"Iron" of the new fleet of Russia


After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian fleet lost a significant part of the surface ship structure due to insufficient financing of operating costs and repair and modernization work. A long pause in the procurement of new combat units allowed to partially determine the priorities of construction fleet in the new political and economic conditions, however, the question of the timing of receiving the Navy's new ships was raised.

Update nomenclature

At the end of 1990-x - the beginning of 2000-s, it was decided to prioritize the fleet’s saturation with second-level surface ships [1]. Due to the massive withdrawal of Soviet ships after 1992, this universal niche turned out to be the most vulnerable. It was on such ships that new approaches to building fleet weapons systems were developed, which would then be scaled to larger ships.

We are talking about the patrol ships of the far sea zone (frigates) of the 22350 project (such as “Admiral Gorshkov”) and the patrol ships of the near sea zone (corvettes) of the 20380 / 20385 project (such as “Steregushchy” and “Thunder”). With the help of serial construction of these projects, it is planned to increase the "meat" on the very fragile "skeleton" of the Russian fleets.

In general, these ships can be considered quite typical for the Russian school of shipbuilding. They carry heavy multifunctional missile weapons, for the first time in stories domestic fleet located in the standard vertical launchers of the universal ship shooting complex (UCSC). The American fleet, for example, has traveled this path a long time ago, and the elimination of the zoo of launchers and missile complexes of the Soviet fleet was inevitable. Most of the guided missile weapons Until recently, the Russian fleet not only did not have universal launchers, but more than that - each individual missile system had its own system of use. The unification of the Onyx / Caliber missile systems, in combination with the new anti-aircraft complexes and the new combat information and control system Sigma, allows flexible building of the fleet’s combat equipment.

Frigate project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov"

The main reason for the delay in the commissioning of these ships is the unavailability of individual systems. This is an important detail that should not be missed by analyzing the breakdowns of shipbuilding schedules. As a rule, the responsibility for the transfer of deadlines lies not with the shipbuilders “golovniki”, but with the subcontractors developing and bringing up new ship systems. In particular, at different times, there were problems with the readiness of the Poliment-Redut air defense missile system (SAM), radio electronic systems, hydro-acoustic systems, artillery systems.

The problem with the rapid saturation of the fleet with ships is attempted to be solved by palliative methods, namely the “reproduction” of projects operating in a similar tactical niche. As the construction of the 22350 frigates was delayed, the fleet command decided to order six frigates according to the fulfilled 11356 export project (six such ships were built for India - these are Talwar frigates). Despite the fact that the ships of the 11356 and 22350 project are likely to be used in different fleets (for example, the 11356 project will go to the Black Sea and, possibly, to the Baltic Sea, and the classmates of Admiral Gorshkov will go to the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Ocean) , it nevertheless brings in a certain inconsistency in the nomenclature.

Assessing the readiness of frigates for the Black Sea, the following should be noted. Taking into account the actual period of construction at the Yantar plant of identical ships of the Talwar type, approximately 57-60 months, it is possible to estimate the time of commissioning of all six Black Sea frigates. Admiral Grigorovich will be ready for the second half of 2015 of the year, Admiral Essen - not earlier than the spring of 2016 of the year, Admiral Makarov - hardly before the winter of 2016 / 2017. Even if we take into account the modernization of the production of the Yantar plant and the inevitable increase in labor productivity at the shipyard with rhythmic serial construction, the rest of the frigates still risk appearing on the Black Sea only by the 2018-2019 years.

If you take a step up to the ships of the first rank, then we find ourselves in the niche of the new destroyer. This is a place of the universal ocean ship, carrier of several types of attack (anti-ship and intended for firing at ground targets) and defensive (directed against aerodynamic and ballistic targets, as well as low-orbit spacecraft) rocket armament.

This ship is currently at the stage of determining the technical appearance of the project "Leader". Of the more or less established facts, we can talk about basing long-range antimissiles on it from the prospective ground-based C-500 system, as well as an advanced attack armament complex, which may include hypersonic cruise missiles (developed in Russia as part of the Zircon project ). The ship with a high degree of probability will have a displacement of about 11-13 thousand tons and carry an atomic power plant (this issue has not yet been resolved to the end).

Despite the obvious "disguise" under the guise of a destroyer, conceptually it is a full-fledged missile cruiser. These ships are potentially capable of replacing the entire “zoo” of ocean ships of the first rank, inherited from Soviet times in Russia: 1144 and 1164 missile cruisers, 956 project destroyers, BNXXX, 1134 and 1155 project destroyers.

I.A. Mikhailov / forums.airbase.ru
Large amphibious under construction
ship "Ivan Gren" project 11711
in launch launch dock PD-8
JSC "PSZ" Yantar "". Kaliningrad,
May 2012

The abundance of shock systems shows the continuation of the line for the construction of arsenal ships - carriers of a large number of anti-ship guided weapons. This is inevitable in the face of the impossibility of quickly creating an aircraft carrier fleet with a strike deck. aviation. The new aircraft carriers themselves, by the way, are in the early stages of design - or rather, as far as one can judge, at the stage of prospecting, which should answer the question about the need for such ships in the combat system of the fleet and their possible technical appearance.

If, on the contrary, we descend from frigates and corvettes to the small forces of the fleet, then there will be noticeable activity here: many new ships and boats are being built. In particular, the construction of small special ships is quite active. Only one example is the creation of the base minesweepers of the 12700 Alexandrite project, whose fiberglass hulls are built using vacuum infusion technology (by the way, these are the largest ships in the world with such a hull).

However, this is where the annoying gaps in the construction of the new ship structure begin.

"Empty seats"

The prospects for building new ships for landing forces are completely unclear. The existing old large landing ships (BDK) of the 775 and 1171 projects are still quite suitable - moreover, they are one of the most active combat units in the Black Sea and Baltic Fleet due to the constant exits to the Mediterranean Sea. However, they need to be replaced in the future. The 11711 “Ivan Gren” BDK, which has been under construction for ten years already in Kaliningrad, was to become the lead ship in a series of such “deputies”.

However, the attitude of the fleet to this ship can hardly be called loyal. Suffice it to say that, despite the six-year development period, the technical requirements for the ship were already copied several times during the construction process, and major changes were made to the project 22. In particular, the composition of weapons was completely revised. At the same time, in 2012, the fleet officially refused the serial construction of the BDK project 11711 after the “Ivan Gren”, although it was previously reported that the military estimated the need for ships of this type to be at least 18 units.

From the point of view of the rapid renewal of the landing forces, there was an order in France for four Mistral-type helicopter carriers. However, this venture, and formerly the subject of sharp battles in the press and among experts, lost its promise after cooling relations with the West due to the annexation of the Crimea against the background of aggressive lobbying by the domestic industry of full import substitution programs.

Ilya Kramnik: Prospects for Russian Naval Aviation

Not appreciating the suitability of this type of ships for the needs of the Russian Navy (we only indicate that there are various opinions on this matter, including among the naval specialists themselves: from careful support and search for benefits in the project to categorical rejection), we note that the alternative “here And now "is not a hypothetical Russian analogue, but the absence of four ships in the fleet. Shipbuilders regularly hint that the fleet wants small helicopter-carrying dock ships that are similar in size and functionality to Dutch Rotterdam-type ships. However, the degree of readiness of such a project, if there is one at all, is completely incomprehensible.

The upper part of the mosquito fleet, a segment of small warships and boats designed mainly for operations in the coastal zone or at an insignificant distance from it, is sagging so far. The fact is that the corvettes of the 20380 / 20385 project stepped behind the 2200 tons of full displacement and received a heavy missile system. These ships are quite expensive and redundant for use in the interests of protecting water areas (OVR), although, most likely, they will be used, including for leading ship search and attack groups composed of small fleet forces. There are a number of reasons for this, including the presence of a helicopter and the ability to deploy a command post on the ship.

In this niche was supposed to appear "corvette OVR." However, both of the ships currently in construction with a tonnage of about 1000-1300 tons have their drawbacks to be used in this role.

So, the small rocket ship of the 21631 “Buyan-M” project is an extremely specific and expensive platform with heavy weapons in the form of eight launchers of the “Caliber” complex. In fact, it is the carrier of an operational-tactical missile system, and if we recall the maximum ranges of 3М14 missiles (2600 km, according to military reports), then it is strategic. It is not yet possible to use the "buyans" as a universal base for the IRA corvette, mainly due to the lack of any hint of the development of its anti-submarine version.

The patrol ship of the 22160 project, firstly, is still under construction (six ships were ordered for the needs of the Black Sea Fleet, the first one was laid), and secondly, as such, it is not a ship of the OVR. Having increased autonomy and range (exceeding the range of 20380 project corvettes by one and a half times), it becomes a “ship of presence”, incl. and in the far sea zone. However, it is these ships that will be built in the near future instead of the former alleged “OVR corvette”. This choice looks ambiguous.

"The modular principle of execution" implies including and the ability to install shock (8 cells UKKS for missiles "Caliber") or anti-aircraft (vertical installation of the air defense system "Shtil-1") rocket weapons. It is stated that the ship carries a powerful hydro-acoustic complex, but its anti-submarine capabilities look frankly insufficient. An exception is the version of the configuration with the UCSS module, which allows the use of anti-submarine missiles, but this version of the corvette is unlikely to become widespread due to its high cost. It is still difficult to say to what extent the combination of these ships with the ships of the 21631 and 20380 / 20385 projects will ensure the combat stability and versatility of the IAD forces.

The presence of factories does not always mean the presence of shipbuilding

Ilya Kramnik: Black Sea Fleet:
23 year of adventure

In Soviet times, the transfer of projects for serial construction to several factories was fairly widely practiced. This was due both to the interests of the rapid commissioning of a large number of ships, and the geography of the fleet-based system, which did not coincide with the geography of the main shipbuilding centers. The two priority fleets, the Northern and Pacific, had an extremely weak shipbuilding base, and the shipbuilders' historical “centers of competence” focused on the secondary Baltic and Black Sea directions. Almost all the major ships of the Soviet era were built either in Leningrad or Nikolaev, while they served mainly either in the North or in the Pacific Ocean.

At the moment there is an attempt to reproduce this experience on the family of 20380 / 20385 projects - with a failed result in the form of a sharp increase in cost and disruption of terms. If the construction of corvettes at the Severnaya Verf in St. Petersburg goes more or less within the framework of the original schedules, orders for the Pacific Ocean transferred to the Amur Shipbuilding Plant are still not ready and have an unclear prospect of commissioning. Moreover, since the 20380 / 20385 family of projects has already begun to multiply by “budding options” (in the 20380 and 20385 versions in the Baltic, 20380 in the Pacific), the situation is further complicated.

At the same time, it cannot be said that the problem of transferring projects from plant to plant is insurmountable and is caused by objective economic difficulties in the country. It is due to the lack of coordination and well-built business process management. Thus, great doubts were expressed at the end of the 2000s, when the execution of the fourth, fifth and sixth frigates of the Talwar type (patrol ships of the 11356 project) for the Indian Navy was transferred from the Baltiysky plant, which built the first three, to Kaliningrad's Yantar factory. Nevertheless, the breakdowns of the planned time-limits for entering ships ranged from 11 to 14 months, which, for the plant that actually received the first major military order after the collapse of the USSR, was an excellent result.

The second problem with the implementation of projects in practice is the lack of a built “kerchief of cooperation” - a multilevel scheme of interaction between the lead executor of the order with the manufacturers of the systems and units with which the product must be completed, as well as, in turn, the relationship of manufacturers with component suppliers. Practice shows that the main delays in commissioning financed ships are not connected with the work of the shipbuilders themselves, but with the unpreparedness of the ship systems, equipment and weapons produced by third-party collectors. The lead contractor, the shipbuilding company, has minimal influence on its subcontractor, and coordination of programs between defense holdings (say, between the United Shipbuilding Corporation and the rocket engineers, between USC and manufacturers of radio electronics, etc.) is still rather poorly defined. This factor is associated with lengthy delays in 20380 / 20385 projects, and especially on the 22350 project.

As long as the government structures regulating the execution of the state defense order do not create an effective staff superstructure capable of quickly “expanding” the bottlenecks that have arisen, the risks of permanent disruption of the construction of new ships remain.

The most painful for Russia is the import question.

The most painful question in planning shipbuilding programs is the question of import, i.e. about ordering warships abroad. This question is of an emotional-political nature and is rather indirect in the planning of naval development programs. The main and so far the only example (but noticeable) is the order in France of four amphibious helicopter carriers of the Mistral type.

30 April at the Baltic Shipyard
(St. Petersburg) was launched
aft section of helicopter landing
ship dock (DVKD) "Sevastopol"
(such as "Mistral")

It is difficult to question the ability of domestic designers to develop the project of the “Russian Mistral”, and the shipyards - to build it. The only question here is: how long will it take to create and refine the project, as well as the building itself? Is it not cheaper and more effective to solve the issue by ordering a spent ship at a shipyard debugged by the technical process? That is, the discussion should be reduced to the alignment of accents in public policy between the rapid adoption of new ships and the support of the domestic manufacturer.

We are not talking about alarmist interpretations, according to which Russia enters a state of dependence on weapons and military equipment from Western countries. However, the rapid closure of individual niches in the framework of clearly defined technical tasks seemed quite acceptable. Nevertheless, at this stage, these arguments are purely speculative - the temporary cooling of Russian relations with the West after the annexation of the Crimea does not allow us to speak about the implementation of such projects in the medium term. And it does not allow both from the point of view of the West, where there is a growing reluctance to “sponsor” Moscow, which is actively involved in the reintegration of spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space, and from within Russia, given the growth of anti-Western sentiment in society.

In conclusion

Summarizing all the above, we can formulate the following conclusions.

In general, Russia is actively expanding the construction of combat units. After a long “purchasing holiday” that lasted from the beginning of the 1990-s, new ships began to arrive at the fleet. However, the breakdown of the timing of the commissioning of the leading ships of new projects and the delaying of the start of serial construction leads to reproduction in the construction of types of ships existing in similar or completely identical tactical niches.

The military is not always ready to provide the industry with clear and consistent technical specifications for the design of ships. Also, there is regular editing of the technical appearance already in the process of construction. Examples with repeated editing of technical assignments for ships already under construction were cited above.

At the same time, there are problems with filling in some important niches for which there are either no design options or there are options with significant drawbacks or limited capabilities.

Launching of the fleet’s armament complexes and electronic systems is lagging behind shipbuilding itself, which lengthens and increases the cost of building ships, and also prevents the transfer to serial reproduction of type specimens.

Also, the ability to transfer projects from plant to plant is still limited. The industry is set up not just in manual mode, but literally with an individual approach to each enterprise.

The situation with the renewal of the ship composition is complicated by the undeveloped ship repair system in the potential fleet number one - the Pacific.

All this will lead to a rather sad phenomenon known as the “shift to the right” - this euphemism describes attempts to introduce a burning work schedule into a controlled state after the breakdown of a previously set deadline. Each of these problems separately is not able to be considered insurmountable, but their combination will begin to act purely statistically, through accumulation.

Blocking military-technical cooperation with the West will not have a systemic impact on fleet renewal. The import of ready-made solutions would help to close some important positions already today, but at the moment such a solution seems unlikely for external and internal political considerations.

This will lead to the fact that separate, uncritical in value, niches in the ship composition, which, theoretically, could be relatively quickly closed with the spent “iron”, will have to be built on our own. Taking into account all the above, about the features of the working rhythms of the industry, for individual positions, we will almost certainly see long schedules for the construction and fine-tuning of ships. In the end, with all the resources expended, including the time and efforts of the USC management team, “import substitution” can be much more expensive than imports.
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  1. +9
    31 July 2014 09: 32
    The process of revival of the military-industrial complex and, in particular, military shipbuilding is taking place slowly and painfully. But he is walking and this is already pleasing. I hope that we will be able to shake this whole monstrously cumbersome system so that new ships are baked like "hot cakes." Times are troubled now - we should hurry up.
    1. +7
      31 July 2014 09: 48
      Yes, it’s really gratifying to see how shipbuilding is reborn. For the Russian Federation, which has a vast water area, the presence of a modern fleet is vital
      1. +24
        31 July 2014 11: 04
        As for the import, in particular of the Mistral ships.

        The question is of course debatable: do you need them? Are you worth it? Was it worth it? Was it worth it ?. And the answer is simple. Could we build helicopter carriers at such a time? The answer is no. we would have completed the design by the year 19. And so by 19 we will have the 4th helicopter carrier.
        And this:
        - creation of helicopters for maritime aviation (sea-based)
        - 4th ship of a new class for the Russian Navy, development of new strategies from supporting the MP during landing on the coast, strengthening of naval groups operating in the oceans.
        - Obtaining foreign technologies and technological solutions with the possible further creation of ships of a similar class or aircraft carriers (I hope that all the same they will be built)
        - Do not forget that the personnel policy in the navy will change. Moremans serving on the ships of the distant USSR will gladly retrain for the "mistral", as a result, the old ships will be written off and new ones will come in their place, + new personnel for new ships.
        - Well, and an important factor (lately) of pressure on the Russian Federation from France. Agree, it is thanks to the Mistrals that it strongly resists the introduction of new sanctions =)
    2. timer
      31 July 2014 22: 52
      For me, our military-industrial complex is akin to Russia, I love it very much, I curse it, I propose my solutions to problems, I worry to the pain in my heart, I am happy for the successes that I received in blood and sweat. This is an excuse.
      As for the article-issues in it, they concern the entire system of the military-industrial complex and industry as a whole. The system is sick and overloaded with inefficient components, it suffers from staff shortages and severance of relations not only with partners in the former cooperation, but also with science and higher education. What I proposed and Once again I repeat, to make the military-industrial complex the basis for creating a new high-tech post-industrial economic model of Russia. I clarify-apply the multi-pointed star scheme, where in the center of the state concern and to it cooperative ties are attached a scientific block (special research institutes, specialized institutes) + labor block (specialized technical schools and vocational schools) + experimental and patent block (MPs created by students and employees of research institutes and universities to break in new ideas and patents both for military and civilian applications). A certain conglomerate of a certain direction is obtained in the framework of the Russian industry development strategy, the elements of which are closely intertwined and able to generate and implement new breakthrough ideas . And such organizational forms will not fade, it is difficult to break and defeat them.
  2. malikszh
    31 July 2014 09: 47
    Here are 10 ocean-going ships with a ready-made hull, but modernization is required Project 956 Sarych destroyers 6 ships, Project 1155 Admiral Kharlamov large anti-submarine ships 1 ship, Project 1144 Orlan cruisers 3 cruisers, urgent need to be restored.
  3. +2
    31 July 2014 09: 51
    Importing ready-made solutions would help to close some important positions today, however, at the moment, such a decision seems unlikely for foreign and domestic political reasons.
    Hope to import, but don’t be too bad! This is confirmed by the introduction of all kinds of sanctions by the United States and its satellites.
    1. +1
      2 August 2014 21: 12
      Quote: Gomunkul
      Hope to import, but don’t be too bad!

      Now what to repeat about the import of not only ships and the entire IWT?
      Everything is clear, everything is clear.
      And in the military-industrial complex, first of all, we need the new Invincibles, Chelomey, Korolev, Makeev and those who were joined not by effective managers, but by intelligent engineers.
      When there is demand and interest ours can. Yes Helicopter engineering is a living example.
  4. +3
    31 July 2014 10: 35
    As I understand it, the problems are in the heads, and not in the availability of technology, etc.
    1. +3
      31 July 2014 11: 05
      The problem is in the heads in which there are no technologies, they don’t want to give the branch of superiority to heads with technologies. )))
  5. +3
    31 July 2014 11: 03
    About the several times named "zoo" of Soviet ships. The zoo was nice and appropriate. The tasks facing our fleet are still somewhat different than those of the American one. And to create universal launchers into which it would be possible to stick both the Granite anti-ship missile and the Kortik missile defense system is not a very reasonable decision from the point of view of an engineer, and from the point of view of using a more or less specialized ship. Therefore, the zoo in the Soviet Navy was reasonable. The Americans were more comfortable with the medium-range anti-aircraft missile system, the Harpoon anti-ship missile system and the Tomahawk anti-ship missile system in more or less one dimension, so they were the first to get confused with unification. And given the tasks, they also need it more. If you bomb the "Banderlog", which has nothing to answer, then naturally you can even remove all the missiles, and load Tomahawks to poke around in peaceful cities. And we were always ready for a clash with the US Navy. Is it possible in this case to reduce the ammunition of the missile defense system? no. Is it possible to remove the RCC? No, because then going out to sea loses its meaning. Therefore, we do not need ammunition variations. As unnecessary and universal PU, which in any case will take up more space and will be less appropriate than specialized ones. But we were the first to use vertical launchers. Because they were appropriate for our fleet as well.
    1. +4
      31 July 2014 16: 30
      Quote: qwert
      The zoo was good and appropriate.

      Versatility is always better, provided that the versatile ship copes with all tasks, at least well. As far as I know, it’s really possible to create a ship that will combine the capabilities of a destroyer, a BOD and a cruiser. Previously, it was impossible, so they built a bunch of everything.
      Quote: qwert
      As unnecessary and universal PU, which in any case will take up more space

      Who told you such nonsense?
      Quote: qwert
      Therefore, we do not need variations of the ammunition

      Depends on the task.
      1. +3
        31 July 2014 18: 30
        Universal ship, mediocre in everything universal. The Soviet fleet, of course, cannot be called balanced, although he strove for this, but our specialized ships exceeded the universal NK of the USA. Universality - reduction of expenses when superiority is achieved and there are no particularly strong enemies.
        NK "which will combine the capabilities of a destroyer, a BOD and a cruiser" is expensive and does not make sense ...
        1. +2
          31 July 2014 20: 17
          Quote: MaximvsDV
          A versatile ship, mediocre in everything

          Not always. It is impossible to combine fundamentally different things, but a similar range of tasks is quite possible. It all depends on technology.
          Quote: MaximvsDV
          but our specialized ships were superior to the universal NK

          Why do you think so? And how fun it is to maintain and repair a bunch of different ships, which even within the same series differ as if different projects - this is generally a fairy tale. Obscene.
          Quote: MaximvsDV
          Universality - reduction of expenses when superiority is achieved and there are no particularly strong enemies.

          Can I have a source?
          Quote: MaximvsDV
          expensive and does not make sense

          And is building three ships cheaper and more meaningful?
    2. +2
      31 July 2014 16: 36
      Quote: qwert
      About the several times named "zoo" of Soviet ships.

      You justify human stupidity and the small-town interests of many KB. The Americans could change the configuration of the ship with MK.41 from shock to air defense and anti-aircraft defense depending on the tasks, we did the special. ships of the type under PLO 1155, under the attack 956, under the attack with the air defense 1164. An attempt to combine all three configurations was expressed in a monstrous 1144 about which mass production was out of the question. While the Americans for 14 years made 27 Ticonderoges on each of which there were 122! UVP cells. That's where you can roam about the composition of weapons ...
      1. 0
        31 July 2014 18: 50
        And these UVPs allowed him to be just a good NK missile defense (and that’s the question since 63/62 is only -4 and then if it’s onboard to attacking objects); RCC from their own PU, and Harpoon weapons against defenseless; Self defense PLO; Well Tamogavki along the coast in the conditions of advanced intelligence ...
        1. +2
          31 July 2014 19: 52
          Quote: MaximvsDV
          And these UVPs allowed him to be just a good NK missile defense (and that’s the question since 63/62 is only -4 and then if it’s onboard to attacking objects); RCC from their own PU, and Harpoon weapons against defenseless; Self defense PLO; Well Tamogavki along the coast in the conditions of advanced intelligence ...

          Brrrrrrrrrr ... what a mess ... Let's go into more detail.
          With regards to the PRO.
          Which ships built during the times of the USSR or the Russian Federation can perform missile defense functions? It is possible to discuss the effectiveness of missile defense with Aegis for a long time, but everything is known in comparison. There is absolutely nothing to discuss and discuss due to absence.
          Regarding the shock functions.
          At present, yes, except for anti-ship missiles Harpoon and SM-2, as well as anti-ship missiles Penguin on SiHoki on Tikonderogami no strike weapons. There was RCC Tomahawk which was withdrawn from armament in the 90s because the enemy was gone, but where did you get the idea that before that RCC Tomahawk was not taken into account? It was a serious long-range RCC and Ticonderoga could carry them much more than 1164 and 1144, not to mention the rest. In addition, RRM LRASM is currently being developed which can be used by any ship equipped with the Mk.41 UVP.
          Regarding PLO. Speaking derogatoryly about PLA Ticonderoga can only ignorant of this amateur. In terms of PLO, only 1155 could be equated with it in some way. Not a single ship in the world really possessed the best PLO system.
          Quote: MaximvsDV
          Well Tamogavki along the coast in the conditions of advanced intelligence ...

          This is generally beyond ...
    3. +1
      31 July 2014 18: 58
      Harpoons have their own PU ....
  6. The comment was deleted.
    1. Hawk2014
      4 August 2014 23: 20
      And who, in your opinion, will have to do this? The president? Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin? Minsudprom? Or. maybe MOE? what laughing
  7. +4
    31 July 2014 12: 38
    Great article! Thanks to the author.
    Here is the final line in doubt:
    "In the end, taking into account all the resources expended, including the time and efforts of the USC management team," import substitution "can turn out to be much more expensive than imports."
    In the short term, most likely yes, but in the future it will not be more exact.
  8. +5
    31 July 2014 13: 18
    From my own experience, I can say that after 23 years we have almost no military-industrial complex, incl. all Rogozin's cries about import substitution are meaningless. People for 20 thousand rubles. have long fled from factories, most of them have collapsed, the money allocated for the renovation of production has been plundered for many years, as a result of what we have at the moment: the remnants of Soviet-era pensioners + low-skilled youth makes koekaker crafts for pennies with wild deadlines for the delivery of finished products and lifelong elimination of complaints and the classic sawing off of money by bosses = long conversations with the word "must" and the disappearance of state money with the issuance of handicrafts someday ...
    1. vyatom
      31 July 2014 14: 03
      Quote: IAlex
      From my own experience, I can say that after 23 years we have almost no military-industrial complex, incl. all Rogozin's cries about import substitution are meaningless. People for 20 thousand rubles. have long fled from factories, most of them have collapsed, the money allocated for the renovation of production has been plundered for many years, as a result of what we have at the moment: the remnants of Soviet-era pensioners + low-skilled youth makes koekaker crafts for pennies with wild deadlines for the delivery of finished products and lifelong elimination of complaints and the classic sawing off of money by bosses = long conversations with the word "must" and the disappearance of state money with the issuance of handicrafts someday ...

      It's like that. It's like that. Unfortunately. Well, working professions are not popular with us. And a welder for 23 tr will not work normally. Moreover, knowing that the director is getting 100 times more, and as a rule is completely absent from the workplace. For fun, go to the job board of any St. Petersburg shipyard.
    2. Hawk2014
      4 August 2014 23: 14
      Quote: IAlex
      all the cries of Rogozin about import substitution are meaningless.

      Pointless to whom? For Rogozin himself? For the Ministry of Justice? For a "patriotic" public?
  9. alexander 17
    31 July 2014 14: 07
    At the present time (when there are so many "literate" economists, but illiterate engineers), I would like to see the construction of projects at several shipyards at the same time, and not the appointment of separate factories by the head and only manufacturer. It is very disappointing to see that when 2014 is already underway, there are 2020 years left until the end of SDO 5, and so few ships have been delivered.
    ps / I am a supporter that the manufacturer would equally bear responsibility along with subcontractors for the entire product life cycle, until the disposal time since the standard ISO 9001 was introduced everywhere!
    1. Hawk2014
      4 August 2014 23: 08
      Quote: Alexander 17

      ps / I am a supporter that the manufacturer would equally bear responsibility along with subcontractors for the entire product life cycle, until the disposal time since the standard ISO 9001 was introduced everywhere!

      Dreaming is not bad! laughing
  10. Leshka
    31 July 2014 15: 28
    slowly yelling but the defense industry rises
  11. 0
    31 July 2014 15: 55
    I would be very grateful if someone explained what will happen now with the deadlines in connection with the stoppage of deliveries of the power plants of the Ukrainian Zorya Mashproekt. And in what projects are their installations used?
    1. +2
      31 July 2014 16: 22
      Quote: 1c-inform-city
      I would be very grateful if someone explained what will happen now with the deadlines in connection with the stoppage of deliveries of the power plants of the Ukrainian Zorya Mashproekt. And in what projects are their installations used?

      There was a project "Siemens-Power Machines" for the construction of a plant for the production of ship-based gas turbines, but as you understand, because of the sanctions, you can put an end to it. And so all our gas turbines were from Zorya ... Well, it seems like ours are swaggering, like "well, okay, we'll build our own gas turbines with blackjack and whore," but not everything is going smoothly here. The fact is that you will have to create a copy because the existing projects of the ships were developed for specific GTUs (dimensions, mounting locations, shaft diameters, etc.), or rework projects for the developed GTU, and this is time and money ...
  12. +1
    31 July 2014 16: 14
    They carry heavy multifunctional missile weapons, the first time in the history of the Russian fleet deployed in standard vertical launchers of the universal naval firing complex (UKSK). The American fleet, for example, has come a long way, and the elimination of the “zoo” of launchers and missile systems of the Soviet fleet was inevitable.

    The author gives out wishful thinking. There is no unification at all. There is a conditional unification of anti-ship missiles in the form of a single UVP 3C-14 for Caliber and Yakhont, that's all. UVP same air defense missile system Redoubt called 3S90E.1 and there is no compatibility.
  13. alexander 17
    31 July 2014 16: 23
    On projects 11356 and 22350. Well, the main and 1st serial units were delivered and mounted, the gunsmiths slowed down. Answering the second question - according to the statement of our rulers, production of gas turbines in the city of Rybinsk will be organized in 2 years.
    1. 0
      31 July 2014 16: 44
      That is, for three years everything will rise.
  14. +1
    31 July 2014 20: 43
    A good article. Reasoned. Only the injection of three Crimean shipyards into Sevastopol, Kerch, and Feodosia into the Russian shipbuilding industry needs to be taken into account. Of course, they are breathing now. But this is not a clean field to build winked The basic structures remained, the remains of the personnel remained. There is a prospect for them to build simple, technologically advanced projects. Personnel + money to find the authorities - and go!
  15. Berezin alex
    31 July 2014 21: 45
    Russia needs to build more ships in the ocean. Why are Project 1144 and 1164 ships bad? The low superstructure of modern ships does not allow a powerful radar to control airspace, the massive use of aluminum and magnesium reduces survivability in the event of a fire on board, the use of thin metal reduces the ability to operate in northern latitudes.
    1. 0
      31 July 2014 23: 02
      Quote: Berezin Alex
      Than the ships of the project 1144 and 1164 are bad

      Outdated weapons and components (in fact, are no longer available now).
  16. 0
    1 August 2014 17: 53
    The main difference between a cruiser and a destroyer is the presence of a squadron headquarters with appropriate communications and reconnaissance equipment, as well as the presence of tactical nuclear weapons. It is at the same time an "admiral's yacht", and a scout, and the striking power of the fleet.
  17. Hawk2014
    4 August 2014 23: 00
    I rate the article as satisfactory. Nothing particularly new, except for a description of the old problems of the Russian Navy and shipbuilding, the author failed to present. Probably, when he decided to write this article, he forgot one immutable truth that everyone who wants to write about the fleet should know. And this truth reads as follows: "The Russian bureaucracy has its own traditions, which are not afraid of ANY Tsushima"! Let me explain a little. The customer of modern warships is either the national bourgeoisie (this primarily applies to Great Britain, the USA, France and Germany), or national governments (this primarily concerns Russia, so in the future I will consider only this option). The government, in turn, consists of a number of departments, of which (in the context of the discussion of the topic) the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry are important for us. Each of these departments has its own interests and traditions. The military believe that they serve the state and the people, although they often understand these terms too generalized. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense requires that the weapons supplied to the armed forces be at the highest technical level. But in the depths of the Ministry of Defense itself, there is also a struggle for its own piece of the budget pie. And this is where the Russian Navy finds itself at a disadvantage. Large warships are one of the most expensive weapons systems, their construction is also one of the most capital, science and labor-intensive branches of the military-industrial complex. But by tradition, the "lion's" share of the military budget goes to the ground forces and the air force. Understanding their position, knowing that they cannot see the desired quantitative ship composition as their ears, the admirals overestimate the technical requirements for the ordered products. But industry then builds what it can build. To get around the overstated requirements, industrialists begin to cheat, or even just complain to the government. And the search for consensus begins, which can take a very long time. The fleet usually loses because: 1) the presence of nuclear weapons makes a direct attack on Russia unlikely; 2) after May 14, 1905, the Russian Navy did not have a chance to fight in the oceanic zone (it is necessary to clarify - the Tsushima battle itself did not take place in the oceanic zone, across the oceans a transition was made to the place of the massacre). Thus, the very internal structure of Russia, always over the past 120 years, has become an insurmountable obstacle to the construction of the Big Fleet.
  18. 0
    5 August 2014 12: 57
    Don’t say, but Russia has only two allies, the army and the Navy. no matter how arrogant it is, but it is. This pleasure is expensive, it seems Napoleon said: He who does not want to feed his army is doomed to feed someone else's. It is good to see that the army and navy are replenished with new models of equipment. But after all, what kind of Olympics did we play and surprised the world with our capabilities, both financial and organization. So Russia Ahead!
  19. 0
    12 August 2014 07: 49
    a good overview, accessible and simple, indeed the problems with saturation of ships of all classes and re-equipment of existing combat units of the Russian Navy are very acute, but I hope that these problems will nevertheless be resolved as quickly and efficiently as possible, otherwise we won’t survive, arms race continues

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