Nikolay Leonov: “We must convince the nation that it is still capable of much”
- Probably, if we change our opinions on historical figures too often, it will, first of all, demonstrate either our weak preparedness, or, as they say, our desire to keep our nose to the wind. Formed views tend to remain stable. Of course, there are some modifications in connection with the opening new facts.
The first thing I would like to repeat is that Russia, for all its diversity (national, territorial, whatever), of course, needs a strong centralized authority. In this case, it is quite possible to sacrifice even some democratic rights in the interests of the integrity and cohesion of the state. Some internal brakes can be released at the moment when the consolidation of the state is achieved. But to achieve consolidation is much more difficult ... I think that today we still have a lot to do in order for the state to become truly united, consolidated.
Any state that builds on the fundamentals of boundless federalization inevitably lays a long-lasting mine under it. The practice of 1991 of the year showed that we exploded like an F-1 grenade on all our republics, because this mine was laid under the foundation of the state - the right of exit. The United States does not give such an opportunity to its states, and in fact their state is considered federal. But this is normal federalization, i.e. separation of managerial functions. And when we begin to engage in federalization, we assume much deeper autonomous rights, trends for certain subjects of the federation, which always jeopardizes unity. Therefore, I consider it more promising to return to the policy traditional for the Russian Empire - not to divide the country along ethnic lines, but to divide them into administrative districts. But to come to this - it takes time.
Stalin, whom we will never be able to forget, no matter how hard they tried, suffered his first serious defeat when he was engaged in national politics. After all, he wanted to create, in essence, a unitary state, roughly speaking, with cultural autonomy for those national suburbs, which then became union republics. In 1921, he was the chairman of the Politburo commission on this issue, and all of his materials and reports were kept in that spirit. But he met with resistance from two delegations, which still cause us a headache - these are Ukrainian and Georgian. These were the most notorious separatists of that time! The fight was serious. The rights of Ukraine were defended by a delegation of two people: Frunze Mikhail Vasilyevich, a Moldovan by nationality, and Bulgarian Rakovsky. These two “Ukrainians” defended the maximum political autonomy of Ukraine. The same with Georgia. They brought Kamenev into this business, and went to Lenin, who was already seriously ill, and brought from him the decision that it was necessary to create allied republics on the very principle on which we then created them. The historian Yury Zhukov writes about this in his book The First Defeat of Stalin. It turns out that it was not for nothing that Rakovsky was shot during the repressions - it was for that! Being a foreigner, he participated in the state reorganization of Russia ...
I want to stress once again: the state should be unitary in the federal distribution of natural administrative functions between regions.
- This is undoubtedly one of the main lessons of the twentieth century.
- All states built on the principle of national autonomy have crumbled. Take Yugoslavia, a federal republic - all fragmented. And Czechoslovakia is really a country with Gulkin nose, but still divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. But the Bulgarians, more precisely, their then leader Todor Zhivkov, despite all the pressure from Moscow to give a federal structure for the Turks (the state could organize there), refused to do so. And Ceausescu refused to arrange Hungarian autonomy in Transylvania. As a result, both Romania and Bulgaria are preserved in the form in which they remain today. There are no numbers of lessons, only you need to be able to take advantage of them and draw the right historical and political conclusions.
As for our leaders, we will not speak about Stalin now, because this figure is incredibly complex. Here we can talk about great merits and no less great sins ...
- In this issue, the emotional, superficial, alas, approach of most people to history is clearly visible. During the years of “perestroika”, the masses were easily captured by the muddy wave of “anti-Stalinism”. The image of the bloody madman on the throne dominated in perception, the media were given an order of magnitude inflated figures of prisoners and executed ... Time passed, and people, comparing, remembered other features of that era: Great victory, great power, which could be on equal footing with anyone to stand for your rights. Even the repressions are already remembered in the sense that the upper crust could have suffered then, it was difficult to be seduced under Stalin. There was a powerful wave of zealous admirers of Stalin, already completely denying the dire consequences of dispossession of the kulaks, lawlessness, the “Leningrad case” to eliminate the Russian leading cadres. That is, again, too many emotions. Historian Vladimir Kuznechevsky his recently published book “Stalin: how was it? The phenomenon of the XX century "opens with these words:" More than thirty years of familiarity with most of the literature about Stalin led me to a paradoxical conclusion: everything that is written about this person in Russia and abroad is all right, negative and positive. It was really an outstanding state and political figure of national and world scale ... ".
Therefore, it is really possible to talk about Stalin without end, and everyone will have their own point of view. However, it is difficult to dispute that this person’s core in life was, after all, service to the state.
- This can not be denied. And when he died, the description of his property took one page in the school notebook. No bank accounts, jewelry and private palaces. All the residences were state-owned, all the gifts sent to him from all over the world remained in the museum collections.
He subordinated everything to the interests of the state, therefore great and evil deeds were accomplished with one goal - to make the state strong. And any other politician who tries to get deeper into the state pocket is no longer a politician.
Of course, paying tribute to Stalin, it is not necessary to make an icon out of him. We must always come from the real that has been done. As in the ledger: debit and credit. And the Lord God will judge us all when we go to a better world ...
After Stalin, all of our leaders were, to varying degrees, subject to such an illness as political anemia ... Khrushchev was probably the last to set strategic tasks for the country, which are not always feasible, stinky, like the fact that "the current generation of Soviet people will live under communism ", or - that" we will bury you "(speaking of the United States and capitalism as a system). Overlaps were, of course, monstrous.
During his ten years of rule, Khrushchev showed himself to be an incredibly active politician. He had so many initiatives that if he had a normal political filter with him: to miss something, support something, and stop something, it would be good for the country. For example, he, on the one hand, turned the matter in the field of armaments to rocket technology, to space, and on the other he decided to develop agriculture in virgin lands by volition, although for every five years there are lean years there for two years.
- Indeed, they threw colossal funds for virgin land, while the central Russian regions remained untidy.
- Of course. And most importantly, we simply removed the population from there. Where are so many Russians in the Kazakh steppes now? Well, then we sent them there to settle in and equip a new virgin virgin land, the Kazakhs never engaged in farming at all.
- It is no coincidence that Khrushchev was a Trotskyite in his youth. He delivered new blows at the peasantry, at the Church.
- The persecution of the Church was generally unmotivated.
- Some kind of frenzy.
- I think, yes. Although at the same time he had some ideas that could not be implemented, but they would help to democratize the party. After all, he first raised the question: two electoral terms in a party position, and then give way. I myself talked with his son-in-law, Alexey Ajubey, who became a member of the Central Committee in 44. And he said to me: they say, Khrushchev is acting unfairly, so I will be just 52 of the year, and I will never be able to get out of the Central Committee again. I say: Alexey, but you remain the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, this is more than enough ...
Khrushchev raised the question of eliminating the “envelopes”, which in essence were a sort of corrupt phenomenon. He was going to eliminate personal machines, which, unfortunately, in Russia there were always a lot and there are. He, of course, had a lot of vain ideas, like corn, planted everywhere, even where it simply cannot grow. Nobody could stop Khrushchev - this is a tragedy.
I happened to talk a lot with Fidel Castro about our leaders, especially about Gorbachev. And when I told him that Gorbachev was so-and-so, and let down all the dogs on him, Fidel asked: where were the 270 members of the Central Committee who could at any time at any plenum or send him out of office or transfer him to another section work? Why did these blind people follow the blind guide to the end, like in the picture of Pieter Bruegel?
- Did Fidel have such a democracy, could someone stop him?
- I asked him these questions directly: “Fidel, what about your democracy?” And he answers me like this: when we make decisions on major issues at the Politburo, then if one person gives his comments on the document under discussion, we will never accept this document by majority vote. A group of people is being created to study this issue further, and a document in a month or two is re-submitted for discussion. Nothing is ever accepted mechanically by a majority vote. And I have never resorted to my authority to suppress opinion.
- In any case, Fidel has saved his country.
- He saved his country - and in what circumstances! It seemed unthinkable.
- If we talk about the role of the individual, then Fidel Castro after the war period, in the last third of the twentieth century, there is no equal among world politicians.
- Of course not. Stand against all!
- To stand in the 90-e years, when we threw it. And what is still popular in the people.
- Such people are not brought up in some party schools, they are sent from above.
... The next notable Soviet leader was Yuri Andropov (I omit Chernenko - this is just a passing figure).
- But we can not say about Brezhnev. You wrote that until the middle of 70's he was quite an adequate figure.
- Of course. Brezhnev, of course, a large figure. Personally, I treat him with deep respect.
- It is not by chance that the people have now changed their attitude towards Leonid Ilyich. By the way, Stalin himself put forward Brezhnev, saw the effectiveness of his work, the ability to get along with everyone.
- It is impossible not to be a diplomat to head such a huge state in order to smooth out, mix up contradictions between separate groups, clans, republics. And he completely coped with all this. With him, for that matter, the Soviet Union reached the peak of its political power and inner strength. I believe that 1975 year has become the pinnacle of our power. We had everything in perfect order, we were preparing to adopt a draft of a new constitution for the 60 anniversary of the October Revolution, with great democratic shifts. The Americans and the West as a whole had a lot of problems then: defeat in Vietnam, the collapse of the colonial empire in Africa, constant protests against the war, Watergate and much more. There was a picture of a fairly serious internal crisis. We had nothing like that. But then Leonid Ilyich started having health problems, which then of course affected the fate of the state. It has practically become unworkable. By the way, he repeatedly asked his Politburo comrades to retire, but he was dissuaded every time: that everything was fine, we would help, everything would be fine. But, in fact, the state was already weak, as was its leader. It became divided into departments, departmental management principles began to prevail. For example, I am not very good at Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov. He, of course, created the most powerful military industrial complex, equal in power to the American one, but at the same time it consumed so many resources of the country that it could not shake its foundations.
- Roughly speaking, tanks they did a lot, but lost because there were no jeans and beer.
- Something like that ... In the interests of the military-industrial complex, we slowed down the development of the national economy and, in fact, created the prerequisites for further collapse. Everything became scarce: toothpaste, matches, toilet paper ... Although they say correctly: in order to patch these gaps, it was enough for 5% of the military budget.
We produced an excess of weapons. The Chinese still have 500-600 rocket launches with nuclear weapons, and this is considered optimal, based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Nobody will touch it, because the 500-600 of released charges is already a catastrophe of world order. And we had 11-12 of thousands of starts, 50 or 60 of thousands of warheads - this is going crazy! After all, in the era of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, we sold 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium to the Americans. 500 tons, taken from the warheads of the destroyed missiles, and practically - for nothing (but this is a separate topic, I wrote about it in the "Century").
Well, the last years of the Brezhnev era, starting with 76 and further, were, as we remember, the apotheosis of stagnation.
However, the successor to Brezhnev was not to be Andropov at all, but a completely different joker ... In one of the memoirs of the Kremlin security officer I read what Brezhnev wanted to make General Secretary of the Central Committee Scherbitsky.
- There is a version that Andropov eliminated Leonid Ilyich.
- At the moment Brezhnev died, the first to arrive at the scene were two people: these were Ustinov and Andropov. Here Ustinov, addressing Andropov, said: “Yura, now you need to take a nuclear briefcase in your hands”. And since in the hands of these two people was the main part of the power unit of the country, Andropov took the suitcase, and thus the issue was resolved.
And it would probably be more expedient to appoint Scherbitsky. Firstly, the person is physically healthy, and secondly, he still had the experience of governing Ukraine, a large, highly developed republic, where there was everything: heavy rockets and agriculture. As for Andropov, his managerial skills were, to put it mildly, very limited. Of course, he was perfectly aware of everything, since he certainly had the information, but could only command the structure that was in his possession. Moreover, when it was inseparable, the deputies Tsvigun and Tsinev, the faithful people of Brezhnev, who watched him so that he didn’t fit, didn’t follow ... In general, Andropov was not sufficiently prepared for the role of the head of state.
Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov was, by the way, on the territory of intelligence in Yasenevo, where they met with Andropov. Once they came to my office, on Saturday, when I was working, they began to ask all sorts of questions. By the way, it is still not clear to me why such a sane person like Andropov supported the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 year. Mind is incomprehensible!
- And you, as analysts, that advised on Afghanistan?
- As for Afghanistan, the intelligence to make this decision had nothing to do.
- Did you ask any of your recommendations?
- No one asked. I was the head of the information and analytical department of the KGB and learned about the deployment of our troops only 3 hours before the start of the operation!
We were then categorically against any expansion of the range of influence of the Soviet Union! Back in 1975, in the period of the maximum flourishing of the Soviet Union, a document was prepared in intelligence, which I conditionally called then the “Roman of the Century”. So, in this “novel”, intelligence recommended the Politburo (and all documents were sent there) to stop the geographical expansion of our zone of influence. We were very frightened by Africa, which devoured a lot of our money. It all started with the Arab world, and then it started: Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique ... All of them urgently declared themselves to be countries not following the capitalist path of development. Linden some kind of wording, by the way. This immediately gave rise to Soviet assistance: economic, military and other. It was monstrous! We opposed this, argued that we had neither material, nor human, nor financial resources to master these vast territories in any way.
Andropov knew about this document, we discussed it, and suddenly - he supported the invasion of Afghanistan.
- His voice was almost decisive in this.
- The fact is that Ustinov, as head of the military industrial complex, wanted to test samples of the new weapons in this local war, but it certainly was a murderous decision for the country. And when Andropov became the Secretary General, he publicly dropped the phrase that plunged us into the icy cold. He said that the USSR should have such an arsenal of weapons that would be equal to the arsenal of NATO and China combined. We are stunned. It was absolutely impossible.
- What year was it?
- Four months after his accession. We understood that our economy would never survive this - China and NATO entirely. God forbid, at least to level up with NATO ... But hotheads, especially in the military-industrial complex, demanded more and more new resources. Indeed, in the aftermath of the events on Damansky there was a question of creating a colossal line of defense in the Far East.
That is, practically we ourselves have devoured ourselves. And there is nothing to look for problems that are secondary.
- As you can see from your book, you respect Yuri Vladimirovich precisely as the head of your department, who gave you the opportunity to express your opinion, who skillfully managed the State Security Committee.
- In the framework of the KGB, everything was, in my opinion, absolutely correct, that is, in internal affairs.
- It has long been known: tell me who your friend is, and I will tell you who you are. Who was he friends with? Arbatov and other famous figures?
- Yes, pro-Westerners, liberals. In personnel matters, he was wrong a lot. After all, he supported the candidacy of Gorbachev, brought him to power. And the fact that he brought Gorbachev is a decisive fact. And, for example, he wrote some notes in the Politburo against the Russianists. Well, who were the Russians? Is this the main threat to the existence of the USSR? He too fanned all this. And by the way, the same Stalin considered: who raises the Russian people in our state, that raises the state itself. It seems to all liberals that Russian nationalism, or even Fascism, is made of an elephant from a fly. So Andropov fell for it, although he was a smart man.
- In 1999, I was preparing a conversation for the “Slovo” magazine with the writer Peter Lukich Proskurin; he then wrote the novel “The Number of the Beast” about the era of Brezhnev. Proskurin spoke about Andropov: “This man belonged to the world behind the scenes, the people of secret dungeons ...”.
- Conspiracy is not my element. In general, Andropov, of course, is a huge topic that cannot be raised in a single conversation.
Of course, the arrival of Gorbachev is a phenomenon of strategic order. How was it possible to bring to power in the country a highly industrial, with great scientific and technical potential, the head of the marginal agricultural region. Romanov was the head of Leningrad, and this is a powerful industry, a powerful scientific intelligentsia ...
- Romanov was some kind of disciplined party member, and left not so long ago, without saying a word why he did not fight for power ...
- After Gorbachev came to the main place in the country, it immediately became uncomfortable in the soul: after all, this should not be by definition. At first we assumed that he came only for agricultural affairs. In agriculture in Russia always put those who are not strong in the political sphere. To ministers of agriculture, as a rule, only the ambassador’s place is farther away, somewhere far abroad. And suddenly he from the secretary for agrarian issues becomes the secretary for organizational issues, and then the deputy general ...
- And then Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev appears at his side. Kryuchkov wrote in his memoirs that, according to credible sources, Yakovlev was connected with the American special services. He even went to Gorbachev with this, which he would not have done if there had been any doubt about the information. And Gorbachev ... advised Yakovlev himself to show this information ...
- I personally, at the direction of Kryuchkov, happened to draw up a document in two persons: according to Yakovlev and according to Shevardnadze. It was exactly the notes prepared by me personally and typed by me on a typewriter (we didn’t have computers at that time). It was printed in one copy and for one addressee - only for Gorbachev. It was 1991 year, February-March. Before the death of the Soviet Union, there were some 8-9 months. These documents collected all the data on their anti-Party, anti-state activities, and it was concluded that these people are in fact opponents of our state. But instead of drawing any conclusions, Gorbachev took both documents and showed both Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. "Brilliant" move! And those, of course, soared from hatred towards the KGB, because it was clear where the document was coming from.
As for Shevardnadze, we had very serious suspicions that he was working against the state. Suffice to say such things. He did not consult with anyone: neither with the military, nor with the military-industrial complex, nor with the Central Committee — in negotiations with the Americans he agreed to clear concessions on armaments.
He never recorded his conversations with foreign leaders, primarily with US Secretary of State Baker. Shevardnadze never used the services of Soviet translators, but worked only with American translators. He never negotiated with the Americans at the Soviet embassy, but always went with them to some ranch and they already met there ...
- That is, he is a recruited person.
- We can not make another conclusion ... The fact is that the practice established in the Soviet state was the same for everyone: you had a conversation with foreigners - write down the text. And the text is then sent to the Politburo members, so that they know what was being said, what obligations we have assumed. It was the norm. Gromyko, for example, always wrote everything down, and the others too, but Shevardnadze never. Think what you want, but for us there is not the slightest doubt. Likewise, they, along with Gorbachev, eliminated our newest tactical missile of the Oka system. No one ever agreed to this, but the Americans raised the question, and they decided in secret. And we burned all these Oka devices, for development, production, the operation of which was spent several tens of billions of rubles.
- As Nicholas II wrote in his diary: “Around treason, cowardice and deceit.”
- These two are traitors, there are not even questions left.
- Reflecting on the role of personality in history, you once told one episode when you sat in August 1991 of the year in the KGB building on the Lubyanka, around which an angry mob raged, and you waited that it was about to break in, and that was when the will of one man ...
- Such moments occur in the life of any person. And they, as it is sung in a famous song, "hand out to whom shame, to whom is shame, and to whom is immortality." Of course, I remember well this terrible day of August 21, when it became clear that the members of the Emergency Committee were arrested, and at the board of the State Security Committee we learned that Kryuchkov was arrested upon returning from Foros, and the late Shebarshin was appointed temporary chairman of the KGB. At the same time, we saw from the windows that a huge mass of people were gathering on Dzerzhinsky Square. It was about 10-15 thousands of people, extremely excited. The situation was very dangerous. By the way, from the windows of the upper floors it was clear that in all the alleys there were people who were pouring vodka and alcohol from canisters into paper cups and offering everyone who came up.
The buildings of the committee were barricaded, and the guards asked all the time what would we do if the building was stormed? And openly, many speakers called for this. Through amplifiers, they called for: "We are going to storm the committee, take all the documents." And here was the question of what to do to the State Security Committee. Shebarshin telephoned Yeltsin. The pipe, in my opinion, took Burbulis. Shebarshin reported that there was a threat of storming the KGB building, we have several thousand officers in the State Security Committee, bloodshed can occur ... And then the head of the border troops Colonel-General Yakov Kalinichenko rose and said: “I am responsible for the Border Troops headquarters. Our border guard officers will not allow themselves, like sheep, to cut their throats in their offices. We will protect the documentation, archives of the border troops by force of arms. We have 200 machines that will now be operational, if needed. ” Like this! These words were transmitted, including directly to Yeltsin’s reception. And he immediately arrived, after 15 minutes, spoke on the square and began to urge to stop everything, because he understood what it could turn into ...
- What then happened to the fate of General Kalinichenko?
- He was fired, of course. But he normally remained in retirement, which he was not deprived of. Of the entire KGB leadership, General Plekhanov, who was the head of the Security Department 9, suffered the most. Gorbachev personally punished him, returning from Foros; stripped of his title, pension, everything. He was rehabilitated only a week before his death. And Kalinichenko lived like an ordinary pensioner. He did not mess with himself - a real commander and a worthy man.
- Nikolai Sergeevich, before our meeting, I leafed through your book 1994 of the Year in Likolete. Her last pages are very pessimistic. Exactly the same mood was then with me and many. The feeling was that Russia, even in the 90s, would fall apart, external forces would begin to divide it ... But nevertheless, now I see it was too pessimistic. Anyway, Russia exists within its borders, in the end it returned the Crimea, which caused, of course, a surge of patriotic feelings and hopes. It is clear that the Lord is keeping Russia, although she has experienced a lot and, probably, will survive ... Now what could you say at the end of the conversation, what is your vision of our future?
- Now there is no such desperate pessimism, because there has also been a turn towards China. The agreements reached with the Chinese leadership instill some hope that we will sober up a little from our nightmarish dope ...
- Covered to a large extent, and tops and bottoms.
- Of course. We will look at the world a little more soberly, I mean the Western world, including the USA, with which we tried to make friendship with 25 for years and made sure that it cannot be by definition. China is a mighty country, it needs, of course, some of our technologies, our raw material potential, and we need their industrial base, which they now have powerful. This is what unites Russia and China. However, we are unlikely to become allies, because the Chinese generally reject the very idea of alliances.
- We must take a sober look at this partnership.
- Soberly and do not choke on enthusiasm. We may well be good partners, and this inspires hope. But there is something that saddens. We still need to move away from commodity dependence. It is becoming deeper, and even the events with China confirm this once again. We depend on the gifts of God: oil and gas. Therefore, I would like to see more decisive government steps such as in the case of the Crimea. God knows, maybe someone else will come in, it's hard to say now ... Take for example the Transnistrian republic, it also asks, and the people there are mostly Orthodox. After all, we have the Kaliningrad region, why don't we create the same region in the south?
But still, the first thing that I would like to add to this state body, which is already fairly well knit together, is, first of all, the economy. We only say: innovations, innovations, but many industries need to be recreated. These disasters in space that are pursuing us, according to Rogozin, are a consequence of the degradation of this industry. Here you have to do everything for real, i. to restore, first of all, the school of vocational training of workers, craftsmen, technologists, engineers, to raise the prestige of this category of specialists. It is necessary to develop modern sectors of the economy - we can not take on everything, but some key ones need to be tightened up. In the meantime, we have some setbacks. "Skolkovo" what happened? Such a swing - and such a result. And most importantly, the result is not only deplorable in the financial sense, but also moral damage is considerable: we again sign for our helplessness. Here, after all, the firm hand of the country's leadership is needed in order to outline the project, to bring it to mind, to the end, and to convince the nation that it is still capable of much.
The second, in importance, after the economy is, of course, a question of demography. And the Russian people - the most suffering in this regard. I constantly think about it with sadness. The people are dying out, the color of the nation is disappearing, and, in my opinion, there is a fairly simple solution to this problem. And we must act, first of all, through the Russian Orthodox Church. Why? Yes, because Orthodox, really Orthodox people, are not mummers, and who really believe - they usually have large, normal families. So we must make sure that this category of people becomes privileged in the country. And our assistant in this is the Russian Orthodox Church. 30 thousands of parishes in the country! Can you imagine how many hotbeds of such a demographic growth could we have? But they don’t even talk about it here ... And this channel must be used and the religion must be supported, so that the large Russian family is not the poorest it is now. We have a large family equal to almost poverty. They should be given privileges, allocated to them, in the end, if necessary, public housing, assist in obtaining education, organizing small businesses, and providing other support. All this must be done necessarily.
- If Russia again has to fight, then the combat units will again be Russian mostly.
- Of course. Marshal Baghramyan, a wise Armenian, said that he did not direct any unit into battle, if there were fewer 50% Russians in it.
- When I was working on a book about our illustrious ace, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Ivanovich Pokryshkin, he studied the documents of the regiment in which he fought and commanded. Here is one detail: on 20 July 1943, the regiment consisted of 187 people, people of different nationalities. But here's the core - the 33 pilot, of which 30 is Russian, 2 is Ukrainian and one Belarusian. Many more such facts can be cited, this is the state-forming role of the Russian people ...
“That's what this is about!”
- By the way, in 1976, Marshal aviation Pokryshkin visited Cuba. A brief meeting was planned with Fidel Castro. But their conversation lasted several hours.
- Apparently, it was something to discuss two figures of this magnitude. Such nations are born at critical moments in their history.
- Alexey Timofeev
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