Cheating data on START. What do the US State Department figures say

July 6 2011 1

The US Department of State, after the entry into force of the START Treaty, published data on the total number of strategic offensive weapons of the United States and Russia. So, in the USA there are 882 deployed carriers with 1800 nuclear warheads, in Russia - 521 deployed carriers with 1537 nuclear warheads. The number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB is in the US - 1124, in the Russian Federation - 865 units.

It must be emphasized that the American certificate on the composition of the nuclear arsenals of the parties aroused considerable interest among government officials, various experts and the media. Thus, in the assessments and comments, the following was noted: “the numbers say nothing; the figures show that Moscow and Washington are very close to the fulfillment of the indicators for the reduction of strategic offensive arms stipulated by the Treaty; The US has 30% more missiles and warheads than Russia; US nuclear forces are ahead of Russia in all respects; There are no data on the number and types of carriers and warheads attached to them; when Russia can verify such information, the United States will provide accurate data, otherwise they may lie shamelessly; For some reason, Russians will learn about the state of their SNF from the reports of the US State Department, ”etc.

At the same time, it was unnoticed that the Americans threw a clearly unreliable number (1800 units) of operational-deployed nuclear warheads in the US SNA, which does not fully comply with the principles of openness, transparency and transparency in relations between Russia and the United States in the field of strategic offensive arms. This conclusion is confirmed by the following arguments, which reflect the personal position of the author of the article in the part concerning the American SNA.

STATE DEPARTMENTS

It should be noted that the US side, on its own initiative, published these data in accordance with the requirements of the formal paragraph 7 of Article VII of the START Treaty: “The total numbers of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and TB, the total numbers of warheads on the deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed TB, as well as the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed TB can (highlighted by the author - M.V.) indulge in publicity e by the parties. " At the same time, the reference does not indicate the types and quantitative composition of US ICBMs, SLBMs, TB and associated nuclear warheads, which makes it difficult to conduct a comprehensive analysis. Moreover, the Americans violated the requirements of paragraph 5 of the same article: "Each Party has the right to publicize data on its own (highlighted by the author - M.V.) START." Of course, the unauthorized publication of information about the Russian nuclear forces of the Russian Armed Forces at the official level is unacceptable (who asked them about it?). Unfortunately, the bodies of state and military government of the Russian Federation on this issue are traditionally silent. Although it would be possible for Russians (that is, taxpayers) to publish reliable data on the combat composition of the strategic forces of the RF Armed Forces, which is not a state secret.

Nevertheless, taking into account the available authoritative data on the combat strength of the US SNA, an objective analysis can be made and the following conclusions can be made.

Government and military officials, various experts and “wise men” are well aware that the ground component of the US SNA includes: 300 ICBM “Minuteman-IIIM” with three nuclear warheads on each rocket and 150 ICBM “Minuteman-IIIS” for one warhead. Total 450 missiles, 1050 warheads. It is also known that the Minuteman-IIIS missiles retain the technical possibility of increasing the number of warheads to three, since the MS platforms, in violation of the conditions of the START-1 Treaty, were not eliminated. Russian inspectors were not given the opportunity to verify the real number of warheads installed on the warheads of these missiles, due to the use of hard cover by the Americans. At the same time, the sluggish claims of the Russian side by the Americans, as a rule, were rejected. At the same time, in many media, a statement was made by Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, Rose Getemyuller: “For the first time, we will receive information on the divided warheads of Russian missiles, and on-site inspections will allow the US to confirm the true number of warheads on Russian intercontinental missiles and submarines. Such an unprecedented form of inspection and inspections did not exist under the terms of the previous START treaties. ” In this regard, the following is proposed. Why should not the Russian side make the following statement: “Finally, Russian inspectors will have the opportunity to visually see that the American ICBMs and SLBMs contain the number of warheads that are installed on the missiles at the time of the expiration of the START-1 Treaty (5 December 2009 of the year). In this case, hard covers will be replaced with flexible ones, as it was shown to the Americans at the Yars PGRK. Finally, Russian experts will confirm that the B-1В heavy bombers, declared as carriers of conventional weapons, have forever lost the technical possibility of restoring nuclear status. ”

ROCKETS CAUSE ALARM

There is no doubt that the high combat capabilities of the US NSF group, the quantitative composition of which for many years has been maintained at the level of the 14 SSBN with the 24 Trident-II SLBM on each boat, while the 2 SSBN are usually under scheduled maintenance. It should be emphasized that during the 15 years of the operation of the START-1 Treaty, the Americans on the "Memorandum on the initial data ..." presented, and the Russian inspectors as if confirmed eight warheads on each rocket. In addition, the Trident-II SLBM has passed flight design tests with 12 cargo packages.

Thus, the possible combat strength of the American NSNF includes: 12 SSBNs, 228 SLBMs and 2304 warheads.

Regarding the US ASLR, consider the 60 combat-ready (emphasis added) TB, including 14 B-2A and 46 B-52H. In the framework of the previous START-1 Treaty, Americans refer to B-1B bombers as carriers of non-nuclear means of destruction, which has not yet been confirmed by the Russian side. We also note that in March of this year, TB B-1B (for the umpteenth time!) Were presented to Russian inspectors as non-nuclear bombers with a demonstration of the so-called distinctive features (repainted in a different color).

In addition, in relation to the US and Russian Air Force heavy bombers, the so-called conditional charges (one deployed TB - one nuclear warhead) took effect, the procedure for which the parties have not yet developed in the contractual process. It is also not determined whether this rule will apply to all types of nuclear weapons of TB or only air-based cruise missiles.

This is how a well-known scientist, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, explains conditional counting: “There is a definite meaning to the fact that the counting order has been changed. The classic bombers have never played a significant role in simulating nuclear strike exchanges compared to intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles. ” The question is quite reasonable: where is the modeling here, if there is a real planning process for the combat use of nuclear forces, which takes into account the real expense of the combat personnel of the NSNF? Speaking of modeling. It was formally carried out at the stage of preparation and negotiation, signing and ratification of the START Treaty, since all procedures were carried out behind closed doors, and the draft contractual documents were not communicated to the interested structures of the Russian Federation.

In the opinion of specialists in the field of strategic nuclear forces, contingent charges make confusion in the development of operational documents, plans for the construction of the NSF and the implementation of contractual activities. There is no clarity on the procedure for applying conditional assessments when planning R & D, KNIR, conducting military-economic calculations and financial justification of the modernization and construction programs of the Russian NSSD, taking into account contractual obligations.

So, according to the conditional counting rule, 60 60 nuclear warheads are counted for XNUMX heavy bombers.

BRIEF RESULTS AND SUGGESTIONS

Thus, in the US SNA, the number of operatively deployed carriers is 798 units, nuclear warheads are 3414 units. At the same time, there is also a variant of the maximum configuration of the warheads of the MSMB “Minuteman-IIIS” (3 warheads) and the Trident-II (8 – 12 warheads) SLBMs, and the ammunition of two SSBNs that are under repair. In addition, all TB B-1В, allegedly converted into carriers of non-nuclear weapons, are able to regain their nuclear status under military conditions, which is confirmed by updated official documents of the Russian Federation. Estimates show that the number of operational-deployed nuclear warheads is about 6000 nuclear warheads.

According to the US Department of State, the number of operational-deployed nuclear warheads is 1800 units, but the consistency of this indicator, as has been shown, is not confirmed. At the same time, it is clear from the Gosdep document that the Americans even fulfilled the requirements of the SOR Treaty, which provided for a reduction of SOR to 31 in December of 2012 to the levels of 1700 – 2200 of operational deployed nuclear warheads. It should also be noted that the well-known American expert in the field of control over START Christensen was unable to figure out the origin of the figure in 1800 nuclear warheads!

As already noted, the certificate does not show the existing types of ICBMs, but according to paragraph 8 in Article III of the START Treaty, the existing types of ICBMs are: for the United States of America - Minuteman-II, Minuteman-III and Peacekeeper. At the same time, the meaning of the term “existing” is not established in the START Treaty and its protocol. Therefore, of particular interest is the possible technical appearance of Peacekeeper ICBMs (MX), since their first stages were destroyed under the control of Russian inspectors, and the second and third stages are used in the interests of making Minotaur missiles during flight tests of non-nuclear equipment of promising ICBMs. . A significant part of the Mk-21 warheads after the modernization was aimed at re-equipping the head parts of the Minuteman type missiles. It is also unclear what the “Minuteman II” ICBMs and the non-finished B-52G TB are, which are declared as “existing”.

However, the following causes bewilderment. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of Chapter 2 of the Protocol to the Treaty, in March of the current year, the Russian Federation and the United States, through the NCLN, exchanged initial data on the initial composition of the START. It can be assumed that the accuracy of the combat composition of US strategic offensive weapons in these notifications is beyond doubt, and their content is not a state secret. However, the information of the military authorities, universities, research organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the defense industry complex of the Russian Federation on the combat composition of the US SNA has not been organized. It can be assumed that the reason for such closeness is that the Russian public and specialists do not have the opportunity to get acquainted with the facts of the ineffective work of some of the Russian government bodies involved in ensuring the implementation of the START treaties.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to recall that the State Department of the USA periodically publishes various unreliable materials on strategic offensive arms, which negatively affect the improvement of the process of “resetting” relations between the Russian Federation and the United States. According to the experience of the implementation of the START-1 Treaty, it can be assumed that the next site of the US State Department will be devoted to violations and circumvention of the START Treaty, which are supposedly allowed by the Russian side. As for the 1800 figure, it is proposed that the structures of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation should nevertheless deal with its origin. If necessary, request its justification from the US Department of State. Conclusions to report to the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation.