Military Review

The fatal "eight" by Admiral Makarov

46
The death of Admiral Stepan Makarov in Port Arthur became a symbol of the strategically inconsistent policy of the Russian state in the Far East and a turning point of the era


"Irrepressible Russian genius"

So Alexander Lieven, commander of the cruiser "Diana" during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, called Stepan Makarov in the pages of his book "Spirit and Discipline in Our navy».

Makarov was unusually talented and, moreover, that not a very frequent phenomenon in Russia was also a tireless, even a restless worker. He left behind a very significant military applied, oceanographic, technical and other scientific legacy.

The fatal "eight" by Admiral Makarov

The battleship "Grand Duke Constantine". Source: shipwiki.ru


Stepan Makarov published his first serious scientific work “The Adkins Tool for Determining Deviation at Sea” at the age of eighteen. And not just anywhere, but in the Sea Collection, the most authoritative scientific journal of that time.

In 1870, in the same “Sea Collection”, Makarov proposed introducing a special plaster into the system for fighting for the survivability of a ship, with the help of which it is possible to quickly repair a hole in the ship’s hull. In principle, this technology, first proposed by Makarov, is retained to this day.

Later, already in the course of his systematic research activities in St. Petersburg, Makarov paid great attention to the theory of ships' unsinkability, and in fact forms a new scientific discipline in this discourse.

A huge layer of scientific and experimental activities of Stepan Makarov in the fleet - the creation of a torpedo weapons and special ships torpedo bombers (at that time they were called destroyers, and torpedoes - self-propelled mines). In the course of the Russian-Turkish war 1877 — 1878, he managed to realize his ideas on the ship “Grand Duke Constantine”, which was turned into the first in the Russian fleet torpedo bomber.

Stepan Makarov summarized the theory and practice of the use of torpedoes in his brilliant, revolutionary for his time, work “Rules for conducting night attacks of mine-boats”.

Makarov’s three-year round-the-world voyage on the Vityaz corvette during the 1886 — 1889 period was completed with the “Vityaz” and the Pacific Ocean capital work. Then the epic on the creation of the first specialized Russian icebreaker "Yermak" and thorough oceanographic work on it in the Arctic Ocean followed logically.

It is curious that the main work of Makarov on the problem of the use of naval forces in a major conflict - “Discourses on Naval Tactics” - was translated into Japanese in Tokyo before the war itself. The chief naval commander of the Mikado, Admiral of Togo, was most attentively acquainted with the book.


The cover of Stepan Makarov’s book “Yermak in the Ice”, 1901 year


Zhil Makarov, as befits every non-arrested citizen in Russia, is very modest. His letter to his wife, which was sent from Harbin 19 February 1904, is quite remarkable in this sense.

“I telegraphed to Fyodor Karlovich [maritime minister Avelan. “N. L.] about giving you 5400 rubles,” wrote the admiral on his way to his last war. - Please, once again I ask you to save money, I will not be able to transfer anything to you afterwards. In the first two months, I will be deducting all the salary increases, since I left you a power of attorney for 1200 rubles. I won't get a coastline here almost a penny a month. Only then will something remain, but we must save it. ”

"I will not be sent there until misery happens there."

Admiral Stepan Makarov wrote these words about himself and about Port Arthur to his friend, Baron Ferdinand Wrangel, back in the year 1903. If that year Makarov was sent to Port Arthur to command the Pacific Squadron, he would have had some time, but still enough time to look around, get up to speed, not drive his own health. Indeed, in December 1903, Makarov met his 55 anniversary. Alas, the Russian bureaucratic machine didn’t give Makarov a machine for understanding the tasks of the Pacific squadron and the methods for achieving them even in this small time: “restless geniuses” are needed in Russia only during times of revolution and serious wars with an external enemy.

In Russian historiography, Vice Admiral Makarov is traditionally considered to be an outstanding naval commander. However, the admiral’s real service record indicates something else: Makarov never commanded any of the Russian fleets before the 1904 year, he didn’t have the experience of a combat naval commander. Admiral, in view of his reputation as a restless reformer and close to a simple sailor commander, simply never appointed to high command positions.


View of Port Arthur, 1904 year. Photo: RIA News


Makarov was a lot, even a lot, he went on ships, mostly as a captain. Among the army of "cabinet admirals" of Russia, he stood out as a real "sea wolf". But not even the fleet, but the expeditionary formation of the ships — a squadron — Stepan Osipovich commanded only once in his life, and that very short time: from November 1894 to May 1895, that is, only half a year. In fact, this was a single naval transition of a squadron from the Mediterranean to Vladivostok, and only this transition exhausted Makarov's own experience as a naval commander.

It seems obvious that it was precisely the lack of real flotation experience in the changed conditions of the beginning of the twentieth century that became the main cause of the tragic death of Russian admiral Makarov 31 in March (April 13) 1904.

Makarov in Port Arthur: the first initiatives

Makarov arrived at Port Arthur March 7 1904. His charismatic leadership style immediately felt everything. Admiral’s adjutant will write about these days: “Often we didn’t even have time to eat or sleep; and yet it was an excellent life. What is especially characteristic of Makarov is hatred of routine, hatred of the old system of shifting responsibility on others, to attempts to avoid independence in actions. ”

The struggle of Makarov for the manifestation of the personal initiative of officers and sailors was a de facto struggle to change the entire traditional style of relations in the Russian fleet, built mainly on the sad maxim "I am the boss, you are a fool." Makarov could not really change the situation for a single month, which he commanded the Pacific Squadron. However, significant changes in the mobilization capabilities of the squadron were achieved.

The first event of Makarov in Port Arthur was the organization of reliable communications in the fortress - without which modern war is unthinkable in principle: a permanent wire connection connected the headquarters with all the main instruments of the forts.

For the crews of the ships came the hard training days: the fleet began to learn to finally shoot, quickly enter and leave the internal base raid on the external raid.

The entrance to the base of the fleet, in order to counter the Japanese destroyers, was narrowed as much as possible: two old ships, loaded with boulders, were flooded on both sides of the port entrance, in addition, permanent minefields were set up.


The death of the destroyer "Steregushchy", illustration from a poster of a charity concert at the Mariinsky Theater, 1904 year. Source: sovposters.ru


On the day of his arrival at Port Arthur, Admiral Makarov raised his pennant on the Askold armored cruiser. In the light of subsequent events, it appears that this first decision was correct: the Askold was the newest ship (commissioned in 1902), fast, maneuverable, very well armed. His draft was almost three meters less than that of the battleship Petropavlovsk, which Makarov later died on, in terms of the defense of mines, it was a safer ship. Unfortunately, guided, perhaps, by an established tradition, Admiral Makarov soon transferred his pennant to the armored giant Petropavlovsk.

Throw on the cruiser "Novik"

Admiral Makarov’s leadership style is best characterized by numbers. In just one month of his command, the Pacific Squadron six times went into the Yellow Sea to conduct combat operations against the Japanese fleet. And for the rest of the Russo-Japanese War, that is, for two years - only three times: once before Makarov's arrival in Port Arthur and twice with his worthless successor, Rear Admiral Wilhelm Vitgeft.

The first clash of Russian ships with the Japanese took place on 9 March 1904 of the year: four Russian destroyers took the battle with four Mikado destroyers. This battle ended in a draw. However, the next naval battle ended not in favor of the Russians.


Evgeny Capital. "Vice-Admiral S. O. Makarov and artist-battleist V. V. Vereshchagin in the cabin of the battleship" Petropavlovsk ", 1904 year"


Early in the morning of 10 in March 1904, the “Resolute” and “Steregushchy” destroyers, returning to the base after a night raid, encountered the Japanese destroyers “Akebono”, “Sadzanami”, “Sinoneme” and “Usugumo”.

The Russian ships tried to break through to Port Arthur, but only the Resolute managed it. The destroyer "Steregushchy" was hit by a Japanese projectile, lost speed and was forced to take his last battle. The commander of the Guardian, Lieutenant A. S. Sergeev, who took command of Lieutenant N. S. Goloviznin, Warrant Officer K. V. Kudrevich, died heroically in their posts.

After suppressing the destroyer's firepower, the Japanese brought a towline to the ship, but at that time the smoke of the Russian cruisers appeared on the horizon: “Bayan” and “Novik” went to the rescue of the “Steregushchy”. The Japanese dropped the cable and, not accepting the fight, left. At about nine o'clock in the morning the wounded "Watchman" sank. With the withdrawal, the Japanese lifted four Russian sailors from the water. All of them survived in Japanese captivity, and when they returned to Russia, they were awarded St. George's crosses.


Internal raid of Port Arthur, 1904 year. Source: wwportal.com


Makarov himself participated in the rescue raid of the “Watchman” on the small armored cruiser “Novik”. We can pay tribute to the heroism of the admiral, but hardly a hasty personal outing at sea on just two ships met the strategic interests of the Russian naval defense in Port Arthur. In addition to the Japanese four destroyers, two Japanese cruisers “Tokiwa” and “Chitose” were already in this area of ​​the sea, and, most importantly, the main forces of the squadron of Togo were on the way. Makarov clearly took an unjustified risk, putting at risk not only his life, but the strategy of victory over the Japanese fleet.

Unfortunately, the unjustified risk has become the Makarov "trademark" in Port Arthur.

Admiral Makarov, probably not from the good organization of the work of his staff, was often forced to combine the work of a designer, treasurer, junior lieutenant, adjutant and radio engineering. Remaining with all that, he is also the chief strategist of the Pacific Squadron.

The substitution of the regular work of the staff officers with their own impulsiveness and energy, so characteristic of Makarov, found, of course, a warm response in the hearts of the sailors, and earned genuine respect for the commander. However, the physical and moral fatigue of the admiral, which became the inevitable consequence of this annoying substitution, appeared to be the main prerequisite for the March 31 tragedy of 1904.

"Sleeping Fire" excited

Among the Japanese sailors, Admiral Togo Heyhatiro received the informal name "Sleeping Fire". Togo, like no one else, knew how to control himself, but all the officers who knew him closely were confident in the admiral's incredible internal energy, in the latent fire of military passion simmering in his chest.

The sharp increase in activity of the Russian Pacific squadron was very disturbing to Admiral Togo. The combat potential of the Japanese army on the mainland was entirely dependent on naval supplies of manpower, equipment and ammunition from Japan. If the Russian squadron managed to organize a planned raid, and it was quite obviously that its admiral was aimed, Japan would have lost the war without launching it in full force.

According to the well-known military historian A.V. Shishov, already in the second half of March 1904, the headquarters of Togo decided to focus on the mine warfare, setting as its main goal the undermining of the most combat-ready ships of the Russian squadron.


Admiral Togo Heyhatiro. Source: sakhalin-znak.ru


The intelligence work of Japanese intelligence, as already described at the RP, was organized at an exceptionally high level, including in Port Arthur. Experts believe that the intelligence data allowed the Japanese specialists to very accurately determine the location of the mine can. In principle, any Russian ship could have reached this minefield, but the first to enter it was Makarov’s flagship battleship, who always headed the system.

A narrow exit from the internal raid of Port Arthur set Makarov the task of achieving such a regime of cruising under the protection of coastal batteries, which would provide an opportunity to fire from ships while simultaneously concentrating the forces of the squadron. Thus arose the famous "Makarov's Eight", which Russian ships leaving from the internal raid described opposite to a strictly local section of the coast - from the eastern rumba of Krestovaya mountain to the southern rumba of the White Wolf mountain. The G8 was good because in any evolution every Russian ship could shoot with one full board. Its weakness was in a completely template, repeated cruise route from time to time. It was enough to block the main reference points of this route with mine banks, and the undermining of the most deep-seated Russian ships became inevitable.

There was, however, an effective "antidote" against the mines - the quality, methodical work of minesweepers, since the limited, practically permanent route of the G8 sharply narrowed the scope of work.

Presentiment of death

On the eve of his death, Admiral Makarov sent a single letter from Port Arthur to his son Vadim. This almost mystical message is worth not only thinking about how special the admiral's relationship with his son was, but also about the mystery of God's will.

“My dear son! This is my first letter sent to you, and not in passages in letters to my mother, as happened before. You are already a teenager, almost a young man. But I appeal to you from the other end of Russia as an adult man. I send the letter to my old friend in Kronstadt. He will find a way to pass it on to you. There is a brutal war, very dangerous for the Motherland, although outside its borders. The Russian fleet, you know, did not work such miracles, but I feel that you cannot tell anyone so far that we, and I including, as if hinder something, didn’t admiral Togo, no, but from the side nudge, as if sneaking up behind.

Who! I do not know! My soul is in turmoil that I have never experienced. I'm already starting to catch something, but dimly so far. Here Vereshchagin Vasily Vasilyevich is trying to explain something, but confusedly, like all artists and poets ... Here is my mood, son. But you know about it while you are alone. Keep quiet, as it should be a man, but remember. ”

“Togo was almost lifeless”

On the eve of March 31, 1904, Makarov slept badly. His adjutant testifies that for several days in a row the admiral practically did not take off his uniform - apparently, she was tormented by insomnia.

Another eyewitness wrote about this night: “... In the rays of the Krestovaya Mount searchlight, silhouettes of several ships appeared, our searchlights were not enough for them about two miles. Particularly prevented to make out what was happening, a grid of fine rain, illuminated by searchlights. It seemed that the suspicious silhouettes were not standing still, or they were wandering back and forth in the same place. ”

Today it is already known that the mysterious “silhouettes” were the Japanese mine cruiser “Korio-maru”, which carried out a large-scale mine setting at all fixed points of the “Makarov Eight”. A total of 48 min deep bombs was set.


The death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk". Source: roshero.ru


At night, Makarov was reported on the discovery of unknown ships in the outer roadstead. Why a report on such an ordinary, in fact, event had to be lifted from the bed of the commander, and not his duty deputy, remains incomprehensible.

Makarov did not give permission to open coastal battery fire along “silhouettes”: there was a detachment of detachments in the sea, sent for reconnaissance by Japanese forces off the Elliott Islands. The admiral feared shelling her sailors. Why the commanders of the destroyers were not promptly communicated the code of the projector signal “I am my own”, which they had to give without fail when approaching the outer raid, also remains unclear.

On the morning of March 3 (April 13), 1904 of the year, Admiral of Togo began to carry out a plan to lure the Russian fleet from the internal base raid.

Six cruisers under the command of Admiral Deva approached Port Arthur. They imitated a detachment that went far from the main forces. Togo at the head of the squadron battleships was at this moment only 45 miles south. Another group of ships, Admiral Kamimura, was waiting for the Russians on the Korean coast, in case they thought of breaking into Vladivostok.

When Makarov was informed about the approach of the Japanese cruisers, he allegedly instructed to immediately clean up the exit from the internal raid and the waters of the G-8 with mine trawls. Why this absolutely obligatory event was not held is again unclear. Perhaps, the lack of professionalism of the Russian staff officers again affected, but it is not less possible that the order was canceled by Makarov himself.

In an incredible rush, Russian ships began to go on the outer raid. The battleship Petropavlovsk led an armada of four battleships, four cruisers and nine destroyers.

Makarov in his famous old - "happy" - jacket with a fur collar was on the bridge. Not far from him stood the Russian painter Vasily Vereshchagin, the representative of the Romanovs' house in Port Arthur, the Grand Duke Kirill, the captain of the scaffold "Manjour" Crown.

In 09: 15, Admiral Makarov saw armadillos Togo in the telescopes. The Japanese commander, in turn, well distinguished the huge Russian flagship. The staff officer Kure Kosigawa, who was standing next to Togo, later noted in his memoirs that the chief admiral Mikado "was so unnaturally immovable that he seemed lifeless." He was painfully, like “sleeping fire,” waiting for something.

In 09: 43, Togo saw a huge explosion on the horizon, throwing a volcanic column of greenish-brown smoke to a height twice the height of the masts. Many Japanese officers took off their caps. Togo gave the command to lower the flags on all ships, and all the officers to put on signs of mourning. "Sleeping Fire" paid homage to his dead enemy as a true samurai.

“Suddenly the stern of the battleship rose straight into the sky,” with a shudder witnessed the witness of the death of Petropavlovsk, Lieutenant Semyonov. “It happened so fast that it did not look like a sinking ship, but as if the ship unexpectedly fell into two parts ...”

The squadron battleship "Petropavlovsk" drowned in just two minutes. The reason for this is in an extremely dangerous place where a mine was detonated: just opposite the artillery cellar of the main caliber - the entire ammunition was detonated, and the boilers exploded behind it.

Together with Makarov, the artist Vereshchagin died, as well as 635 officers and sailors. Grand Duke Cyril was picked up from the water, along with him saved another 80 crew man.

“Something more happened than just the death of Makarov,” writes contemporary researcher Anatoly Utkin. “Fate began to turn away from the country that had made such a long journey to the Pacific Ocean.” The mist of doom from this time begins to envelop Russia in the Far East. The old euphoria of the young giant will never return. ”

Japanese poet Ishikawa Takuboku, shocked by the mystique of the unexpected death of the Russian flagship, wrote heartfelt lines in 1904.
Friends and foes, throw away the swords,
Do not strike violently!
Stand with bowed head
At the sound of his name: Makarov.
Author:
Originator:
http://rusplt.ru/sub/history/rokovaya-vosmerka-admirala-makarova-11357.html
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  1. Drednout
    Drednout 24 July 2014 11: 28
    +5
    Friends and foes, throw away the swords,
    Do not strike violently!
    Stand with bowed head
    With the sounds of his name: Makarov

    Over a hundred years ago, and such a nobility among the warring. Warriors with a capital letter.
  2. Petrik66
    Petrik66 24 July 2014 12: 17
    -1
    In addition, you can see that one of the main culprits of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima battle was a light projectile that did not explode when hit in a Japanese ship. The initiator of the transition to a light projectile was Admiral Makarov.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 July 2014 12: 47
      +10
      Quote: Petrik66
      One of the main culprits of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima battle was a light projectile that did not explode when hit in a Japanese ship. The initiator of the transition to a light projectile was Admiral Makarov.

      The light shell itself was not some kind of supernatural evil. Makarov really proposed making lightweight shells, but at the same time:
      1) Makarov wanted these shells to be supplied with "Makarov caps", which increase armor penetration by 10-15%, which was not done.
      2) Makarov did not at all require that the mass of explosive charge in shells be reduced below low.
      The armor-piercing 12 "331,7 kg shell of the Tsushima era had only 1,3 kg of pyroxylin. In 1907, the new 12" shell with the same mass (331,7 kg) had 5,3 kg of explosives. Those. technically possible, but reluctance to bother with quality steel ...
    2. Mareman Vasilich
      Mareman Vasilich 24 July 2014 13: 31
      0
      Can not be.
    3. Crang
      Crang 24 July 2014 18: 57
      0
      Not at all. Tsushima was made by medium-caliber artillery. The main culprit in the defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima was Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky, who did not even try to train the ship crews in centralized (artillery of one ship) and command (group of ships) control and firing. During the entire campaign, he bothered to conduct artillery exercises once or twice. At ridiculous distances. According to Novikov A.S. when the shields were taken out of the water, they did not even find scratches on them. How it was possible with such preparation to enter the Tsushima battle - I do not understand. as a result, the ships of the Nebogatovsky detachment inflicted the greatest harm on the enemy. The old, old battleship "Nikolai-I" (disabled the "Asam" cruise missile base) and three small battleships of coastal defense.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 July 2014 21: 21
        +2
        Quote: Krang
        The main culprit in the defeat of the Russian fleet under Tsushima was Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky

        A common misconception, dear Krang
        Quote: Krang
        who didn’t even try to teach the command of the ships centralized (artillery of one ship) and command (group of ships) command and control of fire.

        Just the same, Rozhdestvensky perfectly trained his commandors. In fact, the preparation that Rozhdestvensky arranged for his gunners did not have equal in the Russian imperial fleet.
        Before leaving Libava, Rozhdestvensky ordered (Circular No.32 from June 8 to June 1904)
        The headquarters, by order of the Squadron Commander, announces that on all ships of the squadron, except for the full combat set and 20% of the reserve, it is necessary to have the following quantity of ammunition for practical firing:
        1) For each gun from 120 mm. caliber and above, for 75 cartridges for training 37 mm. trunks.
        2) For training of servants 75 mm. guns, for each 75 mm. cannon, as well as 75 rounds for training 37 mm. barrels (firing will be made from 120 mm. or 6 "guns).
        3) For each 47 mm. and 37 mm. gun on 75-ty practical rounds.
        4) For each 300 gunner of the 4,2 line of cartridges for firing from auxiliary trunks.
        5) For each turret gun of 8 "caliber or more, ammunition for 10 shots with practical charges and unloaded cast iron shells.
        6) For each 57 mm, 120 mm and 6 "cannon, 15 shots with practical charges and cast iron cannonballs.
        7) For each machine gun on 300 cartridges 3's linear.
        If, before the publication of this circular, the ship commanders had already submitted demanding stocks for stocks for practical firing on the basis of the rules of the Artillery Service, bearing in mind that the quantity laid down by the rules did not coincide with those indicated in this circular, the Squadron Commander ordered now to enter each ship with additional requirements for the missing ammunition against the prescribed calculation.

        The same "Eagle" in Nossi-Be fired 40 training 12 "shells. For comparison, during the period when the 2TOE was going to Tsushima, Togo's flagship" Mikasa "fired exactly 8 such shells during exercises.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 July 2014 21: 21
          +2
          Quote: Krang
          For the entire campaign artillery exercises, he bothered to conduct one or two times. At ridiculous distances.

          According to the senior artillery officer of the battleship "Sisoy the Great", Lieutenant S. A. Malechkin, training shooting at the Second Pacific Squadron
          “Was carried out at long distances, starting from seventy cable and up to forty, but Sisoy the Great usually started firing with sixty cable of 12" guns, and with fifty cable of 6 "guns, because the elevation angles did not allow using a larger tabular range ... For shooting, pyramidal shields descended, no less than four in number. Usually, by order, the shields were painted in different colors. Shields were distributed between famous ships and each shot at his own shield, when it was possible, and at someone else's, if his went out of sight. The shooting was arranged as required by the combat situation, each time the distance was measured both by Barr and Stroud instruments and by Luzhol's rangefinder-micrometers, and both of them served for mutual control. The distances obtained in this way were transferred to the battery and towers with the help of Geisler's instruments, and, in addition, voice transmission was active. Talking pipes and not telephones enjoyed great confidence. Before the start of firing, the lead ships of their detachments (Suvorov, Oslyabya, etc.) determined the distance either by sighting, or with instruments and showed this distance to their matelots - by a signal, and then each one acted independently.

          Quote: Krang
          How it was possible to join the Tsushima battle with such preparation - I do not understand. as a result, the ships of the Nebogatovsky detachment did the most harm to the enemy.

          Let's clarify. For a quarter of an hour (at the beginning of the Tsushima battle), 3-5 "and 12-14" shells hit "Mikasa" (which could be fired at for the most part by 6 head Russian battleships). And if this is a bad result, then I am the Pope. Because the same Japanese in the battle in the Yellow Sea, having fired 4 065 '' shells for the entire battle, managed to achieve only twenty-nine hits for the entire battle, although, perhaps, some more hits of such shells are attributed to the "unknown caliber"
          Word to campbell
          In total, the Russians achieved 47 hits with heavy shells (8 to 12 "), of which all but 10 or so were 12". This is a good result, especially considering the weather conditions of the battle and the overall defeat of the Russian fleet.

          Unfortunately, God was definitely not on our side that day
          So, within thirteen minutes after the Japanese opened fire, Rozhdestvensky’s flagship wounded the senior artilleryman of the squadron battleship “Prince Svorov”, Lieutenant P.E. Vladimirsky and the flagship artilleryman of the 2 Pacific squadron, Colonel F.A. Bersenev, who was killed by at least one the range finder (left) was thus broken. So is it possible to objectively judge in such an environment the artillery training of Russian gunners, and even more so to condemn them for unprofessionalism?
        2. Crang
          Crang 25 July 2014 07: 57
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          A common misconception, dear Krang

          This is not a common misconception but a historical fact Andrey. Your circular was either invented by the defenders of the "wise men", or written retroactively. Why did neither Kostenko, nor Novikov, nor the other officers of the 2TOE even hear about this circular? Why do they all speak with one voice about the terrible preparation of 2TOE? Why do they all confirm only one practice shooting for the entire trip? Moreover, with a maximum distance of 20 cables. I saw another circular from Rozhestvensky: "Pobeda's hits from a distance of 90 cables were not confirmed. The shells were wasted. Shooting at a distance of more than 40 cables is ineffective ..."
          If you consider Rozhdestvensky to be a competent admiral, please kindly describe to us his battle plan, Andrei. The main points of this plan. And also give a list of orders that Rozhdestvensky gave during the battle.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 08: 29
            +1
            Quote: Krang
            This is not a common misconception, but a historical fact. Andrey

            Unfortunately no. There are no historical facts here, but there are consequences of a large-scale company to denigrate and persecute Rozhestvensky. All the dogs were hung on him, that’s all.
            Quote: Krang
            Your circular was either invented by the defenders of the "wise men", or written retroactively.

            I understand that the data I have given do not correspond to your ideas about Rozhdestvensky, but why deny the availability of documents? No one could have faked them, the Russian office was not that then.
            Quote: Krang
            Why did neither Kostenko, nor Novikov, nor the other officers of 2TOE even hear a rumor about this circular?

            Kostenko, respected Krang, graduated from the Marine Engineering School, served as an engineer in the construction of the Eagle, and then served as an engineer on it. Having no sea experience at all, Kostenko made so many mistakes in his memoirs that it is impossible to take his works seriously. Personally, I believe that Kostenko deliberately lied, like Novikov, by the way
            But EVEN if you take Kostenko’s memoirs, (Chapter 27, which describes the shooting in Nossi-Be), then you can read on the first day of the exercises
            “Eagle” during the training managed to make 9 shots from 12-inch towers and to 30 shots from 6-inch towers with practical shells.

            on the next shootings
            During this training, the Eagle managed to make: 7 shots from 12-inch, 37 shots from 6-inch, 34 shots from 3-inch, 112 shots from 47-mm guns.

            another day
            “Eagle” of large guns had to make only four shots: two 12-inch shells and two 6-inch shells. The shells lay close enough to the target. But the reflection of the mine attack "Eagle" was very brisk.

            So even on the basis of Kostenko's memoirs, we see that Oryol fired 18 shells 12 "- and Kostenko clearly did not set himself the goal of listing all the firing and accurately indicate the consumption of shells.
            Quote: Krang
            Why do they all unanimously say about the terrible preparation of 2TOE?

            Who's everyone? Kostenko with Novikov? The same Semenov writes somewhat differently.
            Quote: Krang
            Why do they all confirm only one single practice shooting for the entire trip?

            I just quoted Kostenko’s memoirs to you, where he indicated at least THREE such shootings. So you should be more careful about the sources, dear Krang.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 08: 30
              +1
              Quote: Krang
              What does the maximum distance 20 cable.

              EVEN Kostenko writes about 25-30 kbt
              "Oslyabya", as before, beat artistically: on the second shot from a distance in the 25 cable - right into the shield.
              (chapter 28)
              A column of 10 ships walked around the shields, keeping them in the center of circulation. The distance was maintained from 6 to 30 cable.
              (chapter 27)
              Well, I gave the words of the gunner "Sisoy" above.
              Quote: Krang
              I saw another circular from Rozhdestvensky: "Pobeda's hits from a distance of 90 cables were not confirmed. The shells were wasted. Shooting at a distance of more than 40 cables is ineffective ..."

              Nevertheless, refer to the number and date of this circular :)))) And at the same time, re-read it again :))) And then, right, it’s already inconvenient for me to catch you on ignorance of the material.
              Quote: Krang
              If you consider Rozhdestvensky to be a competent admiral, please kindly describe to us his battle plan Andrei

              Let's stop at the gunners for now. Because if we climb into battle plans, then I’m afraid that nothing good (for your point of view) will happen, but let's finish at least one question
            2. Crang
              Crang 25 July 2014 08: 48
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Unfortunately no. There are no historical facts here, but there are consequences of a large-scale company to denigrate and persecute Rozhestvensky. All the dogs were hung on him, that’s all.

              Then I repeat again.
              Quote: Krang
              If you consider Rozhdestvensky to be a competent admiral, please kindly describe to us his battle plan, Andrei. The main points of this plan. And also give a list of orders that Rozhdestvensky gave during the battle.

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Let's stop at the gunners for now. Because if we climb into battle plans, then I’m afraid that nothing good (for your point of view) will happen, but let's finish at least one question

              Or nothing to say? Don’t get with the battle plan. this is the main thing that a competent admiral should win in battle.
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              But EVEN if you take Kostenko’s memoirs, (Chapter 27, which describes the shooting in Nossi-Be), then you can read on the first day of the exercises

              He also describes in detail how stupidly and ineptly this shooting was conducted. With swearing and mistakes. The artillery crews worked out the tasks at the very least, but what about the chief - the senior artilleryman and his centralized fire control system with a central aiming system at Borodintsy. Have the officers learned to handle this system? Most of the sources are far from complete. So Togo quite rightly assessed the training of its gunners higher than ours. The only ones who were really well prepared were the ships of Admiral Nebogatov. As luck would have it, his squad consisted entirely of old or incomplete ships.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 09: 01
                +1
                Quote: Krang
                Or nothing to say? Don’t get with the battle plan. this is the main thing that a competent admiral should win in battle.

                In my opinion, dear Krang, there’s nothing to tell you just the same - for if you look at the results of the shooting of Russian ships (both in exercises and in battle), the tale of the poor preparation of Russian gunners vanishes like smoke.
                And there seems to be really nothing to argue with that.
                Quote: Krang
                he described there in detail how stupidly and ineptly this shooting was conducted. With swearing and bugs

                Do you think in other fleets of the world this happens somehow differently? :))))
                Quote: Krang
                but what about the chief - the senior artilleryman and his centralized fire control system with a central aiming system at the Borodintsy.

                To this I wrote to you already that there was no super-central centering system at the Borodino EBR in nature. But in order to explain all this in detail, it’s just right to write a separate article, so I did not answer you in the previous topic.
                So what shall we continue the conversation about? On a centralized tip, or on Rozhdestvensky’s plans?
                If it’s about Rozhdestvensky’s plans, let’s take a look, first, in what form similar plans existed among other eminent admirals of those times. I would be very grateful for the detailed Japanese battle plans at Shantung / Tsushima and the English / German battle plans at Dogger Banks / Jutland.
                1. Crang
                  Crang 25 July 2014 09: 26
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  In my opinion, dear Krang, there’s nothing to tell you just the same - for if you look at the results of the shooting of Russian ships (both in exercises and in battle), the tale of the poor preparation of Russian gunners vanishes like smoke.
                  And there seems to be really nothing to argue with that.

                  One more time:
                  - Bring me battle plan Z.P. Rozhestvensky. The initial alignment of forces. Battle formation. Maneuvering. Interaction. Firing. He had to have such a plan in order to defeat the Japanese in the battle of Tsushima. You want to say that ZP Rozhdestvensky was stipulated, and so he is a great guy - prove it.
                  - Bring me list of orderswhich Z.P. Rozhdestvensky gave in battle. Did he manage the battle somehow? Or just sitting in the wheelhouse?
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Do you think in other fleets of the world this happens somehow differently? :))))

                  This happens only at the initial stage. When people begin to study earlier, they did not touch on this topic at all. The trained crew in the exercises is clear and businesslike. According to the approved program.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  To this I wrote to you already that there was no super-central centering system at the Borodino EBR in nature.

                  There was no central guidance. There was a centralized fire control system and a central guidance system for combat indicators. (to the sighting devices of the central aiming). And you simply toldonili without proof that she was not. Learn materiel. It was not on Mikasa. There, the cabin boys rushed about the ship at breakneck speed.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  If it’s about Rozhdestvensky’s plans, let’s take a look, first, in what form similar plans existed among other eminent admirals of those times. I would be very grateful for the detailed Japanese battle plans at Shantung / Tsushima and the English / German battle plans at Dogger Banks / Jutland.

                  Under Jutland, a battle plan existed on both sides. At Dogger Bank too. All of them are in the public literature. The detailed plan of the Japanese admiral of Togo under Tsushima consisted of the following main positions:
                  1. Operate at the highest possible squadron speed (about 15-16 knots).
                  2. Using speed superiority, cover the head of the enemy column and create something like a stick over T.
                  3. The main caliber shoots slowly, but as accurately as possible using high-explosive or armor-piercing shells depending on the distance.
                  4. Keep a distance with Russian ships at the level of ~ 30-40 cable. No closer.
                  5. Medium caliber fires high-explosive shells as intensively as possible at one previously targeted coverage strip ("massive fire" method). In this case, the adjustment of fire is made by changing the position of the ships themselves, and not the settings of the sights.

                  Now, kindly Andrew - bring me the battle plan of the great admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky. What did he expect when drawing into the Tsushima Strait with a speed of 9 knots and transports on his tail and how he was going to fight.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 12: 42
                    +2
                    And you simply proved to be unproven that it was not there. Learn materiel.

                    Well ... and they talked so peacefully, culturally - and on you. Dear Krang, let's still control ourselves. I, in my opinion, have never been rude to you in our recent discussions. If this happened - I sincerely apologize, it is not from a desire to offend you, but out of oversight.
                    Quote: Krang
                    You want to say that ZP Rozhdestvensky was stipulated, and so he is a great guy - prove it.

                    Quite right. I want to prove that Rozhdestvensky was a completely adequate admiral, yes, perhaps not Nelson and not Ushakov, but absolutely not the "mad and illiterate satrap and tyrant" as he is presented to us today.
                    Quote: Krang
                    One more time:
                    - Bring me the battle plan of Z.P. Rozhestvensky.

                    All in good time.
                    You see, the press of those times (and the post-revolutionary one) created a series of persistent myths regarding the Nativity. One of these myths looks like this:
                    "Rozhestvensky is a mediocre admiral, because he did not draw up and did not bring to his subordinates any battle plan."
                    And since this is your desire, we will definitely analyze the sources of this myth and the legitimacy of accusing Rozhdestvensky of the lack of a plan. But first, I state the fact:
                    I refuted the myth of poor shooting by Russian artillerymen; you have nothing to object to on the merits of the issue. So, can you still somehow argue your position? Your last objection
                    Quote: Krang
                    This happens only at the initial stage. When people begin to study earlier, they did not touch on this topic at all. The trained crew in the exercises is clear and businesslike.

                    strange to read. Do you not know that Kostenko, who
                    Quote: Krang
                    describes in detail how stupidly and ineptly this shooting was conducted. With swearing and mistakes.

                    Describes the teachings of the EAGLE BARNET BEAR, the artillerymen of which WAS ONLY AT THE BEGINNING STAGE, because this battleship was put into operation exactly before the 2TOE and naturally there was no serious artillery training before the campaign, and it couldn’t be.
                    Quote: Krang
                    There was a centralized fire control system and a central guidance pre-system for combat indications. (to the center sight sighters)

                    This question has an 2 aspect - firstly, Firstly - you believe that this system was superior to the OMS of Russian dreadnought (this is not so, but now we can put this issue aside, we are not talking about dreadnoughts now). Second - you have a red thread through the entire argument that it’s not used the capabilities of this system and it was bad.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 12: 42
                      +1
                      We know for sure that in battle the fire (at first) was controlled from the conning tower on the same "Suvorov" Word to Semenov,
                      On the sides of the helm, left and right, two were lying. Both are in officer-style jackets, face down ...
                      - The conductor and Bersenev (Bersenev - colonel of naval artillery, the flagship artilleryman.)! - shouted Midshipman Shishkin in my ear, whom I touched by the hand, pointing to those who were lying. - Berseneva first! to the head - on the spot! ..
                      The range finder worked; Vladimirsky handed out orders in a sharp voice, and the galvaners briskly turned the pointer handles, passing the distances to enemy ships to towers and plutons ...

                      The same Kostenko writes
                      Following these hits, the 8-inch shell ricocheted off the water, hit the cockpit overhang on the left side and exploded near the clearance. Fragments flying into the cabin destroyed the rangefinder of Barra-Stroda, combat pointers were knocked down, and part of the telephone pipes were dented. At the same time, senior mine officer Lieutenant Nikonov and junior navigator [444] Lieutenant Larionov, who determined the distance from the range finder, were seriously wounded in the head. Both are disabled and sent for dressing. The commander, senior artilleryman, helmsmen and signalmen were slightly injured and everyone remained in service. The clock at that moment showed 2 hours 40 min.
                      By 3, there were still hours in the conning tower: the commander was wounded in the head, the senior officer was in the face, the senior gunner Shamshev was in the head and the senior navigator Satkevich was unscathed. Due to damage to the rangefinder and combat pointers, we had to switch to group fire.
                      For some time, the feed range finder, openly mounted on the aft bridge, was still operating. The distance determined by him had to be transmitted by voice to two 6-inch towers and to the 12-inch aft tower, since the control columns for the direction indicators on the bridge were shot down.

                      In other words, the Russian battleships used their FCS until the instruments were disabled. This happened, alas, quite quickly - according to Kostenko, the system went out of order at the "Orel" EDR at 2.40, ie. 50 minutes after the start of the battle. On the Suvorov EBR, the same thing happened at about the same time - in the interval from 2.30 to 3 hours, the conning tower was broken (according to Semenov). Can we admit that both Borodino and Alexander LMS lived a little longer?
                      Your confidence that 2TOE officers did not master the LMS is based on the conviction that if the LMS were mastered, we would be far more likely to fly the Japanese. And I will say this - until our SLAs were broken, 2TOE showed very good shooting results.
                      So, if we have finished with the mythical "untrainedness" of Russian gunners, let's move on to Rozhdestvensky's plans
                      1. Crang
                        Crang 25 July 2014 15: 14
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Due to damage to the rangefinder and combat pointers had to go to a group fire.

                        This is precisely the viziers of the central tip of the system, which, in your opinion, did not exist. But it was.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        In other words, the Russian battleships used their FCS until the instruments were disabled. This happened, alas, rather quickly - according to Kostenko, the system on the "Orel" EDR went out of order at 2.40, i.e. 50 minutes after the start of the battle. On the Suvorov EBR, the same thing happened at about the same time - in the interval from 2.30 to 3 o'clock the conning tower was broken (according to Semenov) In other words, on the two newest battleships, centralized control lived for about an hour.

                        That is, the system described by me on "Borodintsy" all the same was.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Your confidence that 2TOE officers did not master the LMS is based on the conviction that if the LMS were mastered, we would be far more likely to fly the Japanese. And I will say this - until our SLAs were broken, 2TOE showed very good shooting results.

                        Yes, if our officers and sailors had mastered the Borodintsev FCS perfectly - so that they could conduct fire simultaneously on both sides in any composition combining artillery of various calibers - yes, the Yapam would be pounded much more. And so 2TOE showed not very good shooting results. Taking into account the well-trained Nebogatovsky ships, they are not bad, but worse than those of the Japanese. And the rate of fire of our SK were not so high, which again depends on the training.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        So, if we have finished with the mythical "untrainedness" of Russian gunners, let's move on to Rozhdestvensky's plans

                        It is not mythical, but real, but now again the plan. Knowing that high-explosive fragmentation shells for 2TOE are frankly bad and are much inferior to the Japanese Rozhestvensky as a patented artilleryman, he had to develop a battle plan using armor-piercing shells, for which a minimum distance was needed. He didn't. In addition, he did not even rush into the front line when Togo's ships were performing a loop, although full speed pairs on Borodintsy were supported. And 18 knots had to be kept not all day, but only for the duration of the dash. Nothing was done. Therefore, let's move on to the battle plan and, importantly, to the list of orders that Rozhestvensky gave for the battle.
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 20: 47
                        +1
                        Quote: Krang
                        This is precisely the viziers of the central tip of the system, which, in your opinion, did not exist. But it was.

                        The Borodino’s SLA lacked the main thing - an automatic machine for converting the enemy ship’s distance and course / speed to vertical aiming angles (as far as I know, horizontal there is still unprincipled, since the gunner can easily take the lead on 4-5 miles). Those. the main device was missing, which you (absolutely correctly) call the automatic machine for generating a smoothed (current) distance.
                        Without this device, there wasn’t too much sense with the LMS. Compared to the Japanese fire control system (built on a Jung leg from glavart to commentators), our control system had an advantage only in the speed of information transfer from glavart to guns.
                        Before moving on to Rozhdestvensky’s plans (do not think that I want to otmazatsya or somehow talk and “jump off the topic”), I will nevertheless slightly describe the activities of the Borodino FCS - of course, as I understand it. Alas, I have not seen a detailed description of it in the sources, so I have to understand indirect data. But here…
                        Recently I looked in "Wikipedia" for a description of the Borodino control system ... alternately he cried, then sobbed, then burst into burning tears. Who wrote this, I would like to know? !!
                        From the point of view of the wiki, the MSA passed Borodin to the guns And the distance to the enemy And the amendments for vertical and horizontal aiming.
                        I did not find a single source confirming the wiki. According to my data. Borodinians did not transmit any angles of vertical aiming. ONLY distance.
                        We can read Semenov
                        The range finder worked; Vladimirsky handed out orders in a sharp voice, and the galvaners briskly turned the pointer handles, passing them to the towers and plutons distances to enemy ships

                        Or Kostenko
                        So, our right aft 6 inch tower on the dial andchalk reading xnumx cable and shot at the corresponding elevation angle, while the actual distance at that moment was 24 cable.
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 20: 47
                        +1
                        Or Novikov-Priboy
                        We tried to learn how to control artillery from combat on our ship
                        cutting on the dials. Such devices were in every battle tower, in
                        each casemate and in the battery deck. Different arrows on them,
                        moving with the help of electric current, showed the opening, or
                        cease fire, direction of fire, distance to the enemy
                        Ship
                        and the kind of shells that should be used in business.
                        When the gun was ready to fire, its owner, looking at the dial,
                        commanded:
                        - Eighteen cable sight, the whole forty-five!

                        or here
                        Headed everyone officer - tower commander. He followed the general course of all
                        works and also had to calculate the value of the pillar from the shooting tables,
                        taking into account the speed of their own and the enemy’s ship,
                        heading angle, wind strength, derivation. Having received the necessary data, he looked at
                        dial indications and then already commanded:
                        - Forty cable sightall over forty eight!

                        But, nowhere is there any indication that the Borodino FCS would give out vertical and horizontal aiming angles. The artillery officer identified and reported to the guns only the distance and the horizontal guidance angle. And the gunner determined the elevation angle according to the transmitted distance himself. Naturally, there were no mechanisms for "aligning the arrows" either - this appeared later, in Geisler's instruments from 1910.
                        Moreover. There is an assumption that the horizontal tip angle was transmitted in a crude way. Those. the aiming angle transmitted by the dial made it possible to determine which ship should aim, but not an amendment for firing at a particular ship. I won’t undertake to prove it yet (this is Platonov’s version, after all, caperang and doctor of naval sciences) but ... this is my homework :) I, dear Krang, have seriously become interested in ship's OMS - give me time, I’ll get to the bottom: )
                      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 20: 48
                        +1
                        Further. You credit the Borodino FCS with such a thing as
                        As soon as the range was measured, it was pressed by pressing the so-called button. The "rangefinder key" was instantly introduced into the OMS, which by that time was already working out the target's bearing.
                        (this is your quote from another discussion thread)
                        But here is the thing. In my opinion, no instant input was needed here, moreover, it was almost harmful. Why?
                        Because there was no CAC, or at least an apparatus for generating the current distance, for obvious reasons, on our EDBs. Accordingly, information about the range to the enemy could be transmitted ONLY to the glavart and more to no one. If the range measured by the range finder were immediately transmitted to the gun’s dials, then our gunners would never have hit anyone.
                        Dear Krang, the automatic machine for generating a smoothed distance is just needed not only and not so much in order to calculate the current range, but in order for the glavart to give an adjustment to the range transmitted by the range finder.
                        Dear Krang, rangefinders ALWAYS lie. Therefore, in the same German fleet, NEVER used the data of any one rangefinder - the distance to the enemy was measured by 3-5, or even 7 by rangefinders and the average was entered into the machine. And after the fall of the volleys, the glavart (on the basis of this very fall) corrected the distance obtained by the rangefinders, i.e. introduced his corrections into the distance.
                        Accordingly, an attempt to display the rangefinder data (with the 1200 base three times ha!) On the dial would lead to godless smearing.
                        The data of the range finder was not received by the gunners, but only exclusively by the glavart. And the glavart himself decided what amendments to give him the rangefinder range. Therefore, the automatic input of the distance meant a little - this distance would still fall on the dials of the commandors only when the glavart tells the distance, and the galvanic sailor manually sets the specified range on a special giving device, from which the distance will go to towers and plutons.
                        That is why the Borodino FCS lost to the DRO dreadnoughs - on the dreadnoughts it was the gun pointing angle that the gunner could only combine the corresponding arrows. And on Borodintsy, the gunner of each gun MUST calculate the angle of the vertical aiming depending on the distance transmitted by the glavart.
                        Nevertheless, of course, there were many benefits from the Borodino FCS — primarily because the glavart could quickly set the battle distance. He, observing the falls of shots, and reading the data from rangefinders, could give adjustments.
                        Truth be told, I used to think that the glavart only initially gave the distance, the rest was up to the gunners who aimed individually (Platonov misread). Perhaps I still turned out to be wrong and the gunners still set their sights exclusively at the direction of the chief.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 July 2014 20: 48
                        +2
                        I know how to admit my mistakes, and even then to say - little is worth a person who is unable to become smarter today than he was yesterday. That is why, dear Krang, despite the fact that before that we were often rude to each other and generally were "in opposition", I would prefer to forget the old and try to search for the truth together, rather than waste time on bickering. Now I will try to present everything that I have according to the plans (and their implementation) of Rozhdestvensky. I propose not to cut from the hip - let's figure it out TOGETHER, and not try at all costs to prove our point of view.
                      6. Crang
                        Crang 27 July 2014 11: 32
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I will try to state everything that I have according to the plans (and their implementation) of Rozhdestvensky.

                        Let me give you a hint. So the plan proposed by Rear Admiral Enquist Rozhestvensky rejected. Knowing about the power of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells, he did nothing to level it. The squadron went into battle at a speed of 9 knots, not maneuvering, i.e. creating the worst possible conditions for ourselves. Thus, the Japanese were given all the initiative in terms of place, time, distance and position of the parties. The cruisers, instead of using them for their intended purpose (among them were quite powerful: "Oleg" and "Aurora"), he set the task to guard the transports. Destroyers from warships Rozhdestvensky turned into rescue ships. Their task was to watch the battleships and, if anything, to save the command. As a result, 2TOE did not achieve a single torpedo hit on the enemy. Rozhestvensky also allowed enemy scouts to freely accompany our fleet and forbade the auxiliary cruiser Ural to interfere with them. As a result, the enemy scouts accurately and scrupulously conveyed to Togo all the information on 2TOE. This was the original "plan" of Rozhdestvensky. For such a "plan" to work, we had to have at least threefold superiority. Well, during the battle, Rozhdestvensky gave only 2 (two) orders: to actually open fire and the second - to slightly change the course. ALL. Therefore, it is impossible to consider this absolutely incompetent and ignorant tyrant, who was nothing more than a sly-ass snickering official, even as an "ordinary, normal admiral". Most of his orders regarding his "battle plan" not only did not benefit 2TOE, but turned out to be in the hands of the enemy.
                    2. Crang
                      Crang 25 July 2014 21: 19
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      But here is the thing. In my opinion, no instant input was needed here, moreover, it was almost harmful. Why?
                      Because there was no CAC, or at least an apparatus for generating the current distance, for obvious reasons, on our EDBs. Accordingly, information about the range to the enemy could be transmitted ONLY to the glavart and more to no one. If the range measured by the range finder were immediately transmitted to the gun’s dials, then our gunners would never have hit anyone.

                      Due to the absence of the TsAS for the Borodintsy and other battleships of that period, the time from measurements to the opening of fire on the target was critical. Which their system minimized to the limit. In addition, this is only one of the operating modes of the OMS - centralized control. There was also a group fire regime. When all the information from the conning tower devices was transmitted to the installations in the same way, but all calculations related to the corrections for the GN and VN were made by the commanders of the installations or batteries. FCS "Borodintsev" and such a regime of fire made it very effective.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Dear Krang, rangefinders ALWAYS lie.

                      For this purpose, the Borodintsy had a feedback system with a control dial, the range at which was compared with the measured one. Best of all, the work of the Borodintsev FCS is described in Wikipedia: "Battleship Eagle".
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      distance measurements to the enemy were made 3-5, or even 7 rangefinders and the average was entered into the machine. And after the fall of the volleys, the glavart (on the basis of this very fall) corrected the distance obtained by the rangefinders, i.e. introduced his corrections into the distance.

                      Where have you seen 3-5, and even more so 7 rangefinders? On the Bismarck, eh? Do not confuse the First World War and RJAV. Even our dreadnoughts such as "Sevastopol" and "Ekaterina" had only 2 DM-6 rangefinders per ship.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      The data of the range finder was not received by the gunners, but only exclusively by the glavart. And the glavart himself decided

                      But what if the chief artist was killed? As I say, the Borodintsev control system provided three modes of fire, two of which were very effective. Moreover, the MSA made it possible to simultaneously conduct two targets - one from each side.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      That is why the Borodino’s fire control system lost to the dreadnought’s fire control system - it was precisely the gun’s pointing angle that was displayed on the dreadnoughts, the gunner could only combine the corresponding arrows.

                      For the first time, the Borodino team implemented the principle of combining arrows. The central guidance pre-system about which I so much talk. At the exit, the truth was a bare bearing without corrections.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Borodinians, the gunner of each gun should MYSELF calculate the angle of the vertical aiming depending on the distance transmitted by the glavart.

                      No. Correction data on GN and HV in normal mode were transmitted by instruments from the BR or CPU (entered Glavart).
                    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 26 July 2014 18: 45
                      +1
                      Quote: Krang
                      For this purpose, the Borodintsy had a feedback system with a control dial, the range at which was compared with the measured one. Best of all, the work of the Borodintsev FCS is described in Wikipedia: "Battleship Eagle".

                      It's just that I’m very interested where the data on Wikipedia came from. For nowhere else about the two transmission modes (the ability to transmit a choice of distance or HV angles) is not available. And all the memoirs write specifically about the distance.
                      It is also interesting that the information about distance and HV got to the wiki relatively recently, before it was not there. Given the fact that a frank fantasy about cranometers was added - I think the wiki text completely lost touch with reality.
                      Quote: Krang
                      Where did you see 3-5, and especially 7 rangefinders?

                      On the German battle cruisers PMV, for example. I write this to the fact that even using much more advanced rangefinders (and to WWI they, of course, became much better) - all the same, the accuracy of measuring the distance was very lame.
                      Quote: Krang
                      Even our dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" and "Ekaterina" type had only 2 DM-6 rangefinders per ship.

                      In Sevastopol there was something else in the conning tower, although most agree that there were improved micrometers of Lyuzhol-Myakishev.
                      In the future, the number of rangefinders in Sevastopol significantly increased
                      Quote: Krang
                      But what if the chief artist was killed? As I say, the Borodintsev control system provided three modes of fire, two of which were very effective. Moreover, the MSA made it possible to simultaneously conduct two targets - one from each side.

                      Dear Krang, where does this information come from? I repeat, except for the wiki this is nowhere to be found, and the wiki has no links to the source. Other sources (Memoirs of Kostenko, Semenov, Novikov-Priboy, Platonov’s monograph on the OMS, etc.) do not write anything like that.
                  2. Crang
                    Crang 25 July 2014 21: 29
                    0
                    In addition, the Borodintsev control system even transmitted the speed and course of the enemy ship by instruments. I entered these data into the Glavart OMS. Approximately of course.
                2. Crang
                  Crang 25 July 2014 21: 05
                  0
                  Novikov explained to the reader the work of the LMS as best he could. He was not a specialist. OMS Borodintsev reported:
                  - bearing of the target (automatically on the VVs)
                  - distance to the target (automatically using the rangefinder key button)
                  - the speed of the ship (automatic)
                  - the course of your ship (automatically)
                  - amendment on GN (introduced by the Glavart in the LMS)
                  - amendment on VN (introduced by the Glavart in the LMS)
                  - opening and closing times (controlled by the glavart)
                  - type of ammunition used (controlled by glavart)
                  - involved artillery mountings (controlled by glavart)
                  Almost none of this was in Japanese ships. Then they also put the transceiver devices there, but not so fully and the Yapi did not learn how to use them. All the information from the logging to the installations they transmitted was run and voice through telephone pipes and telephone numbers.
                3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 26 July 2014 18: 46
                  +1
                  Quote: Krang
                  Novikov explained to the reader the work of the OMS as best he could.

                  is it possible to quote?
                4. Crang
                  Crang 27 July 2014 11: 15
                  0
                  Can:
                  We tried to learn how to control artillery on our ship from the conning tower by
                  the dials. Such devices were in every battle tower, in every casemate.
                  and in the battery deck. Different arrows on them, moving with
                  electric current, showed the opening, or cessation of shooting,
                  direction of fire, distance to enemy ship and the kind of shells,
                  which should be used in business.
                  When the gun was ready to fire, its owner, looking at the dial,
                  commanded:
                  “The sight is eighteen cable, one hundred and forty-five!”
                  The sight installer set the scope and rear sight to the indicated numbers.
                  The owner of the cannon, acting by lifting rotary mechanisms, pointed his gun
                  and fired at a particular object, after shouting:
                  - Pli!

                  The officer - the tower commander headed all. He followed the general course of all
                  works, and also had to calculate the value of the pillar from the shooting tables,
                  taking into account the speed of their own and enemy ship, course
                  angle, wind strength, derivation. Having received the necessary data, he looked at the directions
                  dial
                  and then he commanded:
                  “The sight is forty-cable, the whole is forty-eight!”

                  That is, in all shooting modes, everything was transmitted by instruments.
                5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 12: 43
                  +1
                  Quote: Krang
                  Can:

                  Now let's see
                  Quote: Krang
                  direction of fire distance to enemy ship

                  Distance. Where is the VN angle here?
                  Quote: Krang
                  Eighteen cable sight, the whole forty-five!

                  Where is the VN angle here?
                  Quote: Krang
                  The officer - the tower commander headed all. He followed the general course of all
                  works, and also had to calculate the value of the pillar from the shooting tables,
                  taking into account the speed of their own and enemy ship, course
                  angle, wind strength, derivation

                  Those. the obvious reference to the fact that the calculation of the VN angle was made by the commander of the tower, not the glavart
                6. Crang
                  Crang 27 July 2014 14: 00
                  0
                  It's hard to talk with you. Somehow it’s tight.
                  Quote: Krang
                  When the gun was ready to fire, its owner, looking at the dial,
                  commanded:
                  - The sight is eighteen cable, one hundred forty-five!

                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Those. the obvious reference to the fact that the calculation of the VN angle was made by the commander of the tower, not the glavart

                  Once again, on the eleventh already, probably. SUO "Borodintsev" provided THREE modes of fire. centralized, group and independent. Naturally all worked out. This episode refers exactly to the second group fire mode. Take another look at the wick. We read:
                  In case of failure of the senior artillery officer or the inability to perform centralized fire control for any other reason, all 305 mm, 152 mm guns and a 75 mm gun gun switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or battery. This fire mode was less effective.
                7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 16: 24
                  +1
                  Quote: Krang
                  It's hard to talk with you. Somehow it’s tight.

                  Naturally - tight. Because apart from repeating the same phrases you do not write anything.
                  Quote: Krang
                  . Take another look at the wiki.

                  It seems that you wrote that article yourself.
                  Quote: Krang
                  we get:
                  In the event of a failure of the senior artillery officer or the inability to perform centralized fire control for any other reason, all 305 mm, 152mm AU and the battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or battery

                  For the eleventh time I ask - where does this data come from? Wiki does not refer to anything.
                8. Crang
                  Crang 27 July 2014 18: 57
                  0
                  Well, read that whether RMMelnikov "Battleships of the Borodino type" or V.Yu. Gribovsky "ESCAPED ARMOR CARRIERS" Tsarevich "and the" Borodino "type". The wiki says exactly the same, only in terms and language understandable to a modern person.
                9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 19: 18
                  +1
                  So I read like :)))
                  Take, for example, Melnikov
                  To control the artillery fire, the system of special electromechanical devices of the St. Petersburg plant of N.K. Geisler, which was stably (even in Soviet times) and consistently improved modifications, which were produced by that time, had already been worked out by that time (a set of domestic devices was demonstrated at the Paris exhibition 1899) for the ships of the entire Russian fleet. The system consisted of cable (47 cores) networks of 23B voltage (with a step-down transformer) connecting all artillery combat posts (towers, casemates, ammunition cellars) with the conning tower and rangefinding stations, from which directions about the direction of fire, distance to the target, kind were transmitted shells and commands to commandants about conducting or ceasefire. These instructions, printed on the dials of the receiving devices, came through the cables when the handle of the master device was rotated in the conning tower.
                  The main instruments were two combat indicators (on the left and right sides of the conning tower) in the form of an 'alidade on a graduated disc with a telescope. According to the direction in which this pipe was turned to the target, the dial arrows of the guns, which automatically followed its turn, also turned. Thus, the servants of the guns were given instructions on the target at which to shoot. Two projectile and two signal (command) pointers by arrows stopping in the corresponding sectors of the dials contained instructions: the first two about the type of projectiles used, the second about the type of firing performed ("Shot", "attack", "short alarm"). The fourth type of master device - a rangefinder key - was included in the rangefinder station kit, which consisted of a column with a rangefinder installed on it (originally a handheld Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometer). By means of the key, the distances determined by the rangefinder were transferred to the dials in the conning tower and to the guns. To check the correct transmission and reception of orders (feedback), the rangefinder station included a control rangefinder dial. Separately, in the conning tower, two rangefinder dial stations were installed, two setting rangefinder dials, two rangefinder keys in the conning tower, four receiving rangefinder dials, four battery rangefinder dial disconnectors. A separate station, duplicating the conning tower devices, was installed in the central post. Thanks to this PUAO system, the artillery officer in charge of the firing could directly "conduct" the fire of the entire artillery of the ship and each gun separately.
                10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 19: 28
                  +1
                  And what do we see?
                  1) The system, which the wiki loudly calls the "sight", is just a pointer to the ship at which to shoot, of course there is no mechanism for calculating the lead,
                  2) The SLM passes exactly 4 of the parameter
                  a) The ship on which we are firing
                  b) Type of ammunition
                  c) Distance to the enemy ship
                  d) Type of shooting.
                  All. No enemy's own courses / speeds or those of the enemy, no angles for HV and HN. And, of course, there is no system of "aligning the arrows" because the receiving devices in the towers are not located on the sighting devices of the gun, but on a separate dial.
                  There are no krenometers according to the testimony of which a volley should be made (this is generally on the other side of good and evil, dear Krang)
                  Naturally, in comparison with the Geisler mod 1910, the system looks archaic - there the receiving devices are on the guns, there the angle was transmitted along the HV and so on and so forth.
                11. Crang
                  Crang 27 July 2014 20: 04
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  1) The system, which the wiki loudly calls the "sight", is just a pointer to the ship at which to shoot, of course there is no mechanism for calculating the lead,

                  That is, this "pointer" which pointed all target bearing installations can be called a central aiming sight? You can rightfully. So one parameter - the bearing is already there.
                  The following options:
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  from which instructions about the direction of fire, the distance to the target, the kind of shells and the command to the commandants about the conduct or ceasefire.

                  Total:
                  Distance
                  Type of ammunition (three types)
                  Opening / closing times.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Two shell and two signal (command) pointers through arrows stopping in the corresponding sectors of the dials contained instructions: the first two about the kind of shells used, the second about type of firing ("Shot", "attack", "short alarm")

                  Still added:
                  Firing mode.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Of course, there is no system of "aligning the arrows" because the receiving devices in the towers are not located on the sighting devices of the gun, but on a separate dial.

                  The "arrow alignment" system is:
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  The main instruments were two combat indicators (on the left and right sides of the conning tower) in the form of an 'alidade on a graduated disc with a telescope. According to the direction in which this pipe was turned to the target, the dial arrows of the guns, which automatically followed its turn, also turned. Thus, the servants of the guns were given instructions on the target at which to shoot.

                  Instruments indicating wind strength, speed and course were in the conning tower and the glavart accordingly took them into account. He determined the speed and course of the target approximately by eye.
                  The rollometer was also in the set of instruments in the conning tower. This device is in almost any floating galoshes, and even more so in the battleship. And the glavart giving team pointers took into account his testimony since roll influenced the angles of HV and GN.
                  Total at the disposal of the Glavart were:
                  1. bearing of the target from the VVS (or combat pointer, as you like)
                  2. range to the target from the rangefinder station.
                  3. the speed of your vessel from the "speedometer"
                  4. course of your ship from the compass.
                  5. Deviation data (fixed)
                  6. firing tables with BH angles (fixed)
                  Using this data, he determined the corrections for HV and GN and transmitted information to the installations and batteries. He fired using system pointers and a telephone.
                  Calculations in gun mounts received information:
                  1. the initial bearing of the target - for devices through the monitoring system of the central circulation station.
                  2. range to the target - by instruments.
                  3. type of ammunition - by instruments.
                  4. corrections for HV and GN - by phone from the Glavart.
                  5. Fire mode - on instruments.
                  6. Opening and closing times - by instruments.
                  7. the speed of your ship - by phone.
                  8. course of your ship - by phone.
                  So will you be happy?
                12. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 20: 53
                  +2
                  Quote: Krang
                  That is, this "pointer" which indicated the target bearing to all settings can be called a center aiming sight? You can rightfully. So one parameter - the bearing is already there.

                  Exactly. Bearing. And in order to control the shooting you need to set the bearing in advance, which, in fact, is the transmission of the angle along GN. On the Geysler mod 1910, such EMNIP devices were (he did not indicate the bearing, but indicated the lead).
                  Quote: Krang
                  Total:
                  Distance
                  Type of ammunition (three types)
                  Opening / closing times.

                  Exactly. A distance that could fall either in the form of a rangefinder data, or as a calculated one - i.e. with adjustments made by glavart after manual calculations. But it is the distance, not the angle along the HV.
                  Quote: Krang
                  The "arrow alignment" system is:
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  The main instruments were two combat indicators (on the left and right sides of the conning tower) in the form of an 'alidade on a graduated disc with a telescope. According to the direction in which this pipe was turned to the target, the dial arrows at the guns, which automatically followed its turn, also turned.

                  Not. Arrow alignment is when arrows at gunpoint indicate the correct position and the gunner only needs to tighten up so that the sight takes the desired position. And here we have a dial, not far from the gun.
                  The difference seems to be small, but only at first glance. The fact is that the gun has individual characteristics (such as, for example, shooting a barrel or gunpowder temperature). So Geisler arr 1910 of the year had a special adaption on the gun itself, with which the appropriate correction was set, and the angle of the gun was automatically transmitted to the gun’s sights received the appropriate amendment. Therefore, it was possible to combine arrows. But the dial is just a dial that shows the range - it's just a dial, the data of which must be turned into a corner by VN, then give the appropriate corrections ... etc. This is never a combination of arrows.
                  Quote: Krang
                  Instruments indicating wind strength, speed and course were in the conning tower and the glavart accordingly took them into account.

                  He could take them into account in one single case - if he himself personally considered the current, smoothed distance. Otherwise, there would be little sense from this accounting - all the same, there are no devices that could transmit this data to the guns in the BMS of Borodin.
                  Quote: Krang
                  The rollometer was also in the set of instruments in the conning tower. This device is in almost any floating galoshes, and even more so in the battleship. And the glavart giving team pointers took into account his testimony since roll influenced the angles of HV and GN.
                13. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 20: 53
                  +2
                  Sorry, dear Krang, but you are completely mistaken.
                  Firstly, the rollometer was not used for artillery fire during the time of the REV. And I could never use it, because:
                  a) Cranometer data were very inaccurate, and showed with some delay, due to which all attempts to connect the krenometer with a gun (in order to ensure a shot when standing on an even keel) did not lead to anything. The first successful devices of this type appeared after the Battle of Jutland.
                  b) An attempt to account for heel roll by glavart is impossible by definition, because the roll changes every moment :))) In the meantime, the glavart will give a command, while it will be typed on the galvanizers, until it is seen in the towers, until the distance is turned into a corner along VN ... In general, you are very mistaken here. Glavart never takes into account the position of the roll. This is the task of artillerymen in the field
                  I advise you to read on this topic the naval regulations of artillery firing of the 1926 and 1927 of the year (when the kraskoms fought on old equipment, there were no Soviet SLAs yet) Then there was a special device (Krylov's marker) with which they trained the commandants of ALL guns (and 305-mm and 120 -mm Linkorovsky) take into account pitching when aiming.
                14. Crang
                  Crang 28 July 2014 12: 13
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Cranometer data were very inaccurate, and showed with some delay, due to which all attempts to connect the krenometer with a gun (in order to ensure a shot when standing on an even keel) did not lead to anything. The first successful devices of this type appeared after the Battle of Jutland.

                  What does it mean to be inaccurate, if by its principle it is the simplest device? He simply cannot show "not exactly". And there will be no delay. If guidance has already been made, then give a command with pointers and press the "fire" button - a couple of seconds. The battleship is not a toy boat. The period of oscillation during rolling is quite long.
                15. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 28 July 2014 12: 37
                  +1
                  Quote: Krang
                  What does it mean that they are not accurate if by its principle it is the simplest device?

                  Nevertheless, I repeat, the attempt to combine the inclinometer with the cannon failed (in my opinion, the first attempt was on the Black Sea Vesta in the Russian-Turkish one), but in reality such devices (gyroscopic) entered service in Germany only after Jutland. The British had EMNIP even later. And we didn't have this on any of the tsarist-built ships - the pitching was corrected by the gunners. I repeat, look at the 1926 artillery regulations.
                  Quote: Krang
                  If guidance has already been made, then give a command to the pointers and press the "fire" button - a couple of seconds

                  Nothing like this. That is why a real salvo fire was not provided at all by a howler (or there is a dial indicating a "shot"), but a very cunning system was required, when the gunner closes the chain when the gun is ready, and when the chief art officer sees that all the guns are ready for a volley, then he closes chain on its side and a volley thunders. Of course, there was nothing of this on Borodino residents either.
                  Quote: Krang
                  Battleship is not a toy boat. The oscillation period during the pitching is quite large.

                  It does not matter. The important thing is that it is constantly changing, so any correction that the glavart will give will automatically become outdated by the time the gunner adjusts the scope.
                16. Crang
                  Crang 28 July 2014 14: 52
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Nevertheless, I repeat, the attempt to combine the inclinometer with the cannon failed (in my opinion, the first attempt was on the Black Sea Vesta in the Russian-Turkish one), but in reality such devices (gyroscopic) entered service in Germany only after Jutland.

                  In "Borodintsy" the inclinometer was not integrated with the system, but it WAS on them. And the chief art officer, counting the amendments and the time of opening / closing the fire, was also guided by him.
          2. Crang
            Crang 28 July 2014 12: 11
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But the dial is just a dial that shows the range - it's just a dial, the data of which must be turned into a corner by VN, then give the appropriate corrections ... etc. This is never a combination of arrows.

            It is precisely the alignment of the arrows that is. There is no need to load the system with additional "options". The task was in the automatic transmission of bearing. And the same system - set the gun's pointer to the same division as indicated by the device. A couple of trifles. As you correctly noted, there is practically no difference.
          3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 28 July 2014 12: 42
            +1
            Quote: Krang
            It is the combination of arrows that is.

            Combination of arrows, I repeat - this is when the arrow is located on the sighting device of the gun and the gunner simply, without calculating anything, you need to tighten the handwheel so that the arrows are combined.
            Quote: Krang
            No need to load the system with additional "options"

            Dear Crang, I am not doing this :))) In fact, it was the Geisler Model 1910 that could be considered somewhat of a full-fledged FCS - because the gunner was assigned a purely mechanical function with the gun, he himself did not calculate anything, but just "turned the flywheel the arrow will not converge. " In addition - volley fire and so on ...
          4. Crang
            Crang 28 July 2014 14: 49
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Combination of arrows, I repeat - this is when the arrow is located on the sighting device of the gun and the gunner simply, without calculating anything, you need to tighten the handwheel so that the arrows are combined.

            And there was nothing to calculate. Just looked at the degrees on the device and pointed the gun at them.
          5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 July 2014 06: 59
            +1
            Quote: Krang
            Just looked at the degrees on the device

            And the device is cable :)
  3. Crang
    Crang 25 July 2014 20: 58
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In Borodino’s SLA, the main thing was missing - an automatic machine for converting the enemy’s distance and course / speed of the enemy ship to vertical aiming angles (as far as I know, horizontal there is still unprincipled, since a gunner can take 4-5 miles ahead).

    Not too big a flaw. Everyone has shooting tables, and the device shows the measured range. Follow the table and select the appropriate BH angle - a couple of trifles.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Compared to the Japanese fire control system (built on a Jung leg from glavart to commentators), our control system had an advantage only in the speed of information transfer from glavart to guns.

    Not only. Ours still had a central aiming system through the VVS (combat pointers). Where the VVC looked, the installations selected by the head master looked there too. The target immediately came into view of their optics. Our system, in comparison with the Japanese, theoretically provided several times less reaction time and, accordingly, greater accuracy in view of the absence of an automatic machine for generating the current distance.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    From the point of view of the wiki, the SSS Borodin passed to the guns And the distance to the enemy And the amendments for vertical and horizontal aiming.

    And that is the true truth. By horizontal guidance, the base was transmitted automatically through the VVS. And corrections for GN and HV were also transmitted by instruments, but the glavart introduced them manually.
  4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 26 July 2014 18: 59
    +1
    Quote: Krang
    Not too big a flaw. Everyone has shooting tables, and the device shows the measured range. Follow the table and select the appropriate BH angle - a couple of trifles

    This is not a couple of nonsense, but, in fact, the most false task of the gunner.
    Because yes, you can translate the distance into the elevation angle according to the table, but the point is that the gunner should not set the distance given to him by the range finder, but calculate the current (smoothed) distance, i.e. the distance that the ships will separate at the time of the shot, for which it is necessary to solve the geometric problem, based on the course / speed of the enemy (and their own) ship, determine their future position.
    And in this sense, the statement about the presence of two separate transmissions (both distance and BH) looks at least strange. It’s just useless - if there is an opportunity to transmit the angle along the HV, then why transmit the distance? And vice versa - if there is a distance transmission, you can give the current (smoothed) distance along it and there is no need to transmit the angle along the HV.
    Quote: Krang
    Where the VVC looked, the installations selected by the head master looked there too.

    In battle, this is not very useful. In essence, this gives a small gain in time when transferring fire from one target to another.
    Moreover, there was no automatic machine - there was the same dial.
  5. Crang
    Crang 27 July 2014 11: 06
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In battle, this is not very useful. In essence, this gives a small gain in time when transferring fire from one target to another.

    This gives a huge gain in time. Minutes Smooth distance can not be calculated.
  6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 12: 45
    +1
    Quote: Krang
    This gives a huge gain in time. Minutes Smooth distance can not be calculated.

    When transferring fire from one target to another - it is possible, although unlikely. And the smoothed distance is much more important
  7. Crang
    Crang 28 July 2014 12: 14
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    When transferring fire from one target to another, it is possible, although unlikely

    Not only when transferring fire from one target to another, but also during the initial aiming, especially for a suddenly discovered target. A automatic machines for generating a smoothed distance in the REV no one had... So he will not blame Borodintsy for his absence.
  8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 July 2014 07: 01
    +1
    Quote: Krang
    Not only when transferring fire from one target to another, but also when initially aiming

    The initial aiming is usually carried out long before the fire is opened, i.e. it’s not like a young man, there you can send a snail - he’ll manage to do it anyway, and there’s still time
    Quote: Krang
    And no one had automatic devices for generating a smoothed distance in the RYAV. So he will not blame Borodintsy for his absence.

    Naturally. And no one had the opportunity (including Borodino) "to conduct firing on both sides at a heap of different targets."
    Borodintsev’s OMS was significantly better than that of the Japanese. But she did not give any overwhelming advantages.
    Moving on to the plans and orders of Rozhdestvensky?
  9. Crang
    Crang 27 July 2014 12: 36
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    It’s just useless - if there is an opportunity to transmit the angle along the HV, then why transmit the distance? And vice versa - if there is a distance transmission, you can give the current (smoothed) distance along it and there is no need to transmit the angle along the HV.

    You can’t understand everything. SUO "Borodintsev" provided THREE modes of fire:
    1. Centralized - glavart.
    2. Group - commanders of the AU and batteries.
    3. Independent - by each separate installation.
  • Crang
    Crang 25 July 2014 15: 05
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quite right. I want to prove that Rozhdestvensky was a completely adequate admiral, yes, perhaps not Nelson and not Ushakov, but absolutely not the "mad and illiterate satrap and tyrant" as he is presented to us today.

    No, he was not a fool, no one argues. But he was a man of a kind of ability. Those abilities that were in demand in that tsarist fleet. Well, there was no need for people who knew how to fight. But so that the crew was well trained, the ships clearly kept the line and "did not delay", so that everything would be clean, neat, etc. etc. A very smart-ass and quirky Mr. Rozhestvensky was strong in this regard, and here his mental abilities are beyond doubt. It is worth at least reading his correspondence with the Supreme. But as an admiral. As a person who should be able to understand the military equipment entrusted to him and be able to competently use all its capabilities - he was great. Well, relatively speaking - an accountant / lawyer was appointed the head of the shop.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And since this is your desire, we will definitely analyze the sources of this myth and the legitimacy of accusing Rozhdestvensky of the lack of a plan.

    This accusation is legitimate. As well as the fact that in the complete absence of his plan, he did not accept any proposals from junior commanders and generally completely deprived them of the initiative. As a result, our squadron began to maneuver more or less sanely only when it was headed by "Alexander-III", which by that time was most likely by the helmsmen or other sailors.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    This issue has 2 aspects - firstly, Firstly - you believe that this system was superior to the MSA of Russian dreadnoughts

    She surpassed the DLC of the dreadnought only in terms of speed and guidance, but lost to her because of much more modest rangefinders and the calculated part.
  • Alex
    Alex 27 July 2014 15: 46
    +2
    Quote: Petrik66
    One of the main culprits of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima battle was a light projectile that did not explode when hit in a Japanese ship.

    As far as I understand, the weight of the projectile does not affect its ability to explode in any way - the fuse is responsible for this. But there really was some crap with them in the Russian Navy: they stubbornly did not want to explode. In contrast to the completely hypersensitive Japanese fuses, which were fired, as they say, even when hit by a rail.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 27 July 2014 16: 28
      +1
      Quote: Alex
      But there really was some kind of crap with them in the Russian fleet: they stubbornly did not want to explode

      Well, why? Exploded. It’s just that the Russians fought with armor-piercing shells, and they explode in moderation. Because the projectile must first penetrate the armor, and only then - to explode, otherwise there will be no sense. The Japanese relied on high-explosive shells, their fuse worked immediately upon contact, but such shells did not penetrate the armor.
  • USSR 1971
    USSR 1971 24 July 2014 13: 01
    +1
    Makarov is a great naval commander, without a doubt. But he had deputies and assistants, and one of them, according to his duties, had to clean the only fairway along which the squadron leaves. Moreover, they saw the setting of mines. In war, every second death is not an accident but a consequence of mistakes. By the way, the Japanese also repeated this mistake a few days later on mines set by the Amur.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 July 2014 13: 15
      +2
      Quote: USSR 1971
      the Japanese also repeated this mistake a few days later on mines set by the Amur.

      They are something not to be repeated. They just went the same course, at the same distance from the coast, for which they were punished. But generally speaking this, of course, is their mistake.
  • KBR109
    KBR109 24 July 2014 14: 10
    0
    Quote: Mareman Vasilich
    Can not be.

    Unfortunately, the cause of the death of the Vice Admiral was his own negligence. in the morning he was informed of the discovery of unidentified small vessels in the indicated area at night.
  • Denimax
    Denimax 24 July 2014 15: 28
    0
    It was risky to send two destroyers, which were inferior to the Japanese in speed and armament, to intelligence. One could give them in addition to Askold and Novik.
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 24 July 2014 17: 03
    +3
    Recently in Kronstadt I was and admired a powerful monument to adm. Makarov. His words are sacramental - "REMEMBER THE WAR!" should stimulate the current government.
  • Alceers
    Alceers 24 July 2014 21: 38
    +1
    Quote: Petrik66
    In addition, you can see that one of the main culprits of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima battle was a light projectile that did not explode when hit in a Japanese ship. The initiator of the transition to a light projectile was Admiral Makarov

    Heh, but you don’t know what you wanted to achieve with this? A light projectile had better trajectory flatness and therefore a higher percentage of hits was expected ...
  • Arct
    Arct 24 July 2014 23: 37
    0
    I just did not understand why they would stick in the drawing of the sailing battleship? If a hint of a Russian-Turkish war, then the author clearly missed ...
    1. hoard
      hoard 25 July 2014 00: 50
      0
      The author made a mistake by placing a drawing of the battleship "Grand Duke Constantine" instead of the steamer of the same name - a mine transport (carrier of mine boats).
      1. The comment was deleted.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  • fan1945
    fan1945 25 July 2014 09: 29
    0
    I also think that the sailing battleship is a mistake because of the name. The article is informative. About
    I first learned the GXNUMX and its role in this tragedy from here. I'm interested!
    The diaries of the participants most accurately convey the psychological, moral state
    events.P.Larenko "The Passionate Days of Port Arthur". The state was rather depressed.
    Therefore, S.O. Makarov, by his arrival, by his indefatigable energy, was, as it were, a "generator" not only for the Navy. Of course, he could not really do, change anything radically. But he gave impetus to a change in the moral state. From oppression to hope ... Who wished, who could receive hope DO.FULFILL! And not to get in your hands ... It was the disbelief in SUCCESS that caused reluctance, passivity, indifference. Which won in the end. Probably this is what Makarov meant in his letter to his son ?!
  • Denimax
    Denimax 25 July 2014 18: 07
    0
    Quote: Krang
    It is not mythical, but real, but now again the plan. Knowing that high-explosive fragmentation shells for 2TOE are frankly bad and are much inferior to the Japanese Rozhestvensky as a patented artilleryman, he had to develop a battle plan using armor-piercing shells, for which a minimum distance was needed. He didn't. In addition, he did not even rush into the front line when Togo's ships were performing a loop, although full speed pairs on Borodintsy were supported. And 18 knots had to be kept not all day, but only for the duration of the dash. Nothing was done. Therefore, let's move on to the battle plan and, importantly, to the list of orders that Rozhestvensky gave for the battle.

    Bad shells, disagreement in the ships, no tactics ...
    Why was it leading to slaughter? If Port Arthur fell, it would be right to return the squadron back. And in the history of the fleet there was not such a sad page.
    1. Denimax
      Denimax 25 July 2014 18: 37
      0
      By the way, 18 knots hardly any battleship could hold. The specifics of steam engines have a lot of wear due to the friction of a large number of parts, the maximum speed is only in tests and not long after them.
      The maximum speed was held after the appearance of turbines.
      1. hoard
        hoard 26 July 2014 00: 10
        0
        Modern ships can go "at full speed" also for a short time - 2-3 hours, no more. "Most complete" is used only in extraordinary situations, such as in combat. It's like the afterburner of an airplane.
      2. Crang
        Crang 26 July 2014 06: 24
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        The battleships had already reached the limit of perfection of their steam manin and could go at maximum speed for a day or two.
    2. hoard
      hoard 26 July 2014 00: 15
      0
      Quote: Denimax
      disagreement in the ships, no tactics ...

      Everything is very, very ambiguous. Personally, I refrain from evaluations.
  • Crang
    Crang 25 July 2014 18: 51
    0
    Quote: Denimax
    Bad shells, disagreement in the ships, no tactics ...
    Why was it leading to slaughter? If Port Arthur fell, it would be right to return the squadron back. And in the history of the fleet there was not such a sad page

    There was no way to get her back. In principle, the composition of the 2TOE, with adequate control and equipment, made it possible to defeat the Japanese fleet. Apparently they decided to "scare" them before signing a peace treaty.
  • fan1945
    fan1945 26 July 2014 03: 25
    0
    As far as I understand, the Borodino control system was the most modern in the Russian fleet. So much that they have not yet learned to own. So its advantage over the Japanese method of control is purely theoretical? Apparently that is why so much time was devoted to artillery exercises after the RYA.
    And how were 1 TOEs managed on ships? How did not everyone have to read the REV
    ships set optical sights ... I must admit, it’s surprising that in general
    either got in. With modernization in the Russian fleet there were always problems and ships,
    obsolete in comparison with the "Borodino" apparently and managed the old fashioned way?
    on the occasion of the war they put control devices?
    Practically, nothing can be found about this. Here for the first time even an idea
    received a thanks!
    1. Crang
      Crang 26 July 2014 06: 25
      0
      Quote: fan1945
      There have always been problems and ships with modernization in the Russian fleet,
      obsolete in comparison with the "Borodino" apparently and managed the old fashioned way?
      on the occasion of the war they put control devices?

      Delivered, but not to such an extent as on the new course.
  • Alex
    Alex 27 July 2014 16: 02
    +2
    Thanks to the author, I saw a slightly different look at Admiral Makarov. An excellent organizer, a man of inexhaustible energy ... Eh, there would still be a dozen and a half such initiative officers, look, the RYAV would have turned otherwise.