Military Review

Battleships like "Sevastopol": success or failure? Part of 2

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The project of “Sevastopol” type battleships is often called the “scared project” - they say Russian sailors were so scared of the Japanese high-explosive shells in Tsushima that they demanded a full boarding reservation for their future battleships - and spat on the thickness of armor, just to protect themselves from monstrous land mines ... In fact, everything was a bit wrong.

The fact is that during the years of the Russian-Japanese war, the twelve-inch guns of the Russian and Japanese battleships were rather weak - they could penetrate the newest Krupp armor 229-mm armor just with 25-30 KBT. This, of course, was not enough, since the battle distances increased significantly, making up 40, and even 70 KBT - and therefore the post-war artillery had to make a big qualitative leap to keep up with the delights of naval tactics. Our gunners, based on the results of the battles, made two important conclusions.

First, it became clear that the main weapon Our battleships of the last war - the old 305-mm gun of the 1895 model, which, for example, our armadillos of the Borodino type were armed with, is no longer outdated and is definitely not suitable for future battles. At the main combat distances, which were now worth counting 45-70 kbts, the shells of such a gun were no longer pierced by enemy armor. And secondly, the shells with which we entered the Russian-Japanese war turned out to be completely flawed: a meager amount of explosives and unimportant fuses did not allow the enemy to inflict decisive damage. Practical conclusions from this were made fairly quickly: the new Russian armor-piercing and high-explosive shells, although they had the same weight as the Tsushima (331,7 kg), but contained several times more explosives and were equipped with adequate fuses. Almost simultaneously with their creation, the Russians set about developing a new 305-mm / 52 gun. If the old 305-mm / 40 Russian artillery system could only disperse the 331,7-kg projectile to 792 m / s, then the new artillery system should accelerate it to the speed of 950 m / s. Of course, the armor penetration of the new gun was much higher, but due to the fact that the light projectile quickly lost speed, at long distances its power quickly fell.

So, initially, when designing a Russian dreadnought, it was demanded that his armor belt be 305 mm thick. But the ship grew rapidly in size - heavy duty weapons, high speed ... something had to be sacrificed. And it was decided to reduce the armor - the fact is that according to the then calculations (made, it seems, based on the data of our new 305-mm cannon, firing a new 331,7 kg projectile), 225-mm armor reliably protected from 305-mm projectiles, starting with distances in 60 kb and above. And domestic admirals perfectly understood that in the future they will have to fight at distances even greater than 60 KBT. And because 225-mm armor (and even taking into account the 50 mm armor reassembly and bevels) they are quite satisfied as protection against armor-piercing 305-mm projectiles. Many even thought that 203 mm would be enough.

Alas, our sailors were wrong. They really did not take into account the crazy power that maritime artillery would soon acquire. But the fright had nothing to do with it - there was, of course, a miscalculation, but when designing protection, it was by no means focused on high-explosive, but on armor-piercing enemy projectiles.

But the height of the main belt wanted to do much more than the 1,8-2 m in old battleships, and for good reason. Russian FIRST IN THE WORLD understood that the reservation area plays no less a role than its thickness and that the existing armored battleships of the battleships, which sought to escape under water with minimal overload or even in fresh weather, are insufficient. Interestingly, the Americans later did the same (the height of their armored belts exceeded 5 m), but the British, lingering at the start, later on their battleships of the Second World War (the five "King George V") brought the height of the armored belt right up to 7 meters! And note that no one called the British and American battleships "scared projects."

Here I anticipate objections. Speaking about the “project of the frightened”, they mean not the height of the main armor belt, but the desire to protect the entire board with armor. Come on! Take a look at the reservation scheme of the same Orion (the scheme of which I cited in the first part of the article). He has booked almost the entire board, with the exception of small sections in the bow and stern.

Here are just a booking of domestic "Sevastopol" looks much more rational. Our dreadnoughts had 2 armor thickness prevailed - 225 mm for protection against armor piercing 305-mm projectiles and 125 mm for the tip and upper armor belt for protection against high-explosive. It was assumed that at distances 60 KB and more 225 mm will save from an armor-piercing projectile, and 125-mm armor will reflect the blow of a mine. If an armor-piercing projectile gets into 125, it will not break (a big hole), but pierce it and explode inside, leaving a neat hole in the armor, which will reduce flooding and simplify the struggle for survivability. Well, but what is interesting, the British were guided by making the upper belt 203 mm thick? Against land mines - unnecessarily, against armor-piercing - not enough. Our limited 125 mm, but booked almost the entire board.

And after all, what is interesting is not so much ours and made a mistake - as we see, at distances 70-80 KBT excellent German armor-piercing shells took 229-mm armor every time. But our “trouble” is that having said “A”, I had to say “B” as well. Realizing that the distances of naval battles had grown greatly, our artillerymen wanted to have armor-piercing shells capable of penetrating enemy armor at these increased distances. For this, the concept of “light projectile - high initial speed” was no longer suitable, so our developers created a Wunderwaffe 470,9-kg, with which the new 305-mm / 52 gun was ahead of the entire armor penetration plane. By that time, the first series of our battleships had long been standing on the stocks ... And then they passed the tests, and we were horrified, knowing that the armor of Sevastopol did not protect at all from our armor-piercing shells of the 1911 sample of that time also extremely vulnerable for that creations of gloomy domestic genius and that imported guns do not have such an all-destructive power, they somehow did not think about it.

But back to the "scared project." Such criticism sounded not once or twice - they say, why was it at all to strive for continuous booking of the board, even if it was of moderate thickness, so if they used all-or-nothing protection when armor was pulled from the ends to thick, impenetrable for the main shells of the enemy shells, that's when it was ... Well, no, the high-explosive “suitcases” with shimoza were scared before that Tsushima horror was completely out of it. But you could have figured out what kind of crazy it would be in a duel of dreadnoughts that you would throw bombs at the enemy? Show it!

In fact, such a "crazy" in the world was. And this (drum roll) ... none other than Great Britain, the mistress of the seas!

The British, who had their observers in Tsushima, came to very interesting conclusions. They understood that the distances at which the sea battle is being waged grow also understood that the armor-piercing shells of their 305-mm guns would not be very good at hitting enemy ships at long distances - power is not enough. And at a time when the Russians, who had learned their bitter experience, rushed to create 305-mm shells capable of striking the enemy at increased distances, the British ... thought that the main role in future battles would be played not by armor-piercing, but by high-explosive and semi-light armor!

The idea was this: from long distances, the British battleships would hail the enemy with high-explosive and semi-armor shells and would inflict heavy damage on enemy ships, even if they were not punching their main armor. And then, when the enemy is beaten enough, they will come closer and finish off the enemy with armor-piercing shells without any special danger for themselves.

So the question arises: if the trendsetter, "Lady of the Seas", a recognized leader in the field of military fleet, if Great Britain itself did not consider it shameful for itself to use the “Tsushima” tactics of the Japanese fleet, then why should defense against such tactics be considered “a consequence of the pathological horror of Russian sailors”?



It must be said that both ours and the Germans thought it possible to use high-explosive shells until they came together at a distance with which the enemy armor penetrates the armor-piercing shells - shoot high-explosive, they would be easier to shoot and the damage would be inflicted on the enemy, while the armor-piercing projectiles, while armor does not penetrate, the enemy ship will only scratch. Armor is not mastered, they will explode in vain, and if they hit the unarmored side, the fuse will not have time to work, and the projectile will fly away without exploding. But they were going to fight with high-explosives only during rapprochement, for our and German sailors the main shell remained armor-piercing, but for the British ... Before the war, armor-piercing shells made up almost a third of their ammunition! For example, in peacetime, the British battle cruisers consisted of 24 armor-piercing, 28 semi-armor, 28 high-explosive, and also 6 shrapnel shells. During the war, the ammunition increased to 33 armor-piercing, 38 semi-armor and 39 high-explosive.

The British created a very powerful semi-slaughter shell. He did not have as much explosives as he had in the high-explosive shell, but he was stronger than the high-explosive and could pierce quite thick armor - in this he was similar to an armor-piercing. But the armor-piercing projectile has a delay of the fuse - it is necessary that he first broke the armor plate and only then, having overcome the protection, would have flown another ten meters and exploded deep inside the ship. And the British semi-demurder's detonator did not have such a delay - so the projectile exploded either during the armor breakdown or immediately behind the armor ...

In Jutland, semi-armor 343-mm projectiles pierced 200 mm and 230 mm armor. But how?

“16 h. 57 m. The second 343 mm projectile from Queen Mary from the 13200 - 13600 m distance (71-74 cable) hit the 230 mm thick side armor opposite the barbet of the left side tower and exploded in the hole he had drilled. The fragments of armor and shell fragments pierced the barbet wall, which had a thickness of 30 mm in this place, penetrated into the transshipment room of the tower and lit two main semi-charge and two additional charging cases in the working compartment (damage to the Seidlitsk cruiser. Husbands, Germany Linear Cruisers ").

Usually English shells exploded at the time of penetration of armor. Therefore, if they fell into relatively weakly armored places (100-127 mm), their ruptures led to the formation of large holes in the hull, but the ship’s interior did not suffer from this, although, of course, such a projectile could hit the waterline. extensive flooding. But if the projectile fell into a sufficiently thick armor, the holes were not too large, and only fragments of the projectile penetrated inside, albeit at high speed. In other words, the spaced booking of the Russian battleship was quite adequate to withstand the English semi-armored 343-mm projectiles, although when hit in 203-mm armor of the towers and 150-mm armor of barbets they could do things ... as, however, they could mess things up with Russian 470,9-kg the shells that hit the 225-280 mm armor of the British Orion towers.

In general, the idea of ​​a semi-slaughter shell did not justify itself, and the British quickly figured it out - after the battle of Jutland, the ammunition load of armor-piercing shells on the gun increased from 33 to 77. But the neglect of armor-piercing shells cost the British fleet dearly - high-quality shells of this type appeared only after the war. And for the entire first world, the maximum thickness of the armor punched by the British armor-piercing projectile was 260 mm, and its fifteen-inch projectile from the battleship "Rivend" broke through.

Do you still believe that the 275 mm aggregate armor of the Russian dreadnought, which covered the engine rooms and boiler rooms and barbettes, was such a bad defense?

There is no doubt that, in Orion’s cellars, full-fledged armor-piercing projectiles (at least similar to German ones), he would have gained an obvious advantage over the Sevastopol type battleship, had they met in battle. But in fact, the British battleship did not have high-quality armor-piercing shells, so, surprisingly, the Gangut duel against some Monarch or Tanderer would be almost equal.

A warship is the most complex alloy of armor, cannon, projectile, etc., and so on. Therefore, for a correct comparison, it is necessary to take into account the mass of available factors, without reducing the analysis to the maximum thickness of the armor belt and the caliber of the main caliber implements. Nobody argues with the fact that the booking of Sevastopol type battleships left much to be desired. But the weakness of his armor does not make him the worst battleship of the world, which is often what we are trying to imagine.

A small remark - most sources shout about the insufficient protection of Russian battleships. And how many authors will find, crying, say, about the weakness of the armor protection of American “battleships”? I have not seen one.

Consider, for example, the American "Wyoming".

Battleships like "Sevastopol": success or failure? Part of 2


"In theory, it is believed that the ship's armor should provide protection against the guns of its main caliber - in this case, the project is balanced according to the" attack-defense "criterion. The developers believed that the 280-mm and 229-mm armor of the 601 project is sufficient protection against fire 305-mm guns at the expected combat distances, so at the time of development, "Wyoming" was really a harmonious and balanced design and also one of the strongest in the world ”(“ United States Battleships, ”Mandel and Skoptsov).

Under the influence of the shooting of “Experimental Ship No. 4” 225-mm armor belt + 50-mm armored partition wall / bevel of Russian dreadnoughts, giving in aggregate 275 mm of armor and more (the bevel is angled) publicly declared insignificant protection. But the armor of the American "Wyoming", laid down later, "Sevastopol", is considered to be quite balanced. At the same time, the Wyoming defense consisted of armor plates, which at one edge had a thickness of 280 mm, and at the second - 229 mm, i.e., the armor plate was made oblique. These armor plates were put on each other, so in the middle of the armor belt its thickness really reached 280 mm, but went down to the edges (upper and lower) to 229 mm. But, unlike battleships of the “Sevastopol” type, the armor belt was the only defense - there were no armored partitions or bevels behind this armor at the Yankee battleship.

Total: 275 mm aggregate armor of the Russian ship - this is almost complete lack of protection. And 229-280 mm American armor - a harmonious and balanced project?

Formally, the Wyoming had the same artillery as the Russian Dreadnought, a dozen 305-mm guns. At the same time, they seemed to be better protected - the front plate of the American towers reached 305 mm, the side walls, however, were, like our towers, 203 mm, but the barbet had 254 mm thickness against our 150 mm. It seems to be the superiority of the American ship. But this is if you do not notice the nuances. And they are - the design of the American towers was very unsuccessful, there was only one lift of projectiles and charges for the two tower guns. In each tower of the German Ostflasland, for example, there were four such lifts - for shells and for the charges to each gun separately, on Russian ships shells and charges were fed to each gun by their lift. Accordingly, the supply of fire-fighting equipment from the cellars of the American Dreadnought was very slow and to ensure an acceptable rate of fire, the Americans were forced ... to place part of the ammunition assembly directly in the tower. In each of them, in the aft niche, 26 shells were stored. The armor of the towers was not bad, but not invulnerable, so you can say, the Americans were simply asking for the fate of the British battle cruisers in Jutland. And we are again confronted, it would seem, with a paradox - the armor of the Americans seems to be thicker, but unsuccessful design solutions make their ships even more vulnerable than ours.

When we take the reference book, seeing twelve 305-mm Wyoming cannons and 280 mm thickness of its armor-belt against twelve 305-mm trunks of Sevastopol and 225 mm of armor-belt, we unconditionally give the palm to the American ship. But one has only to look at how it will become clear that in fact the American battleship does not have too many chances against the Russian ship.

It will not make it difficult for me to give a detailed analysis of possible collisions of the battleship Sevastopol with French and Italian dreadnoughts (I don’t even remember a sin about Japanese Kawati, but I’m not sure about any exotics like Spanish dreadnoughts) the word is that Sevastopol could fight on equal terms with any of them, otherwise it would even have some advantage. But the exception is still there. The German dreadnoughts of the Koenig and Kaiser series are the only ships that, perhaps, surpassed the Russian battleships in the combination of the power of armor and projectile.

Battleships like "Koenig" - these are the twelve-inch ships with which Sevastopol would have to be so hard. At distances in the 70 KBT 350 mm armor belt of the “twilight Teutonic genius”, the Russian armor-piercing model 1911 could, in principle, be able to break through. But with great difficulty, with angles of about 90 degrees. At smaller angles, breaking through the main armor belt was possible, but the projectile would not pass inside the ship, but would burst in the slab, shoveling internal compartments with shrapnel. However, the three-inch bevels of the German battleship and 80-mm barbety (it was this thickness that they had behind the main armor belt) remained practically unkillable. It would have been easier for the Russian shells at the level of the upper armor-piercing piercing the 170-mm board, they had some chance of making a hole in the 140-mm barbety of the German battleships. But taking into account the designs of the enemy towers, even in this case, there is almost no chance of a cellar exploding.

At the same time, the German 70 armor-piercing shells had the opportunity to penetrate the 225-mm armor belt of Russian ships - even if not every shell, even if two to the third. But this very third projectile was quite high-quality armor-piercing - after breaking through the main armor belt, it could not explode or collapse, and with all the power it had left it would blow up into an 50-mm armored partition or bevel.

Experiments that were conducted by our sailors in the 1920 year showed that to reliably block the splinters of large-caliber artillery, it is not 50-mm, but 75-mm armor that is needed. In this case, if the projectile exploded not on the armor, but in 1-1,5 meters from it, it will withstand all the fragments not only of the twelve-inch, but even of the four-inch projectile. But if the projectile exploded when hit in such armor, a gap is formed, and fragments of the projectile and armor penetrate inside. The study of damage to the English battlecruisers suggests that on the 70 KBT the German 305-mm guns still have some chances to break through the 225-mm armor and jerk on the 50 mm bulkhead, or even pass through it, but the chances of that our shells will be able to inflict decisive damage to the German battleships at this distance are almost illusory.

On the 55-65, the KBBT battleships of the “Sevastopol” type would have turned out to be in a completely unprofitable position - there their armor was penetrated fairly well with German projectiles, but our German armor - almost not. True, if our battleships could get close to the cable on 50, then ...

I must say that the Russian admirals and designers were seriously concerned about the booking systems of future battleships. To this end, during the time of the First World War, special compartments were created that were armored in various ways, and the thickness of the plates that mimic the main armor belt reached 370 mm. It was not possible to test various defense ideas - a revolution occurred, but, surprisingly, the case was not abandoned halfway through, and in 1920, already under Soviet rule, the above compartments were tested by domestic 12- and 14-inch shells. Here is a description of the action of the Russian 305-mm armor-piercing projectile from a distance of approximately 45-50 KBT.

“Shot No. 19 (shooting 2 July 1920 g.), At compartment No. 2 and plate No. 3 (370mm, far right), 12“ armored-piercing non-loaded projectile of the 1911 model, reduced to the standard weight of 471 kg, factory POC, 1914 batch No. of 528, SchD-0,5 brand powder charge, 7, 1916 production batch, for 8 "/ 45 guns with weight 40 kg and impact speed 620 m / s (according to various data corresponds to 45-50 distance in kbt. - Note auth.). Subject to testing were the 12 armor-piercing ability of the “1911 model artillery piercing projectile”, and the resistance of 370-mm side armor and 50-mm lower deck bevel behind it. The impact point from the right edge of 43 cm, from the bottom edge of 137, see. The shell struck through the side with armor with a shirt, 50-mm lower deck bevel, bilge bulkhead (6 mm), 25-mm base sheet of the compartment and went into the earthen filling of the foundation. No shell fragments were found ("The Last Giants of the Imperial Navy", Vinogradov).

In other words, the Russian projectile punched not only 420 mm of armor (in fact, even more, since the 50-mm bevel was at an angle) but also 31 mm of iron and did not collapse at all. Even the thickest armor of the Germanic Dreadnoughts will not save from such a blow.

The conclusion from this is this. At a distance of about 80 kb and higher, our battleships could fight Germans without receiving (but without doing) critical damage, although in general there were a dozen or so barrels spitting 470,9-kg projectiles with lower speed (and a greater angle of incidence on such distances than the Germans' flat-fired guns) will have an advantage over 8-10 barrels of the battleships König and Kaiser. At a distance in 60-75 kbt, the Germans will have an advantage, but starting from 50 kbt and less everything is in the hands of the Lord, for there is already German, that Russian armor will be pierced through. True, one can argue that 50 kbt as a battlefield for dreadnoughts is a completely frivolous distance, but I want to remind you that in Jutland it happened to fight with kbt 45.

And I also want to note an important nuance. At a distance in 60-70 kbt, the commander of the German Kaiser will seek to fight out of ten twelve-inch guns, not eight. To do this, he will have to put his battleship practically on the traverse and on parallel courses to the Russian Dreadnought (otherwise one of the middle towers will not be able to fight). But, having set his own armored belt under 90 degrees to the guns of the Russian battleship, he will automatically put the Sevastopol guns in the best conditions, and his armor will still be vulnerable ... And to change course - yes, Kaiser will get an obvious defense gain, but 8 guns against 12 with a heavier projectile ...

Someone may say that I play along with Russian dreadnoughts. I want to remind you of the battles of the German “Goeben” against the battleships of the Russian Black Sea fleet. In theory, at distances of the order of 60, the KBGB “Goeben” could have shot Russian ships in a dash, and those would not have had a chance to inflict decisive damage on it. In fact, we have the fact that the two attempts of the German ship to fight with the Russian battleships ended in the swift flight of the Geben.

Therefore, I am still inclined to think of Sevastopol-type battleships about equal to the “Kaiser”, but inferior to “Koenig”. However, it should be noted that even the Kaisers were laid down after Sevastopol, the Kaiser battleships being the third German type of dreadnought (the first was Nassau, the second was Helgoland), and the Germans had gained a certain base and experience, and Sevastopol is the first among Russians. Well, while Nassau and Helgolands met with the Baltic Dreadnoughts in battle, it was absolutely contraindicated ...

And here the reader may again object: “What is the difference when the ship was laid down? It is important that when it went into service, it is therefore necessary to compare not with those battleships that were laid simultaneously, but with those that at the same time joined the ranks of other maritime powers ... "

Of course, the battleships of the “Sevastopol” type were built for long 5,5 years. And here we have another myth, of which there are so many around our linear firstborn:

Russian industry and cursed Tsarism were decidedly uncompetitive with advanced European industry, perhaps the worst dreadnoughts of the world had been building for more than five years ...

Well, how "worst" were the battleships of the "Sevastopol" type, we seem to have already figured out. As for the level of domestic producers, let me say the following.

Russian industry, focused on the construction of squadron battleships, which were almost half the size of new battleships, carried the old artillery and two-gun towers instead of three-guns, steam engines instead of turbines, etc., and other, fell into prostration after the Russian-Japanese war. There was almost no new orders, the pace of naval construction plummeted, and therefore the factories had to make massive reductions in workers, but even without that they quickly fell into a pre-bankrupt state. Nevertheless, when suddenly it was necessary to proceed with the construction of ships never seen before, the domestic industry performed its task with the utmost worthiness. Workshops for the production of machines and mechanisms, tower workshops and so on — all this had to be rebuilt to create new mechanisms never seen before.

But the fact is that in order to build something as big as a battleship, three things are needed - money, money, and more money. And it was with the money of our shipbuilders that the hitch went out. Unlike in Germany, where the Maritime Law obliged the state budget to finance a certain number of battleships annually, financing the construction of battleships of the Sevastopol type is an extremely sad spectacle. The battleships with fanfare laid in June 1909 of the year - but really they were started to be built only in September-October of the same year! And they financed the construction site so that even a year and a half after the official bookmark (1 January 1911 of the year), 12% of their total cost was allocated to the construction of the battleships!

What does it mean? The battleship is a complex engineering structure. Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the construction of the building on the building berth, you need to start making turbines, boilers and artillery - otherwise, by the time the body is ready to “accept” all of the above, there will simply be no cannons, no turbines, or boilers! And our domestic budget financiers failed almost two years. In essence, it is possible to speak of any consistent financing for the construction of the first Russian dreadnoughts only after a law was adopted on the appropriation of funds for the completion of battleships, i.e. 19 May 1911 Propulsion The type "Sevastopol" really built too long. But this is not the fault of the domestic industry, but of the Ministry of Finance, who were unable to promptly raise funds for such construction.

I would also like to warn those who prefer to compare the times of building ships by the dates of their laying / commissioning. The fact is that the date of the official bookmark usually does not correlate in any way with the actual date of commencement of the construction of the ship. The beautiful legend about the “Dreadnought” British “Dreadnought” built “for a year and one day” has long been debunked - although a year and a day passed between its official bookmark and commissioning, but construction work began long before the official bookmark. The same applies to the German ships - in the works of Muzhenikov you can find information that the "preparatory work" began several months before the official bookmark. And when our industrialists were given money on time, the same “Empress Maria” turned out to be completely built in less than 3 of the year.

"The linear arrangement of the artillery of the main caliber of Russian battleships is stupidity and anachronism."

In fact, neither. For some reason, many believe that the linear-elevated scheme allows you to save on the length of the citadel - they say, the layout is denser. But it is not. If we look at almost any section of the battleships of those times, we will see that they were extremely tightly assembled - barbety and cellars of the towers of the Civil Code, machine and boiler rooms were closely adjacent to each other.

Look Germanic Bayern.



As we can see, the length of the citadel is made up of the length of two towers (in the figure, this is arrows A), the length (more precisely, diameter) of two barbets of towers (arrow B), machine (C), boiler rooms (D) of branches and ... nothing so busy space (E).

And now we are looking at the “Sevastopol” section.



And we are surprised to find that the length of the citadel of the LC “Sevastopol” is all the same two lengths of towers (A), two lengths of brabets (B), length of the machine (C) and two boiler rooms (D) of the compartments, but the space that is not occupied ( E) is significantly less than that of the “Byerne”. Thus, putting the tools into a linearly sublime scheme, we won nothing.

But lost a lot. The point is that with the linear scheme all the 4 towers are located at the upper deck level. But in the linear-elevated scheme, two towers must be raised above the deck approximately to the height of the tower. In other words, the height of the barbets of the two towers is greatly increased. How critical is it? It's easy to calculate. The diameter of the barbet is 9-11 meters, take 10 for clarity. The height to which you want to raise the tower no less than 3 meters, but rather, even higher - I do not have accurate data on the height of the towers, but all the photos show that there are about two human height in the tower.



So, I think, we will not make a big mistake by accepting an increase in the height of the barbet by the 3,5 meter. Which roughly corresponds to the height of the average main armor belt of the Germans. The thickness of the barbet usually also corresponded to the thickness of the main armor belt. So, the circumference is 2 * Pi * Er, that is, 2 * 3,14 * 5 = 31,42 meters! And this is only one barbet, and we have two of them. In other words, by rejecting the linear-elevated scheme in favor of the linear one, we can extend the main armor by about 30 meters, or, without increasing the length of the main armor, increase its thickness - taking into account that the length of the main armor usually does not exceed 120 meters, then, due to the abandonment of the linearly elevated scheme, it would be possible to increase the thickness of the main armor belt by more than weighty 20-25% ...

Of course, the linear-elevated scheme provides the fire of the two towers in the bow and stern, but how critical is it for the battleships? Taking into account the fact that the fire was usually avoided right along the course, the risk of damaging the nose of the ship with muzzle gases was too great. At the same time, due to the insignificant width of the superstructures, the Russian dreadnoughts could fight in full volleys already on the 30-degree course angle, so that although the advantage of the linear-elevated scheme is obvious, it is not so great.

In fact, the main reason for abandoning the linear scheme was the need for developed add-ons on the battleship. There are several reasons for this. The first is that it’s very inconvenient to control a ship from a narrow cabin. It is advisable to have a normal bridge over the entire width of the ship - but the presence of such a bridge (superstructures) dramatically reduces the angles of fire of artillery placed in a linear pattern. The second - with the advent of aviation it was necessary to place numerous air defense batteries on superstructures, and it was no longer possible to confine oneself, as in the good old days, to small armored cuttings in the bow and stern. And the third - an important drawback of the linear scheme was the reduction of deck space. Obviously, the trunks of the higher towers of the Civil Code, hanging over the lower ones, save 10, or even all 15 meters of the deck. In other words, putting 4 towers linearly elevated, you can carve 20-25 meters of additional deck space. And this is a lot.

In general, it is clear why, after the First World War, the linear arrangement of artillery quickly disappeared into oblivion, but before and during the war, such an arrangement fully corresponded to the tasks of the battleships. The only thing that would be worth regretting is that our admirals demanded that all the main caliber 4 towers be placed on the same level - the presence of a forecastle on Sevastopol would be more than appropriate. One can understand the admirals: they feared that the different height of the towers would entail an excessive spread of shells in the volley, but here they were clearly reinsured. If “Sebastopol” had a forecastle, their seaworthiness would be significantly higher.

Speaking of seaworthiness ...

To be continued ...
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  1. Crang
    Crang 25 September 2014 09: 18
    +2
    I read it. Very interesting. In the third part, it turns out that our first dreadnoughts were also excellent in seaworthiness. But I never saw a detailed comparison of the battle: "Sevastopol" vs "Koenig". From a distance of 110-80kbt. Let me remind you that among the classic dreadnoughts with 305mm guns, the German series of battleships of the "König" class was considered the most powerful in the world. Although the British had the Enginkourt II with its linearly spaced 14mm guns.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 16: 38
      +2
      Quote: Krang
      But I never saw a detailed comparison of the battle: "Sevastopol" vs "Koenig". From a distance of 110-80kbt.

      Did I promise him? !!!
      But generally speaking, it is at these distances that I would not put on the "Koenig". Its shells fly more flat, but they can only cause serious damage if they hit non- or weakly armored parts - under an armored belt, for example, or into a side with 125 mm armor. Well, the heavier Russian shells will hit the decks of the German battleship, this is bad for him.
    2. kavad
      kavad 25 September 2014 20: 34
      -2
      I read in most sources that seaworthiness was so-so. Especially after the Bolsheviks modernized the face. Due to overload buried in the nose. Long time ago I read about the passage of roofing felts to Marat, roofing felts of the Commune (too lazy to search for books, so I forgot) on the Black Sea, there they added a superstructure on the face, almost a flood the boat! The superstructure was like a spoon - it scooped generously! The benefit of the storm fell off.
      But in fact - the overload was on the nose. It was recommended to remove a pair of 120mm guns from the nose.
      1. Taoist
        Taoist 25 September 2014 22: 05
        +2
        well here you are wrong. It was the second modernization, during which the battleships received a full-fledged tank, a cruising rod and the collapse of the sides in the bow and ensured acceptable seaworthiness and ensured the action of artillery in fresh weather. And the case that you remembered concerned only "Parisian" which really hastily before transferring to the Black Sea Fleet tried to increase the collapse of the sides in the bow with little blood. By the way, simply unloading the bow, for example, removing the bow guns would not have worked - the problem was not so much in the construction differential (it was only 14 cm), but in the "icebreaker contours" of the bow. And the overload was general .... the construction overload of Sevastopol was 1500 - 2000 tons on average.
      2. avt
        avt 25 September 2014 22: 09
        +1
        Quote: kavad
        , there on the muzzle an add-on was added, almost a flood was a boat!

        It was a matter of even being repaired in France, because instead of a normal forecastle they made a really big spoon
        Quote: Taoist
        Well, here you are mistaken. Just the second modernization during which the battleships received a full tank,

        Pure truth and real
        Quote: Taoist
        provided acceptable seaworthiness indicators and ensured artillery operation in fresh weather.
  2. avt
    avt 25 September 2014 09: 24
    +12
    ,,. The only thing worth regretting is that our admirals demanded to place all 4 main battery towers on the same level - the presence of a forecastle on the Sevastopol would be more than appropriate. "---- Which affected more seaworthiness and it was confirmed during the ocean crossing of Sevastopol to the Black Sea, by the way I read somewhere that the Empress Maria was overloaded on the nose, which again is not buzzing for driving performance, well, they were the first and really took a long time to build. eliminated on "Nikolay" and "Izmail" by the way - the linearly elevated scheme was considered and worked out for "Sevastopol", but refused. In general - yes, it is simply stupid to demand from the first Russian battleships, and even those that were too long in construction, to be equal with the machines of the second and third generations of the First World War, as the "experts - historians" of the fleet often do, is simply stupid! the topic is written in a calm style, it is pleasant to read when there is no hysteria in the text and you can calmly consider the facts and arguments of the author. good
    1. jayich
      jayich 25 September 2014 09: 31
      +4
      Sevastopol was also overloaded on the nose; I didn’t have to take 110 shells, but 70 I don’t remember exactly on 1 barrel or on the entire first tower
      1. avt
        avt 25 September 2014 10: 04
        +3
        Quote: jayich
        I didn’t have to take 110 shells on my nose, but 70 I don’t remember exactly on 1 barrel or on the entire first tower

        Yes, I found it in my papers - on "Maria" they took less to the bow cellar, and they refused from the forecastle on "Nikolay" to improve seaworthiness, in particular Eberhard was against - the displacement increases and therefore the price, etc., and etc.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        25 September 2014 16: 21
        +2
        Not Sevastopoli - Empress Mary
        1. avt
          avt 25 September 2014 19: 40
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Not Sevastopoli - Empress Mary

          That's what always amazed me in the decisions of the General Staff of the Empire, is that, unlike the Angles, whose ships were often taken as a standard, well, the same "Rostislav" for example, who built ships in series, which our naval strategists ALWAYS did for the Black Sea Fleet with different characteristics. Here at least two knots at the battleships, and the speed is lower for Potemkin and Eustathia with a partner than that of the Tsarevich-Borodino, perhaps the only exception is the cruiser of the Oleg series. Well, it seems dreadnoughts - sculpt a series not 4x4, but 8 at once according to the same patterns and "Noviki" also, but no to the Baltic - "Petropavlovski", the Black Sea - "Mary". Well, straight according to Raikin - "Let everything be, everything. But let something be missing." laughing
          1. Kars
            Kars 25 September 2014 20: 11
            +1
            Quote: avt
            ALWAYS ships for the Black Sea Fleet did with different characteristics

            So this is understandable and even correct, the Black Sea Fleet in the Republic of Ingushetia has always been built with an estimate for the Bosphorus operation, and that the area of ​​operation is obscurely known.
            1. avt
              avt 25 September 2014 22: 05
              0
              Quote: Kars
              So this is understandable and even right,

              Which is understandable ? That at 16 knots the battleship is faster to reach the Bosphorus than at 18!!? laughingAnd is that even right !?
              1. Kars
                Kars 25 September 2014 22: 14
                +2
                Quote: avt
                That at 16 nodes the battleship is faster to reach the Bosphorus than at 18ti!

                And what about the Bosphorus?
                But extra millimeters of armor will help a little.
                1. avt
                  avt 26 September 2014 09: 18
                  +1
                  Quote: Kars
                  And what about the Bosphorus?

                  Yes Yes . That was quite confirmed when they met both battleships, well, it was not an indicator to count the numbers, with "Goeben", and "Catherine". Indeed, the Bosphorus did not go anywhere, "Goeben" simply left
                  1. Kars
                    Kars 26 September 2014 11: 09
                    +1
                    Quote: avt
                    Well, it’s not an indicator to count it, with "Goeben"

                    And where will Goben go if the fleet begins to block the Bosphorus? Do you think it will remain in the Black Sea?
                    1. avt
                      avt 26 September 2014 14: 24
                      0
                      Quote: Kars
                      And where will Göben go if the fleet begins to block the Bosphorus?

                      And look where he really went to the Black Sea Fleet, even when Maria appeared and Ekaterina was chasing him, not to mention the famous shootout when he ran into the armor, got and got away, and even when the approaches were mined and when the Germans So to castrate the performance characteristics of ships, even serial ones as on the Black Sea "Noviks", for the sake of some mythical specifics of the Black Sea basin, for me is a big mystery of the admiral's thoughts.
                      1. Kars
                        Kars 26 September 2014 16: 44
                        +1
                        Quote: avt
                        And look where he really went to the Black Sea Fleet, "disappeared" even when "Maria" appeared

                        where he disappeared into the Sea of ​​Marmara. at the same time he could not sink a single large RI ship.
                        Quote: avt
                        So to castrate the performance characteristics of ships, even serial ones like on the Black Sea "Noviks", for the sake of some mythical specifics of the Black Sea basin, for me is a big mystery of the admiral's thoughts.

                        But the specifics do not go away from this, and that I’m not aware of the newcomers there, I am interested in heavy ships.
                      2. avt
                        avt 26 September 2014 18: 17
                        -1
                        Quote: Kars
                        where he disappeared into the Sea of ​​Marmara. at the same time he could not sink a single large RI ship.

                        And here are the figurines! Only when his partner was blown up to death, and he himself, too, completely disgraced himself in the Black Sea, for which Eberhard was called Gebengard, and his follower could not do anything, using classical methods of battleship skirmishes, until Kolchak established a mine work.
                      3. Kars
                        Kars 29 September 2014 22: 09
                        +1
                        Quote: avt
                        Only when a team mate was blown up

                        You are already confusing the real story and the possible Bosphorus operation of the Russian fleet, the Black Sea Fleet didn’t have a balanced fleet, nor did it have an amphibious operation, in which the extra 3 nodes would not solve anything. And by the way, you know that Geben is still a linear cruiser , and RI had no battlecruisers.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 September 2014 16: 53
    +3
    Always please, glad I liked it! :)
  • jayich
    jayich 25 September 2014 09: 28
    +2
    Great article, I look forward to continuing.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 16: 39
      +1
      Thank!:)
  • Crang
    Crang 25 September 2014 09: 28
    +3
    This phrase of the author also raises a logical question:

    In other words, the Russian shell pierced not only 420 mm of armor (actually even more, since the 50 mm bevel was located at an angle) but also 31 mm of iron and did not collapse at all. Even the thickest armor of the German dreadnought will not save from such a blow.

    WHY then did the battleships switch from 305mm guns to larger-caliber guns? WHY did the Japanese equip the Yamato with 9-460mm guns? After all, if the author's statement is true, then it turns out that even in a battle with the Yamato, our first dreadnought, Sevastopol, at distances of about 50kbt has good chances! And taking into account that he has 12 barrels, he will be even stronger against 9 in Yamato! But in practice, neither the first French dreadnoughts could do anything special against the British superdreadnoughts. Neither our "Novorossiysk" (when he was still "Giulio Cesare") together with a fellow nifiga could not oppose a single British superdreadnought.
    1. alicante11
      alicante11 25 September 2014 16: 04
      +2
      You look at a distance. There is the equivalent of 45-60 cab.
    2. igor36
      igor36 26 September 2014 10: 32
      +2
      Quote: Krang
      And WHY then on the battleships switched from 305mm guns to larger ones?

      The mass of the Yamato salvo is 1460 * 9 = 13140 kg, at the Sevastopol 470 * 12 = 5640 kg, even taking into account the higher rate of fire, our battleship is 2 times inferior. In terms of firing range, the same is inferior to 70 cab. Here are the arguments for increasing the caliber
  • shtraib
    shtraib 25 September 2014 09: 38
    -9
    IMHO did not cost Russia to build battleships in such numbers, a couple of pieces per fleet and fine. Throw everything else to Svetlana and destroyers.
    1. Crang
      Crang 25 September 2014 09: 48
      +2
      Quote: shtraib
      IMHO did not cost Russia to build battleships in such numbers, a couple of pieces per fleet and fine. Throw everything else to Svetlana and destroyers.

      On the contrary, it was worth it. Since it was battleships that were then the striking force of the fleet. You can't do anything with cruisers and destroyers. But what size to build battleships is, of course, a question. I am convinced that of course it was necessary to have one or two powerful battleships per fleet. And instead of the rest, and instead of most of the cruisers, continue to build battleships the size of battleships squadron. They would perform the same tasks, but at the same time they had a colossal superiority in numbers (over "normal" battleships) and in survivability and firepower (over cruisers).
      1. shtraib
        shtraib 25 September 2014 10: 14
        0
        Pocket battleship also costs a lot. For offensive operations, it would be better to build submarines in the same way. Those. light fleet forces are much more promising. There was still no chance of winning this war, if not a revolution, then an economic crisis, they would still put an end to such ships.
        1. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 25 September 2014 10: 48
          +4
          Quote: shtraib
          There was still no chance of winning this war,

          Strange ... There was no chance of winning that war, but the Entente won the war as a result ... Or are you talking about Germany? Now, since the fall of 1914, she really had no chance of winning the war.
        2. Crang
          Crang 25 September 2014 10: 48
          +3
          Quote: shtraib
          For offensive operations, it would be better to build submarines in the same way.

          The Navy of the USSR, even in the difficult years of 2MB with the number of submarines, everything was in order. Another thing is that submarines are oceanic in nature. In the Baltic, Black Sea and Japanese seas it is crowded.
          Quote: shtraib
          Pocket battleship also costs a lot

          Not more expensive than a cruiser, anyway. And the combat characteristics with a comparable displacement - the battleship is much better. This is just what we need for the Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, CF and partly Pacific Fleet. The Finns built the BRBO and were quite pleased with them. Like a splinter in the ass, our admiral was.
          Quote: shtraib
          There was still no chance of winning this war, if not a revolution, then an economic crisis, they would still put an end to such ships.

          In WW1 in the Baltic, in addition to the above-mentioned 4 dreadnoughts, we had two dreadnoughts of the "Andrew the First-Called" type (very powerful by the way), one famous pre-dreadnought "Slava", one "Citizen" (formerly "Tsarevich") and a training artillery ship - a former battleship 1st class - "Alexander-II". In the Northern Fleet there was one dreadnought type "Poltava", and on the Black Sea there was also an impressive park of pre-dreadnoughts, of which two "Efstathias" and "John Chrysostom" were hopelessly spoiled by the British. So the new government did NOT NEED in a situation of complete collapse of the economy and shipbuilding, on a complete battleship without fish, to let all this equipment under the knife, including some dreadnoughts. After all, they could not build anything of a new analogous class anyway. And it was necessary to modernize all the pre-dreadnoughts of the "Maratov" type. That is, to do with them the same as the Germans did with their pre-dreadnoughts of the Schleswieg Holstein type. And the result would be extremely powerful and combat-ready ships, well adapted for operations on communications and mine-artillery positions. After all, our country was not bound by any international agreements on this part. And in the end it turned out what happened. Our industry was not able to make up for the almost complete absence of battleships with armor and large-caliber guns with light forces. You yourself know. Our surface fleet with a core of three old battleships, even with the completion of the Profinterns, etc., was not taken seriously by anyone.
      2. goose
        goose 25 September 2014 12: 47
        0
        As for the cruisers - I agree, not a single good project has succeeded. But the cruiser cost a lot. IMHO, it was necessary to limit ourselves to emerald-like, ruriks, and novices, and throw the rest of the resources into dreadnoughts and BWOs for the Baltic. The cruiser took quite a lot of money.

        The same Ushakovs and Sinyavins for the Baltic, with a displacement of 4000 tons, are quite adequate ships, as later similar Finnish armadillos showed themselves.

        It was even better to equip the army with shells, rifles, machine guns and ammunition, at least to the mobilization minimum, with the money of the cruisers and build a new modern production of explosives and gunpowder. Perhaps armored cars would have been enough.
        1. Crang
          Crang 25 September 2014 16: 25
          0
          Quote: goose
          As for the cruisers - I agree, not a single good project has succeeded.

          We had just great cruisers. Best in the world. But this is just a cruiser. Although the best in the world.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 September 2014 16: 55
          +1
          Quote: goose
          It was even better to equip the army with shells, rifles, machine guns and ammunition with the money of cruisers

          Who bothered? The generals believed that they had enough. We had production facilities for the same rifles in front of the PMV.
        3. 97110
          97110 25 September 2014 17: 25
          0
          Quote: goose
          And even better was the money of the cruisers ...

          "... to look from the height of centuries at the shame of past generations." Apparently, it turned out to be easier to prove the need to send money to the construction of cruisers than to believe in the need to "equip the army with shells, rifles, machine guns and cartridges, at least to the mobilization minimum, and build a new modern production of explosives and gunpowders." And they simply did not remember about armored cars at the time of development of the fin. plan.
      3. The comment was deleted.
  • moremansf
    moremansf 25 September 2014 09: 53
    +11
    The main thing is that they were built at Russian plants, by Russian shipbuilders, and were not bought abroad for Russian gold ... Russian shipbuilding gained experience, its own Russian architecture was formed in shipbuilding ... Russia was increasingly moving away from dependence on the West ... RUSSIA BECOMING INDEPENDENT POWER !!!
    1. shtraib
      shtraib 25 September 2014 10: 05
      +2
      Yeah, and then the economy was covered with a copper basin. The Bolsheviks came and everything had to be done anew.
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 25 September 2014 11: 08
        +5
        Quote: shtraib
        Yeah, and then the economy was covered with a copper basin
        The "copper basin" of the Russian economy was not because of the Bolsheviks, and, in general, had it not been for them, the Yeltsins, Chubais and Gaidars would not have "reformed" Russia in 1991, but much earlier, together with their brother Kerensky and other pro-Western huskies, in which Russia would never become a space and nuclear superpower, but would fall to pieces. Moreover, if Nicholas II had not faintly renounced the throne at the most crucial moment in history (by the way, without the influence of the Bolsheviks, as well as the February Revolution), the situation would hardly have raised Russia to the level of the Soviet Union.
        1. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 25 September 2014 11: 14
          0
          Quote: Per se.
          The "copper basin" of the Russian economy was not because of the Bolsheviks,

          So the previous author did not blame the Bolsheviks for this. Learn to read more attentively and without the nervous urge to defend the "bright past."
          1. Per se.
            Per se. 25 September 2014 11: 41
            +3
            So I do not blame the "previous author", but supplement his thought. Learn and you do without nervousness in minusism, and defense of the "dark future".
            1. Trapperxnumx
              Trapperxnumx 25 September 2014 11: 42
              +2
              Quote: Per se.
              So I do not blame the "previous author", but supplement his thought. Learn and you do without nervousness in minusism, and defense of the "dark future".

              OK. I will take note and promise to correct. Accept and plus)))
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        25 September 2014 16: 56
        +2
        Quote: shtraib
        Yeah, and then the economy was covered with a copper basin.

        This is certainly not the fault of the battleships. You compared the costs of the fleet and the army of Russia?
  • Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 25 September 2014 10: 05
    +5
    Many thanks to the author for the article! Very interesting and informative!
  • Crang
    Crang 25 September 2014 11: 15
    0
    And then the tests passed, and we were horrified, realizing that the Sevastopol armor does not at all protect against our armor-piercing shells of the 1911 model. That the armor of other battleships of that time is also extremely vulnerable to this creation of a gloomy domestic genius and that the imported guns are not so destructive power, somehow did not think about it.
    So who conducted the tests? You want to say that the 305mm / L52 artillery system was tested there? No. The experienced "Chesma" was shot by the battleship "John Chrysostom" (type "Efstafiy"). That is, the "Chesme" with a reproduced section of the side of our dreadnoughts was fired from the old 305mm / L40 cannon, but with new 471-kilogram shells. The results are known to be shocking. What would happen to the Japanese fleet at Tsushima, there are 305mm shells weighing 450 kilograms in the cellars of our Borodintsy ... But this question was considered. But Rozhestvensky refused.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 01
      +4
      Quote: Krang
      That is, the "Chesme" with a reproduced section of the side of our dreadnoughts was fired from the old 305mm / L40 cannon, but with new 471-kilogram shells. The results are known to be shocking. What would happen to the Japanese fleet at Tsushima, there are 305mm shells weighing 450 kilograms in the cellars of our Borodintsy ... But this question was considered. But Rozhestvensky refused.

      Nothing would have happened. Firstly, because there was no way to shove new 470,9 kg shells into the Borodino cellars and so on, which, incidentally, applies to 450 kg.
      Eustathius could shoot a little from the units without dropping shells into the cellar - yes, they could. There was no need for speed.
      The results were amazing, but what does the 305-mm / 40 have to do with it? Her task was to simulate the fall of shells from a distance of 70 kbt or more. With what, from a pistol shot distance, she somehow managed :)))
      In Tsushima, the Japanese, I think, would have had enough 331,7 kg of shells arr 1907 g
  • sevtrash
    sevtrash 25 September 2014 11: 21
    +3
    Good article. But the author considered the confrontation of Russian battleships with German, English, American based on the quality-quantity of elements of the gun-shell-armor. Maybe you need to add the rest to the consideration - the quality of training for sailors, officers, the quality of equipment, other characteristics of battleships? Russian naval battleships seem to have worse seaworthiness, it matters - probably, yes, the clashes will not go exclusively to calm. Speed, too, not only maximum, but one that the connection can maintain long enough for pursuit and withdrawal. Etc. etc. In general, we look forward to continuing.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 02
      +3
      Quote: sevtrash
      Maybe you need to add the rest to the consideration - the quality of training for sailors, officers, the quality of equipment, other characteristics of battleships?

      The quality of training moyarkov is still not related to the project and the battleship iron :)))
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 25 September 2014 20: 26
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The quality of training moyarkov is still not related to the project and the battleship iron :)))

        But the outcome of the clash is certainly relevant!
      2. sevtrash
        sevtrash 25 September 2014 20: 47
        -1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The quality of training moyarkov is still not related to the project and the battleship iron :)))

        But the outcome of the clash is certainly relevant!

        And about the quality. It seems that the barrels were not adapted to the new heavy shells and quickly "burned out". Was the armor from the Izhora plant equal in quality to the German armor? Was Krupp cemented or Kruppovskoy? Probably this will also have an impact on the possible outcome of the clash.
  • Per se.
    Per se. 25 September 2014 11: 32
    +4
    When the Soviet shipbuilding is "caught" in the Italian influence, it should be noted that the influence, if it is legitimate to talk about it, began earlier, with the battleships of the Sevastopol class. It is no secret that there was a competition for a project in which not only our promising battleship projects, but also German and Italian ones, in particular the Ansaldo company, participated. "Dante Aligeri", a kind of prototype of our battleships of the "Sevastopol" class. For its time, "Sevastopol" was a worthy ship, with its pluses and minuses, which became the starting point for the improved Black Sea battleships of the Empress Maria class and battle cruisers of the Izmail class. The Italians from "Dante" came to "Giulio Cesare", which is interesting in how, during modernization, it from an old dreadnought with 13 305mm main battery guns and a speed of 21 knots with "kopecks", in fact, turned into a modern battle cruiser with a speed stroke of 28 knots and 10 320 mm guns (bored out of 305 mm). We did nothing of the kind on battleships of the "Sevastopol" type. There was a project to convert the victim of the fire "Frunze" (former "Poltava") into a battle cruiser, but this project was not implemented. It is a pity that the modernization of our battleships was not as impressive as in Italy, on ships of similar characteristics. Now one can only fantasize about what battleships of the "Sevastopol" type could be, for example, as opposed to the German "pocket battleships".
    1. Crang
      Crang 25 September 2014 11: 48
      0
      Only the GK installations should be replaced with 406mm from the "Soviet Union". It would have fit in.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        25 September 2014 17: 05
        +3
        Quote: Krang
        Only the GK installations should be replaced with 406mm from the "Soviet Union". It would have fit in.

        Well, yes - some 2087 tons of the rotating part against the EMNIP 780 ...
        1. Crang
          Crang 25 September 2014 19: 50
          0
          4x780 = 3120t versus 2x2087 = 4174t. Would shove. Not that much of a difference.
          1. Alekseev
            Alekseev 26 September 2014 21: 47
            +1
            Quote: Krang
            Would shove. Not that much of a difference.

            You can’t shove anything that is not shoved ... lol
            But, for example, it was theoretically possible to replace a three-gun 12-inch tower with a two-gun 14-15 inch tower, but practically in the conditions of 30 years - this is unlikely.
            In addition, the appropriateness of such a complex and expensive modernization seems highly controversial, since a battleship from a means of gaining dominance at sea by destroying its own kind turned into 40 years of the 20th century only as a means of artillery support of landing operations, units of land forces on coastal routes, and long-distance escort of convoys etc.
    2. Taoist
      Taoist 25 September 2014 12: 48
      +3
      Well, in battleships like Sevastopol, the influence is rather German. It was based on the Blom und Foss project. The Italian versions were not even considered then. And later, yes, the cooperation was very close. But again, mainly in the "cruise-destroyer" section. Italian battleships as prototypes for battleships of the "big fleet" were not particularly suitable. Again, taking into account the specifics of our naval theaters and the general condition of the fleet, the modernization of Sevastopol to the level of battle cruisers simply did not make sense. This did not increase their combat value (especially in the Baltic), but greatly increased the cost of this upgrade.
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 25 September 2014 22: 49
        +2
        Quote: Taoist
        It was based on the Blom und Foss project.
        You are right that the German project of Blom und Foss was in the lead in the competition, the second place was taken by the project under the motto "Far East" (developed by Lieutenant Colonel Coromaldi), then the project of engineer Kuniberti, presented by the firm Ansaldo. To a large extent, these projects were united by the fact that MTK showed a commitment to the linear arrangement of the GC towers at the same level. Nevertheless, it is the Italian naval engineer, Major General Vittorio Cuniberti, who is one of the authors of the very idea of ​​the dreadnought battleship, the influence of his ideas on the use of towers with three 305 mm guns placed exclusively in the center plane and the use of armor for the largest possible freeboard area. found its reflection in the accents of the terms of reference and in the selection of the favorites of the competition. Here, rather, the Germans used Italian ideas in the project for Russia. It is probably debatable to say that the already Russian project of the Baltic Shipyard was based on the German one, especially since the Germans, unlike the Italians, did not use three-gun towers on their battleships at that time. If you look at the Blom und Foss project in 1909, it is rather closer to the Italian Dante Aligeri, which was already started this year.
  • Taoist
    Taoist 25 September 2014 11: 49
    +8
    A good article, as I already noted, is at least an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the issue and not a frontal comparison of inches with millimeters ...
    Let me make a few remarks on the topic:
    MTK abandoned the linearly elevated layout of the main battery artillery proposed in the Baltiysky Zavod project with the wording "reduced survivability with such a scheme" - indeed, if we look closely, the turret compartments and cellars with a linear layout are separated by the maximum possible distance. And the history of the battleship Marat clearly demonstrated that even the explosion of the main battery cellars in this case does not cause fatal damage - even the combat effectiveness of the 2nd tower was eventually restored. In the case of a linearly elevated scheme, the probability of detonation of the cellars of the second tower would be guaranteed to put an end to the ship.

    Considering the hypothetical duel of the "Ganguts" with classmates, two more elements should be taken into account. 1) The much smaller size of the Russian battleships in terms of the "given target" (one of the reasons why the MTK also insisted on a smooth-deck hull and a linear arrangement of the towers) and the determination of the course angle at a distance due to the "symmetrical" silhouette of the Russian battleship would be difficult. 2) And as a derivative of this, the low base and the lack of constructive protection of the KDP of the Russian battleships, which greatly impeded their centralized guidance.

    Although our author claims that I must reconsider my position, I am increasingly asserting that the main functionality of the Russian battleships was designed and sharpened specifically for coastal defense, for battle with a superior enemy in the conditions of a prepared mine-artillery position. And in these conditions, of course, our battleships were almost perfect ships.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 06
      +3
      Quote: Taoist
      Although our author claims that I should reconsider my position

      In no case! You do not owe anything. At least - to me :)))
  • qwert
    qwert 25 September 2014 12: 08
    +3
    Quote: Krang
    That is, the "Chesme" with a reproduced section of the side of our dreadnoughts was fired from the old 305mm / L40 cannon, but with new 471-kilogram shells.
    That's right, but with a much shorter range. those. roughly speaking, they fired with an 20 cable with an old cannon, simulating (corresponding to the projectile speed, with the same mass) firing range of a new one with an 40 cable.

    But what the author is doing is that he correctly emphasized two points. First, we are accustomed to scolding the same Sevastopoli, not paying attention to the fact that at that time all over the world things were not very good with many issues. Here in the comments they talked about the overload of the bow. And what do you know about Wyomings loads? What trim did they have? What were the problems with the shivering of the ship during the swell? How did it flow after a 5-point storm?
    That's it. We know very well the problems of our technology, because now everyone is writing about it. As one of the authors wrote in the magazine "AiK": "It's a pity I could not get information on ALL (!!!) flight accidents of the M-4 aircraft" Will you, an American or English author, find such regret in an article about B-52? No. And you will consider our plane flawed, and their ideal. And there are a lot of such examples.


    And again, many thanks to Andrey from Chelyabinsk about "Wyoming". I would be glad to read, if you dare, a separate article in which all the flawed moments of “Iowa” will be revealed. Information, for example, about the armor of which in all reference books was overestimated by almost 100mm.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 09
      +2
      Quote: qwert
      And again, many thanks to Andrey from Chelyabinsk about "Wyoming"

      Thank you for your kind words! drinks
      Quote: qwert
      I would be glad to read, if you dare, a separate article in which all the flawed moments of “Iowa” will be revealed.

      Alas, there is very little information on them. For Americans, everything is simple - the best battleships in the world and that's it. laughing Like all American ... Data on that. what they were in operation almost none, alas.
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 25 September 2014 12: 27
    +2
    Well, the article put a plus for the expansion and, as it were, the upholding of a certain opinion with calculations and calculations. But that's all, in my opinion, only on paper. In reality, everything is much more prosaic ...
    Well, at a hypothetical meeting of the four "königs" with the four "sevastopols" the Russian admiral will not say on the radio "Hey, German, let's fight at a distance of up to 50 cables! Then we will be on equal terms. And then on 70 cables our equipment will not pierce your armor ... "Or when meeting with the Americans:" we will fight in any scenario, because we have spaced armor and we are the winner. " And when you meet English "Malays" you can't shout: "It's not fair, you have more guns!" Therefore, practically the only evidence in confirming their theoretical calculations should be considered only the steps of the British and Germans after Dogger Bank and Jutland. Only they had the "good fortune" to draw conclusions after studying the real damage to their ships. Only they can decide with confidence which shell is better and which type of booking is worse.
    Yes, I agree with you, Andrey, that on paper everything seems to be thought out to the smallest detail, where you can reduce the armor, where you need to add. But I believe that single tests at proving grounds should not be considered an axiom that the adversary's projectile will behave this way. This is just a guess. After all, if you look at some examples of other states, it seems that at that time the Japanese "Congo" were also considered the most powerful ships. So they generally have 203mm armor. Well, "España" is not taken into account, there were other motives for choosing the thickness of the armor. And on the test of time, it turned out that if "Kirishima" went to the bottom under a hail of 406mm ton (approximately) blanks, and no armor could help here, then "Hiei" burned out from the fire of 127mm, 152mm and 203mm shells of American cruisers and destroyers. But these were considered powerful ships. The thickness of the armor, as time shows, in most cases does not play any role, and if it does, it is only psychological.
    1. Crang
      Crang 25 September 2014 13: 07
      0
      Quote: Rurikovich
      "Hiei" was burnt up by 127mm, 152mm and 203mm shells of American cruisers and destroyers.

      Yeah. After hitting 85 (!) 203mm shells weighing 150kg each. And the clouds are smaller. And that kind of torpedoes had to finish.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 25 September 2014 13: 18
        +1
        We are talking about the advantages of booking. After all, no one will say specifically whether the "Hiei" armor pierced or not ... The very fact of a short night collision of light forces with a battleship, where the unarmored parts of the ship were broken by lighter shells, which led to further destruction of it speak of a lot. Those. about the non-key influence of booking in battle. By the way, this fight is very similar to Tsushima. The destruction of unprotected parts of the ship with lighter shells, even if the armor is intact, leads to sad consequences.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 12
      +5
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Well, at a hypothetical meeting of the four "königs" with the four "sevastopol" the Russian admiral will not say on the radio "Hey, German, let's fight at a distance of up to 50 cables!

      Will not say. There will be good weather - they will fall into parallel wake columns of cable ones on 80-90 and they will beat. The weather will be worse - they will converge on 70. Or someone will get tired that we’re fighting on 90, and will want to sharpen the point a little. And then they will get into the fog, and they will bump into each other cable in 45 ...
      My task here is not to tell how the battle of the Russian and German battleships will end, but to describe the advantages that those or others will have at different battle distances.
      You are always trying to assign me words that I did not say :))) drinks
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 25 September 2014 19: 17
        0
        hi I am not trying to assign any words to you. This is not the point. I am trying to say that whether the "Sevastopols" have 225mm armor, or 425mm armor, the armor factor of the ship still plays an insignificant role on the battlefield. And when entering the battle, no commander keeps in mind the thickness of the armor of his ship and the zone of free maneuvering. Quite different factors play a significant role. Again, the only exception was the battle at the Falkland Islands. But there the advantage was completely on the side of the British. And so the priority points are speed and firepower.
        You, of course, respect for the article. Described substantially in the case. But this is just the analytics of a particular type of ship. Take any projects and put them in a heap, and then sort them by displacement, either by armament, or by other parameters and analyze who is stronger - this is all from the region if so. We will wait for the continuation drinks hi
        P.S. By the way, you yourself indicated weather factors as more influential in choosing the battle distance and with them the benefit of choosing a distance is leveled out by what turns out in reality. smile
        P.P.S. By the way, the key message, in my opinion, in your reasoning, that battleships were designed based on the choice of 12-inch caliber, both in justifying the thickness of the armor, and in choosing the composition of weapons. Then, I agree with many calculations. But the question is, what would have happened when faced with a more serious adversary? The comparison would not be in favor of the "Sevastopol". But it may turn out that Sevastopol will have no other options than the abyss, as in the case of von Spee's ships ...
        This, of course, is just my opinion. hi
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 25 September 2014 12: 55
    +1
    I will continue. Any admiral, expecting a meeting with the enemy or even when meeting with the enemy, thinks about protecting his ship almost last. In the first place are the number of the enemy, offensive weapons and their comparison with their own, weather factors, the speed factor, the factor of ensuring this very speed (by and large, the speed at all collisions did not always correspond to those declared on paper and sometimes had dire consequences. And many others. And I am more than one hundred percent sure that none of them thinks that "I have thick armor and another bulkhead at a distance of a meter behind the armor and another 57mm deck ... You can piss and we will win." But there are still other factors on the battlefield: the proximity of the coast, the presence of minefields, the meeting time (morning, afternoon, evening, night), on the basis of which the possible course of the battle is built. And in the first place is what you want, but not booking As far as I remember, the ONLY battle in which the thickness of the armor played a role was the beating of Count von Spee's ships by the Invincible and Inflexible. And in that battle, Stardy realized that the 152mm paper of his ships was weak bite against the 210mm shells of the Germans, therefore, having guns of a larger caliber, he chose a greater speed at a distance of battle, at which the Germans could only die. But in this battle the Germans did not have a chance, and here the decisive factor was the weakness of the armor of the British, which led to the choice of a long range of combat and the overexpenditure of shells. Will they meet an hour before the night? It is not a fact that the Germans would not have escaped death.
    In any battle, the presence of armor plays a role as if by itself. After all, if they say that battleships have met, they mean a meeting of armored ships. And one more nuance. In an artillery duel at long distances, the very fact of being hit speaks volumes. And hitting the ship at such a distance is rather random. Those. Accidental not in hitting the ship, but in getting to where one would like on the ship. Therefore, an ACCIDENTAL hit to a vital place plays a much greater role than having heavy armor. After all, the Japanese did not aim at the wheelhouse of the Tsarevich on purpose, and the King George 5 projectile hit the Bismarck's bow cistern covered only with thin armor, radically changing the outcome of the battle, but about the accidentally hitting the last torpedo in the stern of the same Bismarck "I am silent. Moreover, it was considered the most powerful ship of its time.
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 25 September 2014 13: 06
    +5
    So the booking factor does not play a significant role in the opposition of ships. He will never save if the enemy has the time and high speed to impose his own course of battle (examples of sinking Scharnhorst, Yamato, Prince of Wales and Repals). The last three were sunk by aircraft, who said that the armor shouldn't protect against bombs and torpedoes?
    Therefore, in a hypothetical meeting with ANY enemy, the decisive factors in justifying the "Sevastopol" powerful ships will be any other, but not the armor power! Tactical advantage, early sighting and covering, successful hits, intelligence and resilience of the commander and crew, but not the thickness of the armor. She would rather play a psychological role (after all, a battleship) than an applied one (reliably protect the ship from sinking)
    Here is my opinion hi
    P.S. Reliable armor does not exist - proved by a sledgehammer laughing drinks
    1. Taoist
      Taoist 25 September 2014 13: 35
      +1
      The reservation factor does not play a role in itself, but in combination with others ... Armor is primarily a passive defense designed to ensure the functioning of active means of attack and defense under enemy fire. And by the way, from this point of view, "continuous protection" of Sevastopol is more rational than "all or nothing" .... it reduces just that "probabilistic damage" from randomly distributed hits. Although now we are engaged in pure theorizing. Taking into account modern means of destruction (and most importantly fire control), the value of passive protection has been reduced to 0. (Although I know people on this forum who strongly disagree with this conclusion.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 25 September 2014 13: 49
        +2
        I agree with you. With a short-term clash, the armor is still able to give stability to the combat characteristics of the ship. The probability that a couple of suitcases will completely disable the ship is extremely low. But in the long run, coupled with other damages, booking often loses its function. This is about artillery dueling. In the modern world, booking is generally an anachronism. You can still agree with the local anti-fragmentation booking of control and communication centers, but protection at the level of battleships and cruisers of the beginning of the century (past) is an anachronism! Although there were comrades on the site and with such offers. After all, it’s one thing to accidentally hit a projectile and protect vital parts from it, and another thing is to hit a guided missile weighing several tons, and even selectively. Protect the hull - get into the add-ons, protect the add-ons - get into the hull. Therefore, the best defense in the modern world is to prevent getting into the ship i.e. Air defense of all echelons around the ship
  • goose
    goose 25 September 2014 13: 13
    0
    Quote: Rurikovich
    then "Hiei" was burnt by the fire of 127mm, 152mm and 203mm shells of American cruisers and destroyers.

    What? Is it true? Did it burn out right? The old battlecruiser was simply damaged, and the Japanese correctly did that they retreated with a dry score in their favor, having an unfavorable position. It was possible to drown such a ship by heavy cruisers only with overwhelming superiority, and it was, but the Japanese did not drown by itself.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 25 September 2014 13: 35
      0
      I, of course, have not been there, and I do not know how you can "give up with a dry account in your favor", while losing the battleship request Mass hits, even without breaking through the armor of lighter shells, will at times raise the ship's vital systems. In some cases, they become fatal, since it is problematic to evacuate a damaged ship from the battlefield. What happened to "Hiei". Not everything can be covered with reliable armor ... "Hiei" was a descendant of British "cats". It had powerful fangs in the form of 8-356mm guns (in WWII 6-356mm), but too thin a skin of 203 mm. Therefore, if SEVERAL shells were hit up to 203mm inclusive, fatal damage could have been avoided, but several dozen hits from the shaking of the hull and a mass of debris lead to disruption of communication systems, fire extinguishing, control (after all, no one books high bridges) and many other minor ones. That is why "Hiei" died because it turned out to be unadapted to other realities of the battle, rather than to those that the admirals draw on paper.
      My free advice: there is always a reason, but there is a consequence. And sometimes they should not be confused, because the interpretation of what is happening will change.
  • Crang
    Crang 25 September 2014 14: 15
    0
    Battleships such as "Koenig" - these are the twelve-inch ships with which the "Sevastopol" would have been oh so hard.
    At 55-65 kbt, battleships of the Sevastopol type would have been completely in a disadvantageous position - there their armor penetrated quite well with German shells, but German with ours almost did not.
    but the chances that our shells will be able to inflict decisive damage to the German battleships at this distance are almost illusory.
    Reading these lines, I recall with some inner shudder the sailors from the battleship "Slava". I understand why, after the battle with these two monsters, they supported the revolutionary impulse of the masses and immediately ran to take the Winter Palace ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 15
      +1
      Apparently, is there some kind of joke? :)
  • Taoist
    Taoist 25 September 2014 14: 46
    +2
    When arguing about booking, it is worth remembering that, first of all, the effectiveness of the ship as an artillery platform is affected by the fire control systems. Those same KDP, which is almost impossible to defend ... As a result, the same Bismarck, having a completely intact main caliber after the first minutes of the second battle, did not get anywhere else. And the most powerful battleships in the world, Yamato and Musashi, ingloriously died under air strikes without causing any damage, despite the presence of hundreds of anti-aircraft barrels and the most powerful armor protection.
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 25 September 2014 17: 15
    +2
    Solid material. I do not agree with all the promises of the author. But the fact is that the fact that technically the ship industry of tsarist Russia was able to build the most complex class of ships of that era - the battleships - is in solidarity hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 September 2014 17: 16
      +2
      Thank you for your kind words, and that you don’t agree with everything - so please you, I write to present a different point of view from the generally accepted point of view, and whether or not to agree with it is the Sacred Right of the Reader laughing drinks
  • schizophrenic
    schizophrenic 25 September 2014 19: 07
    +2
    A large amount of material, and quite well processed.
    Well done articles on Sevastopol, thanks Andrew. 
  • Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 25 September 2014 19: 18
    0
    The article looks serious. Like a scientific work. Only in very serious scientific works are references usually given for each information. Where did that come from. There are links, but few. The penetration of such a projectile from such a gun at such a distance is such, but on the other it’s different! But it was not the author himself who took the dreadnought from the museum, shot it from the museum cannon and watched what happened. You can write anything. And there are many fans who do this, including here.
    1. Kars
      Kars 25 September 2014 19: 38
      +2
      Quote: Falcon5555
      But it was not the author himself who took the dreadnought

      I personally take this author’s word for word.
      And links would certainly not hurt, but who is interested and already knows where what lies on the network.
  • askold
    askold 25 September 2014 20: 05
    +1
    Undoubtedly, an excellent full article with facts, drawings and photographs. Perhaps it can be called patriotic. Not in the sense that the author is trying to prove that Russian dreadnoughts are the coolest. Not at all, both the strengths and weaknesses of the project are revealed. The article says exactly that these ships were worthy fighting units of that era, at the level of the fleets of England or Germany. Thank you for the objectivity, your work and the meticulous study of the material.
  • qwert
    qwert 26 September 2014 12: 59
    0
    Bad is the admiral who does not take into account the strengths and weaknesses of the ships of his fleet, and the enemy fleet. I am sure that the same Makarov unequivocally shifted the meeting with Kenigami to sharp corners and went for a rapprochement to the 40-50 cable. What would have been achieved since the initial 80 cable minutes for 15. Taking into account the sighting, as well as the rapid change in the disposition of the covers of the ships during the maneuver period, it would be quite small, if not existent.
    But how could it be otherwise, how much these admirals are studying, and what experience they have by the time they become admirals.
  • xAriy
    xAriy 26 September 2014 16: 08
    0
    Excellent article (as, in fact, the first part) We look forward to continuing !!!
  • Forest
    Forest 27 September 2014 18: 30
    0
    Dear author, are there plans for articles on WWII about naval battles in the Baltic? I have nowhere to find a detailed analysis request
  • AlexA
    AlexA 28 September 2014 19: 53
    -1
    Dear colleagues, it seems that a methodological error has crept into the reasoning of Andrey from Chelyabinsk and his opponents. As Academician A.N. Krylov in the analysis of the battle of "Hood" with "Bismarck", at distances of about 100 cables, taking into account the laws of ballistics under conditions of air resistance, the angle of incidence of the projectile is about 80 degrees. In this case, taking into account the values ​​of the trigonometric functions of sine and cosine, the side area is about 15 times less than the area of ​​the decks. Accordingly, the probability of hitting the side is 15 times less than that of the deck. And therefore, it is not the side armor that needs to be analyzed, but the deck armor. But here ALL shipbuilders have a complete failure. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the Second World War the majority of ship losses were from aerial bombs and torpedoes. Of the artillery duels, one can only recall the sinking of Hood by Bismarck, Scharnhorst by the Duke of York and the Earl of Spee by some of the British.
    By the way, both Marat and Tirpitz were sunk by bombs. So all the reasoning in the article is pure scholasticism.
    1. dipqrer
      dipqrer 29 September 2014 00: 07
      +1
      Admiral Graf Spee was not sunk by "any Englishman", but
      destroyed by his own team. By the way there was still a battle of Kirishima
      with South Dakota and Operation Catapult.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 September 2014 17: 14
      +2
      Quote: AlexA
      As Academician A.N. Krylov in the analysis of the battle of "Hood" with "Bismarck", at distances of about 100 cables, taking into account the laws of ballistics under conditions of air resistance, the angle of incidence of the projectile is about 80 degrees.

      It is sad, but in this case, the error crept into the calculations of the esteemed Krylov. NEVER AND ANY projectile will fall at an angle of 80 degrees. A gun is not a mortar, ask any artilleryman :))
      You can familiarize yourself with the angles of incidence of the main caliber guns in the monograph by Kofman "Japanese battleships of the second world Yamato" and "Mussi" (page 124) and see that the main caliber shells of the WWII battleships fell by 100 kbt at an angle of 12 to 17,8 degrees You can go here http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_15-52_skc34.htm and see that the Bismarck cannon has an angle of incidence of shells by 20 thousand m (which is more than 100kbt) is 16,4 degrees. Vinogradov - his "The Last Giants" mentions the calculation of armor penetration tables made in Russia based on the results of the shelling of Chesma - it indicates that for 70 kbt the angle of incidence is 10 degrees. You can also read Puzyrevsky, describing the damage to English and German ships in Jutland and the number of hits on the deck :)))
      You can also read a lot of literature and guess why WWII battleships, seriously concerned with deck protection, had up to 406 mm armored belts but only 150-200 mm armored decks or even lower, and it was assumed that these ships had invulnerability zones for 406-mm shells. With a little thought, you could guess that if there were, as the academician says, the incidence angles of 70-80 grad (for the distance 80-100 kbt) armored decks would be absolutely permeable to 406-mm shells.
      Finally, if an ordinary cannon can provide a projectile fall under 80 hail, then what the hell did world artillery take care of creating howitzers and mortars?
      Quote: AlexA
      So all the reasoning in the article is pure scholasticism.

      But what you should not have done was to call me a scholastic. Albeit clean laughing
  • blizart
    blizart 1 October 2014 11: 09
    +1
    Well done Andrey