Limited combat capability
The problem of equipping the Russian Navy with universal landing ships (UDC) of the Mistral type continues to worry the public. And this despite the fact that the decision to have such ships as part of our fleet has already been taken.
According to the abilities and labor
“Ship for all occasions” - this is the title of the article by supporter of the inclusion of the UDC in the structure of our Navy Mikhail Barabanov, published in the issue number 24 of the newspaper “VPK”. But is Mistral universal?
So, let's call the tasks that he is able to solve.
1. To deliver troops to the landing area both directly on the coast and in a vertical way, that is, by helicopters deep into the enemy’s defenses.
2. To support the landing on the coast during the battle for disembarkation and in subsequent actions by the forces of the onboard air group.
3. Provide management of operational groups of fleet forces in remote areas of the seas and oceans, as well as landing forces and troops.
4. Serve as a floating hospital.
5. To strike at the surface ships and ground objects of the enemy by the forces of the onboard air group.
6. Search and destroy using enemy antisubmarine submarine antisubmarine helicopters.
7. Participate in peacekeeping operations, carry out humanitarian missions.
The list is impressive. However, it is worthwhile to take a closer look, as far as possible participation in all these actions is exactly the Russian UDC “Mistral”. After all, the authors of articles emphasizing the universality of the UDC, rely mainly on the experience of the United States.
The ability to solve the first two tasks is beyond doubt - these are the ships intended for this. However, their successful actions here are possible only with reliable suppression of the enemy’s air defense system to the entire intended depth of the UDC air group. The Russian Mistrals will be exclusively equipped with Ka-52 and Ka-29 helicopters (Ka-27 is an anti-submarine helicopter, will not take part in the assault landing). Even if the enemy in the area of the flight of these helicopters will remain isolated complexes of short-range air defense and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (MZA), the losses will be very noticeable. This is evidenced by the experience of military conflict in the south-east of Ukraine. The practice of using helicopters with UDC "Mistral" in the Libyan operation in relation to the landing of the assault (where he would be counteracted by a previously prepared defense system) is irrelevant. In Libya, the aggressor had the opportunity to choose the place and time of the strike in such a way as to exclude ground-based anti-aircraft fire weapons (AIA) from entering the affected area, maneuvering over a very wide area. Without a prior reliable suppression of the enemy’s air defense system, the UDC cannot do anything. Helicopters, both Russian and other countries, including the most advanced, are unable to solve this problem fully.
I must admit that in the landing operations of the Mistral UDC, they are limitedly combat-ready - without the massive support of other forces of the fleet and the Air Force, they will not be able to do anything. Given the lack of a sufficient number of aircraft carriers in the Russian Navy, Mistral will be able to provide landing only within the reach of the coast aviation, primarily bomber and fighter, at a distance of no more than 500-600 kilometers from airfields. And this means that the UDC as part of the Russian Navy can operate only within the near sea zone. Then why are they needed? After all, the tasks of landing in these areas can be successfully solved by the landing ships that are part of the Navy. And what landings can our fleet land in the near sea zone? Only in the interests of supporting the actions of the coastal flank of the army, that is, the maximum in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense — no more than 100–150 kilometers from the front line, where coast-based helicopters will successfully operate.
Narrow manager
The available areas of the premises, the developed electronic armament give reason to rely on the use of "Mistral" as a control ship. However, here the expediency of their use in the Russian Navy raises questions. First of all, to fully perform these functions as part of the groups of the Russian Navy, the ship should be equipped with Russian control and communications facilities. Otherwise, it is impossible to provide full-fledged interfacing with similar systems of other ships of the grouping and interacting aviation. That is, Russian controls and communications should be installed on it. Then the question arises: why buy a UDC for huge money without a control system?
In addition, the control ship must be able to operate as part of the ship connections. First of all, its speed, both squadron and limit, should correspond to that of other ships of the warrant or operational connection. Almost all Russian warships - from heavy aircraft carrier and missile cruiser to the corvette - have a maximum speed of at least 29 nodes. In this case, the squadron move can be assigned in the range from 18 to 25 nodes, depending on the operational situation. For this reason, both in the Soviet and American fleets, command and control ships were created on the basis of combat ships that had a corresponding speed. In particular, in the USSR Navy there were two cruisers of the 68 project, which were command and control ships in the Pacific and Black Sea fleets. The ultimate move of the Mistral is only 20 nodes, and the squadron, which they can withstand, is significantly smaller. That is, it is incapable of controlling the operational strike forces of the fleet forces. The only thing for which it can be successfully used in this respect is to control the landing forces during amphibious operations. Very narrow applicability.
UDC "Mistral" to strike at surface ships are very limited. So much so that you probably shouldn’t even talk about using it in this capacity.
The range of ground objects against which the air group of the Russian Mistral can be applied is also small. These are targets, the defeat of which is possible with a small warhead of an anti-tank missile or NURS, and not protected by air defense weapons. As in the case of the use of French Mistral helicopters in Libya. At the same time, the ship must be within 50 – 70 kilometers from the enemy’s coast or even closer, which is also possible only if absolute supremacy of the sea is established. Such conditions can only be created when conducting combat operations against an adversary that has virtually no naval forces and an air defense system. That is, in the colonial wars that Russia is not yet supposed to wage. Thus, Mistral is not suitable for such tasks.
In the dry residue
There remains the possibility of using in wartime as an anti-submarine helicopter carrier. In this capacity, he could contribute to the solution of the two most important tasks of our fleet - the destruction of enemy submarines in the areas of the near-sea zone and ensuring the combat stability of our strategic missile submarines from the attacks of the anti-submarine forces of the enemy. It could become the core of the carrier-based search and strike group. However, there arises the problem of ensuring its combat stability. In this capacity, he will become the object of attack by anti-ship missiles (RCC) from a submarine, which in a salvo can be from two (for example, "Harpun" from torpedo tubes of the "Los Angeles" type boat) to eight or more units (when firing "Tomahawk" from the woo of the same boat) Own air defense systems of the Russian “Mistral” have a destructive potential for RCC significantly less than one. And this means that even a two-launch volley with a probability of more than 60 – 70 percent will lead to its defeat by at least one missile. Specialists shipbuilders have repeatedly pointed out the design flaws of this ship, which are determined by the fact that the UDC was designed according to commercial standards with minimum requirements for the combat component. Accordingly, its structural resistance to combat damage is small. How important it is for combat aircraft carriers, World War II showed well, when hitting two to four bombs led to the death of full-fledged aircraft carriers with insufficiently perfect structural protection. It can be assumed that the hit of one or two modern anti-ship missiles is guaranteed to lead to the destruction or destruction of the Mistral.
Thus, only peacetime tasks remain - the participation in peacekeeping operations, the performance of various humanitarian missions, in particular, such as the evacuation of civilians from military conflict zones.
Plus Russian adjustments
It is possible to justify the presence of these ships in the Russian Navy only as light aircraft carriers - carriers of vertical (shortened) take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL). There is already quite a rich experience of using UDC in this capacity in the USA. So, on the UDC type "Tarava" and "Wasp" can be based VTOL AV-8V "Harrier II". From the deck of these ships, they were used in military conflicts, in particular in aggression against Yugoslavia in the 1999 year and against Iraq in the 2003. There were these planes and on board the UDC of the “Wasp” type, which took part in the hostilities against Libya in the 2011.
The capacity of the Mistral UDC hangars, designed for 30 helicopters, will allow for a rough estimate to place at least eight VTOLs together with three or four XR-Ka-31 helicopters. For basing on UDC "Mistral", the Yak-141 aircraft, created as early as 1989, and adapted for use on board the first four Soviet heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of the 1143 project, could be used. In 90-ies, this project was curtailed at the stage of acceptance of the aircraft for service. However, the relevance is not lost. Just as today the Russian Air Force adopted the Su-34, which fully meets modern requirements, although it has passed all tests in the USSR. According to its tactical and technical data achieved in Soviet times, the Yak-141 is fully consistent with the tasks that can be assigned to it in modern conditions. Possessing a supersonic speed, it has quite a decent range (from 400 to 700 kilometers, depending on the take-off and flight modes to the target and back). Powerful and multifunctional electronic weapons allows him to use a wide range of weapons, including high-precision weapon, including medium-range P-27 air combat missiles of various modifications and short-range P-73, X-29 and X-25 air-to-air missiles, X-35 anti-ship missiles and X-31 anti-radar missiles, as well as corrected aerial bombs
Having six take-off positions on the deck, the Mistral UDC, acting as a light air defense aircraft carrier, will be able to bring into battle one or two links of such fighters at a distance of up to 200 – 250 kilometers from the ship during independent actions and up to 400 kilometers - in cooperation with coastal-based DRLO planes. This will allow the Mistral UDC air group to solve the tasks of covering small groups of surface ships in operational-critical areas from strikes by small enemy aviation groups (to 6 – 8 machines) and to ensure the combat stability of the submarines from the strikes of the enemy’s main patrol aviation. Both of these tasks are crucial to maintaining a favorable operational regime.
UDC “Mistral” will also be effective in this quality when solving problems of striking surface targets. Striking four to six aircraft using 4 – 12 X-35 missiles will destroy or disable one or three ships or boats from a small ship group (search and attack anti-submarine or attack).
However, the use of the UDC "Mistral" in the Russian fleet is hampered by the lack of VTOLTs ready for use. The engineering groups that created the Yak-141 are crushed. Part of the enterprises engaged in the production of the necessary components, reprofiled or destroyed for unprofitability. It is vital to recreate the national school of VTOL. And not so much for the UDC "Mistral", but for the Air Force, which may be able to increase the combat stability of the basing system.
Thus, in the Russian Navy UDC "Mistral" can be used only as ships of peacetime with very limited capabilities in the military. Neither of which their universality can not speak.
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