshal St. Arnaud. Most French generals also offered to attack the North side. But the seriously ill Saint-Arno (he had only a few days left to live), after listening to an Englishman, said that Sir John was right. Bypassing Sevastopol from the south allowed the use of the harbors of the Crimea in this part of Sevastopol. Thus, the Allied forces stretched from the weakly defended Northern side to the south.
Kornilov and Totleben believed that God's providence saved Sevastopol. If the enemy immediately after Alma attacked the North side, the city, not ready for defense, would have no chance for a long defense. Kornilov noted in his diary: “It must be that God has not left Russia yet. Of course, if the enemy went to Sevastopol right after the Battle of Alma, it would have easily taken possession of him. ” True, the Russian commanders were modest. In fact, Sevastopol was saved from an immediate fall, not only the mistakes of the Allied Command, but also the decisive actions of Nakhimov, Kornilov and Totleben.
Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov (1806 - 1854)
After Alma, Menshikov did not know what the enemy would do. 12 (24) September, he suggested that the enemy wants to cut off Sevastopol and the entire Crimea from Perekop, that is, from the rest of Russia. And he decided to stop it. In Sevastopol, the commander of the Russian troops in the Crimea left a very weak garrison - eight reserve battalions. Such a garrison could not resist the enemy army. In fact, Sevastopol was left unprotected from land. For the formation of naval formations and the organization of defense were necessary time. And the enemy could hit at any time.
Kornilov objected to the withdrawal of the army from Sevastopol. But Menshikov could not persuade. He believed that his task was to maintain contact with Russia and prevent the full taxation of Sevastopol, as his army created a flank threat to the troops of the western coalition. At the same time, he even led off all the cavalry, worsening the capabilities of the garrison of Sevastopol in reconnaissance. 13 (25) September, the army of Menshikov came to Belbek. 14 (26) Russian troops stationed on the river Kache. Admiral Nakhimov did not approve of these maneuvers and called the actions of Menshikov "blind man's buff."
Menshikov appointed Kornilov as commander in the Northern part of the city, and Nakhimov in the South. However, after the Allies withdrew from the Northern side and besieged the Southern, Nakhimov asked Kornilov to take command. Nakhimov became the main assistant to Kornilov. Nakhimov at that time believed that he was not capable of independent command on land. At the same time he told the commander that he was ready to die, defending the city. Apparently, a certain psychological depression of Nakhimov played a role. He clearly saw that the city could not be saved. The admiral was in a gloomy mood. At the same time, he tried to hide this feeling of doom so as not to undermine the fighting spirit of the fighters. Apparently, Nakhimov has already made a difficult decision - he will die with Sevastopol. It must be said that after the death of Kornilov, Nakhimov no longer showed signs of depression. He became the main symbol of the defense of the city and could not afford to weakness, undermining the morale of the defenders.
The work of Kornilov, Totleben, Nakhimov and Istomin after the departure of the army of Menshikov was simply titanic. It is not clear when these iron people slept. They did everything possible and impossible to prepare Sevastopol for a hard struggle. At the same time, it was necessary to build fortifications not only in the conditions of the constant expectation of an enemy attack, but the lack of literally the most basic things. So, in Sevastopol there were a brilliant engineer Totleben, and sappers, and dedicated workers, but there were no iron shovels and pickaxes (!). Apparently, someone for years has plundered the money released on the entrenching tool. They rushed to Odessa, but there was no pickaxe there, and shovels sent only 3 of October on horse-drawn carriages, and they arrived on 17 of October. Until that time, it was necessary to dig and peat the soil, often stony, and then daily restore the parapets destroyed by enemy artillery using wooden shovels.
Totleben significantly expanded the frontal position on the North side and actually re-equipped the defensive line on the South side. Due to lack of time, it was not possible to build powerful, long-term fortifications. It was necessary to work along the whole line, to use what the city and fleet could give. Totleben applied the following principles: he chose the convenient position closest to the city, put artillery on it; these positions connected trenches for shooters; Between the main points of defense in some places put a separate battery. As a result, Sevastopol received a fairly strong frontal and flank defense. The work was titanic. They built day and night. As a result, where before there were only separate fortifications, unrelated to each other and having large unprotected gaps, a solid defense line was equipped with artillery positions, dugouts, shelters, powder cellars and communication lines. As a result, the enemy missed the moment for an open assault and began siege operations.
Monument to General E. Totleben in Sevastopol
What to do with the fleet?
When Kornilov asked Menshikov, "What to do with the fleet?" The commander-in-chief replied: "Put it in your pocket." Kornilov still demanded instructions at the expense of the fleet. Then Menshikov answered more definitely: remove the guns, send the sailors to the defense of the city, drill and prepare the ships for flooding, block the entrance to the bay with them.
September 9 (21) Kornilov gathered a meeting and suggested, despite the enormous numerical and technical superiority of the allies, to go to sea and strike at the enemy. Death was almost inevitable, but at the same time the Russian fleet retained honor, avoiding “shameful captivity” and could cause the enemy serious damage that could disrupt the offensive of the coalition army in the Crimea. The Russian fleet could take advantage of the disorder in the location of the British and French ships at Cape Ulyukol, strike first, go to close range and board the ship. In the extreme case, when the crews had exhausted the means of struggle and the ships received serious damage, it was proposed to undermine themselves along with the enemy.
This courageous plan was supported by some, by others rejected. Kornilov went to see Menshikov and declared his readiness to withdraw the fleet into the sea and strike at the enemy. The commander categorically forbade it. He again ordered the ships to sink. Kornilov continued to stand his ground. Then Menshikov said that if Kornilov would not obey, he would be sent to serve in Nikolaev. Kornilov cried out: “Stop! This is suicide ... Why are you forcing me ... But so that I leave Sevastopol surrounded by the enemy is impossible! I am ready to obey you. ”
Admiral Nakhimov also supported the decisive actions of the fleet. But, he was forced to admit: “... The application of the screw engine finally decides the question of our present insignificance on the Black Sea ... we have only one future that can exist only in Sevastopol ... lose Sevastopol and the fleet, we lose all hope for the future; having Sevastopol, we will have a fleet ... without Sevastopol, you cannot have a fleet on the Black Sea; This axiom clearly proves the need to decide on all sorts of measures in order to bar the enemy ships from entering the raid ... ”Kornilov addressed the sailors with an order saying that they had to give up“ their favorite thought to strike the enemy on the water ”and they are needed to defend Sevastopol. "... We must surrender to the necessity: Moscow was burning, but Russia did not die from this ..."
At dawn, 11 (23) began flooding ships. In Sevastopol Bay, across the raid flooded ships - Silistria "," Varna "," Uriel "," Three Saints "," Selaphail "and two frigates -" Flora "and" Sizipol. " After some time, to reinforce the barrier, the ships “Twelve Apostles”, “Svyatoslav”, “Rostislav”, the frigates “Cahul”, “Mesemvriya” and “Midia” were additionally flooded. The importance of this event was recognized by the adversary. The French admiral Gamelin noted that if the Russians had not blocked the entrance to the Sevastopol bay, then without a doubt, the allied fleet would have entered it successfully and established contact with the land forces after the first sustained fire.
It must be said that the sinking of ships is a problem that causes controversy among researchers. Some believe that it was a necessary step and a step that was caused by military expediency. Most military historians have concluded that sinking ships was a rational act. However, there is the opposite opinion. Thus, military theorist Col. V. A. Moshnin, in a special work on Coast Defense, which was released in 1901, called this event an example of “insane, senseless destruction of his own funds ...” According to him, there is no excuse for such an act.
Military writer D. Likhachev in 1902 year concluded that the barrier to the entrance to the Sevastopol raid by submerged ships of the Black Sea Fleet was in tactical and strategic terms, negative. In his opinion, the land defense could be strengthened with ship guns and without flooding the ships. At the same time, he recognized that the Black Sea Fleet (which had 45 ships, including small ships) at sea to attack the enemy fleet (89 ships, including 50 wheeled and screw ships) had no hope of success. Likhachev believed that the hasty decision to sink ships affected the defense of Sevastopol. If the ships were saved, there would remain a serious threat to the enemy fleet and sea communications of the enemy. This forced the enemy throughout the siege to maintain a close blockade of Sevastopol from the sea in order to ensure its operational base and communications.
The sinking of ships was perceived with deep pain by all sailors. For them, the native ships were living beings, able to appreciate all their efforts. However, the sailors did not become discouraged, but, on the contrary, mobilized all their spiritual forces to repel the enemy. New units were formed, experienced commanders were put in charge, combat sections were distributed. Kornilov and Nakhimov defined the main tasks of units and divisions. Fortifications were built. Guns were removed from ships. As a result, almost the entire defensive line (except for the 6 bastion) was armed with ship guns. Thus, the Black Sea Fleet and became a defensive line, which defended Sevastopol.
September 11-12 (23-24) was formed 17 naval battalions, totaling 12 thousand people. When people were taken from ships, according to the memoirs of Lieutenant-Commander Voevodsky, the most difficult thing was to select the crew that remained on the ship. Voevodsky noted: “What can't you do with people like that?” Any praise to people will be insufficient, only in such a difficult time can they be appreciated. ”
Together with the tools and transported various shipboard items materials. So, water tanks adapted for powder cellars. Powder, shells, various artillery supplies, telescopes, etc. were transported. Day after day, the bastions of Sevastopol were reinforced by new buildings and batteries. People worked with amazing energy peculiar to Russian people in the days of the hardest trials. The difficulties and the danger made the Russians only stronger, forcing them to show their unprecedented potential. From morning till night, the sailors dug ditches, trenches, laid out the walls, carried guns and various supplies, equipment to the mountains, and at night carried out patrol service.
Every day the defense of Sevastopol strengthened. Only in three weeks of continuous work (from September 15 to October 5), which was boiling day and night, the defenders built 20 batteries. The artillery armament of the external fortifications was doubled - from 172 to 341 guns. In total, during the heroic defense of Sevastopol, 2 thousand guns from the Russian fleet were installed on land positions. At the same time, from the very beginning of the battle, the naval guns showed greater effectiveness in defeating enemy fortifications than the usual light siege and field guns.
Menshikov's army reached the North side of Sevastopol only on 18 (30) of September, when in Sevastopol, they had long ago made the decision to stand to the death and actively work on equipping positions. Up to this point there has been no news from him. Menshikov ferried three infantry regiments to the South side, which strengthened the defense of the city. But, the commander was still little interested in what was happening in Sevastopol. He located his main apartment (headquarters) near Belbek. Menshikov told Kornilov that he would try to organize “sabotage” in order to distract the enemy from the city. However, Kornilov and Nakhimov doubted the benefits of such an event and did not believe in the strategy of the commander. October 2 Nakhimov brought the remaining ships from the South Bay and placed them so skillfully that they until the end provided artillery support to the defense of Sevastopol.
In this way, Russia owes Kornilov, Nakhimov, Totleben and Istomin that a strong enemy did not take Sevastopol straight away and seized Russian ships. Menshikov did not cope with the task of organizing the land defense of Sevastopol. Only the iron will and skill of these great people saved the Russian Empire from the disgrace of the rapid fall of the city. Thus began the heroic 349-day Sevastopol defense, which became one of the brightest pages in Russian history.
Unfortunately, Kornilov, who organized the defense of Sevastopol, will die already during the first bombardment of the city - 5 (17) in October 1854. But his mission will be taken by another hero of Sevastopol - Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov.
Aivazovsky I.K. 1859 year. Siege of Sevastopol
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