Sixty Years Since the Beginning of the Korean War

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US Army soldiers in Korea. 1950

Anxiously began the second half of the twentieth century. The cold war raged in the world. Former allies of the anti-Hitler coalition stood on opposite sides of the barricades, the confrontation between them grew. The arms race that unfolded between the NATO bloc led by the United States, on the one hand, and the USSR and its allies, on the other, was gaining momentum. Conflicts of varying degrees of tension flared and went out, hot spots arose where the interests of the parties collided. One of these points at the beginning of the 50s was the Korean Peninsula.

Korea, annexed by Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, was promised by the Allies independence at the Cairo Conference (December 1 1943). The decision was enshrined in the Post-Dam Statement (26 June 1945). When Japan capitulated in World War II, the Allies reached an agreement (15 August 1945) to establish a dividing line along the 38 parallel, to the north of which the Japanese troops would surrender to the USSR, to the south - the United States. Following the terms of surrender, the USSR considered the 38 parallel to be the political border: an “iron curtain” fell along it.

In accordance with the decisions of the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the tasks of the joint Soviet-American commission set up were to assist in the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and to develop appropriate measures. To this end, the Commission, in preparing its proposals, was to consult with Korean democratic parties and public organizations. The Soviet side in the Commission relied primarily on left-wing democratic parties and organizations that expressed the will of the people. The United States relied mainly on right-wing forces and public parties and organizations that focused on capitalist America and collaborated with it in South Korea. The position taken by the United States on the issue of consultations once again showed their unwillingness to listen to the voice of the Korean people, direct opposition to the creation of an independent democratic Korea. The American government deliberately tried to exclude the participation in the consultations of representatives of democratic parties, trade unions, peasants, women, youth and other organizations of the South. It insisted on bringing to the consultations those parties and groups that opposed the Moscow decisions in December 1945.

The Soviet Union, on the contrary, pursued in the Commission a line on the broad involvement in consultations of the largest possible number of Korean democratic parties and public organizations, that is, those who expressed the genuine interests of the people. As a result of the activities of the United States, until May 1946, the Commission was unable to come to any decisions, and its work was interrupted.

Meanwhile, the main line of the political and democratic development of Korea increasingly shifted to the North. Under the leadership of the Labor Party, the process of consolidating progressive forces developed, the struggle for national unity and democracy, for the creation of an independent, truly people's state intensified and expanded on a Korean-wide scale, with the active participation of the working masses and constant Soviet assistance. North Korea became the center, uniting the efforts of the whole nation, aimed at the formation of a temporary democratic government of united Korea. The people's power in the North conducted an initiative policy in the issues of uniting the country and its political structure, coordinating the most important actions with the Soviet Union.

At the founding congress of the Workers Party of North Korea 29 August 1946, the central task of the Korean people was defined as follows: “To overcome South Korea’s anti-people reaction line as soon as possible, to carry out consistent democratic reforms there and in the same way to build a new, democratic Korea , united and independent. " The most important condition for accomplishing this task was the full strengthening of the Unified Democratic National Front — the unification of all the patriotic, democratic forces of Korea.

The tactics of the united front, adopted by the North Korean communists as the central element of the struggle for the unity of the country, was a proven means of uniting social forces in the struggle for freedom and democracy. Nominated by the Seventh Comintern Congress, it was already used by the Korean Communists in the struggle for the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule. Now, in the conditions of the division of the country, the Unified Democratic National Front has become a particularly relevant and effective form of struggle for a democratic solution to the problem of the unification of the motherland. This line of people's power in North Korea was also relevant for another reason. In South Korea, at that time, the struggle of the masses against the policy of the American military administration, which in the Joint Commission prevented the establishment of the Provisional Government of Korea, was growing. The Labor Party and the United Democratic National Front of South Korea joined this struggle. The biggest performance was the strike of railway workers, which turned into a general political action by workers, peasants and other segments of the population, who demanded, in particular, the immediate resumption of the activities of the Joint Commission. In December, 1946. A right-wing gang sent Lee Seung Man to Washington to persuade the US to take responsibility for creating a separate government of South Korea. He told American ruling parties that the alleged "Russians would not agree to the creation of a free government for the whole of Korea." Lee Seung Man proposed: to organize elections for the South Korean government, which should function as long as Korea is divided, and general elections immediately after its unification; accept this government in the UN and allow it to negotiate directly with the governments of the USSR and the USA regarding the problems of the occupation of the North and South of Korea; maintain US troops in South Korea until both foreign armies are withdrawn simultaneously.

Missouri cruiser firing at North Korean positions

US Secretary of State Marshall and the head of the US military administration in South Korea, General Hodge, then rejected the plan of Seung Man and continued to insist on a guardianship plan, claiming that she was the only correct way to unite Korea. After that, the situation inside Korea became sharply aggravated: Hodge wrote a report to Washington in February 1947 that a civil war was inevitable if the governments of the United States and the USSR did not take immediate measures to unite Korea. On the American side, the recommendations of General D. MacArthur on the Korean issue were such a “measure”. They envisaged: the transfer of the Korean problem to the UN General Assembly; the formation of a commission on Korea, which would consist of representatives of disinterested states, in order to monitor the Korean problem and make recommendations on the merits; further meetings between the governments of the United States, the USSR, China and the United Kingdom to work out an acceptable solution for the implementation of Art. 3 of the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers with regard to Korea; High-level meetings of representatives of the United States and the USSR to discuss and solve problems that hinder the successful development of Korea as a political and economic union seeking to create an independent state. Thus, in the course of the work of the Joint Commission, the United States tried to lay the foundation for solving the Korean problem in the future along the American model, that is, the core of the reactionary separate South Korean government was created.

After a powerful new wave of strikes and speeches by the working people of South Korea, who received the unanimous support of the North Korean population, in favor of the resumption of the Joint Commission and an active initiative in this regard for the Soviet Union, the Joint Commission 21 in May 1947 began work again.

It should be emphasized that the international situation during this period deteriorated significantly - it was the height of the Cold War, the time of the proclamation of the doctrine of “restraining communism”, the harsh political course of President G. Truman, the implementation of the “Marshall Plan”. Nevertheless, under such unfavorable conditions, thanks to the persistent efforts of the USSR, despite the resistance and tactics of delays from the American side, the Joint Commission nevertheless achieved some results by the end of 1947. Democratic parties and public organizations in North and South Korea submitted applications to the Joint Commission. about the intention to participate in oral consultations with her, singled out for this purpose their representatives, expressed their views on the structure and principles of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and national authorities and the political platform of the Provisional Government. It is noteworthy that representatives of political parties from 39 and public organizations from 386 were separated from the southern zone. They claimed to represent 52 million, which exceeded the population of all of Korea by 20 million and indicated obvious fraud and fraud. From the North, 3 parties and 35 public organizations were represented. The Soviet side proposed reducing the number of parties and groups from the South to 118, but the American side refused to do so, stating that such a move would actually lead to the dominance of the Communists in the future Korean government. Nevertheless, the first results achieved quite clearly and unequivocally said that the Korean people see the future of the nation in an independent democratic development. However, this is exactly what caused the serious fears of the internal and external reaction.

17 September 1947 another effort was made to reach an agreement with the American side: it was proposed to proceed to the implementation of the issues on which the points of view of both delegations became close. However, in this case, a clear response from the representatives of the United States to the Commission did not arrive. Finally, on September 26, at the meeting of the Joint Commission, a new constructive proposal was made on behalf of the Soviet government: to withdraw Soviet and American troops from Korea at the beginning of 1948 at the same time and give the Koreans themselves the opportunity to form a national government. Thus, the Korean people had the prospect of restoring their independence and statehood in the shortest possible time without any outside interference. This proposal envisaged a radical solution to the Korean problem, immediately eliminating the difficulties that had arisen in the way of the Allied powers fulfilling their previous obligations. Only the United States and its South Korean appointees reacted negatively to this proposal. The US refusal to accept it led in October 1947 to the cessation of the activities of the Soviet-American Joint Commission.

In May, 1948 was held in South Korea, under the control of a UN commission established by the United States, in a separate election. Former head of state was elected former professor at Washington University Lee Seung Man. The South Korean government declared itself the government of the whole country, with which, of course, the communist forces of the North did not agree. In the summer of 1948, they organized elections for the Supreme National Assembly of Korea, which 9 of September proclaimed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Thus, there was a legal registration of the split of Korea into two states, and the government of each declared itself the only legitimate one.

For Kim Il Sung, the support of the USSR was especially important. Having restored its national economy after the Second World War, it was one of the most powerful countries in the world. Kim Il Sung remembered that on October 13 1948 was in a welcoming telegram to the North Korean government on the occasion of the declaration of the DPRK I.V. Stalin limited himself to the wishes of success for the new government "in its activities on the path of national revival and democratic development", without delving into the problems of further relations between the two states. Therefore, the head of the DPRK government persistently sought Moscow’s consent to the visit of the DPRK government delegation to the Soviet Union. The leader of the North Korean Communists needed to clarify Stalin’s position on the DPRK.

Since the end of 1949, relations between the two Korean states have become increasingly acute. Both governments claimed the unification of Korea, each under its auspices. In October, 1949, South Korean President Lee Seung Man, in an interview with the American sailors in Incheon, stated that "if we have to solve this problem on the battlefield, we will do everything that is required of us." 30 December at a press conference, he tightened his position, saying that "we should unite North and South Korea on our own." 1 March 1950, speaking at a rally in Seoul, Lee Seung Man declared that "the hour of unification of Korea is approaching." His defense minister was also not shy about expressions. 9 February 1950. He said: "We are in full readiness to fight for the restoration of the lost territory and just waiting for the order."

Another portion of ammunition for the Korean War

The United States also did a lot to ensure that, as the then American ambassador in Seoul J. Muccio said, “bring the time of a general offensive to the territory north of the 38 parallel”. General W. Roberts, US Chief Military Advisor in South Korea in January 1950, five months before the war, at a meeting with South Korean ministers, pointed out that “we will start the attack,” although it was agreed that an excuse should be created to attack it had a valid reason. ”

To the north of the 38 parallel, there were also very warlike plans, but this was done under cover of secrecy without broadcasting statements. Intensive deliveries of weapons, military equipment, ammunition from the USSR to North Korea continued throughout the 1949 year. 1950 made the nuances. 19 January 1950 The Kremlin received an important message from Pyongyang. The Soviet ambassador Shtykov reported: “In the evening, at the Chinese embassy, ​​in connection with the departure of the ambassador, he received a reception. During his time, Kim Il Sung told me the following: now that the liberation of China ends, the next issue is the liberation of Korea. The guerrillas will not solve the case. I do not sleep at night thinking about reunion. Mao said that there is no need to advance to the South. But if Lee Seung Man will advance, then he must go on the counteroffensive. But Lee Seung-man does not come ... He, Kim Il Sung, needs to visit Stalin and ask permission to attack for the liberation of South Korea. Mao promised help, and he, Kim Il Sung, will meet with him. Kim Il Sung insisted on a personal report to Stalin on permission to advance to the South from the North. Kim Il Sung was in a state of intoxication and talked in an excited state. ”

Stalin was in no hurry to answer. He exchanged messages with Mao Zedong, who believed that the issue should be discussed. Only after this, 30 January 1950 of the year from Moscow from Stalin to Pyongyang went encryption: “Message from 19 January 1950 received. Such a big deal needs preparation. The case must be organized so that there is no great risk. Ready to take ... "

In Pyongyang, the telegram was regarded as consent to the operation with the condition of achieving guaranteed success. After another consultation with Beijing, on February 9, Stalin agreed to prepare a large-scale operation on the Korean peninsula, endorsing Pyongyang’s intention to unify his homeland by military means. Following this, deliveries from the USSR sharply increased. tanks, artillery, rifle weapons, ammunition, medicines, oil. At the headquarters of the Korean army with the participation of Soviet advisers, the development of a plan for a large-scale operation was conducted in deep secrecy, and the formation of several new Korean formations was accelerated. But Stalin, having agreed to the campaign of Kim Il Sung, still hesitated. is he feared US armed intervention in the conflict between North and South Korea, which could lead to unpredictable consequences, and perhaps to direct confrontation between the two superpowers, which threatened a nuclear war. Therefore, he believed, Moscow had, on the one hand, to secure Beijing’s consent to support the DPRK’s actions on Korea’s unification of forces, and on the other, to distance itself from the possible participation of the USSR in the imminent conflict, in order to avoid the risk of being dragged into a war with the USA , in case of their intervention in Korean affairs. The Kremlin was increasingly inclined to believe that the approach of Kim Il Sung to the south could be crowned with success, if one acted energetically and quickly. In this case, the North Korean army would have managed to seize the southern part of Korea before the Americans could intervene in the course of events.

The position of the Americans, as it seemed to Moscow, allowed them to hope that South Korea did not occupy the first places among the American strategic priorities in the Far East. For example, US Secretary of State D. Acheson 12 January 1950 announced that South Korea is not part of the United States "circulating perimeter" in the Pacific region. “My speech,” he later recalled, “opened up the green light to attack South Korea.” Of course, this statement of Acheson was taken into account by the leaders of North Korea. However, the calculation was not taken - and most likely did not know about it - another important document of the US government. In March, 1950, the US National Security Council prepared a directive - SNB-68, in which the government was recommended to firmly restrain communism everywhere in the world. The directive argued that the USSR was more inclined to engage in “patchwork aggression” than in total war, and any failure of the United States in repulsing such aggression could lead to a “vicious circle of taking too hesitant and late measures” and a gradual “loss of positions under force by pressing. " The United States, it was stated in the directive, should be ready to confront the USSR anywhere in the world without making a distinction between "vital and peripheral interests." 30 September 1950 US President Harry Truman approved this directive, fundamentally changing the US approach to defending South Korea.

Meanwhile, in the DPRK, preparations for the first large-scale offensive operation against the troops of Seung Mang were over. Encouraged by the support of their great neighbors - the USSR and the PRC - Kim Il Sung ordered an invasion. With the dawn of 25 on June 1950, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched an offensive deep into the Republic of Korea. When the North Koreans developed an attack on the South, Kim Il Sung asked to send Soviet advisers directly to the units leading the battles on the front line. From Moscow followed refusal. However, with the start of the war, despite the major successes of the North Korean troops, foreign policy events did not develop as they had hoped for in Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing. Already from the first days of the war, the conflict was internationalized as a result of active intervention by the United States. To ensure that American participation in the war is not interpreted as interfering in the internal affairs of Korea, the political leadership of the United States has taken care to make the actions of its troops lawful in terms of international law. The United States put to the vote in the UN Security Council the question of turning the American expeditionary forces in Korea into “UN troops”. This action could have been prevented by using the right of veto, but the Soviet representative to the UN, Ya.A. Malik, at the direction of Moscow, left the meeting of the UN Security Council, which was a major miscalculation of Stalin’s diplomacy. In addition to the United States, 15 states were also involved in the “campaign against communism,” although American troops, of course, formed the basis of the interventionist corps.

Although the war was between two Koreas, it is clearly visible that these two states were only puppets of the USSR and the USA. After all, the Korean War was the first and biggest conflict since the end of the Second World War. Based on this, one can judge that Korea has become the starting point for the start of the “cold war”. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that the UN General Assembly at that time was under the noticeable influence of America, which, in turn, also had a lot of influence on the course stories Korean war. The USA became an aggressor in relation not only to North Korea, but also to South, as they strongly pressed the ruling circles led by Seung Mann. Many sources of the time say that only under pressure from the United States, South Korea launched an offensive against the DPRK.

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