The problem of integration of Tajikistan into the Customs Union
In the integration of each post-Soviet republic in the Customs Union has its own specifics. Belarus, for example, wants trade without any restrictions, Kazakhstan protects its industry, isolated Armenia needs to be “connected” by rail to the Union. However, the most problematic will be the integration of the two Central Asian republics - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And if the Kyrgyz goods can still be reconciled with the Kyrgyz re-export, the problem is different in Tajikistan: the state and drug cartels have grown together like Siamese twins.
Holes in the border
Kyrgyzstan, as is known, has no common borders with Afghanistan, which in no way protects it from drug trafficking. The fact is that there is no common border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - the delimitation agreement is still at the negotiation stage. In addition, the future boundary passes through the mountainous terrain and control over it is very conditional.
The condition of the Tajik-Afghan border is no better: the number of holes in it is simply incredible, and the equipment of the Tajik border guards does not hold water.
However, even this is only half the problem: the merger of the state apparatus and law enforcement agencies with local drug cartels poses a greater danger.
Transit appendage of monocultural Afghanistan
According to a recently published report “Between cooperation and isolation: Afghanistan’s relations with the republics of Central Asia”, the only sector of the economy connecting the leadership of Tajikistan with Afghanistan is drug trafficking. It is noteworthy that the key player in the Tajik drug market is not the drug cartels, but the officials and law enforcement officials on both sides of the border.
In fact, without the proceeds of drug trafficking, Tajikistan will become an incompetent state and will be plunged first into the most severe intra-elite confrontation, which will then grow into a civil war.
It is noteworthy that the economic model of Tajikistan will soon completely exhaust itself. If the shadow economy in the republic rests on control over drug flows and collecting tribute from the remaining local enterprises, the official economic pillars are guest remittances, aluminum trade and cotton exports. And all of these branches of the Tajik "economy" have already begun to have significant problems.
Thus, the volume of aluminum production in the first half of the year was reduced by 47%, it is said that Emomali Rakhmon's family is fed from the only aluminum plant TALCO. Cotton production has also fallen and remittances from Russia to Tajikistan have declined.
However, the economy of Tajikistan is in a kind of homeostasis and it can be broken either by the mass return of guest workers from Russia, or by the beginning of the real work on Eurasian integration. The campaign of the Afghan Taliban to the North is unlikely: they have yet to face official Kabul. In addition, the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Tajikistan is the Russian 201-I base. The trouble is that integrating Tajikistan in its current state is impossible, and leaving it outside of integration processes threatens to randomize the republic and inevitably lead to the subsequent export of instability to neighboring states.
Destructive dilemma
It is almost pointless to carry out reforms in Tajikistan: they will be sabotaged by local elitist groups who have created joint drug enterprises with Afghanistan, and the funds allocated for reform will be inefficiently spent.
Solve the problem with "leaky borders" could return the Russian border guards to the Tajik-Afghan border. But the elites of Tajikistan will not agree to such a step. First, the easy drug profits corrupt: the elites of Tajikistan are possible and can earn on something else, but not the fact that they want. Secondly, the drying up of narcotic rivers will cause a sharp reduction in the food supply base of the Tajik elitarians, which will automatically lead to an aggravation of internal contradictions and the beginning of civil strife.
With this scenario, the first thing likely to break out is Gorny Badakhshan, which borders Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. Dushanbe’s control over Badakhshan can be called highly conditional. Gorno-Badakhshan "authorities" (this is a common formula in the local media, and without quotation marks) are directly accused of smuggling, organizing drug trafficking, creating illegal armed groups. But Dushanbe has only one comment to them - the late return of bank loans. And this is not surprising: the central authorities do not have the forces to control this region, and attempts to strengthen the position of the government in autonomy by force will only lead to greater destabilization.
This area is also attractive for Americans trying to shake Central Asia. Kindle fire in Badakhshan is easy, as evidenced by the burning of the police department in the capital of autonomy - Khorog. Then instability can be transferred to the rest of Tajikistan, as well as to China, where interethnic contradictions between the Uighurs and the Hans are intensely heated.
Protect the neighbors
There is reason to think that in the near future Moscow will have to prepare for plunging Tajikistan into chaos, from which it is unlikely that the CSTO’s measures to strengthen the borders of the republic are unlikely to be protected. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on stimulating the prompt delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and equipping it with all the necessary controls. In addition, the preparation of a corps of crisis managers capable of resuscitating the chaotic republics would not be redundant. Soon they will be useful not only in Novorossia, but also in other parts of Eurasia, which our overseas “partners” will burn before our retreat before our retreat.
Holes in the border
Kyrgyzstan, as is known, has no common borders with Afghanistan, which in no way protects it from drug trafficking. The fact is that there is no common border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - the delimitation agreement is still at the negotiation stage. In addition, the future boundary passes through the mountainous terrain and control over it is very conditional.
The condition of the Tajik-Afghan border is no better: the number of holes in it is simply incredible, and the equipment of the Tajik border guards does not hold water.
However, even this is only half the problem: the merger of the state apparatus and law enforcement agencies with local drug cartels poses a greater danger.
Transit appendage of monocultural Afghanistan
According to a recently published report “Between cooperation and isolation: Afghanistan’s relations with the republics of Central Asia”, the only sector of the economy connecting the leadership of Tajikistan with Afghanistan is drug trafficking. It is noteworthy that the key player in the Tajik drug market is not the drug cartels, but the officials and law enforcement officials on both sides of the border.
In fact, without the proceeds of drug trafficking, Tajikistan will become an incompetent state and will be plunged first into the most severe intra-elite confrontation, which will then grow into a civil war.
It is noteworthy that the economic model of Tajikistan will soon completely exhaust itself. If the shadow economy in the republic rests on control over drug flows and collecting tribute from the remaining local enterprises, the official economic pillars are guest remittances, aluminum trade and cotton exports. And all of these branches of the Tajik "economy" have already begun to have significant problems.
Thus, the volume of aluminum production in the first half of the year was reduced by 47%, it is said that Emomali Rakhmon's family is fed from the only aluminum plant TALCO. Cotton production has also fallen and remittances from Russia to Tajikistan have declined.
However, the economy of Tajikistan is in a kind of homeostasis and it can be broken either by the mass return of guest workers from Russia, or by the beginning of the real work on Eurasian integration. The campaign of the Afghan Taliban to the North is unlikely: they have yet to face official Kabul. In addition, the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Tajikistan is the Russian 201-I base. The trouble is that integrating Tajikistan in its current state is impossible, and leaving it outside of integration processes threatens to randomize the republic and inevitably lead to the subsequent export of instability to neighboring states.
Destructive dilemma
It is almost pointless to carry out reforms in Tajikistan: they will be sabotaged by local elitist groups who have created joint drug enterprises with Afghanistan, and the funds allocated for reform will be inefficiently spent.
Solve the problem with "leaky borders" could return the Russian border guards to the Tajik-Afghan border. But the elites of Tajikistan will not agree to such a step. First, the easy drug profits corrupt: the elites of Tajikistan are possible and can earn on something else, but not the fact that they want. Secondly, the drying up of narcotic rivers will cause a sharp reduction in the food supply base of the Tajik elitarians, which will automatically lead to an aggravation of internal contradictions and the beginning of civil strife.
With this scenario, the first thing likely to break out is Gorny Badakhshan, which borders Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. Dushanbe’s control over Badakhshan can be called highly conditional. Gorno-Badakhshan "authorities" (this is a common formula in the local media, and without quotation marks) are directly accused of smuggling, organizing drug trafficking, creating illegal armed groups. But Dushanbe has only one comment to them - the late return of bank loans. And this is not surprising: the central authorities do not have the forces to control this region, and attempts to strengthen the position of the government in autonomy by force will only lead to greater destabilization.
This area is also attractive for Americans trying to shake Central Asia. Kindle fire in Badakhshan is easy, as evidenced by the burning of the police department in the capital of autonomy - Khorog. Then instability can be transferred to the rest of Tajikistan, as well as to China, where interethnic contradictions between the Uighurs and the Hans are intensely heated.
Protect the neighbors
There is reason to think that in the near future Moscow will have to prepare for plunging Tajikistan into chaos, from which it is unlikely that the CSTO’s measures to strengthen the borders of the republic are unlikely to be protected. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on stimulating the prompt delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and equipping it with all the necessary controls. In addition, the preparation of a corps of crisis managers capable of resuscitating the chaotic republics would not be redundant. Soon they will be useful not only in Novorossia, but also in other parts of Eurasia, which our overseas “partners” will burn before our retreat before our retreat.
Information