The Munich Agreement seemed to be studied for a long time and reliably up and down. Meanwhile, it is considered to be the agreement of the monolithic West with Nazi Germany, while in the last part we established that the West was in fact divided and its leaders pursued their own, and diametrically opposite goals, objectives and interests. In the light of the new circumstances, the September events of 1938 of the year appear in a completely new light - as one of the brightest episodes of the diplomatic struggle of America against England for world domination.
As we remember on the eve of Munich, “France ... organized a variant with the defeat of Germany and Poland in the event of their attack on Czechoslovakia. In the end, France was profitable against Germany, the alliance of England, France and Italy, familiar to us from Stresa. " England needed the Anglo-French-Italian-German alliance for the controlled surrender of Czechoslovakia, the defeat of the USSR during the "crusade" "in which the role of the strike force was assigned to fascist Germany in the West and militaristic Japan in the East" for the cardinal solution of inter-imperialist contradictions and maintaining its leadership in the international arena (Year of the Crisis, 1938 – 1939: Documents and Materials. In 2 T. T. 1. September 29 1938 - May 31 1939 - Moscow: Politizdat, 1990. - S. 7; Lebedev S. America v. England: Part of 10 // The Leviathan Struggle in // http://topwar.ru/52614-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast-10-shvatka-leviafanov.html).
“In turn, America arranged for Germany to defeat first Czechoslovakia and then France in order to weaken Britain, conclude the Anglo-German-Italian alliance and surrender (by the United States - SL) the leading positions on the world stage to the United States of America.” The inter-imperialist contradictions were supposed to be resolved either at the expense of the USSR or at the expense of England (Lebedev S. America v. England. Part 10. Ibid.). The American point of view in Munich was defended by Hitler, while the British were actively using the French project to localize the American project. As a result, in the fall of 1938 in Munich, the exclusive interests of England and America clashed.
In particular, when “in Munich, the Czechoslovak observers expressed to Chamberlain their bewilderment why he prompted Czechoslovakia to mobilize, and also publicly stated in a sufficiently clear form that Britain and France together with the USSR would oppose Germany if Hitler used force to solve the Sudeten question, and now he frankly sacrificed all the interests of Czechoslovakia and demanded the withdrawal and demobilization of the newly mobilized army. Chamberlain responded with cynical frankness that he did not take all this seriously, but was only a maneuver to put pressure on Hitler, in other words, it was Counter Chamber's bluff (Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - 36).
11 September 1938, England and France declared that in the event of war they would support Czechoslovakia, but if Germany did not allow war, she would get everything she wanted. The next day, speaking at a party congress in Nuremberg, Hitler said that he wanted to live in peace with England, France and Poland, but would be forced to support the Sudeten Germans if their oppression did not cease. Thus, England rejected the American version, voiced by Hitler, and offered him either her own choice or the French one. Hitler showed firmness and insisted. “For a moment the war seemed inevitable, but then the events took an amazing turn.
In the September 13 message that was sent on the night, the British Prime Minister declared his readiness immediately, regardless of prestige considerations, to come to any city for a personal conversation with Hitler. ... Hitler felt very flattered, although this proposal slowed down his apparent craving for a collision. Later he said: “I was completely stunned” (Festus I. Hitler. Biography. Triumph and fall into the abyss / Translated from German. - M .: Veche, 2007. - C. 272). At the very first meeting with A. Hitler on September 15 in his residence Berghof in the Bavarian Alps N. Chamberlain agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia, but not by force, but by peaceful means. Thus, N. Chamberlain created the Anglo-German alliance with the dominant position of England, which, with the participation of France, was able to dictate its terms to both Italy and Germany. “It was agreed that Chamberlain would return to England to discuss the matter with the cabinet of ministers, and in the meantime Hitler would not take any military measures. ...
As soon as Chamberlain left, Hitler began to force the crisis ... pushing Hungary and Poland to make territorial demands on Prague, at the same time stimulating Slovaks' desire for autonomy ”(Fest I. Decree. Op. C. 273 – 274). Thus, Hitler nullified the outcome of the negotiations. At the same time, England and France really demanded that Czechoslovakia accept Hitler’s proposals, threatening that “if ... the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war can assume the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then the governments of England and France will find it very difficult to stand aside ”(History Diplomacy / Edited by V.P. Potemkin // http://www.diphis.ru/s-a755.html).
21 September The Czechoslovak government issued an English-French ultimatum, while Poland, incited by Germany, sent a note to Czechoslovakia demanding a solution to the problem of the Polish minority in Cieszyn Silesia. As a result, when Chamberlain met with Hitler in Godesberg (now a suburb of Bonn) for the second time on September 22 and informed the Führer that the issue of the Sudeten Germans was resolved by the British and French governments in exact accordance with Germany’s wishes, Hitler unexpectedly demanded that “territorial the claims of Hungary and Poland, with which Germany is bound by friendly agreements ”(Shearer U. The rise and fall of the Third Reich // http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/GERM/shirer1.txt_with-big-pictures.html). According to E. von Weizsäcker, “Hitler repaid evil for good, demanding from Chamberlain more than what was stated in Berchtsgaden” (Weizsäkker E. Ambassador of the Third Reich / Translated by F. Kapitsa. - Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. - - C. 160).
On the same day, the Polish government urgently announced the denunciation of the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement on national minorities and announced to Czechoslovakia an ultimatum about the accession of Poland to the lands with the Polish population. In response to this, “23 of September the Soviet government warned the Polish government that if Polish forces concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia invade its borders, the USSR will consider this an act of undisguised aggression and denounce the non-aggression pact with Poland” (Shirokorad A .B. Great intermission. - M .: AST, AST MOSCOW, 2009. - S. 249), and Czechoslovakia announced a general mobilization. “The news of mobilization in Czechoslovakia, which broke into promiscuous, nervous final negotiations, further strengthened the sense of impending catastrophe” (Festus I. Decree. Op. - S. 272) and “for the second time, the parties dispersed, doubting whether it was possible over time to reach an agreement, as the date set by Hitler to invade Czechoslovakia was stubbornly approaching.
Meanwhile, the real disagreements between England and Germany were so insignificant and related only to the way the Sudeten lands would be annexed - peacefully or by war ”(Weizsäcker E. Decree. Op. - C. 161 – 162). Thus, the fate of Czechoslovakia was originally predetermined and the essence of the negotiations was reduced to the struggle of England and America for world leadership and the conclusion of an alliance with the participation of England, France, Italy and Germany, followed by the defeat of the USSR for the sake of keeping England of its leadership in the international arena or Italy and Germany, followed by the defeat of Czechoslovakia, France and the USSR for the sake of giving the UK leading positions on the world stage to the United States of America.
“The British cabinet, which met on Sunday, September 25, to discuss the Hitler memorandum, flatly rejected the new requirements and assured the French government of support for Czechoslovakia in the event of a military clash with Germany. Prague, which accepted the Berchtesgaden conditions only under strong pressure, now has the freedom of action to repulse Hitler’s claims. Military preparations began in England and France ”(Fest I. Decree. Op. - C. 275). “September 26 and September 27 Twice September 1938. US President F. Roosevelt sent messages to Hitler, B. Mussolini, N. Chamberlain, E. Daladier and E. Benes to make new efforts to prevent armed clashes, convening a conference for this purpose“ countries concerned ”(Year of the Crisis, 1938 – 1939: Documents and Materials. In 2 T. T. 2. 2 June 1939 - September 14 1939 - Moscow: Politizdat, 1990. - C. 372). 28 September 1938, "the Soviet government came out ... with the proposal" about the immediate convening of an international conference to discuss measures to prevent aggression and prevent a new war. ... Moreover, he agreed to render military assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France, with the only condition that Czechoslovakia itself would resist the aggressor and ask for Soviet assistance "(History of the USSR Foreign Policy. In 2 t. Volume 1. - M .: Science, 1976 - S. 347).
Thus, Chamberlain refused to go on about Roosevelt and did not allow Germany, along with Poland, to defeat Czechoslovakia, and then France. Accepting the American conditions, he chose to destroy the regime of Hitler. Saving Nazi Germany from military defeat at the time of the highest tension “Roosevelt personally asked to act as an intermediary for Mussolini. In the morning of September 28, following the American proposal and the advice of the British, Mussolini suggested that Hitler cancel the mobilization order, which was supposed to come into effect that morning "and convene a quadripartite meeting in order to settle all the problems with the world (Weizsäkker E. Decree. Op. - S. 162).
According to the head of the personal archive of the former president of Czechoslovakia, T. Masaryk Shkrah, the Hitler regime in Germany was “rotten through and would not have survived even the shortest war, at least with Czechoslovakia alone. ... Shkrah drew the conclusion that Czechoslovakia was sacrificed precisely because all the participants in this tragedy were terribly afraid of the collapse of the Hitler regime, afraid of dying under the ruins of this colossus, afraid of the inevitable revolution that would have affected not only France but also England the whole of Europe "(Year of the crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - S. 104).
“Then Hitler did not have enough forces for the war with Czechoslovakia - against 30 well-armed Czechoslovak divisions that relied on strong defenses, the Germans had only 24 infantry, 1 tank, 1 mountain rifle and 1 cavalry division ”(Weizsäcker E. Decree. Op. Cit. - S. 160). Even though Poland “was preparing to attack Czechoslovakia in alliance with Germany ... the Red Army alone could defeat the combined armies of Germany and Poland in September 1938” (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. Cit. - pp. 244–245) . Hitler pinned to the wall by the military preparations of England, France, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, Hitler backtracked and “offered to meet with Mussolini, Chamberlain and possibly Daladier to settle the Czech question” peacefully (Weizsacker E. Decree. Op. Cit. - S. 163).
“On September 29, Chamberlain got on a plane for the third time and left for Germany. ... Germany was represented by Hitler, England - by Chamberlain, France - Daladier, Italy - Mussolini. Negotiations ended around two in the morning. The terms of the Godesberg Memorandum were fully accepted. Czechoslovakia proposed to transfer to Germany all the regions bordering on it. ... The agreement also pointed out the need to "settle" the question of the Polish and Hungarian national minorities in Czechoslovakia. Thus, it meant the rejection of Czechoslovakia of several more parts of its territory in favor of Poland and Hungary. After this issue is “settled”, the remaining part of Czechoslovakia should be provided with guarantees of England, France, Germany and Italy against unprovoked aggression ”(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - C. 248).
As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia lost part of its territory, “lost the right to ask and expect something from the USSR”, and its will to fight, because in the event of resistance to Czechoslovakia, the USSR would immediately start a war with all of Europe in which Czechoslovakia would “be swept away ... deleted from the map of Europe ”even if the USSR was victorious, was paralyzed (Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - S. 35, 46). For France, Munich became capitulation, a new Sedan - with the loss of Czechoslovakia, she lost her greatness, and with it her last allies. Before the threat of armed confrontation with Germany one on one, she was now forced to obediently stand in the wake of British politics.
“The USSR was put in a position of virtually complete international isolation. The Soviet-French agreement on mutual aid was deprived of all meaning and significance. The governments of Britain and France, hoping to push Germany into war with the Soviet Union, openly emphasized that they did not want to have anything in common with the USSR. The Foreign Office stopped all contacts with the Soviet embassy in London after Munich. In England, the issue of breaking a trade agreement with the Soviet Union was seriously considered ”(Sipols V.Ya. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of the Second World War. - M .: International relations, 1979 // http://militera.lib.ru/research/sipols1 /03.html).
Essentially, Germany was given freedom of action in Eastern Europe in exchange for expansion into the USSR. We should not disregard the fact that “in July – August 1938, the Red Army fought hard at Lake Hassan and was on the verge of a big war with Japan” (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - S. 245), “During the Munich conference, I. Ribbentrop presented the draft tripartite pact between Germany, Italy and Japan to the Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano” (Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 51).
Meanwhile, the Munich Agreement was initially directed against America and that is why the States suffered the main defeat. England, having stopped the American plan, managed to embody the project. According to the British, “it is precisely in the face of the constantly strengthening economy of the United States of America that the European economy is in serious danger if the four powers, instead of cooperating, oppose each other,” and therefore the British government immediately began implementing economic cooperation between Germany, England, France and Italy against America's disagreeable (Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - S. 70).
In the fall of 1938 of the year, Chamberlain embodied his unfulfilled dream of the 1933 of the year - the Pact of Four (The Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 42) into reality. It is not surprising that he returned to London happily declared at the airport, waving the text of the agreement: “I brought peace to our time”, while the pro-American Churchill and Hitler, in contrast to him, were dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations. Moreover, Hitler was determined to, at the earliest opportunity, reset all the agreements reached. “Official London sought to formalize the collusion offered by it in a full-size agreement, but in the end it was content to sign the declaration“ never again fight each other ”with Hitler 30 September 1938 and continue efforts to eliminate“ possible sources of disagreement ”by consulting. In fact, it was a non-aggression agreement ”(Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 6).
The essentially anti-Soviet military alliance, in case the USSR rendered assistance to Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland 1 on October 1938, invaded Czechoslovakia. Germany occupied the Sudetenland, and Poland, to the great discontent of England and Italy, occupied the Cieszyn region. Following England 3 in October 1938, France began consultations with Germany regarding the conclusion of an alliance similar to that of Germany and England (Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 46). "Chamberlain attached great importance to this signing and (was - SL) was disappointed that the German side ... did not appreciate the significance of this Munich declaration." What, in England, in particular, was judged "by the fact that this declaration was not noted in the speech of the Fuhrer in Saarbrücken" (Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - S. 70).
At the insistence of Berlin 5 in October, President Benes resigned, and General Syrovy temporarily took over his post. October 7 under pressure from Germany, the Czechoslovak government decided to grant autonomy to Slovakia, October 8 - Subcarpathian Russia. As in the case of the Pact of Four, Poland immediately began to torpedo a new quadripartite treaty and supported Hungary’s intention to form a powerful barrier to Germany on its way to the Soviet Union by creating the Polish-Hungarian border in the Carpathians. October 13 1938 Hungary attempted to resolve misunderstandings with Germany arising from the demand for the return of Carpathian Russia, and on October 21 1938, Hitler issued a secret instruction “about the possibility of resolving the issue with the Czech Republic remnants in the near future (Year of crisis. T. 1. Decree op. - C. 78).
In order to resolve the conflict with Poland, Ribbentrop in an interview with the Polish Ambassador Lipsky 24 in October 1938 offered to sacrifice Carpathian Rus in exchange for Danzig and the highway (Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 86). “These proposals envisaged the accession to the third Reich of Danzig (while maintaining economic benefits in Danzig for Poland); the construction by Germany of an extraterritorial highway and railway line through the Polish Pomerania; extension of the Polish-German declaration of friendship and non-aggression by 25 years; Germany’s guarantee of the Polish-German border. Ribbentrop proposed that, thus strengthening the Polish-German friendship, both countries should pursue a “common policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact” (Sipols V.Ya. Decree. Op.).
"At the end of October, 1938 Ribbentrop visited Rome to negotiate with Italy on the conclusion of the (Steel - SL) pact" (Year of the crisis. T. 2. Decree. Op. - C. 377). October 31 England offered Germany to expand the treaty and in exchange for “satisfying Germany’s fair claims on colonies ... thinking about England’s acceptance of certain defense duties or even guarantees against Soviet Russia in the event of a Soviet attack” (Year of crisis. T. 1., Decree op. - C. 90 – 93). “The fact that ... the rulers of France, together with their English colleagues, would not mind resolving all disputed and“ damned ”issues at the expense of the USSR, of course, there is no doubt, and there is nothing fundamentally new about this” (Year of the crisis. T. 1 Decree op. - C. 96). November 2 decision of the first Vienna Arbitration of Germany and Italy, Hungary received a part of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Rus. 16 November The 1938 of the year entered into force on the Anglo-Italian agreement (Lebedev S. America v. England. Part 10. Ibid.).
20 November 1938 of the year U. Bullitt, for the sake of the destruction of the Anglo-French-Italo-Germanic Union, in a lengthy conversation incited Polish ambassador to the US Jerzy Pototsky to turn against Germany - “democratic states ... will need ... at least two years for complete rearmament. In the meantime, the German Reich would probably have directed its expansion to the east, and it would have been desirable for democratic states that there, in the east, it came to the war between the German Reich and Russia. Although the potential strength of present-day Soviets is not yet known, it is likely that, acting far from its bases, Germany would be forced to wage a long and exhausting war. Only then, Bullit said, could democratic states attack Germany and achieve its surrender (Year of Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 111 – 112).
In his opinion, “the Carpatho-Russian Ukraine, in the existence of which Germany is certainly interested, mainly from a strategic point of view, was to become the springboard for Germany’s attack on the USSR. ... He argued that Germany has a fully prepared, formed Ukrainian headquarters, which should in the future take control of the power in Ukraine and create an independent Ukrainian state there under the auspices of Germany. ” W. Bullitt wanted to see Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia among Germany’s opponents: “He confirmed that Poland is another state that will come up with weapons in the hands if Germany violates its borders. I understand well, he said, the problem of a common border with Hungary. Hungarians are also a courageous people, and if they acted jointly with Yugoslavia, the question of defense against German expansion would have been greatly alleviated ”(Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. C. 112).
In view of Poland’s blocking of Germany’s access to the Soviet border on the southern flank, backing Hungary’s desire to gain control of the Carpathian Ukraine and the north’s refusal of concessions on Danzig and Germany’s obstacle to establish communication with its East Prussian enclave, November, Hitler launched negotiations with Italy on joint military actions against Britain and France (Year of the crisis. T. 26. Decree. Op. - C. 1). November 115 Poland demanded that Czechoslovakia “transfer ... to the Moravian Ostrava and Vitrovich. However, Hitler refused ... in a rather categorical form. ”(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - S. 28).
On the same day at a dinner hosted by the Naval League on the day of the Battle of Trafalgar, Kennedy, who was “the first American ambassador who was granted the right to open this celebration ... in his speech ... not only defended Chamberlain, but also brought Munich as a model for settling relations in the future, arguing that the peaceful resolution of the Czechoslovak question showed: one can get along with dictators. Kennedy also noted that Democrats and dictators should work together for the common good.
Kennedy's statements were voiced in discord with the position of the president, who more and more began to be inclined to the policy of quarantine of aggression. A week later, Roosevelt delivered a speech on a nationwide radio address, which largely refuted the ambassador’s point of view: there can be no peace if authorized use of force prevails instead of the law; there can be no peace if the nation deliberately chooses the threat of war as an instrument of its policy. This was the beginning of the end of Kennedy's career "(Mokhovikova GV American diplomats in Europe on the eve of the Second World War. BULLETIN OF NOVGOROD STATE UNIVERSITY. 1998. No. 9 // http://admin.novsu.ac.ru/uni/vestnik.nsf / All / FEF11D3250EBFEA9C3256727002E7B99).
At the beginning of December, the first bills of exchange MEFO and Yalmar Schacht were received with extraordinary sharpness and demanded that Hitler immediately repay them. The Fuhrer instantly lost his temper: “Do not tell me about the Munich Treaty! I spat on these Jewish bastards - Chamberlain and Daladier! The armament program will continue. ” The chairman of the Reichsbank reacted to this with an official statement about the cessation of all credits to the government ”(A. Nemchinov and the Oligarchs in black uniforms // http://mobooka.ru). 7 January 1939, Hitler fired Mine. “The seat of the chief banker was occupied by Walter Funck, who obediently executed the order of the Fuhrer to replace bills with treasury obligations and tax vouchers” (Nemchinov A. Ibid.).
Meanwhile, Britain and France continued their cooperation with Germany and Italy and developed a stormy propaganda of the extreme necessity of Germany’s campaign against the USSR in order to create a “Great Ukraine” under a German protectorate. December 6 France and Germany signed a similar declaration Anglo-German. "It was essentially a non-aggression pact between France and Germany" (History of the USSR Foreign Policy. Decree. Op. - C. 355). The declaration reinforced the “rejection of Alsace and Lorraine in 1919, and the inviolability of existing borders between states” (Weizsäcker E. Decree. Op. - C. 182). In turn, France pledged to limit "its interests to the limits of its colonial empire and not ... intervene in what is happening in Eastern Europe", in particular "not to influence Poland against concluding an agreement with Germany, under which Danzig would return to Germany and Germany would receive the extraterritorial corridor from East Prussia to the Reich, through the territory of the Polish corridor ”(Weizsäcker E., op. cit. - S. 182; History of USSR foreign policy. Ibid.).
15 December 1938 French ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre in a letter to French Foreign Minister J. Bonnet reported that "Ukraine is the path to the empire": "The desire of the Third Reich for expansion in the East ... seems as obvious as its the rejection, at least at present, of all gains in the West; one follows from the other. The first part of Hitler's program — the unification of the German people in the Reich — was largely completed. Now the hour of "living space" has struck. ... Becoming a master in Central Europe, subjugating Czechoslovakia and Hungary, then creating Great Ukraine under German hegemony - that seems to be basically the concept adopted by the Nazi leaders, and, of course, by Hitler himself. The subordination of Czechoslovakia, unfortunately, is already an almost accomplished fact. ...
As for Ukraine ... the ways and means, it seems, have not yet been developed, but the goal itself seems to be already established - to create a Great Ukraine, which would become the breadbasket of Germanium. But for this you need to break Romania, convince Poland, take away part of the territory from the USSR; German dynamism does not stop at any of these difficulties, and in military circles they are already talking about going to the Caucasus and Baku. ... The center of the movement will be Transcarpathian Ukraine. Thus, by strange quirks of fate, Czechoslovakia, created as a stronghold for deterring German advancement, serves the Reich as a ram for breaking the gate in the East (Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 147 – 149). Meanwhile, Poland was categorically against the creation of the Great Ukraine, she herself claimed the Soviet part of Ukraine, and in Transcarpathian Ukraine she saw a dangerous and uncontrollable center of Ukrainian separatism.
1 January 1939 Mr. Mussolini told Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano "his decision to accept Ribbentrop's proposal to transform the anti-Comintern Pact into an alliance." According to Ciano, “he wants the pact to be signed in the last decade of January. He considers an ever more inevitable collision with Western democratic countries and therefore wants to prepare a military alliance in advance ”(Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 167). "2 January 1939 Mr. Ciano told Ribbentrop of the consent of Italy to sign the pact" (Year of the crisis. T. 2. Decree. Op. - C. 377).
5 and 6 January 1939, Beck met with A. Hitler and I. Ribbentrop to resolve issues on Danzig, Transcarpathian Ukraine, border guarantees, transform the 1934 statement of the year into an agreement like Germany’s agreement with England and France, and Poland’s accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. I recall that in the German-Polish declaration of guarantees of the Polish-German border was not. “The refusal to use force against each other, not complemented by guarantees of immutability of borders” and the absence of “an article that would speak about the termination of the declaration if one of the parties entered into an armed conflict with a third country ... under certain conditions could give it a character an offensive alliance ... for revising the territorial status quo of third states "- first of all, the Soviet Union (Lebedev S. America v. England. Part 6. Split of the anti-Soviet camp // http://topwar.ru/44330-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast -6-raskol-antisove tskogo-lagerya.html).
“In order to finally resolve the still unresolved issues in relations between the two countries, the Führer said, we should not limit ourselves to the 1934 agreement, which is rather negative in nature, but we should try to finally resolve individual problems by agreement. ... The German side considers it necessary to settle directly in the German-Polish relations the problem of Danzig and the corridor. ... If Germany had provided its guarantees, then the Polish corridor would have been spoken as little as nowadays about South Tyrol or Alsace and Lorraine. ... With a general broad settlement of all problems between Poland and us, it would be possible to completely agree to regard the Ukrainian question as a privilege of Poland and to support it in every way when considering this issue. Again, this has a prerequisite for the increasingly overt anti-Russian position of Poland, otherwise common interests can hardly be. In this regard (Ribbentrop - SL) told Beck if he would not one day join the Anti-Comintern Pact ”(Year of the Crisis. T. 1. Decree. Op. - C. 171 – 172, 176).
Beck reiterated “Poland’s aspirations to establish a common border with Hungary” and former claims to Ukraine, however, said that “I must reckon with the true opinion of the people and see in this regard the greatest difficulties in resolving the Danzig issue,” Hitler assured “ Poland in its common position will still be faithful to the line it has been following since 1934, ”and regarding the Comintern,“ promised that Polish policy in the future will probably be able to develop in this respect in the direction we want ”(Year of the crisis. T X NUMX. Decree op. - C. 1 – 173, 174). In essence, Poland has withdrawn Germany on all declared issues. At the same time claiming to Ukraine and refusing to give Germany instead of Danzig and the road through the corridor, she blocked Germany’s path to the Soviet Union. Opposed border guarantees and the transformation of the 176 statement of the year into an agreement like the German agreement with England and France. She did not want to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Following the January 22 talks, I. Ribbentrop announced a plan for the defeat of Poland in the summer of 1939. In Poland, 4 in February 1939 was quickly completed the “East” (“Shoot”) defense plan in case of war with the Soviet Union, and on March 4, the Chief of Staff of the Polish Army began to develop a plan for preparing for an armed conflict with Germany “West” (X “Zahud”). According to him, “This work can and should move faster than the previous one, since the principles and methods are tested during the development of the“ East ”plan (From the 1939 war to the 1914 war (by the example of Poland) // http: //www.polska. com / polska / historia / 1939-1914.html). Thus, the impact of Bullitt on the Polish establishment yielded a result, and Poland, in its political preferences, began to drift from England to America, sharply replacing confidential relations with Germany with confrontational ones.
At the beginning of 1939, A. Hitler began to support the Slovak separatists in order to join the Czech Republic to Germany to declare Slovakia independent. 24 February 1939, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. 12 March 1939 A. Hitler agreed to the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine by Hungary, March 13 called the head of the Slovakian government of Slovakia Y. Tucka to Berlin signed the “Protection Treaty”, and March 14 Slovakia proclaimed its independence. At the same time, despite the concentration of German troops on the Czechoslovak border, waiting for the German troops to enter Czechoslovakia, the formation of the head of the fascist party in Czechoslovakia Guyda in Prague with the support of the Germans, as well as the ultimatum of the Hungarian government of Czechoslovakia demanding the evacuation of the Czech and Moravian units from the territory of the Carpathian Ukraine non-intervention of England and France was considered secured.
The statesmen of England and France until the last moment relied on the occupation by Germany of the whole of Czechoslovakia and the presentation of the USSR to the Soviet part of Ukraine. Therefore, they looked at Germany’s military preparations and enthusiastically greeted the long-awaited German armed action against Czechoslovakia. “March 15 British Prime Minister Chamberlain said in the House of Commons:“ The occupation of Bohemia by the German armed forces began today at six in the morning. The Czech people received an order from their government not to resist. ”
Then Chamberlain said that, in his opinion, the guarantee given to them by Czechoslovakia was no longer valid, and continued: “That was the situation until yesterday. However, it has changed since the Slovak parliament declared Slovakia independent. This declaration gives an end to the internal disintegration of the state, the boundaries of which we intended to guarantee, and His Majesty’s government cannot therefore consider itself bound by this obligation ... Naturally, I am very sorry for what happened. However, we will not allow this to cause us to turn from our path. Let us remember that the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world are still concentrated in the hope of peace ”(Shearer U. Decree. Cit.).
Thus, on the eve of Munich, the West was heterogeneous and its leaders, defending purely national interests, pursued diametrically opposite goals. France needed to guarantee its security and, in the event of Germany’s aggressive actions against Czechoslovakia, demanded its immediate defeat. England needed to preserve the existing status quo and thwart America’s attempts to overthrow it from the pedestal of world politics by concluding an alliance with France, Italy and Germany, and later Poland, putting Czechoslovakia to Hitler and resolving interimperialist contradictions by defeating the USSR by a broad coalition of interested parties headed with Germany.
America tried to take England’s place on the political Olympus by organizing the defeat of Czechoslovakia and France, imposing England as a junior partner of an alliance with Germany and Italy, resolving interimperialist contradictions under its patronage at the expense of the Soviet Union, and in the case of resistance to the US account of England itself, by the hands of Germany and the USSR. A feature of the 1938 autumn negotiation process was that Hitler defended the American plan, while Chamberlain insisting on accepting the British plan stopped the American plan in French.
Having flatly refused to accept the American plan put forward by Hitler, Chamberlain opposed his own to him, threatening in case of refusal to use force according to the French version. In order to save the Nazis from the inevitable defeat, Roosevelt agreed to Germany conclude an alliance with England, France and Italy, but did not accept his defeat, continued the struggle and got Poland to block the path of Germany to the Soviet Union and start preparations for France instead of Czechoslovakia.
Under these circumstances, Hitler decided to seize the Czech Republic, proclaiming Slovakia’s “independence” and handing over the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary not to go to the border with the Soviet Union and not to create a springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union in the form of Great Ukraine, thereby canceling out the terms of its agreement with England and France , starting at the same time preparations for war with England, France and Poland. Meanwhile, Britain and France until the last moment hoped for the inviolability of their agreements and agreements with Hitler regarding the German attack on the Soviet Union after the complete seizure of Czechoslovakia and the creation of the Great Ukraine.