The Great War: The Schlieffen Plan
Schlieffen Plan
Based on the experience of the 19th century wars, German theorists were aiming the army to win one general battle. Having planned to throw all forces into battle at once and win, the Germans underestimated the role of strategic reserves.
Schlieffen developed a theory of encirclement and destruction of the enemy by crushing blows on his flanks (or one of them), with a subsequent exit to the rear. The operational idea of the Schlieffen plan finally crystallized in 1905. The essence of the plan was to decide the outcome of the entire war with a single strategic offensive operation (general battle). The enemy's army, in this case France, was planned to reach from the right flank, squeeze into a bag and destroy. Deprived of the army, France was forced to capitulate. The main blow was delivered through the territory of Belgium. By nature, the border of France was inconvenient for a massive invasion, along it ran a series of wooded mountains and hills - the Ardennes, Argonnes, Vosges. In addition, convenient passages were locked with powerful fortresses that could greatly slow down the invasion and generally bury the plan for a quick war. While the German troops would be busy with the fortresses, the French could complete the mobilization and launch a counter-offensive. Therefore, Schlieffen wanted to deliver the main blow across the plain of Flanders (Belgium).
The left wing at this time was to hold down the enemy by the battle. It was noted that if the left wing of the German army, under the pressure of the advancing forces of the French army, which planned to deliver the main blow in the center of the front, would retreat, it would even be advantageous to reach the enemy more successfully. The deepening of the French army on the territory of Germany will lead to even more disastrous consequences for it, after the completion of the right flank. Schlieffen believed that further the Ardennes, wooded and hilly territory, the enemy will not pass. And then the main forces will come to the rear of the shock grouping of the French and the huge “Cannes” will turn out, the French will be forced to capitulate.
In the east, they planned to leave a minor barrier. The German command was counting on a slow mobilization of the Russian army: in Germany it was planned to be completed in 10 days, in Russia, then, it lasted 30 days. After the defeat of France, they were going to transfer troops to the Eastern Front, using the developed network of German railways. Kaiser Wilhelm II said: "We will have lunch in Paris, and dinner in St. Petersburg." On the Eastern Front, they also dreamed of repeating "Cannes": deliver converging blows - the Germans from the north, and the Austrians from the south, from Krakow. Allied forces are encountered in the Warsaw area, surrounding the Russian army in Poland. The defeat and surrender of the main forces of the Russian army were to lead to the defeat of Russia. In the end - a complete victory in the West and East. And in the shortest possible time.
Schlieffen did not count on a solid alliance with Italy, although this country was part of the Central Powers bloc. In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy signed a secret treaty on the Triple Alliance. In 1887 and 1891 the contract was renewed, and automatically renewed in 1902 and 1912. However, there was little hope of a strong alliance with Italy. Italy wanted significant territorial concessions from Austria-Hungary, and already in 1902, it entered into an agreement with France, pledging to maintain neutrality in the event Germany attacked France. This forced Schlieffen to abandon the idea of holding two flank attacks, with the participation of the Italian army.
According to the theoretical calculations of Schlieffen against France, it was necessary to deploy 35 army corps (70 infantry divisions) and 8 cavalry divisions, in the second echelon there were also 8 reserve corps (16 divisions). They were united in 7 armies. The German troops, having the Metz and Diddenhofen (Thionville) area as the axis of descent, had to go deeply around the enemy’s left flank to Amiens or to the west to Abbeville and even along the coast of France, covering Paris from the north-west. The corps of the 5 armies (1-5) participated in the strike, one army was holding the right flank. The troops remaining in Alsace and Lorraine (around 4 1 / 2 corps - 10 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) could withdraw under the onslaught of the enemy on the line Metz, Strasbourg and even to the Rhine. By this the French armies were drawn into the ring of encirclement. French troops planned to destroy around the Alsace region or to press against Switzerland.
Altogether, Schlieffen planned to deploy 48 corps (96 infantry divisions) and 11 cavalry divisions against France. But, it was in theory. In fact, Germany had 1905 infantry and 62 cavalry divisions by 10. According to the 1905 plan of the year, the ratio of forces to the north and south of Metz was 7: 1. It was a risk. So, criticizing the balance of power between the right and left flanks of the German army, Schlieffen's student Ludendorf noted in his memoirs: “Such limited forces that Schlieffen left in Alsace-Lorraine without any justification could create an unnecessary danger for success, which was the most dangerous strategic game” . The French army, with skillful leadership and a certain determination, could put the German army in a very difficult position, intercepting the message lines of the German wings.
In addition, the question arose of supplying a huge mass of troops on the right flank of the German army. So, two weeks after the start of the offensive, the right wing began to feel a significant shortage in supply, and this despite the fact that the army grouping was significantly weakened when the plan was improved by the new Chief of Staff Helmut von Moltke. In addition, Schlieffen assumed that German troops would reach the Franco-Belgian border by 30 day from the start of mobilization. But during this considerable period of time, the French had to learn about the movement of huge masses of German troops on their left flank and, using their powerful French railway network, to regroup their armies, depriving the enemy of a operational advantage.
Alfred Von Schlieffen (1833 - 1913)
Moltke changes
Despite the significant shortcomings of the Schlieffen plan, it was still maintained, although it made significant changes. Helmut Johann Ludwig von Moltke (Moltke Jr.), who in 1906 headed the Great General Staff of the German Empire, under pressure from disgruntled warlords and Kaiser Wilhelm II, improved the Schlieffen Plan. Schlieffen's ideas were considered too risky, fearing to leave too weak a grouping on the left flank of the Western Front.
The main idea of the main strike on the right flank through Belgium was maintained. However, the left wing was greatly strengthened to the detriment of the strike force on the right flank. The deployment plan of Moltke, with whom the German Empire entered the war in 1914, was as follows. In the Metz area and north of it, it was planned to deploy 26 1 / 2 corps, including reserve ones (and Schlieffen proposed to deploy 35 with half corps), almost all cavalry units and 17 landwehr brigades. This group of armies was supposed to bypass the left flank of the French armies with its right wing, advancing through Belgium, and secured its left wing with the fortifications of Metz and Diddenhofen. In the German center there were 11 corps (400 thousand soldiers), taking Luxembourg, they covered the right flank of the main strike force. The main strike force, 16 Corps (700 thousand people), was to pass through Belgium, crushing two powerful fortresses of Liege and Namur along the way, force the Meuse River, take Brussels on 19 mobilization day and cross the Belgian-French border on 28 day. Then the troops were to advance west and south, coming to Paris from the north on 39 day. Moltke promised the Austrians that on 40 the day the German command would begin to deploy troops to the east, in order to crush Russia together with the Austro-Hungarian army.
The left wing of the German army was significantly strengthened: 8 army corps were deployed in Alsace and Lorraine - 320 thousand people (according to Schlieffen's plan there were 4 and a half). As a result, the balance of power between the northern and southern groups became equal to 3: 1 (for Schlieffen, it was 7: 1). Although these troops were hardly able to contain the bulk of the French troops. But this one was not required of them. In retreating, they had to lengthen the lines of communication of the shock forces of the French, complicate their interaction in mountainous wooded areas, lure the greatest possible number of French troops into the region, which did not decide anything in the general course of the war, and then shut the trap.
Thus, there was a significant weakening of the right wing of the German army, a significant strengthening of the Alsace-Lorraine group. These were the most significant differences between the 1914 plan of the year and the Schlieffen plan. In addition, while Schlieffen on the Eastern Front was going to confine himself to defense with the help of landver connections, then Moltke Jr. sent 3 field and 1 reserve corps to the Russian border, not counting reserve divisions, landwehr and reinforced garrisons of fortresses.
Helmut Johann Ludwig von Moltke (1848 - 1916)
The main reasons that forced the German command to change the Schlieffen plan were as follows:
1) the threat of a strong blow on the left flank and the general lack of strength prevented a radical strengthening of the right wing of the German army. The German command did not take risks, since with the active attack of the French army the entire rear of the German armies was threatened, the French could intercept communications and upset the attack on the right wing;
2) industrial circles were afraid of the severe destruction and devastation of the highly industrialized Alsace-Lorraine region. He was in the 1905 year, when Schlieffen’s plan was drawn up, had not yet risen to such a height as in the 1914 year. They wanted to save the area from destruction, so it could not be given away to the enemy, as Schlieffen suggested;
3) under the pressure of the Prussian youth (nobility), the supreme command decided to divert quite significant forces to defend East Prussia. Against the Russian Empire, the 8 Army, under the command of General Maximilian von Pritvice (200, thousand people), was deployed in East Prussia. Military considerations sacrificed the economic interests of the German Junkers;
4) an assessment of the transport capabilities of Germany to supply such a huge mass of troops, which Schlieffen intended to concentrate on the right flank, showed that during the offensive it would be impossible to provide it with everything necessary.
In addition to the objective lack of strength, one can see a great influence on the German command of the German industrial bourgeoisie, as well as on the landlords-junkers. The German military could not disregard the interests of the nobility and the big bourgeoisie. As a result, the German Empire in 1914 entered the war with high hopes for the realization of its goals, but for the implementation of all tasks from the Second Reich simply did not have enough strength and resources. In addition, the German military-political leadership underestimated the opponents, the strength and the means of Russia, France and England, which harbored the prerequisites for the future defeat of the German Empire.
It should be noted that a number of researchers believe that in implementing the original Schlieffen plan, the German army had a chance of success. And the 1914 plan of the year led to a dispersal of power, which deprived the German army of any chance of success in the 1914 campaign of the year. Other historians believe that Moltke’s “mistakes” were not the causes of the failure of the German Blitzkrieg. There were many objective reasons for the failure, including the technical unpreparedness of the armies of that time for such a rapid movement, the inability to calculate all the factors, including the fast and successful Russian offensive in East Prussia. The smooth German plan was only on paper; it did not take into account many factors.
Source:: Kolenkovsky A. The agile period of the first world imperialist war 1914.
German Plan on the Eastern Front
The commander of the German army 8, which was set against Russia, received "free hand" - had to conduct operations in the east at its own discretion. In general, the 8 Army received the task of securing the eastern regions of the empire from the invasion of Russian troops and supporting the offensive planned by Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian offensive was planned to be supported by Silesia, for which the Landwehr Corps was identified. In general, the German command believed that the best support for the Austro-Hungarian army would be the factor that the 8-I army would spoil the possible large forces of the Russian troops, distracting them from Galicia.
If the Russians launch an offensive against East Prussia, it will lead by such forces that the pressure on the Austro-Hungarian army will be seriously weakened. If the Russian army takes a wait-and-see or defensive position towards Germany, then the commander of the 8 Army must conduct offensive actions and coordinate its movement with the Austro-Hungarian command. As a result, the German command reserved full freedom of action in any situation. The Austrian command had no guarantees that they would be helped in any way.
In accordance with these instructions, the commander of 8 of the German army, von Pritvits, relying on the Mazury lake-marsh line, deployed one army corps front to Narew, approximately from Mlawa to Vilenberg, the second front to the Neman between Goldap and Gumbinen, the remaining two corps were in the army reserve in the area of Angerburg, Allenstein, Marienburg. German troops were located near the junction stations of the railways so that they could be quickly transported in the right direction. Landveor corps located on the direction from Silesia to Ivangorod, as if to communicate with the Austro-Hungarian army.
The German Army
The German soldier of the 1914 model of the year opposing the Entente countries was well prepared. Dressed in a green-gray uniform, a German soldier carried 26 kg of cargo - rifle, ammunition, grenades, satchel, entrenching tools, bowler hat, scissors, food ration and a flask with schnapps. The officers still had binoculars and a tablet with maps. The head was defended by a pointed helmet, where the number of the regiment was marked with red paint. Staff officers moved in cars.
Foreign experts noted the perfection of technical equipment and the smooth running of the German military machine. Her greatest strength was artillery, especially heavy. The Germans, earlier than their opponents, appreciated the importance of howitzers, which fired at the outboard trajectory with projectiles of great destructive power. Such guns caused enormous damage to the enemy troops and overcame most of the defenses. The division had 24 machine guns and 72 guns, of which 12 are heavy. The corps artillery consisted of 16 heavy guns (caliber 150 mm). German heavy artillery counted 1914 guns in 575, French guns only 180, and Russian guns 240. In addition, the Germans used the disregard of the French by the new factors of modern war: machine guns, heavy artillery, barbed wire, etc. For the first time, German observers saw a lot of them at the first big modern-type war, the Russian-Japanese. Therefore, technically, the German army was significantly superior to the army of opponents.
However, idealize the German army is also not worth it. She also had her drawbacks, and serious ones. Although the German command studied the experience of previous conflicts, it did not learn all the possible lessons from it. Thus, the tactics of the army still lagged behind modern requirements. Defense paid insufficient attention. When the offensive was going to attack, like the past in full growth, without using all the terrain factors, thick chains - at intervals in 2 stride or even thick columns. Such an archaic method of stopping the chain after a certain number of steps was preserved, the soldiers took aim, fired a volley and marched on. And all this is under enemy fire. The cavalry was also prepared for attacks in tight formation. All these elements led to great losses.
The German Imperial Army before World War 1 and during the war
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