Factory War
“The storm of the twelfth year has come - who helped us here? Frenzy of the people, Barclay, winter il Russian God? ". So A. S. Pushkin determined the origins of the victory of the Russian state in the Patriotic War 1812 of the year. We could not find an equally brief “formula of victory” in World War 1941 – 1945 in Russian literature. The interpreter at the headquarters of the 3 Shock Army, E. Rzhevskaya, who, through her interrogations, sought after the interrogations from German soldiers and officers, showed the truthful characteristics of our Armed Forces, among the advantages, she received the same phrase: “T-34 Tank, endurance of soldiers, Zhukov.
"Thirty-four" has always been in the first place. And it's not just the magnificent tactical and technical characteristics of the Soviet medium tank. Almost all foreigners who had the misfortune to get to the Eastern Front as part of the forces of the Third Reich and its allies had to experience unforgettable impressions of communication with him. T-34 tanks were many. Lots of. Amid countless T-34s, the German soldiers no longer remembered the heavy Soviet KV and IS tanks that were magnificent for their time, the self-propelled guns SU-152, ISU-152 and ISU-122, and the constant satellites of the SU-76 self-propelled infantry and even more light tanks T-60 and T-70.
In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, starting from 1 in July, 1941 and through 1 in June, 1945, Soviet industry built 95 252 tank and SAU against 40 380 combat vehicles from the enemy. True, these figures are somewhat crafty and take into account only those classes of armored vehicles that were produced in our country. Meanwhile, the palette of armored vehicles in Germany was much wider than in the USSR, and also included all-wheel drive armored vehicles with cannon armament and semi-tracked armored personnel carriers. And this is even more 25 thousand units. By the way, the Soviet command took them seriously. The memo for tank destroyers published in 1943 indicated that the destroyed armored car corresponds to a light tank, the Order of the Patriotic War 1 degree was relied on for three pieces. The same award was given for two heavy or medium tanks. In other words, two “Tigers” were equal in combat value to three armored cars.
27 vs 150
But all the same, even taking into account armored cars and armored personnel carriers, the German industry lost the competition to the Soviet Tankprom. This is especially obvious if we compare the number of plants that oppose each other: 27 - from the Soviet side (as of the end of 1944, the beginning of 1945) and around 150 - with the German one.
“Domestic industry leaders, scientists and engineers have created a more efficient large-scale production of military equipment”
At one time, in Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War, the idea of confronting the USSR with not just Germany, but with the united forces of Western Europe, except for Great Britain, was a red thread. In 90's, for reasons of political correctness and future integration with the West, this idea was somehow forgotten, but did not lose its historical content.
The Third Reich began mass production of tanks later than the Soviet Union, but first-class enterprises were immediately involved in the matter. Krupp (Essen), Rheinmetall-Borsig (Berlin), Daimler-Benz AG (Berlin) and Henschel and Son AG (Kassel) were the first to master the serial production of tanks; a little later, the Krupp factory joined them "Gruzon-Werke" (Magdeburg). According to the British researcher J. Forti, these were the true flagships of the German industry, which had everything necessary for the independent production of most of the main tank units and assemblies. Later, several more plants were built which were engaged exclusively in armored vehicles: Alkett (Berlin), MIAG (Braunschweig). Especially for the assembly of "Panther" plant "Niedersaxen" was erected.
In addition, the German Empire connected enterprises of the associated countries to the tank industry. At first it was the Austrian company "Steyer-Daimler-Pooh", then the Czech "CKD" ("BMM" in the German designation) and "Skoda". At the Warsaw United Machine-Building Plants, the assembly of the Pz.Kpfw II tanks began shortly after the conquest of Poland. French tank manufacturing plants were used by the Germans mainly for the production of components, but there is information about the assembly of a certain number of French tanks - S-35, B-2, R-35 and H-35, possibly from the old stock of parts and mechanisms. The German administration didn’t disregard the Soviet enterprises that fell into its hands: tanks, engines, locomotives, cars were repaired at the Kharkov plant No. 183, and aircraft assemblies assembled.
German specialists perfectly understood the value and significance of the industrial “trophies” that they got. Let us quote the opinion of the tanker general F. Senger-und-Etterlin: "The French military industry was forced to work with all its might for arming Germany ... Without the industrial potential of France, Hitler could not continue the war for so long." Or another statement, by Colonel G. Ritgen: "... without the Czech military industry and the Czech tanks, we would not have four tank divisions, which would have made an attack on the Soviet Union impossible."
In total, the Germans attracted large industrial groups 34 to the production of armored vehicles. True, only German, Austrian and Czech enterprises worked at full capacity, and the rest suffered equally from sabotage by local staff and from the greed of the Germans themselves, who were exporting the most valuable equipment. Nevertheless, the potential of tank building of the Third Reich was very impressive.
This is especially evident against the background of the Soviet industry. During 1941, the USSR was forced to evacuate almost all pre-war tank-building enterprises due to defeats at the front, only the Stalingrad tractor remained in place. But in the summer too, 1942 was under attack and was almost completely destroyed. Everything had to be re-created in the Urals, in the Volga region and Siberia.
As a result, at the turn of 1944 – 1945, the following tank assembly plants operated as part of NKTP:
-Chelyabinsk Kirovsky Plant (tanks EC-2, SAU ISU-152, ISU-122);
-Ural tank factory number 183, Nizhny Tagil (tanks T-34-85);
-Ural heavy engineering plant, Sverdlovsk (SAU SU-100);
-factory № 112, Bitter (tanks T-34-85);
-factory № 174, Omsk (T-34-85 tanks);
-factory number 75, Kharkov (tanks T-44).
In addition, two factories (No. 38 and No. 40) plus Gorky Automobile, which was not part of the NKTP, produced light SU-76, and also 18 enterprises - various tank units, components and spare parts for repair shops. And all this against 150 German and German-controlled other European factories.
Or maybe they lacked something?
Of course, restrictions in materials, equipment, personnel and attention from the authorities are able to tie the hands of the most powerful industry.
Let's start with the most obvious: state order for armored vehicles. The German leadership, who had fallen into the euphoria of continuous victories at the beginning of World War II, started too late to mobilize industry. The first major defeat near Moscow was considered an annoying misunderstanding, especially since in the summer of 1942, the timpani sounded again over the grand offensive to the Volga and the Caucasus. And only the Battle of Stalingrad forced to think seriously about the prospects. In January, 1943-th Hitler issued an order on a sharp increase in the production of tanks.
Nevertheless, tank building had previously been the focus of the Reich. Already at the beginning of 1942, Albert Speer, who had just been appointed Minister of Arms, set his first task: "... to focus on the production of tanks." And by the way, not without success. Production of tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers and cannon armored vehicles increased in the Third Reich compared to 1941 in 1942 in the year - by 75 percent, in 1943-m - in 3,9 times, in 1944-m - in 5,6 times. In absolute numbers, in 1944, the German production of armored vehicles was almost equal to the Soviet - 28 862 and 28 983 units, respectively.
Equal to, but not surpassed. Maybe this happened due to the lack of material and human resources?
Of course, in a country that has unleashed a world war, there is no complete well-being, especially since Germany is not the richest state in mineral resources. But this does not mean that the tank industry could not fully work due to the lack of metals. Recall only the most common figures: steel production in Germany and the countries under control in 1940 – 1944 amounted to 162,6 million tons, and in the USSR - 63,7 million. Own iron ore together with supplies from Sweden and other countries turned out to be quite enough for full-fledged work of German metallurgy.
The situation with doping substances was somewhat worse, but deliveries of overt and covert allies, as well as trophies that had been acquired during the blitzkrieg, helped. For example, the mines of Finland saturated the German armor with nickel. Krupp managers controlled Balkan chrome mines and French tungsten deposits. Manganese and chrome ores of occupied Ukraine, together with its metallurgical plants, were under the tutelage of the German Eastern Mining and Metallurgical Company, whose administrative council was headed personally by Alfried Krupp. He perfectly mastered the technology of industrial robbery: only in the first 13 months of occupation, 438 thousand tons of manganese ore were exported to Germany, which covered more than 30 percent of needs.
So we can only talk about replacing some materials with more affordable ones. Sometimes this was accompanied by a loss in quality (for example, armor steel), but by no means a reduction in volumes. According to Speer’s calculations, even with the maximum output of the military products of the most metal-deficient metal in Germany, the chrome would suffice until the autumn of the 1945. Stocks of manganese and nickel allowed to work even longer.
Regarding the German machine park: it was still 1941 times better than the Soviet one in 2,5, which did not prevent the Germans from taking any attracted car from the captured countries. In the occupied part of the USSR, they found and sent to their 175 thousands of machines of various types and purposes.
A special Anglo-American commission that examined German tank-building enterprises spoke only to superlatives about the quality of the German equipment itself, and success in creating special high-performance machines was especially noted. Volumes of production of new equipment in Germany during the years of the Second World War not only did not decrease, but even doubled.
The USSR, on the contrary, to recreate the tank industry after the loss of 1941, sacrificed most of its already not too powerful machine-tool industry, whose enterprises became part of the machining divisions in the tank factories. Of course, the best equipment was assembled here, but there was definitely not enough special and high-precision equipment. According to the summer of 1943, all enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the tank industry had only 29 coordinate boring machines.
What this led to is illustrated in a fragment from the memoirs of the plant director No. 183, Yu. E. Maksarev: “In the requirements of the GABTU there was a point to switch to the 5-speed gearbox and this requirement was correct. But we were connected by a special boring machine, which immediately gave coaxial, precise holes for the side bearings and the main shaft, and also ensured the perpendicularity of the bore for the drive shaft bearing from the main clutch. This machine was obtained for the BT-5 variable transmission box and was the Procrustean bed that determined all subsequent BT-7, А-20, А-32 and Т-34 speed boxes. The designers of Comrade Baran Yakov Ionovich and Comrade Speichler worked on the design of the 5-high-speed gearbox to keep the dimensions between the shafts and thus save the machine and the accuracy of the boring. ”
Of course, a certain amount of equipment was supplied by the American and British allies, for which many thanks to them. However, let's not forget that many months passed between asking for help and delivering from overseas. The American machine tool industry was overloaded with internal orders and the transportation took a considerable time.
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Maybe German tank factories suffered from a shortage of manpower, especially skilled labor? And here the answer is no.
There is no doubt in the skills and skills of the German machine builders 40-ies, and in terms of numbers on the eve of World War II, they were one and a half times as great as their Soviet counterparts. The mobilization almost did not affect the workers of the German military industry: in the winter of 1940 – 1941, the main factories and factories received the status of special enterprises, completely exempted from conscription. At the beginning of 1942, a more individual approach was introduced: the entire working-age population was divided into specialists, auxiliary workers, apprentices, re-trainees and unskilled workers. Young and inexperienced were sent to the front, and skilled older workers, on the contrary, returned from the army to the factories and received a “reservation”. In addition, professional differentiation was introduced: the rate of calling miners working underground was five percent, while hairdressers and cooks made 65 percent. The mobilization of all other working professions was between these boundaries. The labor of prisoners of war and forcibly mobilized "contingents" from conquered countries was widely used to carry out heavy unskilled work. In 1944, their number reached seven million people, at tank-building plants they accounted for up to 50 percent of the total workforce. As for the most qualified German engineers and workers, by the beginning of 1945 in industry and transport about five million men of military age continued to work. Major General A. Weidemann later wrote: “The high command willingly yielded to the demands of the military economy, despite all the difficulties with reserves, because even a simple front-line soldier with his limited outlook understood that the military industry ultimately served his own vital interests.”
Everything said in conjunction with the redistribution of labor between industries led to an increase in the number of German tank factories in 2,7 times in the period from 1940 to 1944 a year.
In the USSR, the situation was almost the opposite. The number of industrial workers in the industry decreased from 11 million in 1940 to 7,2 million in 1942. Recall that in the occupied territory lived 40 percent of the population. Despite all the mobilization efforts and the most severe control over labor resources, even in 1945, before the prewar level, there was not enough 1,5 million factory workers.
An excellent illustration is story of the Kharkov Tank Plant No. 183 team: in the very first months of the war, the number of employees fell from 41 to 24 thousands. The main part of the workers and craftsmen of responsible foundry and machine-assembly workshops lived in the vicinity of Kharkov and was mobilized into the army at the place of residence. A group of factory testers had to be sent to the army for training tankers. A considerable number of workers and engineers volunteered for a tank brigade staffed with super-planned tanks. And finally, many workers refused to go to the Urals: having received travel documents, they did not come to the trains. As a result, from 12 140 people to be evacuated, only 5234, mainly engineers and servants, actually went to Nizhny Tagil.
Amazingly, in the fall of 1941, in the fall of Nizhny Tagil, the mindless mobilization into the army continued with the difficulty of the exported specialists. The local military enlistment office, having exhausted the human resources of Uralvagonzavod, set about evacuees. The ugliness was stopped only after the intervention of the deputy chairman of the USSR SNK, the People's Commissar of the tank industry V. A. Malyshev.
The shortage of labor had to be compensated by evacuated workers from other industries (for example, the same machine-tool factories), and then by "labor soldiers" mobilized by way of labor service. N. Sobol (in 1941 – 1943 - head of one of the UTZ shops) gave an exhaustive description of the latter: “Field farmers, beekeepers, grooms, weighers, watchmen, accountants, accountants, they had no idea about a large engineering plant and its production. "
But even so, the average number of employees of the plant number 183 could not be brought to the pre-war indicators. In December 1942 of the year, it was only 32 520 people and in subsequent years it only shrunk.
Allies prevented?
You can recall another problem of German tank building - the attacks of the Anglo-American strategic aviation. Undoubtedly, the rain of high-explosive and incendiary bombs did not contribute to the productive work of the tank factories. However, the impact of the bombing is also not worth overestimating.
The first raid on the enterprises of the Krupp company was made in January 1943 of the year, 26 in November was seriously damaged by one of the large tank factories of the company Alkett. Then, during the entire 1944, the Allies continuously increased the power of airstrikes.
The Americans themselves estimated the Reich's loss of production capacity at nine percent. In fact - hardly. Speer claims that the damage has more than compensated for the commissioning of the new workshops and the re-equipment of the existing ones. After the war, V. Schlicker, the third most important person in the German Ministry of Armaments, told the amazed US air force experts: “As much as the bombing intensified, so did German production, so at the very moment of defeat, when everything collapsed in Germany, The Ruhr was producing more than ever before. ” And he continued his explanation like this: “The Ruhr ... ultimately fell, not because factories, mines and mines bombed, but because the railways leading to it were paralyzed as a result of the destruction of the railways and clogged with burnt locomotives There was no way to export thousands of tons of finished products, which the Ruhr factories provided daily, to 30. In the end, in January and February 1945, the Ruhr was strangled by its own products - it did not stop the conveyor due to the roar of bombs. ”
It only remains to add that the paralysis of transport occurred after not only thousands of heavy strategic aviation bombers, but also tens of thousands of light bombers, attack aircraft and fighters hung over Germany. In other words, the German industry stopped after it hit the frontline zone.
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As a result, we inevitably come to the only conclusion: the system of the USSR People's Commissariat of the tank industry demonstrated during the years of the Great Patriotic War a higher level of technology and organization of production than Germany’s considered unsurpassed engineering industry. Domestic industry leaders, scientists and engineers made better use of the scarce material and human resources at their disposal and created a more efficient high-volume production of military equipment.
This “war of tank factories” is still little known to the general public, and its lessons have not lost their value over time. Therefore, the cycle of articles, which will be published on the pages of the "MIC" until May 2015, can be given the general name "NKTP: Lessons of the Great Victory".
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