Russians of Kyrgyzstan: Is the Exodus Irreversible?
A century and a half together
The resettlement of Russians on Kyrgyz lands began around the middle of the 19th century (the first Kyrgyz tribes accepted Russian citizenship in 1855), and after the main part of present-day Kyrgyzstan (1861-1876) was annexed to the Russian Empire, the influx of Russian immigrants increased significantly. The first appeared the Ural Cossacks, the whole villages moved to Semirechye, and peasants from the south of Russia.
Relations of Russians with the indigenous population developed, in general, not bad. Already a textbook became story that the first Russian churches were located in Kyrgyz yurts, and rich Kirghiz made donations for the construction of Orthodox churches. In this regard, it should be noted that in the conditions of the ethnic diversity of these territories, national and religious tolerance was generally characteristic of the Kyrgyz. But, of course, the picture was far from being benevolent: the difference in cultures and mentalities, the contact of behavioral stereotypes with different ethnic and cultural foundations, throughout the whole period of living together, led to the preservation in the mass consciousness of the division into "we" and "they" with difficult to overcome. between them. In addition, among the Russian settlers in Kyrgyzstan, there were many peasants to whom the tsarist government distributed land actually taken away from the Kyrgyz. This naturally led to conflicts that acquired the sharpest forms during the 1916 uprising of the year. The scars inflicted on each other during this period have not disappeared so far and constantly make themselves felt, especially as the centenary of the uprising approaches. In Kyrgyzstan, as indeed, everywhere, modern politicians are trying to use the memories of the historical past in their present, momentary and, as a rule, unseemly goals.
In the Soviet years, it was not peasants who came to the republic any more, but specialists: teachers, doctors, engineers, highly skilled workers. As well as prisoners of the Gulag, exiles, special settlers and so on. Particularly rapidly, the Russian population of Kyrgyzstan grew in the 1960-s. During this period, it increased annually by a third. But already in the middle of 1970, a gradual return migration began - the return of Russians to the European part of the USSR. The reason for this was the glut of the labor market, in the first place, this related to elite positions.
Mass emigration in the nineties
Of course, after the collapse of the USSR, the Russians in Kyrgyzstan found themselves in a very difficult situation - with the emergence of independent Kyrgyzstan, the problem of identity arose, defining their attitude to the new “non-Russian” state and to the historical homeland - the Russian Federation. The Russians were forced to get used to the role and status of an ethnic minority and put up with the loss of the previous position of the conditional “elder brother”.
But, although the first truly powerful wave of Russian emigration from Kyrgyzstan caused tragic events in the cities of Uzgen and Osh in the summer of 1990, when, during the conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, up to 15 thousands of people, including many Russians, died in the first decade Independence inter-ethnic situation in the country was relatively stable. At least, there was no need to talk about any large-scale, purposeful threat to the normal life of the Russian community.
In 2000, the presidential decree "On additional measures to regulate migration processes in the Kyrgyz Republic" and the law "On the Russian language" were adopted, giving it the status of the second state. In general, against the background of a number of other countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, the situation of Russians in Kyrgyzstan, which was also considered the “island of democracy” among the local despotic regimes, could be considered more or less satisfactory. And, nevertheless, the mass exodus of Russians from Kyrgyzstan fell on this period - in terms of the scale of the outflow of the Russian-speaking population, the country came out on top among the former Soviet republics.
Experts believe that the main reason for the mass exodus of Russians from Kyrgyzstan in 90 is the economy — the collapse of industry, the growth of unemployment, and the general decline in living standards. Certainly, there was also an ethnic moment, expressed primarily in the “root-raising” of leading cadres and the general strengthening of interethnic competition in the labor market. The displacement of Russians from mixed groups began. By 1994, there were no Russian executives left at all at large. The Russians were, with rare exceptions, pushed aside from positions that allowed them to influence what was happening in society. The introduction of state language proficiency tests for civil servants markedly hampered access to the authorities for "non-title".
The growing migration of Kyrgyz from the countryside has changed the ethnic structure of the cities where most Russians lived and live. In general, there were natural processes that led to a clear predominance of representatives of the titular nation, not only in power structures, but also in the composition of the urban intellectual elite. Poor knowledge of the state language by the Russian population has greatly weakened its position in social and political life, reinforcing the already rather serious disunity of the Russian diaspora.
Finally, mass emigration was very dependent on the elementary instinct of self-preservation and the desire for a normal and stable life and work. We are talking about such powerful stimulants of the outcome, as the growth of crime, the general social and moral degradation of society, which intensively nourished the same everyday nationalism, and not only everyday. To this was added the growth of tension on the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan. After all, the “Batken war” with militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which went on during the summer months of 1999 and 2000 in southern Kyrgyzstan, became another push for the emigration of Russians. Russian fears associated with the threat of Islamic extremism intensified even more after 11 September 2001.
Strengthening the nationalist "trend"
Any revolution, of course, does not contribute to a normal and stable life and work. In Kyrgyzstan, the processes of political destabilization, the weakening of state institutions and the growth of regional clan conflicts took place in conditions of a deepening economic crisis and the actual impoverishment of the majority of the population. Against this background, Russian emigration from the country began to grow again. For the sake of justice, it should be said that the growth of migration outside the country was not a purely Russian phenomenon: it was around the same years that the mass departure of the Kirghiz to work in Russia began.
Nevertheless, the factors that contributed to the growth of emigration of the Russian and Russian-speaking population intensified. The ousting of the Russian language and Russian-speaking cadres from prestigious spheres of government and economics did not stop. At the same time, in all three versions of the draft new constitution of Kyrgyzstan, developed by the Azimbek Beknazarov commission, the Russian language was deprived of its official status. In Kyrgyz society, heated debates on this issue flared up, during which the preservation of the official status of the Russian language was supported by the majority.
However, as they say, the sediment remained. Moreover, the linguistic problem was not exhausted by a single constitutional status. We can also recall the decision to transfer from 1 in January of 2007 of the entire office work in the country to the Kyrgyz language, which the Russian diaspora was perceived extremely negatively. Then this decision was not implemented - even December 18 2006, President Bakiyev said that Kyrgyzstan was not ready to translate office work into the state language. And yet the nationalist “trend” with a strong xenophobic accent clearly gained strength in the country's political beau monde. For example, the scandalous speech of Deputy Beyshen Abdyrasakov, who replied to the Parliament in the Parliament of the Minister of Labor and Social Development Nazgul Tashbaeva for speaking in Russian, received a wide resonance at one time: he said that “over the years of independence, the monkey could be taught to speak in Kyrgyz language ".
It is characteristic that, even during the April events, “revolutionary activity” often acquired simply a pogrom character in relation to national minorities (Kurds, Turks, Uigurs, Dungans, and then Uzbeks and Russians). Almost immediately, high-ranking ideologues appeared, substantiating the new ideological “trend”. So, Emilbek Kaptagaev, who headed the administration of Roza Otunbayeva, president of the transitional period, just after a week of coming to power (April 16 2010 of the year), said: “Kyrgyzstan is not the state for Kyrgyz people who can’t live here.” The main directions in which ultranationalists intend to act energetically: 1) were quickly identified; legislatively securing the special status of the “titular nation”, in other words, the implementation of the same slogan “Kyrgyzstan for the Kyrgyz people”; 2) the widespread ousting of the Russian language and the total introduction of Kyrgyz. Political advisor to the President of Kyrgyzstan, Topchubek Turgunaliev, developed a draft “Law on the titular nation”, in which the titular was defined as “a nation that constitutes a state”.
Although the Kyrgyz political parties seem to be the bearers of the most diverse ideologies — from national-conservative and liberal to social democratic and communist — a number of their representatives found it necessary to equal the ideological trend that was gaining momentum. For example, the chairman of the socialist Ata-Meken party, Omurbek Tekebaev, said bluntly: "Everywhere there is an unspoken rule that to engage in politics is the lot of the titular nation." The leader of the party “Ata Zhurt” (“Fatherland”) Kamchibek Tashiyev repeatedly stated that only those representatives of national minorities who are ready to obey the Kirghiz and will serve them faithfully can live in Kyrgyzstan. Local leaders also echoed the capital's figures with varying degrees of obsession. Against this background, the bloody tragedy in the Osh region in the summer of 2010, no longer looked like a surprise.
The aggressiveness of the nationalist circles and relevant media has only increased. They consistently injected anti-Uzbek, anti-Russian and anti-Semitic sentiments. Initiatives in the spirit of statements by Kaptagayev, Turgunaliev and Tashiev were constantly launched in the parliament. Some initiatives have been implemented. For example, in February 2011, the protests of the Russian-speaking population caused the decision of the National Commission for the State Language to replace the Russian names of settlements with Kyrgyz.
Contradictory realities
Almazbek Atambayev, who was elected president of the republic in 2011, as it is known, proclaimed a policy of closer rapprochement with Russia within the framework of the Customs Union. Nevertheless, the policy of the new administration in the field of interethnic relations and, in particular, in the language area, caused rather contradictory feelings, including among the Russian community of Kyrgyzstan. It was impossible not to notice that Atambayev appointed Kaptagaev, not someone, but adviser on inter-ethnic relations (then presidential plenipotentiary in Issyk-Kul oblast).
In the 2012-2013 years at the state level, measures were taken to oust the Russian language from office work. In particular, in March 2013, President Atambayev signed amendments to the Law on Official Language, according to which the normative legal acts of representative local governments (kenesh), by their own decision, can be issued exclusively in the state language - provided that owning state language. In this regard, the Coordinating Council of the Russian Unity of Compatriots Union (ROSS) issued a statement in which the amendments, approved by the president, were characterized as “anti-constitutional” and “discriminatory”. Moreover, the ROSS statement stated that “the decision made by the president through 2-3 of the year can put a bullet on the existence of a Russian, not even an official, but a spoken language in Kyrgyzstan”.
At the same time, the president rejected the amendments proposed by the parliament to some legislative acts and to the Law on Language introducing fines for government officials for not knowing the Kyrgyz language. The President noted that the amendments exclude from the law “the obligation of the Kyrgyz Republic to create conditions for the study and development of the native language of ethnic groups”.
By 2030, only 194 of thousands of Russians will remain
With all the ambiguity of the assessments of the national policy of the current Kyrgyz authorities, all the experts have to unequivocally state an objective fact - the Russians from Kyrgyzstan still leave and will leave. Today, Kyrgyzstan is leaving, above all, graduates. Due to the intensive emigration, which affected, first of all, Russian citizens under the age of 45, an intensive process of aging is going on among the remaining Russian population.
Along with economic reasons, first of all, big problems with employment, Russians continue to be greatly disturbed by the language situation and, first of all, by the difficulties in obtaining quality education in their native language, despite the fact that Russian retains very good positions in Kyrgyzstan. According to the 2013 year, 52,6 percent of the country's population said that they speak Russian. Representatives of more than 80 ethnic groups living on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, in particular Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh, Ukrainians and Koreans in Bishkek, Kazakhs and Dungans in the Chui oblast, continue to use them in interethnic contacts.
At the same time, the majority of specialists note that the Kyrgyz authorities, persistently expanding the scope of the state language, nevertheless, still do not actually do anything so that the “non-title” population intensively masters the Kyrgyz language. Teaching Kyrgyz in classes with Russian language of instruction does not meet modern requirements, students who have studied it for ten years, do not speak it as a result.
In general, the full-fledged adaptation of the majority of the Russian population to new conditions during the years of independence did not work out, as a result, apathy and dissatisfaction with people with their position increased.
Among the many political parties in Kyrgyzstan, there is not one that clearly represents the interests of Russians or the Russian diaspora as a whole.
By the way, about labor migrants. The killing of Kyrgyz “migrant workers” by Russian Nazis in recent years, as well as the general increase in xenophobia in Russia, naturally cause a very painful reaction in Kyrgyzstan, which can not but affect the attitude towards local Russians. And this, in turn, is used by the Kyrgyz ultranationalists for every kind of whipping up passions, up to provoking ugly excesses. Of course, the psychological climate around the Russian community is also influenced by the quite heated discussions that have recently unfolded in Kyrgyzstan’s society around the feasibility of the country’s entry into the Customs and Eurasian unions and the resulting threats to national sovereignty.
Yes, and the statements of Russian politicians, not only characters like Zhirinovsky, but also those in power, calling for “protecting foreign compatriots” in the spirit of the concept of “rallying the Russian World”, do not improve this psychological climate, to put it mildly. Especially in light of the well-known actions of Russia in relation to Ukraine. Add to this the growth of Islamic extremism, which acquires a sinister shape against the background of an unstable political situation and a crisis state of the economy.
According to the forecast of the United Nations Population Fund, only about 2030 thousand Russians will remain in Kyrgyzstan by 194 in the year. As the leader of the Russian Union of Compatriots, Alexander Ivanov, notes, the forecasts of the UN Foundation are based on indicators that are characteristic only for the stable development of the country. But who guarantees that Kyrgyzstan has a stable future ahead?
Sources - Ferghana.ru, CentrAsia (PR elements and redundant statistics are omitted from the text when reprinting)
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