Mathias Rust: forever alive
Versions of the infamous flight of the German amateur pilot continue to multiply
It would seem that all the facts on this event a quarter of a century ago are known to the widest public. But it was not there. Each anniversary of the flight of Mathias Rust causes a surge of new, often absurd essays. Let us examine at least one of them. In particular, not so long ago, quite by chance, I came across a text of the following character. I will give it in full. Blog Konstantin Dobrynin.
Colonel Who Did Not Knock Rust
He was a little over fifty. The whiskers that hide a smile and lively eyes complemented the rapid movements and broad steps. He could not be called thin at the age of fifteen. Outwardly, he looked like a kind Winnie the Pooh from our cartoon. And he was a rocket pilot and a retired Soviet colonel. And I saw live the legendary violator of the Soviet border Rust. First on the radar, then on the TV.
His voice sounded a little chant. And he smiled well and a lot. Enough time has passed, and I no longer remember why, and who first spoke the German last name Rust.
“It was like that,” he began intriguingly and set aside a can of stew, which he skillfully opened.
- When the German crossed the border, it was immediately fixed. Almost on approach. Our fighter was sent to him, they say, welcome to the USSR, dear comrade. The fighter looked. The plane flies and flies. Well, let him fly, passed on. The airplane is light, the speed with a fighter is different. And here Rust entered the area of responsibility of the 54 Air Defense Corps, - he rubbed his hands and paused.
- Estonia flew by, it means. The transfer of the goal of the RIC division to the RIC of the 54 corps begins. Everyone thinks whether or not to send a target for escort. Thought 14 minutes! A lot, - he poured one by one, put the stew on the bread, we clinked glasses and drank.
“They gave me a goal,” he bit off a home-made stew sandwich, chewed and continued, “under their responsibility, they say, take them.” Those looked and said: not detected, - he raised his index finger up and paused.
- You see, late for 14 minutes. Another 54 body is looking for a target. No goal. Well, everything, everyone calmed down, they say, you never know what was there, maybe an agricultural target or an athlete, but now there is no one. In general, it did not go farther, neither in the Moscow District, anywhere, - he poured one more.
- And the airplane flies further. Moscow air defense district no one in combat readiness, but because no one else is looking for him. So my duty that day and ended.
I am in 7 hours of the evening 28 May come home and turn on the TV. Not color yet. “Rainbow”, in my opinion, is old. There, the sound and the picture didn’t coincide either, it was necessary to buy a special prefix, but I also watch and see without sound: Finnish television shows that a plane is landing on Red Square. I tell my wife, in, the fuck-a-fly, what film they made, - he poured one more.
- Bam, sound. Special communication boomed. Willingness. Major General Kromin calls. Everyone at the command post to arrive immediately. I come. All run nervous, pale, coddled, in one word.
And the team: comrades, everything that you have on tape recorders, you understand?
Immediately, - he was silent for a moment.
- We learn, on the Red Square villages Rust. Finita la comedy!
Well, the next day, prosecutors eagles landed in our unit. Questions started asking questions like: what commands did you receive, what did you see? The answer is: I saw this and that. The plane did not enter the zone of fire and the zone of destruction. What are my actions? In the affected area did not enter, what action - no. Prosecutors began to groan and continue, so, they say, and the 7-th division, why did not you open fire? And everything is so nervous, on the raised ones, - he still smiled, but his eyes no longer laughed.
- In accordance with the order on the conduct of combat duty to open fire should combat ships - violators of the state border. It was not a combat ship, - he rubbed the back of his head and lay back, - in short, we had a happy life that month. For the rest I remembered, - he turned on the kettle and generously poured tea cups out of the jar.
- Then, when there was already an analysis of the situation, everything became more or less clear. You see, the bottom edge of the detection zone was such and such. He walked below. This bastard flew not just competently, he knew how to bypass each particular company. He was clearly explained, and all the information he had, they say, this company stands on the regulations - it is necessary to fly here. And in a neighboring company, the lower detection edge zone is much higher; it will not do anything. See nothing. The route he famously worked. Result: the Minister of Defense was removed, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces was removed, the division commander Colonel Skorokhod was removed, the commander of the 6 Army was removed. All naughty and having an opinion in the army. The rest were exiled to the 10 Army. So, Eduardych, it all happened, - he smiled and poured tea into the mugs.
- Why did Alexander Anatolyevich leave the army? - I asked in the forehead.
He stopped smiling, sighed and said:
- You know, in the army there are three types of colonels: comrade colonel, colonel and hey, colonel. I served in the first.
And now let's analyze the written text on sentences and words.
"He was a little over fifty."
So in May 1987, this colonel was 24 of the year. Who then could he be by the position? What was your rank? Where did you serve? The narrator about this is somehow modestly silent. But even from the performance of this “colonel” one can easily calculate that his title in May 1987 is the senior lieutenant. And he served, it seems, on the RIC KP 6-th OA defense. Why? Yes, simply because he has only one abbreviation of this - RIC without errors, correctly spells. And he tries to talk about the actions of the entire army (and even the Air Defense Forces) as a whole, despite the fact that some mythical 7 division (in which the brigade / regiment, division / corps is unknown) slips in one place).
What could the senior lieutenant understand then? And what could he see? This is not a quality, God forbid, insults, but the senior lieutenant in the army’s command post is a man by the name of NIKTO and call him NO place. Here is a chef from the dining room at the army army would get out and write his memoirs: "I, soup and porridge and Matias Rust." According to the value of the works, this would be equivalent.
Or a line like this: “He was also a rocket man and a retired Soviet colonel. And I saw live the legendary violator of the Soviet border Rust. First on the radar, then on the TV. ”
Let's get to the bottom. If he served on the RIC 6-th Air Defense OA, then it was no longer a missile, but a native of the RTV - radio engineering troops.
“I saw live the legendary violator of the Soviet border, Rust. First on the radar, then on the TV. ”
Live is live. Not on the radar, and certainly not on TV. In the latter case, the whole country saw Rust live. And “on the radar” this legendary colonel could not see Rust. Firstly, the expression “on the radar” itself is illiterate. But theoretically, this colonel could see the mark from the plane of Mathias Rust on the screen of the radar indicator of the circular review. But this is only theoretically, since there are no screens with primary radar information on the Army Army Communist Party (there is such a thing, by the way). So he saw nothing.
In general, it does not make sense to analyze this verbal blizzard in detail. I’ll dwell only on one moment: “This little bastard flew not only competently, he knew how to bypass each particular company. He was clearly explained, and all the information he had, they say, this company is on the rules - it is necessary to fly here. ”
Complete nonsense. Mathias Rust did not “get around” anything - he flew along the shortest route. About the existence of the radar mouth was unaware. And these words did not know.
Or such words - "lower edge of the detection zone." Here it is, a classic combination of honey, bees and sand. The "lower edge" is a characteristic of cloudiness. And the detection zone has a lower limit. A trifle, and even she shows - a character invented.
Well, to all this verbal rubbish appropriate surroundings.
Pepper is clear, if the "colonel", then only a stew as a snack (currently, even homeless dogs do not eat it because there are no hints of meat in it), bread, and tea leaves in mugs. For pseudo-conviction, everything is far-fetched - do not indulge in the most.
It would be necessary to kindle a fire, spread the raincoat, put the sooty pot to the foreground, the PPSh machine on the nail on the wall, and the sleeve-stalingradka as lighting. Well, to the end to the end of all the environment consistent with the image of a seasoned colonel.
It is ridiculous to read all these stories. They can be called only this way: “I heard something somewhere, saw something out of the corner of my eye, but confused the right angle with the boiling point of water and turned everything upside down.”
And one must still correctly tell the army jokes that this legendary colonel has not mastered so far.
Quote from the text:
“Why did Alexander Anatolievich leave the army? - I asked in the forehead.
... He stopped smiling, sighed and said:
- You know, in the army there are three types of colonels: comrade colonel, colonel and hey, colonel. I served in the first.
And then fails, however. The topic has not been disclosed.
"Colonel Comrade" - is a colonel with an official car and office. As a rule, this is the commander of the unit (regiment or brigade). Or the head of the department (of some large structural subdivision, for example, the head of the department of the organizational-mobilization department of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces — both a service car and an office).
"Colonel" is a colonel with a cabinet, but without a company car.
“Hey, Colonel” is a colonel without a cabinet or a car.
In these words, in fact, nothing offensive is not.
In the organs of the Central Staff of the Armed Forces, there are indeed rooms with five or six colonels in each. But the "Colonel" story-teller, it seems, still belonged to the category "Hey, Colonel." If he was the commander of a regiment or brigade, then surely about it somehow, yes mentioned. And in this case there was no need for him to “leave the army” (I personally don’t know cases when regimental / brigade commanders “left”). Yes, and damn if such a pro Rust "colonel" tale never flogged. Already schoolchildren know how everything was in reality, and this one invents some additional versions.
And how could he personally bring down Rust, being a senior lieutenant at the RIC KP army? Cap? Sword belt? Empty holster? Underpants tied in a knot? Either the fighter-interceptor pilot or the commander of the anti-aircraft missile division can destroy the intruder.
And here is how it really was.
Information for consideration № 1
This document was drafted almost immediately after the violation of the state border of 28 in May of 1987. Dry lines of brief reports can sometimes tell more than the most emotional story. It should be noted that the attitude to the calculation of the command post of the 14 Air Defense Division (Tallinn City) is more than harsh. And the guilt of these people is not so great, in my deep personal conviction. Now directly text.
"In 14.29 28.5.87, the duty radar of the P-15 922 separate radar company (Loksa) of the 4 radio engineering brigade (Tallinn) of the 14 air defense division (Tallinn) discovered an air target at the height of 600 m in the territorial waters of the USSR, running a Kursk on the coastline. The target followed the international route in the direction of corridor No. 1, information about the target was issued to the command post of the radio engineering battalion (Tapa), 4 th rtbr and RIC (intelligence information center) 14 th air defense division. In fact, information about the target was displayed on the AWS screens of the on-duty abbreviated combat crew of the command post 14 of the air defense system with the 14.31.
The operative duty officer of the command post rtbr, Major Krinitsky Ya. I., did not declare the target a violator of the state border of the USSR and continued refining the characteristics and belonging until it left the brigade’s radar zones of visibility.
The deputy commander of the command post of the 14 air defense division on the RIC, Major Chernykh, acted irresponsibly. Having a real situation and knowing that the target is coming from the Gulf of Finland to the coastline, he identified it and assigned it a number only from 14.37.
The operational duty officer of the KP of the division, Lieutenant Colonel I. Karpets, did not require clear reports, clarification of the type and nature of the target, thereby violating the requirements for issuing an alert target immediately, and a report on the superior command post, and making a decision to raise the crew on duty to identify the target.
At the command post of the 6-th separate air defense army at his command, the target was issued only at 14.45. Thus, due to the fault of the command post of the 14 th division of the air defense, 16 was lost minutes of time, and most importantly, the sharpness of the perception of the air situation of the command post of the army disappeared, based on the fact that the goal was coming from the Gulf of Finland and entered the USSR borders.
Moreover, OD KP 656 th Fighter Aviation Regiment (Tapa), Lieutenant A. Filatov, having information about the target with 14.31, alerted fighter jets to 14.33 on 1, but repeatedly asked permission to lift the fighters, but Lieutenant Colonel I. Karpets I. V. lifting them allowed only in 14.47.
Such inexplicable, except for the complete irresponsibility bordering on the crime, the actions of the operational duty officer of the command post of the division led to the fact that time was lost, the goal was actually already passing through the zone of a continuous duty radar field at low altitudes and the affected area of duty personnel.
The commander of the 14.53 Air Defense Division, who arrived at the command post in 14, was reported that the fighter was raised to clarify the type of target in the area of corridor No. 1 of the Helsinki-Moscow route. The fact that the target was discovered over the Gulf of Finland, near the state border, in 14.29, was not reported to the division commander. OD KP 6 th OA air defense Colonel Voronkov, having received information about the target, in 14.46 alerted the 1 No. of the duty forces of the 54 th To the air defense and allowed the 656 th fighter jet to be lifted into the air.
In 14.51, the army commander arrived at the command post of the 6 OA air defense unit, who later supervised the operations of the duty personnel. The in-flight crew of the MiG-23 (Senior Lieutenant Puchnin) on 14.51 was taken to the zone in which it was located before 15.00, because the shift supervisor of the EC EC ATC (regional center of the unified air traffic control system) of the Leningrad zone Colonel Timoshin gave permission to enter fighters in the area of responsibility of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District only in 15.00 at an altitude of 2100 m (permission from the gearbox 14-d air defense was requested in 14.48 and only in 15.23 already under control from the MOU (point of guidance) 54-k To air defense (Kerstovo) the pilot to the goal for its recognition.
Targeting to the target area was initially carried out at an altitude of 2000 m, while the goal followed at an altitude of 600 m. In fact, the fighter marched in 10-point cloudiness (the lower edge was 500 – 600 m, the upper one was 2500 – 2900 m). Not finding the target during the first approach, when re-pointing at 15.28 at 600 m height, the pilot visually below himself on 30 – 50 m detected the target and transmitted its characteristics to the TL (point of guidance): “Light-engine white aircraft of the Yak-12 type”.
No specific task, except identification, was given to the pilot, despite the presence on the flight route of a sufficient number of airfields suitable for landing the fighter, for the remaining fuel he was returned to the aerodrome of departure for Thapa.
Further actions of the CP (command posts) of the 6-th Air Defense OA and 54-K Air Defense Forces were illiterate. The type of target was reported at the command post of the 6-th Air Defense Air Defense OA, but no decision of the Control Committee on that report was made. Permission was given to divert the fighter from the target, although the balance of the fuel provided another approach to more fully identify the target, and most importantly, to determine its state ownership. The “Carpet” signal has not been announced.
In 15.31, a second fighter was raised from Tapa airfield. The previous guidance procedure was repeated. Only in 15.40 from the center of the EU ATC was permission to enter the fighter into the area of responsibility of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District. At 15.58, at a height of 1500, the pilot was placed in the target area. The airborne sight was not turned on, the pilot did not detect the target visually.
The lack of clear interaction with the EU center of air traffic control, illiterate actions of the command of the 6-th OA air defense system on targeting fighters, the inability to clearly and competently set the task for the crews, and also the EU center for air traffic control to release the airspace to perform the combat mission by fighters led to an unjustified loss of time and account to the failure of the combat mission.
The army’s radio engineering troops did not fulfill their task of sustaining the target, although there were enough forces and means, and their capabilities ensured its wiring.
Further ascent of the fighters in 15.54 and 16.25 from the airfield of Lodeynoye Pole were carried out on a false goal - meteorological formations and were useless, since the target at that time was in a different area.
In 16.30, the commander of the 6-nd Air Defense OA personally informed the OD of the Defense Directorate of the Defense Ministry (operational duty command post of the Moscow district air defense) about the situation. According to this information, the 16.32 Radar Battalion Radar Station (Staraya Russa) was turned on in 2266, the crews on duty at Andreapol and Khotilovo airfields were transferred to readiness number 1.
The rise of two fighters of the Defense Ministry of Defense (Moscow District Air Defense) did not lead to the detection of the target, since their withdrawal was carried out in the area of a false target, presumably meteorological formation.
In 16.16, the intruder was detected by the on-call radar of the 1074 separate radar company (Yamnik) of the 3 radio engineering brigade (Rzhev) of the 2 air defense corps (Rzhev) and the data on it were issued to the radio engineering battalion before 16.47.
Directly on the gearbox of the 2-K to the air defense system on the Proton-2 equipment there were wiring data of the intruder from 16.18 to 16.28, however, due to the low preparedness of the calculations, this information was not used.
In the period from 17.36 to 17.45, Lieutenant-General Brazhnikov Yu.T., Deputy Commander of the Air Defense Forces, who was on the command post, set the task to alert the 1’s alert forces to the air defense missiles 2-13 and to search for the target of the ROC ZRK C-200. The intruder was not detected, since by this time the border of responsibility of 2-2 to air defense had passed. The tasks of 1-th A of the air defense of the United Nations (special-purpose air defense army) were not set. ”
Soviet air defense forces in the second half of the 70s developed so rapidly that in the expert community, the US and NATO recognized their superiority over similar systems in other countries of the world. Even the individual failures of parts and formations of the air defense of the USSR in local conflicts could not shake the very high reputation of the Soviet air defense system as a whole.
On the eve of the flight of Rust
During these years, the re-equipping of the Air Defense Forces with the latest weapons and military equipment was completed. Advanced anti-aircraft missile systems, troop control systems and weaponsradar devices aviation interception systems and communications equipment. The next generation of weapons and military defense equipment was put into development and tested.
The country's air defense system during this period began to acquire qualitatively new features. In addition to the basic functions of destroying the forces of a massive rocket-air attack, the air defense of the USSR had new ones. She had to become an element of real deterrence of potential aggressors from air attacks. In essence, it was a single automated organizational and technical complex, which was in constant combat readiness and continuously improved. The main attention was paid to border units, air defense units and units. They have traditionally been highly strained, and there was a special demand for omissions in the military service from them.
The air borders of the USSR during the Cold War were constantly subjected to strength tests. In the middle of 70, violations of the state border by light-engined airplanes (such as Cessna, Beechcraft, Piper, and others) from Finland were a real scourge of the Soviet air defense system in the North-West region. As a rule, the reason for this was the loss of orientation by amateur pilots. However, it was not the case with light airplanes alone. April 20 On the Kola Peninsula, the state border was crossed by a passenger plane Woing-1978 of the South Korean airline KAL. After unsuccessful attempts to force the plane to land, the commander of the 707 Army of Air Defense decided to use a weapon. The Su-10 air defense fighter opened fire and damaged the left wing of the liner. He made an emergency landing on the ice of the lake Kolpijärvi near the city of Kem. The explosion of rockets and landing on the ice killed two passengers and several people were injured. The actions of the Air Defense Command were subsequently recognized as correct. All interception participants are presented to state awards.
In the middle of 70, an influential group of senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense planned another air defense reform of the USSR. The reformers' plans envisaged the transfer of the larger, best, and most combat-ready part of the Air Defense Forces to the composition of the border military districts. Such organizational measures inevitably led to the actual destruction of the established system of command and control of the Air Defense Forces, their way of life and activity, and the reduction in the combat capability of the country's air defense system as a whole.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Pavel Fedorovich Batitsky most strongly opposed innovations. He repeatedly declared his position to the USSR Minister of Defense, reported at meetings of the Defense Ministry’s collegium, prepared a memo to the CPSU Central Committee. However, his arguments were not taken into account by the highest party and state leaders of the time. For a long time, persistently, Batitsky was looking for an opportunity to report his ideas personally to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. However, the Secretary General, who was seriously ill at that time, did not honor the Marshal of the audience.
As a result, in the summer of 1978, it was decided to transfer a significant part of the country's Air Defense Forces to a number of military districts. Essentially, full-blooded air defense corps and divisions were given to administrative and economic structures, which in practice were military districts (and are currently). The transfer took place in an unjustified hectic. At the same time, the staffs of the border air defense armies with their infrastructure were staffed up with experienced personnel. Such reforms quickly destroyed the complex system of governance that had been created over the decades. The professional level of command and control of troops and the overall combat effectiveness of units and formations have sharply decreased. Without real opportunities to resist the decisions already made, Marshal Batitsky submitted a report on his release from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country. This request hastily granted July 28 1978 of the year.
As a result, the single streamlined organizational and technical complex of the country's air defense system ceased to exist and was divided into separate fragments and groupings. During the reform of 1978, a significant number of generals and senior operational officers were transferred to the reserve. This naturally had a negative effect on the quality and professionalism of troop command and control. Looking ahead, it should be noted that only a few years later it was decided to return everything to its original state, but it was too late. It is simply impossible to measure the damage caused by the rash actions of the military-political leadership of the country of that period.
And the tension in the protection of the state border did not subside. In particular, at the beginning of the 80-x in the Far East, the air defense troops escorted more than three thousand air objects annually on the PLC screens near the borders. The tragic climax of this call was the penetration of 1 of September 1983 of the year into the airspace of the USSR by the South Korean airliner Boeing-747, which ended with the death of many people. After that, the Soviet Union was declared an "evil empire."
At an extraordinary session of ICAO, an addendum was adopted to the third article of the Chicago Convention 1944 of the Year “On International Civil Aviation”, which prohibited knocking down civilian aircraft, regardless of the territory of which state they turned out to be.
However, even after the tragic 1 incident of September 1983, tensions at the borders of the USSR did not subside. The intrusion into the airspace of the country of the violators has become almost a mass one. During the 1984 – 1987 period, dozens of violations of the state border were recorded by light aircraft, gliders, balloons, and other aircraft. And all this against the background of an unabated number of planned reconnaissance flights along our borders.
After the events of 1 September 1983, the leaders of the state made a political decision to limit the use of weapons by the Air Defense Forces. By order of the Minister of Defense it was forbidden to open fire on passenger, transport and light-engine aircraft. At the same time, it was prescribed by all means and forces to force them to land. This document did not simplify the situation, but rather complicated it.
The commanders of air defense units and formations became hostages of the decisions of a political nature. After all, the procedure of coercion to land the violator of the state border is not clearly defined until today. If we analyze the violation of the state border of 28 in May of 1987 without taking into account these circumstances, then an objective analysis of the situation and the actions of the USSR Air Defense Forces on duty will hardly be possible.
Rust crosses the state border
On the morning of May 28 at Malmo Airport, near Helsinki, Matias Rust prepared his Cessna-1987R monoplane, which had flown in from Hamburg the day before, for departure. In flight documents, the end point of the route was listed as Stockholm.
At 13.10, after receiving permission, Rust took off and headed along the planned route. After 20, the flight minutes reported to the dispatcher that he was in good order on board, and traditionally said goodbye. After that, turning off the on-board radio station, he turned the plane abruptly toward the Gulf of Finland and began to descend to the height of 80 – 100 meters. This planned maneuver was supposed to provide a reliable exit of the aircraft from the surveillance zone of the control radar and hide the true route of flight. At this altitude, Mathias headed to the settlement point of the Gulf of Finland near the Helsinki-Moscow air route. Having deployed the aircraft in the direction of the first landmark on the coast of the Soviet Union (shale plant of the city of Kohtla-Järve with its smoke, which can be seen for a hundred kilometers) and comparing the readings of the radio compass with the calculated, Rust went to the "combat course". The weather on this leg of the flight was favorable: overcast - layered cumulus, 4 – 5 points, wind - northwest, 5 – 10 meters per second, visibility - at least 15 – 20 kilometers. So began the first phase of the flight of the violator of the state border.
In 14.10, a radar company on duty (radar P-15) near the Estonian village of Loks was detected on the territorial waters of the Soviet Union by an unidentified light-engine aircraft, which was approaching the coastline. According to the instructions, the air object was assigned the next number and the sign of “flight mode violator”, since at that time there were no applications for flights of small aircraft in this area. The course of the aircraft almost coincided with the direction of the busy Helsinki-Moscow air route, where several aircraft were in the upper echelons of the airspace.
The calculation of the command post of the 14 Division of the Air Defense Forces has begun to refine and analyze the air situation. It was decided: until the full clarification of the situation, the information “to the top” is not issued. Over the territory of Estonia at that moment were at least 10 light aircraft of various departmental affiliation. None of them was equipped with a state identification system. At the command posts of the units and the duty units of the 14 Division, gain changes were called.
Already at this stage, the consequences of dismembering the unified command and control system of the Air Defense Forces of the country began to appear. Previously, a prerequisite for the functioning of the air defense system was the presence of direct and reliable channels of communication with civilian air traffic controllers. Information on targets for higher command posts was issued almost from the first notch. Now, instead of direct communication channels, there was a network of switches, which literally “ate” precious time. The “holy principle of frontier” was also violated - the immediate release of information on the target before the situation was clarified.
This is evidence that during the five years of the 14 air defense division (KP - Tallinn city) as part of the Baltic military district, the necessary knowledge and skills of calculating in extreme conditions, which were practiced for years of continuous study and training, were lost. And at the moment (28 of May of 1987), the level of preparation of the calculations did not match the conditions of the current air situation. This sad fact later gave rise to a chain reaction of serious mistakes at other levels of management.
For 19 minutes, the calculation was unsuccessfully trying to figure out the prevailing air situation, and in the meantime Rust’s plane was approaching Lake Peipsi. In 14.27, the commander of the 656 Fighter Aviation Regiment (Tapa City), assessing the situation, with his decision he lifted into the air a pair of MiG-23 fighter jets with the task of one of them to block the border, another to visually identify the violator of the flight mode. And here it took time to coordinate with the air traffic controllers fighter admission to the search area, since the actions of the air defense forces on duty were carried out in the area of the airway.
In 14.28, it finally turns out that there are no civil aircraft of small aircraft in this area. In 14.29, the operational duty officer of the command post of the 14 Air Defense Division decided to assign the “combat number” 8255 to the violator, to issue information “up” and to declare readiness No. 1.
So at the command post of the 6 Army of Air Defense, information appeared about the 8255 target. The commander of the 6-th Air Defense OA General Hermann Kromin translated into readiness No. 1 all the connections and parts of the 54-th to the air defense. The commanders of the three anti-aircraft missile battalions 204-th Guards. zrbr (n. p. Kerstovo), who were on the route of the flight of Rust, reported that the target was being watched and ready to launch missiles.
Radar 5H84А “Defense” of the radio engineering battalion (Vyshniy Volochek) of the 2 Air Defense Corps of the Moscow District of the Air Defense is accompanied by Matthias Rust's plane. Moscow time 16.48, azimuth of the target 234, distance 75 kilometers
Meanwhile, due to the sudden disappearance of the mark from the plane from the dispatch radar of the Malmo airport, the dispatcher tried to contact Mathias Rust. After several unsuccessful attempts, the plane was declared to be in distress and rescuers were sent to the intended area of the fall. The search continued for several hours. Later, Rust will be charged about 100 thousand dollars for “services rendered”.
On 14.30 on the Cessna-172R flight route, the weather deteriorated dramatically. The wind increased, the lower edge of overcast clouds dropped to 70 – 100 meters, visibility dropped to 600 – 700 meters, and in some places it began to rain. Rust decided to leave with a decline below the lower edge of the clouds and change course in the area of the reserve landmark: the railway hub of the station Dno. In this direction, visibility was better.
During this maneuver in 14.30 (just a minute after receiving the first target data), the target was lost at the command post of the 6 Army. However, the track in the automated system continued to exist. In accordance with the performance characteristics, the system supports the route, its number and all movement parameters for almost two minutes. And if at least one target report arrives in this time interval, target tracking is not interrupted. This is the result of many years of work of designers, military scientists and testers of ACS. It was originally intended to avoid accidental loss of the tracks of air objects.
The loss of radar contact with Rust's aircraft occurred at the junction of the boundaries of responsibility of two air defense units - the 14 Division and the 54 Corps, where consistency of command posts calculations plays an important, if not decisive role. In 14.31, the target reappeared on the radar screens of one of the radar companies, but already 20 kilometers west of the 8255’s previous target route at extremely low altitude. This hampered her steady observation. They decided not to give out information on it, so as not to interfere with the already complicated situation. Especially, the target left the zone of detection of the radar company and entered the zone of responsibility of the adjacent junction.
Ten minutes earlier, in 14.21, in the Peipsi Lake area, a mark with the direction of movement appeared on the screens of the radar on duty: Gdov - Malaya Vishera. In 14.24, information on this goal began to issue "up". With 14.25, the mark became unstable and in 14.28 the tracking of the aircraft was discontinued. In 14.31, the same subdivision reveals a target with the same parameters, but is issued “upward”, as it should be, with a different number.
And all this devilry is combined in time and space. Even to a prepared person, looking at a plan — a result of a detailed, multi-day analysis — it can be difficult to understand what happened then, 18 years ago, in the sky and on earth.
And the following happened. In 14.31, as a result of a brief situation analysis, it is decided that the 8255 target changed course to 60 °. By inputting a complex proofreading computer, the calculation made the “automaton” believe it. Divisions received new target designation, but the target 8255 was not found. From this point on, as it turned out in the course of the investigation, the system instead of the 8255 target was accompanied by a long-lived meteorological object (or their dense group).
This requires some explanation. In the middle of the 70-x, when powerful high-potential locators began to arrive at the armament of the air defense RTV, already during their field tests, marks began to be found with movement parameters commensurate with the characteristics of light-engined airplanes. They jokingly dubbed echo angels. This phenomenon has caused serious difficulties in the automated processing of information. Even if the operator doesn’t distinguish them well, how to teach the “automaton” to work without errors? There was no time for laughter.
In the course of serious research and mass experiments, it was found that specific meteorological objects can observe radar due to the high radiating potential. These are vortex formations that are formed from vertical ascending air flows, especially with a noticeable difference in temperature at the boundary between the earth and water surface. This phenomenon is very characteristic for the spring period in middle latitudes and during the movement of a powerful warm front. The physics of the energy sources of such vortices (with their long existence in the atmosphere) has not yet been fully studied. In addition, the seasonal migration of dense flocks of birds creates a very similar effect. The radar operators needed assistance in recognizing objects of this class. Detailed methods and instructions have been developed for the control bodies of the Air Defense Forces.
The newly followed 8255 target had a height of 1200 meters, an average speed of 85 kilometers per hour. Significant changes in the parameters of the target within just one minute did not alert the calculation and were left without proper attention. It is obvious that in this episode the operators clearly did not have enough qualifications. It was not their fault, but the misfortune of the system. After all, the calculations allowed for combat duty, pass the corresponding tests and exams. It means that someone has not properly learned them in due time. Perhaps, the consequences of the loss of professional staff during the reform of the country's Air Defense Forces in 1978 are also seen here.
In 14.36, the pilot of the MiG-23 fighter, Senior Lieutenant Puchnin (Thapa airfield) found Matthias Rust's plane and reported: "I see a Yak-12-type sports plane with a dark stripe on board in the ruptures of the clouds." Visual contact was short-lived due to dense cloud cover. More to detect the plane Mathias failed. During the investigation, Rust was asked the question: “Did you see the fighter?”. Matthias replied: “Yes, I saw and even greeted him, but he (the fighter) did not give me any signals, but my radio station was turned off.” The report of the pilot MiG-23 was adopted, but was ignored. It was considered that the discovered plane belonged to one of the local flying clubs, where at that time scheduled flights were carried out.
In 15.00, by the decision of the commander of the 6 Army of Air Defense from the Gromovo airfield, a pair of fighters on duty was raised into the air with the task of determining the type and nationality of the 8255 target. On the flight route, the weather did not please the target. The warm front moved southeast. Cloudiness is solid, in some places it rains, the lower edge of the clouds is 200 – 400 meters, the upper edge is 2500 – 3000 meters. The search was carried out within 30 minutes. It was forbidden for fighters to descend into the clouds, it was too dangerous. Reports began to arrive from the anti-aircraft missile battalions that the new target designation of the 8255 target was not detected. In 15.31, the army commander decided that the target of 8255 is a dense flock of birds. This was reported to the TsKP Air Defense Forces.
However, the existing methods and instructions contained the necessary information about which species of birds could fly in fog and clouds at what time of day, and under what circumstances a dense flock could change the direction of flight. If you follow these recommendations, then Rust's plane could not be identified with a bird flock.
In the area of responsibility of the Moscow Air Defense District
15.00 Rust approached the railway station at Dno. The weather has improved by this time. Above the intersection of the railways, he again changed course and continued to hold it all the way to Moscow.
“The guilty were found almost immediately. The Soviet Union has not known such a pogrom since 1937 of the year. ”
In 15.05, the Rust airplane was already within the responsibility of the Moscow Air Defense District, the 2 Air Defense Corps (Rzhev City). His route passed through the aerobatic zones of the air force aviation regiment, where planned flights took place. The air was at the same time before the 12 fighter. In 15.00, the state identification system code has changed in accordance with the schedule. Since this process (technically just a toggle switch) is performed by the crews in the air and on the ground, the procedure takes some time. As a rule, no more than one or two minutes.
In this case (with fighters from the Air Force) the process was delayed prohibitively for a long time. From the higher command post they demanded to immediately deal with the situation, as five of the twelve fighters began to be accompanied by a system without an “I am my plane” recognition signal. In this case, the system makes recommendations on changing the current numbers to “combat” and prepares data for targeting to the anti-aircraft missile divisions and aviation guidance points. The calculation of the command post of the air defense junction tried to contact the flight director iap to give a command to the enthusiastic young pilots to change the code. Due to the lack of direct communication channels, this was done only in 16 minutes.
At this time, in the Moscow District of the Air Defense Forces, the commanders and personnel were awaiting a routine check of the duty personnel with the participation of control targets. The essence of this verification is as follows. According to a previously developed and agreed plan on one of the airplanes that are in the air, the system of state identification is switched off upon command. The inspection manager announces this target to the control. She is assigned a "combat" number and all the necessary actions of the duty forces are carried out with analysis and scoring based on objective control materials.
In order not to make additional confusion in the air situation, the operational duty officer of the command post of the compound gave the command to the head of the calculation of the division's automation system: “Assign the sign“ I am my plane ”to all fighters. On the objections of the officer that such instructions contradict the instructions, he is discharged from combat duty. In the end, the young lieutenant executes the command. Rust's plane is also assigned the sign "I am my plane." Thus, in 15.10, the German pilot, without knowing it, temporarily received legal registration in the airspace of the USSR.
To 16.00 in the area of the city of Ostashkov, Rust's plane entered the detection zone of the next flight on the RTV unit and lost its temporary registration. Information on the aircraft was again issued without the sign “I am my aircraft”. Again, a long clarification of the situation and again the assignment of the required sign and the further legalization of the flight.
Matthias at that time was in 40 kilometers west of the city of Torzhok, where a plane crash occurred the day before. Two aircraft collided in the air - the Tu-22 and MiG-25. At the scene of the fall of the fragments of the machines, several rescue teams and accident investigation specialists were working. People and cargo were delivered to the crash site by helicopters of the aviation unit near the city of Torzhok. One of the helicopters was in the air as a coherent repeater. In 16.30, Rust's plane was identified with the rotorcraft. Therefore, he did not cause any anxiety in this flight segment.
The air situation in the detection zone of the next unit, where Matthias entered, was also tense. Here they fought with the notorious long-lived meteorological objects. They were observed on the screens of the radar indicators already for 40 minutes (and several at a time). All objects moved southeast. Here Rust again came under "amnesty" - he was removed from the escort as a meteorological object. This happened already at the exit from the detection area of the unit.
Nevertheless, at the command post they noticed the course difference of this route from the previously discharged from the air objects. In 16.48, the decision of the commander of the 2 air defense corps raised two duty fighters from the Rzhev airfield with the task of searching for small aircraft or other aircraft southeast of the city of Staritsa. It was believed that wariness during a routine inspection would not be superfluous. Search results did not give.
In 17.40, Mathias's plane hit the radar of the Moscow aeronautical hub. This seriously threatened the safety of air traffic in the Moscow aviation zone. In terms of the aircraft did not appear, flew in violation of the rules, there was no communication with the crew. Until the situation was clarified, the administration of the Sheremetyevo airport stopped receiving and sending passenger liners. At that time, the mass media for some reason attributed some mysteriousness to this fact, right up to the preliminary collusion of Sheremetyevo with Rust.
When coordinating a joint action plan with the command of the Moscow Air Defense District, it was decided that the civil aviation administration itself would cope with the violator of the flight regime. But when they found that the intruder was already in the city limits of Moscow, where flights were generally prohibited, it was too late to say or do anything.
In 18.30, Rust's plane appeared over the Khodynka field and continued flying to the city center. Having decided that it was impossible to land on Ivanovskaya Square of the Kremlin, Matias made three unsuccessful attempts to land on Red Square. The dimensions of the latter allowed to do this, but there were a lot of people on the pavement. And, as Rust himself said during the investigation, “although I signaled by turning on the landing lights and shaking my wings, the tourists in the square did not understand me.”
After that, he made a risky decision - to land on the Moskvoretsky bridge. Turning over the hotel "Russia", began to decline over Bolshaya Ordynka Street, turning on the landing lights. Traffic police of the traffic police in order to avoid an accident on the bridge turned on the red light of the traffic light. Landing on the bridge Rust performed skillfully, given that he had snipers get into the area between the adjacent transverse stretch marks of the trolleybus network. This happened in 18.55. He rode to the Pokrovsky Cathedral and turned off the engine, Matthias stepped out of the plane in a new red jumpsuit, put the pads under the chassis and began to distribute autographs.
It is impossible not to shed light on two more myths that emerged at that time. Someone from the amateur researchers, putting a ruler to the map, wondered why the 850 route with the average speed of the 220 aircraft in kilometers per hour Rust traveled 5 hours in 50 hours? Consequently, I had to land on 1 an hour 30 minutes earlier. A version appeared immediately that he was landing somewhere, and maybe not even one. Someone remembered that they had seen him at Helsinki Airport before flying in jeans and a green shirt, and he was getting out of his plane in Moscow in red overalls. Consequently, changed clothes during landing.
In fact, everything is much simpler and more prosaic. The distance that Rust traveled at his Сessna-172R was 1220 kilometers, the average flight speed, given the variable altitude profile, was 210 kilometers per hour. At the exit, we have 5 hours 50 minutes. It is in strict accordance with the materials of objective control. By the way, after the landing of the fuel in the tanks of the aircraft Rust remained for another two hours of flight. So the pilot could not care about fuel economy.
With a red jumpsuit even easier. While preparing the plane for the flight to Helsinki, the neat German was afraid to get a new overalls specially acquired for this flight. Rust put on top of his jeans and shirt, which he took off before departure. He flew the flight in a new beautiful jumpsuit. After all, he (in his opinion) flew to Moscow as a messenger of peace.
During the flight of Rust, various random events and their most bizarre overlaps occurred. Any of them could lead to the termination of the flight or change its goals. Only one example - a dangerous thunderhead at the beginning of Rust’s flight could radically change everything. However, this did not happen - the planned flight was completed successfully.
Aftermath
Among the reasons for the flight of Mathias Rust at the time was dominated by two versions. The first was that the flight was planned by the West to help Mikhail Gorbachev carry out personnel reform in the highest echelons of the USSR Armed Forces and remove from power the conservative leadership of the army led by Marshal Sokolov. The second version qualified the flight of Rust as reconnaissance. Both versions are too elegant to be true. The second immediately disappeared during the investigation.
What else was revealed during the investigation? The serious imperfection of the legal basis for the actions of the duty forces of the Air Defense Forces of the country became obvious. In fact, the DCs have become hostages of serious miscalculations by politicians and senior officials of the Ministry of Defense. There were insurmountable contradictions between the tasks assigned to the Air Defense Forces and the limited rights of the command personnel in the use of forces and means. In addition, there were no criteria for evaluating the actions of their troops in extreme situations. In many ways, the troubles are rooted in the ill-conceived and unprofessional reorganization of the Air Defense Forces in 1978. You can justifiably say: if there were no 1978, then there would not be 28 events of May 1987.
After the flight of Rust, the guilty were found almost immediately. Three Marshals of the Soviet Union and about three hundred generals and officers were removed from their posts. Two of them are convicted. The army did not know such personnel pogrom since 1937 of the year. People came to the leadership of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces, an order of magnitude (or even two) inferior in their professional, business and moral qualities to the marshals and generals. According to many experts, the degradation of the USSR Armed Forces began precisely after Rust. This was largely due to the qualities of the new appointees.
As conclusions
“To the colonel who nearly shot down Rust,” these two texts should be carefully read. Learn. Maybe even lectured. And in their memories somehow stick to them. And in the future, without resorting to amateur, to quote excerpts from these two materials. And it’s right to tell the army jokes that the colonel has not mastered so far. A few words about yourself. 28 May 1987, I was the deputy commander of the 219-th anti-aircraft missile regiment (n. Malinovka Vyborg district of the Leningrad region) 54-air defense corps 6-th OA air defense. Moreover, on that day I acted as commander, since the commander of the unit, Colonel Yushin MM, was on a planned vacation.
Our regiment (the five-channel C-200ВМ) was stationed very far from the route of the flight of Matthias Rust (where Kohtla-Järve and where we are - Vyborg district). Despite the fact that the task of finding and detecting the aircraft was also set for us, we could not detect Rust with our five rays of the ROC C-200 simply because of the curvature of the earth's surface.
The situation on the command post of the corps was calm. She then seemed to us as an ordinary work on real goals, nothing more. At that moment, simply no one imagined how all this would ultimately end. The corps commander, General Kornyakov (he is still warmly remembered by all personnel), led the actions of his subordinates confidently. And the fact that Rust sat on Red Square, we learned not the second day, not the third. Not immediately. Anyway, not on the same evening. And the personnel pogrom began. Moreover, the most prepared and qualified generals and officers, who in their posts could bring many more benefits to the country and the army, suffered. The management of our 54 Air Defense Corps beautifully said goodbye to subordinates (commander, deputy, chief of staff). From the command post on the speakerphone, thanked for the service, wished all the best, asked not to remember dashing.
It would seem that all the facts on this event a quarter of a century ago are known to the widest public. But it was not there. Each anniversary of the flight of Mathias Rust causes a surge of new, often absurd essays. Let us examine at least one of them. In particular, not so long ago, quite by chance, I came across a text of the following character. I will give it in full. Blog Konstantin Dobrynin.
Colonel Who Did Not Knock Rust
He was a little over fifty. The whiskers that hide a smile and lively eyes complemented the rapid movements and broad steps. He could not be called thin at the age of fifteen. Outwardly, he looked like a kind Winnie the Pooh from our cartoon. And he was a rocket pilot and a retired Soviet colonel. And I saw live the legendary violator of the Soviet border Rust. First on the radar, then on the TV.
His voice sounded a little chant. And he smiled well and a lot. Enough time has passed, and I no longer remember why, and who first spoke the German last name Rust.“It was like that,” he began intriguingly and set aside a can of stew, which he skillfully opened.
- When the German crossed the border, it was immediately fixed. Almost on approach. Our fighter was sent to him, they say, welcome to the USSR, dear comrade. The fighter looked. The plane flies and flies. Well, let him fly, passed on. The airplane is light, the speed with a fighter is different. And here Rust entered the area of responsibility of the 54 Air Defense Corps, - he rubbed his hands and paused.
- Estonia flew by, it means. The transfer of the goal of the RIC division to the RIC of the 54 corps begins. Everyone thinks whether or not to send a target for escort. Thought 14 minutes! A lot, - he poured one by one, put the stew on the bread, we clinked glasses and drank.
“They gave me a goal,” he bit off a home-made stew sandwich, chewed and continued, “under their responsibility, they say, take them.” Those looked and said: not detected, - he raised his index finger up and paused.
- You see, late for 14 minutes. Another 54 body is looking for a target. No goal. Well, everything, everyone calmed down, they say, you never know what was there, maybe an agricultural target or an athlete, but now there is no one. In general, it did not go farther, neither in the Moscow District, anywhere, - he poured one more.
- And the airplane flies further. Moscow air defense district no one in combat readiness, but because no one else is looking for him. So my duty that day and ended.
I am in 7 hours of the evening 28 May come home and turn on the TV. Not color yet. “Rainbow”, in my opinion, is old. There, the sound and the picture didn’t coincide either, it was necessary to buy a special prefix, but I also watch and see without sound: Finnish television shows that a plane is landing on Red Square. I tell my wife, in, the fuck-a-fly, what film they made, - he poured one more.
- Bam, sound. Special communication boomed. Willingness. Major General Kromin calls. Everyone at the command post to arrive immediately. I come. All run nervous, pale, coddled, in one word.
And the team: comrades, everything that you have on tape recorders, you understand?
Immediately, - he was silent for a moment.
- We learn, on the Red Square villages Rust. Finita la comedy!
Well, the next day, prosecutors eagles landed in our unit. Questions started asking questions like: what commands did you receive, what did you see? The answer is: I saw this and that. The plane did not enter the zone of fire and the zone of destruction. What are my actions? In the affected area did not enter, what action - no. Prosecutors began to groan and continue, so, they say, and the 7-th division, why did not you open fire? And everything is so nervous, on the raised ones, - he still smiled, but his eyes no longer laughed.
- In accordance with the order on the conduct of combat duty to open fire should combat ships - violators of the state border. It was not a combat ship, - he rubbed the back of his head and lay back, - in short, we had a happy life that month. For the rest I remembered, - he turned on the kettle and generously poured tea cups out of the jar.
- Then, when there was already an analysis of the situation, everything became more or less clear. You see, the bottom edge of the detection zone was such and such. He walked below. This bastard flew not just competently, he knew how to bypass each particular company. He was clearly explained, and all the information he had, they say, this company stands on the regulations - it is necessary to fly here. And in a neighboring company, the lower detection edge zone is much higher; it will not do anything. See nothing. The route he famously worked. Result: the Minister of Defense was removed, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces was removed, the division commander Colonel Skorokhod was removed, the commander of the 6 Army was removed. All naughty and having an opinion in the army. The rest were exiled to the 10 Army. So, Eduardych, it all happened, - he smiled and poured tea into the mugs.
- Why did Alexander Anatolyevich leave the army? - I asked in the forehead.
He stopped smiling, sighed and said:
- You know, in the army there are three types of colonels: comrade colonel, colonel and hey, colonel. I served in the first.
And now let's analyze the written text on sentences and words.
"He was a little over fifty."
So in May 1987, this colonel was 24 of the year. Who then could he be by the position? What was your rank? Where did you serve? The narrator about this is somehow modestly silent. But even from the performance of this “colonel” one can easily calculate that his title in May 1987 is the senior lieutenant. And he served, it seems, on the RIC KP 6-th OA defense. Why? Yes, simply because he has only one abbreviation of this - RIC without errors, correctly spells. And he tries to talk about the actions of the entire army (and even the Air Defense Forces) as a whole, despite the fact that some mythical 7 division (in which the brigade / regiment, division / corps is unknown) slips in one place).
What could the senior lieutenant understand then? And what could he see? This is not a quality, God forbid, insults, but the senior lieutenant in the army’s command post is a man by the name of NIKTO and call him NO place. Here is a chef from the dining room at the army army would get out and write his memoirs: "I, soup and porridge and Matias Rust." According to the value of the works, this would be equivalent.
Or a line like this: “He was also a rocket man and a retired Soviet colonel. And I saw live the legendary violator of the Soviet border Rust. First on the radar, then on the TV. ”
Let's get to the bottom. If he served on the RIC 6-th Air Defense OA, then it was no longer a missile, but a native of the RTV - radio engineering troops.
“I saw live the legendary violator of the Soviet border, Rust. First on the radar, then on the TV. ”
Live is live. Not on the radar, and certainly not on TV. In the latter case, the whole country saw Rust live. And “on the radar” this legendary colonel could not see Rust. Firstly, the expression “on the radar” itself is illiterate. But theoretically, this colonel could see the mark from the plane of Mathias Rust on the screen of the radar indicator of the circular review. But this is only theoretically, since there are no screens with primary radar information on the Army Army Communist Party (there is such a thing, by the way). So he saw nothing.
In general, it does not make sense to analyze this verbal blizzard in detail. I’ll dwell only on one moment: “This little bastard flew not only competently, he knew how to bypass each particular company. He was clearly explained, and all the information he had, they say, this company is on the rules - it is necessary to fly here. ”
Complete nonsense. Mathias Rust did not “get around” anything - he flew along the shortest route. About the existence of the radar mouth was unaware. And these words did not know.
Or such words - "lower edge of the detection zone." Here it is, a classic combination of honey, bees and sand. The "lower edge" is a characteristic of cloudiness. And the detection zone has a lower limit. A trifle, and even she shows - a character invented.
Well, to all this verbal rubbish appropriate surroundings.
Pepper is clear, if the "colonel", then only a stew as a snack (currently, even homeless dogs do not eat it because there are no hints of meat in it), bread, and tea leaves in mugs. For pseudo-conviction, everything is far-fetched - do not indulge in the most.
It would be necessary to kindle a fire, spread the raincoat, put the sooty pot to the foreground, the PPSh machine on the nail on the wall, and the sleeve-stalingradka as lighting. Well, to the end to the end of all the environment consistent with the image of a seasoned colonel.
It is ridiculous to read all these stories. They can be called only this way: “I heard something somewhere, saw something out of the corner of my eye, but confused the right angle with the boiling point of water and turned everything upside down.”
And one must still correctly tell the army jokes that this legendary colonel has not mastered so far.
Quote from the text:
“Why did Alexander Anatolievich leave the army? - I asked in the forehead.
... He stopped smiling, sighed and said:
- You know, in the army there are three types of colonels: comrade colonel, colonel and hey, colonel. I served in the first.
And then fails, however. The topic has not been disclosed.
"Colonel Comrade" - is a colonel with an official car and office. As a rule, this is the commander of the unit (regiment or brigade). Or the head of the department (of some large structural subdivision, for example, the head of the department of the organizational-mobilization department of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces — both a service car and an office).
"Colonel" is a colonel with a cabinet, but without a company car.
“Hey, Colonel” is a colonel without a cabinet or a car.
In these words, in fact, nothing offensive is not.
In the organs of the Central Staff of the Armed Forces, there are indeed rooms with five or six colonels in each. But the "Colonel" story-teller, it seems, still belonged to the category "Hey, Colonel." If he was the commander of a regiment or brigade, then surely about it somehow, yes mentioned. And in this case there was no need for him to “leave the army” (I personally don’t know cases when regimental / brigade commanders “left”). Yes, and damn if such a pro Rust "colonel" tale never flogged. Already schoolchildren know how everything was in reality, and this one invents some additional versions.
And how could he personally bring down Rust, being a senior lieutenant at the RIC KP army? Cap? Sword belt? Empty holster? Underpants tied in a knot? Either the fighter-interceptor pilot or the commander of the anti-aircraft missile division can destroy the intruder.
And here is how it really was.
Information for consideration № 1
This document was drafted almost immediately after the violation of the state border of 28 in May of 1987. Dry lines of brief reports can sometimes tell more than the most emotional story. It should be noted that the attitude to the calculation of the command post of the 14 Air Defense Division (Tallinn City) is more than harsh. And the guilt of these people is not so great, in my deep personal conviction. Now directly text.
"In 14.29 28.5.87, the duty radar of the P-15 922 separate radar company (Loksa) of the 4 radio engineering brigade (Tallinn) of the 14 air defense division (Tallinn) discovered an air target at the height of 600 m in the territorial waters of the USSR, running a Kursk on the coastline. The target followed the international route in the direction of corridor No. 1, information about the target was issued to the command post of the radio engineering battalion (Tapa), 4 th rtbr and RIC (intelligence information center) 14 th air defense division. In fact, information about the target was displayed on the AWS screens of the on-duty abbreviated combat crew of the command post 14 of the air defense system with the 14.31.
The operative duty officer of the command post rtbr, Major Krinitsky Ya. I., did not declare the target a violator of the state border of the USSR and continued refining the characteristics and belonging until it left the brigade’s radar zones of visibility.
The deputy commander of the command post of the 14 air defense division on the RIC, Major Chernykh, acted irresponsibly. Having a real situation and knowing that the target is coming from the Gulf of Finland to the coastline, he identified it and assigned it a number only from 14.37.
The operational duty officer of the KP of the division, Lieutenant Colonel I. Karpets, did not require clear reports, clarification of the type and nature of the target, thereby violating the requirements for issuing an alert target immediately, and a report on the superior command post, and making a decision to raise the crew on duty to identify the target.
At the command post of the 6-th separate air defense army at his command, the target was issued only at 14.45. Thus, due to the fault of the command post of the 14 th division of the air defense, 16 was lost minutes of time, and most importantly, the sharpness of the perception of the air situation of the command post of the army disappeared, based on the fact that the goal was coming from the Gulf of Finland and entered the USSR borders.
Moreover, OD KP 656 th Fighter Aviation Regiment (Tapa), Lieutenant A. Filatov, having information about the target with 14.31, alerted fighter jets to 14.33 on 1, but repeatedly asked permission to lift the fighters, but Lieutenant Colonel I. Karpets I. V. lifting them allowed only in 14.47.
Such inexplicable, except for the complete irresponsibility bordering on the crime, the actions of the operational duty officer of the command post of the division led to the fact that time was lost, the goal was actually already passing through the zone of a continuous duty radar field at low altitudes and the affected area of duty personnel.
The commander of the 14.53 Air Defense Division, who arrived at the command post in 14, was reported that the fighter was raised to clarify the type of target in the area of corridor No. 1 of the Helsinki-Moscow route. The fact that the target was discovered over the Gulf of Finland, near the state border, in 14.29, was not reported to the division commander. OD KP 6 th OA air defense Colonel Voronkov, having received information about the target, in 14.46 alerted the 1 No. of the duty forces of the 54 th To the air defense and allowed the 656 th fighter jet to be lifted into the air.
In 14.51, the army commander arrived at the command post of the 6 OA air defense unit, who later supervised the operations of the duty personnel. The in-flight crew of the MiG-23 (Senior Lieutenant Puchnin) on 14.51 was taken to the zone in which it was located before 15.00, because the shift supervisor of the EC EC ATC (regional center of the unified air traffic control system) of the Leningrad zone Colonel Timoshin gave permission to enter fighters in the area of responsibility of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District only in 15.00 at an altitude of 2100 m (permission from the gearbox 14-d air defense was requested in 14.48 and only in 15.23 already under control from the MOU (point of guidance) 54-k To air defense (Kerstovo) the pilot to the goal for its recognition.
Targeting to the target area was initially carried out at an altitude of 2000 m, while the goal followed at an altitude of 600 m. In fact, the fighter marched in 10-point cloudiness (the lower edge was 500 – 600 m, the upper one was 2500 – 2900 m). Not finding the target during the first approach, when re-pointing at 15.28 at 600 m height, the pilot visually below himself on 30 – 50 m detected the target and transmitted its characteristics to the TL (point of guidance): “Light-engine white aircraft of the Yak-12 type”.
No specific task, except identification, was given to the pilot, despite the presence on the flight route of a sufficient number of airfields suitable for landing the fighter, for the remaining fuel he was returned to the aerodrome of departure for Thapa.
Further actions of the CP (command posts) of the 6-th Air Defense OA and 54-K Air Defense Forces were illiterate. The type of target was reported at the command post of the 6-th Air Defense Air Defense OA, but no decision of the Control Committee on that report was made. Permission was given to divert the fighter from the target, although the balance of the fuel provided another approach to more fully identify the target, and most importantly, to determine its state ownership. The “Carpet” signal has not been announced.
In 15.31, a second fighter was raised from Tapa airfield. The previous guidance procedure was repeated. Only in 15.40 from the center of the EU ATC was permission to enter the fighter into the area of responsibility of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District. At 15.58, at a height of 1500, the pilot was placed in the target area. The airborne sight was not turned on, the pilot did not detect the target visually.
The lack of clear interaction with the EU center of air traffic control, illiterate actions of the command of the 6-th OA air defense system on targeting fighters, the inability to clearly and competently set the task for the crews, and also the EU center for air traffic control to release the airspace to perform the combat mission by fighters led to an unjustified loss of time and account to the failure of the combat mission.
The army’s radio engineering troops did not fulfill their task of sustaining the target, although there were enough forces and means, and their capabilities ensured its wiring.
Further ascent of the fighters in 15.54 and 16.25 from the airfield of Lodeynoye Pole were carried out on a false goal - meteorological formations and were useless, since the target at that time was in a different area.
In 16.30, the commander of the 6-nd Air Defense OA personally informed the OD of the Defense Directorate of the Defense Ministry (operational duty command post of the Moscow district air defense) about the situation. According to this information, the 16.32 Radar Battalion Radar Station (Staraya Russa) was turned on in 2266, the crews on duty at Andreapol and Khotilovo airfields were transferred to readiness number 1.
The rise of two fighters of the Defense Ministry of Defense (Moscow District Air Defense) did not lead to the detection of the target, since their withdrawal was carried out in the area of a false target, presumably meteorological formation.
In 16.16, the intruder was detected by the on-call radar of the 1074 separate radar company (Yamnik) of the 3 radio engineering brigade (Rzhev) of the 2 air defense corps (Rzhev) and the data on it were issued to the radio engineering battalion before 16.47.
Directly on the gearbox of the 2-K to the air defense system on the Proton-2 equipment there were wiring data of the intruder from 16.18 to 16.28, however, due to the low preparedness of the calculations, this information was not used.
In the period from 17.36 to 17.45, Lieutenant-General Brazhnikov Yu.T., Deputy Commander of the Air Defense Forces, who was on the command post, set the task to alert the 1’s alert forces to the air defense missiles 2-13 and to search for the target of the ROC ZRK C-200. The intruder was not detected, since by this time the border of responsibility of 2-2 to air defense had passed. The tasks of 1-th A of the air defense of the United Nations (special-purpose air defense army) were not set. ”
Soviet air defense forces in the second half of the 70s developed so rapidly that in the expert community, the US and NATO recognized their superiority over similar systems in other countries of the world. Even the individual failures of parts and formations of the air defense of the USSR in local conflicts could not shake the very high reputation of the Soviet air defense system as a whole.
On the eve of the flight of Rust
During these years, the re-equipping of the Air Defense Forces with the latest weapons and military equipment was completed. Advanced anti-aircraft missile systems, troop control systems and weaponsradar devices aviation interception systems and communications equipment. The next generation of weapons and military defense equipment was put into development and tested.
The country's air defense system during this period began to acquire qualitatively new features. In addition to the basic functions of destroying the forces of a massive rocket-air attack, the air defense of the USSR had new ones. She had to become an element of real deterrence of potential aggressors from air attacks. In essence, it was a single automated organizational and technical complex, which was in constant combat readiness and continuously improved. The main attention was paid to border units, air defense units and units. They have traditionally been highly strained, and there was a special demand for omissions in the military service from them.
The air borders of the USSR during the Cold War were constantly subjected to strength tests. In the middle of 70, violations of the state border by light-engined airplanes (such as Cessna, Beechcraft, Piper, and others) from Finland were a real scourge of the Soviet air defense system in the North-West region. As a rule, the reason for this was the loss of orientation by amateur pilots. However, it was not the case with light airplanes alone. April 20 On the Kola Peninsula, the state border was crossed by a passenger plane Woing-1978 of the South Korean airline KAL. After unsuccessful attempts to force the plane to land, the commander of the 707 Army of Air Defense decided to use a weapon. The Su-10 air defense fighter opened fire and damaged the left wing of the liner. He made an emergency landing on the ice of the lake Kolpijärvi near the city of Kem. The explosion of rockets and landing on the ice killed two passengers and several people were injured. The actions of the Air Defense Command were subsequently recognized as correct. All interception participants are presented to state awards.
In the middle of 70, an influential group of senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense planned another air defense reform of the USSR. The reformers' plans envisaged the transfer of the larger, best, and most combat-ready part of the Air Defense Forces to the composition of the border military districts. Such organizational measures inevitably led to the actual destruction of the established system of command and control of the Air Defense Forces, their way of life and activity, and the reduction in the combat capability of the country's air defense system as a whole.The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Pavel Fedorovich Batitsky most strongly opposed innovations. He repeatedly declared his position to the USSR Minister of Defense, reported at meetings of the Defense Ministry’s collegium, prepared a memo to the CPSU Central Committee. However, his arguments were not taken into account by the highest party and state leaders of the time. For a long time, persistently, Batitsky was looking for an opportunity to report his ideas personally to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. However, the Secretary General, who was seriously ill at that time, did not honor the Marshal of the audience.
As a result, in the summer of 1978, it was decided to transfer a significant part of the country's Air Defense Forces to a number of military districts. Essentially, full-blooded air defense corps and divisions were given to administrative and economic structures, which in practice were military districts (and are currently). The transfer took place in an unjustified hectic. At the same time, the staffs of the border air defense armies with their infrastructure were staffed up with experienced personnel. Such reforms quickly destroyed the complex system of governance that had been created over the decades. The professional level of command and control of troops and the overall combat effectiveness of units and formations have sharply decreased. Without real opportunities to resist the decisions already made, Marshal Batitsky submitted a report on his release from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country. This request hastily granted July 28 1978 of the year.
As a result, the single streamlined organizational and technical complex of the country's air defense system ceased to exist and was divided into separate fragments and groupings. During the reform of 1978, a significant number of generals and senior operational officers were transferred to the reserve. This naturally had a negative effect on the quality and professionalism of troop command and control. Looking ahead, it should be noted that only a few years later it was decided to return everything to its original state, but it was too late. It is simply impossible to measure the damage caused by the rash actions of the military-political leadership of the country of that period.
And the tension in the protection of the state border did not subside. In particular, at the beginning of the 80-x in the Far East, the air defense troops escorted more than three thousand air objects annually on the PLC screens near the borders. The tragic climax of this call was the penetration of 1 of September 1983 of the year into the airspace of the USSR by the South Korean airliner Boeing-747, which ended with the death of many people. After that, the Soviet Union was declared an "evil empire."
At an extraordinary session of ICAO, an addendum was adopted to the third article of the Chicago Convention 1944 of the Year “On International Civil Aviation”, which prohibited knocking down civilian aircraft, regardless of the territory of which state they turned out to be.
However, even after the tragic 1 incident of September 1983, tensions at the borders of the USSR did not subside. The intrusion into the airspace of the country of the violators has become almost a mass one. During the 1984 – 1987 period, dozens of violations of the state border were recorded by light aircraft, gliders, balloons, and other aircraft. And all this against the background of an unabated number of planned reconnaissance flights along our borders.
After the events of 1 September 1983, the leaders of the state made a political decision to limit the use of weapons by the Air Defense Forces. By order of the Minister of Defense it was forbidden to open fire on passenger, transport and light-engine aircraft. At the same time, it was prescribed by all means and forces to force them to land. This document did not simplify the situation, but rather complicated it.
The commanders of air defense units and formations became hostages of the decisions of a political nature. After all, the procedure of coercion to land the violator of the state border is not clearly defined until today. If we analyze the violation of the state border of 28 in May of 1987 without taking into account these circumstances, then an objective analysis of the situation and the actions of the USSR Air Defense Forces on duty will hardly be possible.
Rust crosses the state border
On the morning of May 28 at Malmo Airport, near Helsinki, Matias Rust prepared his Cessna-1987R monoplane, which had flown in from Hamburg the day before, for departure. In flight documents, the end point of the route was listed as Stockholm.
At 13.10, after receiving permission, Rust took off and headed along the planned route. After 20, the flight minutes reported to the dispatcher that he was in good order on board, and traditionally said goodbye. After that, turning off the on-board radio station, he turned the plane abruptly toward the Gulf of Finland and began to descend to the height of 80 – 100 meters. This planned maneuver was supposed to provide a reliable exit of the aircraft from the surveillance zone of the control radar and hide the true route of flight. At this altitude, Mathias headed to the settlement point of the Gulf of Finland near the Helsinki-Moscow air route. Having deployed the aircraft in the direction of the first landmark on the coast of the Soviet Union (shale plant of the city of Kohtla-Järve with its smoke, which can be seen for a hundred kilometers) and comparing the readings of the radio compass with the calculated, Rust went to the "combat course". The weather on this leg of the flight was favorable: overcast - layered cumulus, 4 – 5 points, wind - northwest, 5 – 10 meters per second, visibility - at least 15 – 20 kilometers. So began the first phase of the flight of the violator of the state border.
In 14.10, a radar company on duty (radar P-15) near the Estonian village of Loks was detected on the territorial waters of the Soviet Union by an unidentified light-engine aircraft, which was approaching the coastline. According to the instructions, the air object was assigned the next number and the sign of “flight mode violator”, since at that time there were no applications for flights of small aircraft in this area. The course of the aircraft almost coincided with the direction of the busy Helsinki-Moscow air route, where several aircraft were in the upper echelons of the airspace.
The calculation of the command post of the 14 Division of the Air Defense Forces has begun to refine and analyze the air situation. It was decided: until the full clarification of the situation, the information “to the top” is not issued. Over the territory of Estonia at that moment were at least 10 light aircraft of various departmental affiliation. None of them was equipped with a state identification system. At the command posts of the units and the duty units of the 14 Division, gain changes were called.
Already at this stage, the consequences of dismembering the unified command and control system of the Air Defense Forces of the country began to appear. Previously, a prerequisite for the functioning of the air defense system was the presence of direct and reliable channels of communication with civilian air traffic controllers. Information on targets for higher command posts was issued almost from the first notch. Now, instead of direct communication channels, there was a network of switches, which literally “ate” precious time. The “holy principle of frontier” was also violated - the immediate release of information on the target before the situation was clarified.
This is evidence that during the five years of the 14 air defense division (KP - Tallinn city) as part of the Baltic military district, the necessary knowledge and skills of calculating in extreme conditions, which were practiced for years of continuous study and training, were lost. And at the moment (28 of May of 1987), the level of preparation of the calculations did not match the conditions of the current air situation. This sad fact later gave rise to a chain reaction of serious mistakes at other levels of management.
For 19 minutes, the calculation was unsuccessfully trying to figure out the prevailing air situation, and in the meantime Rust’s plane was approaching Lake Peipsi. In 14.27, the commander of the 656 Fighter Aviation Regiment (Tapa City), assessing the situation, with his decision he lifted into the air a pair of MiG-23 fighter jets with the task of one of them to block the border, another to visually identify the violator of the flight mode. And here it took time to coordinate with the air traffic controllers fighter admission to the search area, since the actions of the air defense forces on duty were carried out in the area of the airway.
In 14.28, it finally turns out that there are no civil aircraft of small aircraft in this area. In 14.29, the operational duty officer of the command post of the 14 Air Defense Division decided to assign the “combat number” 8255 to the violator, to issue information “up” and to declare readiness No. 1.
So at the command post of the 6 Army of Air Defense, information appeared about the 8255 target. The commander of the 6-th Air Defense OA General Hermann Kromin translated into readiness No. 1 all the connections and parts of the 54-th to the air defense. The commanders of the three anti-aircraft missile battalions 204-th Guards. zrbr (n. p. Kerstovo), who were on the route of the flight of Rust, reported that the target was being watched and ready to launch missiles.
Radar 5H84А “Defense” of the radio engineering battalion (Vyshniy Volochek) of the 2 Air Defense Corps of the Moscow District of the Air Defense is accompanied by Matthias Rust's plane. Moscow time 16.48, azimuth of the target 234, distance 75 kilometers
Meanwhile, due to the sudden disappearance of the mark from the plane from the dispatch radar of the Malmo airport, the dispatcher tried to contact Mathias Rust. After several unsuccessful attempts, the plane was declared to be in distress and rescuers were sent to the intended area of the fall. The search continued for several hours. Later, Rust will be charged about 100 thousand dollars for “services rendered”.
On 14.30 on the Cessna-172R flight route, the weather deteriorated dramatically. The wind increased, the lower edge of overcast clouds dropped to 70 – 100 meters, visibility dropped to 600 – 700 meters, and in some places it began to rain. Rust decided to leave with a decline below the lower edge of the clouds and change course in the area of the reserve landmark: the railway hub of the station Dno. In this direction, visibility was better.
During this maneuver in 14.30 (just a minute after receiving the first target data), the target was lost at the command post of the 6 Army. However, the track in the automated system continued to exist. In accordance with the performance characteristics, the system supports the route, its number and all movement parameters for almost two minutes. And if at least one target report arrives in this time interval, target tracking is not interrupted. This is the result of many years of work of designers, military scientists and testers of ACS. It was originally intended to avoid accidental loss of the tracks of air objects.
The loss of radar contact with Rust's aircraft occurred at the junction of the boundaries of responsibility of two air defense units - the 14 Division and the 54 Corps, where consistency of command posts calculations plays an important, if not decisive role. In 14.31, the target reappeared on the radar screens of one of the radar companies, but already 20 kilometers west of the 8255’s previous target route at extremely low altitude. This hampered her steady observation. They decided not to give out information on it, so as not to interfere with the already complicated situation. Especially, the target left the zone of detection of the radar company and entered the zone of responsibility of the adjacent junction.
Ten minutes earlier, in 14.21, in the Peipsi Lake area, a mark with the direction of movement appeared on the screens of the radar on duty: Gdov - Malaya Vishera. In 14.24, information on this goal began to issue "up". With 14.25, the mark became unstable and in 14.28 the tracking of the aircraft was discontinued. In 14.31, the same subdivision reveals a target with the same parameters, but is issued “upward”, as it should be, with a different number.
And all this devilry is combined in time and space. Even to a prepared person, looking at a plan — a result of a detailed, multi-day analysis — it can be difficult to understand what happened then, 18 years ago, in the sky and on earth.
And the following happened. In 14.31, as a result of a brief situation analysis, it is decided that the 8255 target changed course to 60 °. By inputting a complex proofreading computer, the calculation made the “automaton” believe it. Divisions received new target designation, but the target 8255 was not found. From this point on, as it turned out in the course of the investigation, the system instead of the 8255 target was accompanied by a long-lived meteorological object (or their dense group).
This requires some explanation. In the middle of the 70-x, when powerful high-potential locators began to arrive at the armament of the air defense RTV, already during their field tests, marks began to be found with movement parameters commensurate with the characteristics of light-engined airplanes. They jokingly dubbed echo angels. This phenomenon has caused serious difficulties in the automated processing of information. Even if the operator doesn’t distinguish them well, how to teach the “automaton” to work without errors? There was no time for laughter.
In the course of serious research and mass experiments, it was found that specific meteorological objects can observe radar due to the high radiating potential. These are vortex formations that are formed from vertical ascending air flows, especially with a noticeable difference in temperature at the boundary between the earth and water surface. This phenomenon is very characteristic for the spring period in middle latitudes and during the movement of a powerful warm front. The physics of the energy sources of such vortices (with their long existence in the atmosphere) has not yet been fully studied. In addition, the seasonal migration of dense flocks of birds creates a very similar effect. The radar operators needed assistance in recognizing objects of this class. Detailed methods and instructions have been developed for the control bodies of the Air Defense Forces.
The newly followed 8255 target had a height of 1200 meters, an average speed of 85 kilometers per hour. Significant changes in the parameters of the target within just one minute did not alert the calculation and were left without proper attention. It is obvious that in this episode the operators clearly did not have enough qualifications. It was not their fault, but the misfortune of the system. After all, the calculations allowed for combat duty, pass the corresponding tests and exams. It means that someone has not properly learned them in due time. Perhaps, the consequences of the loss of professional staff during the reform of the country's Air Defense Forces in 1978 are also seen here.
In 14.36, the pilot of the MiG-23 fighter, Senior Lieutenant Puchnin (Thapa airfield) found Matthias Rust's plane and reported: "I see a Yak-12-type sports plane with a dark stripe on board in the ruptures of the clouds." Visual contact was short-lived due to dense cloud cover. More to detect the plane Mathias failed. During the investigation, Rust was asked the question: “Did you see the fighter?”. Matthias replied: “Yes, I saw and even greeted him, but he (the fighter) did not give me any signals, but my radio station was turned off.” The report of the pilot MiG-23 was adopted, but was ignored. It was considered that the discovered plane belonged to one of the local flying clubs, where at that time scheduled flights were carried out.
In 15.00, by the decision of the commander of the 6 Army of Air Defense from the Gromovo airfield, a pair of fighters on duty was raised into the air with the task of determining the type and nationality of the 8255 target. On the flight route, the weather did not please the target. The warm front moved southeast. Cloudiness is solid, in some places it rains, the lower edge of the clouds is 200 – 400 meters, the upper edge is 2500 – 3000 meters. The search was carried out within 30 minutes. It was forbidden for fighters to descend into the clouds, it was too dangerous. Reports began to arrive from the anti-aircraft missile battalions that the new target designation of the 8255 target was not detected. In 15.31, the army commander decided that the target of 8255 is a dense flock of birds. This was reported to the TsKP Air Defense Forces.
However, the existing methods and instructions contained the necessary information about which species of birds could fly in fog and clouds at what time of day, and under what circumstances a dense flock could change the direction of flight. If you follow these recommendations, then Rust's plane could not be identified with a bird flock.
In the area of responsibility of the Moscow Air Defense District
15.00 Rust approached the railway station at Dno. The weather has improved by this time. Above the intersection of the railways, he again changed course and continued to hold it all the way to Moscow.
“The guilty were found almost immediately. The Soviet Union has not known such a pogrom since 1937 of the year. ”
In 15.05, the Rust airplane was already within the responsibility of the Moscow Air Defense District, the 2 Air Defense Corps (Rzhev City). His route passed through the aerobatic zones of the air force aviation regiment, where planned flights took place. The air was at the same time before the 12 fighter. In 15.00, the state identification system code has changed in accordance with the schedule. Since this process (technically just a toggle switch) is performed by the crews in the air and on the ground, the procedure takes some time. As a rule, no more than one or two minutes.
In this case (with fighters from the Air Force) the process was delayed prohibitively for a long time. From the higher command post they demanded to immediately deal with the situation, as five of the twelve fighters began to be accompanied by a system without an “I am my plane” recognition signal. In this case, the system makes recommendations on changing the current numbers to “combat” and prepares data for targeting to the anti-aircraft missile divisions and aviation guidance points. The calculation of the command post of the air defense junction tried to contact the flight director iap to give a command to the enthusiastic young pilots to change the code. Due to the lack of direct communication channels, this was done only in 16 minutes.
At this time, in the Moscow District of the Air Defense Forces, the commanders and personnel were awaiting a routine check of the duty personnel with the participation of control targets. The essence of this verification is as follows. According to a previously developed and agreed plan on one of the airplanes that are in the air, the system of state identification is switched off upon command. The inspection manager announces this target to the control. She is assigned a "combat" number and all the necessary actions of the duty forces are carried out with analysis and scoring based on objective control materials.
In order not to make additional confusion in the air situation, the operational duty officer of the command post of the compound gave the command to the head of the calculation of the division's automation system: “Assign the sign“ I am my plane ”to all fighters. On the objections of the officer that such instructions contradict the instructions, he is discharged from combat duty. In the end, the young lieutenant executes the command. Rust's plane is also assigned the sign "I am my plane." Thus, in 15.10, the German pilot, without knowing it, temporarily received legal registration in the airspace of the USSR.
To 16.00 in the area of the city of Ostashkov, Rust's plane entered the detection zone of the next flight on the RTV unit and lost its temporary registration. Information on the aircraft was again issued without the sign “I am my aircraft”. Again, a long clarification of the situation and again the assignment of the required sign and the further legalization of the flight.
Matthias at that time was in 40 kilometers west of the city of Torzhok, where a plane crash occurred the day before. Two aircraft collided in the air - the Tu-22 and MiG-25. At the scene of the fall of the fragments of the machines, several rescue teams and accident investigation specialists were working. People and cargo were delivered to the crash site by helicopters of the aviation unit near the city of Torzhok. One of the helicopters was in the air as a coherent repeater. In 16.30, Rust's plane was identified with the rotorcraft. Therefore, he did not cause any anxiety in this flight segment.
The air situation in the detection zone of the next unit, where Matthias entered, was also tense. Here they fought with the notorious long-lived meteorological objects. They were observed on the screens of the radar indicators already for 40 minutes (and several at a time). All objects moved southeast. Here Rust again came under "amnesty" - he was removed from the escort as a meteorological object. This happened already at the exit from the detection area of the unit.
Nevertheless, at the command post they noticed the course difference of this route from the previously discharged from the air objects. In 16.48, the decision of the commander of the 2 air defense corps raised two duty fighters from the Rzhev airfield with the task of searching for small aircraft or other aircraft southeast of the city of Staritsa. It was believed that wariness during a routine inspection would not be superfluous. Search results did not give.
In 17.40, Mathias's plane hit the radar of the Moscow aeronautical hub. This seriously threatened the safety of air traffic in the Moscow aviation zone. In terms of the aircraft did not appear, flew in violation of the rules, there was no communication with the crew. Until the situation was clarified, the administration of the Sheremetyevo airport stopped receiving and sending passenger liners. At that time, the mass media for some reason attributed some mysteriousness to this fact, right up to the preliminary collusion of Sheremetyevo with Rust.
When coordinating a joint action plan with the command of the Moscow Air Defense District, it was decided that the civil aviation administration itself would cope with the violator of the flight regime. But when they found that the intruder was already in the city limits of Moscow, where flights were generally prohibited, it was too late to say or do anything.
In 18.30, Rust's plane appeared over the Khodynka field and continued flying to the city center. Having decided that it was impossible to land on Ivanovskaya Square of the Kremlin, Matias made three unsuccessful attempts to land on Red Square. The dimensions of the latter allowed to do this, but there were a lot of people on the pavement. And, as Rust himself said during the investigation, “although I signaled by turning on the landing lights and shaking my wings, the tourists in the square did not understand me.”
After that, he made a risky decision - to land on the Moskvoretsky bridge. Turning over the hotel "Russia", began to decline over Bolshaya Ordynka Street, turning on the landing lights. Traffic police of the traffic police in order to avoid an accident on the bridge turned on the red light of the traffic light. Landing on the bridge Rust performed skillfully, given that he had snipers get into the area between the adjacent transverse stretch marks of the trolleybus network. This happened in 18.55. He rode to the Pokrovsky Cathedral and turned off the engine, Matthias stepped out of the plane in a new red jumpsuit, put the pads under the chassis and began to distribute autographs.
It is impossible not to shed light on two more myths that emerged at that time. Someone from the amateur researchers, putting a ruler to the map, wondered why the 850 route with the average speed of the 220 aircraft in kilometers per hour Rust traveled 5 hours in 50 hours? Consequently, I had to land on 1 an hour 30 minutes earlier. A version appeared immediately that he was landing somewhere, and maybe not even one. Someone remembered that they had seen him at Helsinki Airport before flying in jeans and a green shirt, and he was getting out of his plane in Moscow in red overalls. Consequently, changed clothes during landing.
In fact, everything is much simpler and more prosaic. The distance that Rust traveled at his Сessna-172R was 1220 kilometers, the average flight speed, given the variable altitude profile, was 210 kilometers per hour. At the exit, we have 5 hours 50 minutes. It is in strict accordance with the materials of objective control. By the way, after the landing of the fuel in the tanks of the aircraft Rust remained for another two hours of flight. So the pilot could not care about fuel economy.
With a red jumpsuit even easier. While preparing the plane for the flight to Helsinki, the neat German was afraid to get a new overalls specially acquired for this flight. Rust put on top of his jeans and shirt, which he took off before departure. He flew the flight in a new beautiful jumpsuit. After all, he (in his opinion) flew to Moscow as a messenger of peace.
During the flight of Rust, various random events and their most bizarre overlaps occurred. Any of them could lead to the termination of the flight or change its goals. Only one example - a dangerous thunderhead at the beginning of Rust’s flight could radically change everything. However, this did not happen - the planned flight was completed successfully.
Aftermath
Among the reasons for the flight of Mathias Rust at the time was dominated by two versions. The first was that the flight was planned by the West to help Mikhail Gorbachev carry out personnel reform in the highest echelons of the USSR Armed Forces and remove from power the conservative leadership of the army led by Marshal Sokolov. The second version qualified the flight of Rust as reconnaissance. Both versions are too elegant to be true. The second immediately disappeared during the investigation.
What else was revealed during the investigation? The serious imperfection of the legal basis for the actions of the duty forces of the Air Defense Forces of the country became obvious. In fact, the DCs have become hostages of serious miscalculations by politicians and senior officials of the Ministry of Defense. There were insurmountable contradictions between the tasks assigned to the Air Defense Forces and the limited rights of the command personnel in the use of forces and means. In addition, there were no criteria for evaluating the actions of their troops in extreme situations. In many ways, the troubles are rooted in the ill-conceived and unprofessional reorganization of the Air Defense Forces in 1978. You can justifiably say: if there were no 1978, then there would not be 28 events of May 1987.After the flight of Rust, the guilty were found almost immediately. Three Marshals of the Soviet Union and about three hundred generals and officers were removed from their posts. Two of them are convicted. The army did not know such personnel pogrom since 1937 of the year. People came to the leadership of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces, an order of magnitude (or even two) inferior in their professional, business and moral qualities to the marshals and generals. According to many experts, the degradation of the USSR Armed Forces began precisely after Rust. This was largely due to the qualities of the new appointees.
As conclusions
“To the colonel who nearly shot down Rust,” these two texts should be carefully read. Learn. Maybe even lectured. And in their memories somehow stick to them. And in the future, without resorting to amateur, to quote excerpts from these two materials. And it’s right to tell the army jokes that the colonel has not mastered so far. A few words about yourself. 28 May 1987, I was the deputy commander of the 219-th anti-aircraft missile regiment (n. Malinovka Vyborg district of the Leningrad region) 54-air defense corps 6-th OA air defense. Moreover, on that day I acted as commander, since the commander of the unit, Colonel Yushin MM, was on a planned vacation.
Our regiment (the five-channel C-200ВМ) was stationed very far from the route of the flight of Matthias Rust (where Kohtla-Järve and where we are - Vyborg district). Despite the fact that the task of finding and detecting the aircraft was also set for us, we could not detect Rust with our five rays of the ROC C-200 simply because of the curvature of the earth's surface.
The situation on the command post of the corps was calm. She then seemed to us as an ordinary work on real goals, nothing more. At that moment, simply no one imagined how all this would ultimately end. The corps commander, General Kornyakov (he is still warmly remembered by all personnel), led the actions of his subordinates confidently. And the fact that Rust sat on Red Square, we learned not the second day, not the third. Not immediately. Anyway, not on the same evening. And the personnel pogrom began. Moreover, the most prepared and qualified generals and officers, who in their posts could bring many more benefits to the country and the army, suffered. The management of our 54 Air Defense Corps beautifully said goodbye to subordinates (commander, deputy, chief of staff). From the command post on the speakerphone, thanked for the service, wished all the best, asked not to remember dashing.
Information