Miracle tanks in June forty first. Miracle Tank Fiasco

A bit in stories wars of so mysterious and contradictory pages as the use of Soviet tanks new types in the summer of 1941. In epic tales, the T-34 and KV receive hundreds of marks from shells without a single penetration, the KV tank alone stops the tank group, the 26-ton T-34 tanks rush about, barely touching the ground and crushing everything in its path

The flip side of the epic tales was the persistent view that beautiful cars became the victims of their own commanders and that they were massively abandoned without a fight. If used correctly, the wonder tanks would have had to crush the enemy before the German tank groups reached the Dnieper.

In the dark ...

The first riddle is the fact of the complete lack of information about the new Soviet tanks in the Wehrmacht. The T-34 and KV have entered tank units in border districts since the end of 1940. By June, 1941-th account was already on the hundreds. In Alytus, they stood in open parks not far from the railway, on which there were trains from East Prussia. Moreover, in Leningrad, the KV tanks drove to factory tests in public. You could even estimate the volume of their production. Nevertheless, the pocket guide for the Wehrmacht on Soviet armored vehicles, published in June 1941, was not mentioned in the T-34 and KV tanks. In addition to T-38, T-26, T-28, T-35 and BT, there is only an experienced heavy SMK tank called T-35C. Information about this car came to the Germans from the Finns - in December 1939, the QMS was blown up on a land mine in the depths of the Finnish defense. In the documents OKH / FHO (Department for the Study of Eastern Armies OKH) there is a tank T-32, not included in the directory. As we know, in the USSR one of the prototypes was called “thirty-four”. However, the performance characteristics of the T-32 tank, according to OKH / FHO, have nothing in common with the T-34 and the present A-32. The same T-35 appears before us: one 76,2-mm cannon, two 45-mm cannons, five machine guns, and an 30 mm armor. At the same time, the mass is markedly underestimated for the five-tower giant - 35 t.

... but fully armed

However, ignorance does not always mean unpreparedness to meet with new enemy tanks. It is not even about the experience of the French campaign and the meetings of the Germans with heavy B1bis. In addition to reference books on Soviet tanks in the Wehrmacht, there were secret schedules of armor penetration of anti-tank, tank and anti-aircraft cannons. The lines of charts began much higher than the thickest armor that the Germans could meet in the USSR, according to their pre-war data. They evaluated the armor T-35C (QMS) in 60 mm. The 88 mm anti-aircraft gun took 100-mm armor even with 1 km. A sabot to the 50-mm anti-tank gun PAK-38 punched on 100 m twice as much - 120 mm armor. Accordingly, 50-mm tank gun with a short barrel on the 100 m when firing a sabot projectile turned out to be in the teeth armor thicker than 90 mm. However, it is necessary to emphasize that there were few tanks with weaver guns in the Wehrmacht.

Without much emotion

So, early in the morning of 22 June 1941, the troops of the three German army groups crossed the Soviet border. Where did the Germans first meet with the T-34 and HF? Most of the new tanks were in the Kiev Special Military District, but the first German meeting with them occurred not in Ukraine, but under Alytus in the Baltic States and in the Grodno area.

In the afternoon of June 22, near Alytus (Olita), a tank battle took place between the 5 Tank Division of Colonel FF Fedorov and the 7 and 20 Tank Divisions of the German 3 Tank Group. The Soviet version says that the division of Colonel Fedorov met the enemy in defense, but the study of documents leads to a different conclusion. The Germans captured the bridgeheads on the Neman, and then followed a counterattack of Soviet tanks on the bristling with anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns. In the evening report of the 3 tank group, the battle near Alytus was rated as “the largest tank battle during the period of this war” (that is, World War II) for the 7 tank division. Own losses, according to the report of the 3 th TGr, amounted to 11 tanks, including four "heavy" (Pz.IV). According to Soviet data, from 24 T-28 tanks that participated in the battle 16 was lost, from 44 T-34 - 27, from 45BT-7 - 30. As we can see, almost three dozen T-34 were lost at a time. Moreover, the German command did not cause any special emotions in the collision with the “thirty-four” under Alytus.

KB-2
German soldiers inspect the wrecked tank KV-2 with a weapon in the installation of MT-1. On the turret and the mask of the gun one can see at least a dozen traces of shell projectiles. A tank from the 2 Tank Division of the 11 Army. Baltic, summer 1941 of the year.

Where did the HF go?

Under Grodno, tanks of the 11 th mechanized corps of General D.K. Mostovenko 22 June were used in a counterattack against the German infantry advancing on the city. Tankmen managed to prevent the immediate collapse of the defense of rifle units, but at the cost of heavy losses. In total, according to German data, in battles on the outskirts of Grodno on the first day of the war 180 Soviet tanks were destroyed.

On the very first day of the war, the fate of all three tanks of the 11 KV of the mechanized corps was decided. One fell over and sank in the swamp. The second was immobilized by hits in the chassis. It was the first KV tank that the Germans faced in battles. Oddly enough, no reports of this collision followed. Apparently, the tank was disabled before it showed its invulnerability. The third HF remained in the workshops due to a malfunction, and later it was blown up during the departure. This episode answers the question of where the HF and T-34 went in the summer of 1941.

As a result of the battles, the Germans noted that Soviet tankers acted "energetically and stubbornly in groups of 20 – 40 combat vehicles.” On the other hand, it was stated that "the effectiveness of the 3,7-cm anti-tank gun is sufficient against all types of tanks encountered."

New fast tanks

Following the results of the battles near Grodno with parts of the Mostovenko corps, the Germans received the first reliable information about the newest Soviet T-34 tanks. Tankers captured reported that they had “two types of tanks in service: T-26 with 4,5-cm anti-tank gun and two machine guns, booking - 15mm, and T-34 with 7,62-cm gun and two machine guns. Reservations - minimum 30 mm. In service with the 11 th mechanized corps were really T-26 and T-34 (28 units). The latter had family ties with BT. The exact number of Thirty-Fours lost 22 June is unfortunately unknown.

On the second day of the war, the Kiev Special Military District, which became the South-Western Front, joined the process of acquiring Germans with the new Soviet armored vehicles. At the town of Radzekhov, near the border, a clash of Soviet forward detachments and the German 11 Panzer Division occurred. The result of the battle was the loss of the Soviet side 37 tanks, including at least six T-34, the German side recognizes the irretrievable loss of seven tanks. Under the Radzekhov, the thirty-four Germans noticed and appreciated: “There were very fast heavy enemy tanks with 7,62-cm guns that shoot perfectly from long distances. Our tanks are clearly inferior to them. " It was indicated that at close range 37-mm guns still hit "fast tanks". In general, the picture "a typical battle of new tanks" loomed more and more clearly. The most important participant in the fighting from the German side was artillery, both field and anti-aircraft. Its fire hit the tanks, cut off the infantry from them, and in fact disrupted the Soviet attacks. The Soviet artillery did not keep pace with the tanks - standard STZ-5 tractors for the mechanized corps were not suitable for a maneuverable battle.

Invincible ram

Much more dramatic was the meeting of the Germans with KV tanks in quantities of more than one. They engaged in battle on different sectors of the front and actually caused shock to the enemy. The first was again the Baltic States. The vanguard of the 6 Tank Division of the 4 TGr in the morning of 24 June captured a bridgehead on the Dubissa River near the town of Raseiniai. Soon the bridgehead was under attack by tanks of the Soviet 2 tank division, including heavy KV-1 and KV-2. It quickly turned out that they were “completely invulnerable to anti-tank weapons in caliber up to 3,7 cm.” The Soviet counterattack rolled through Dubiss and the tank attack struck the main forces of the Zekendorf battle group of the 6 Panzer Division. She did not have any saving anti-aircraft guns, and conventional artillery and rocket launchers were used to combat the new tanks. In 13: 00, the first KV in the Baltics was hit by an 150-mm field howitzer shell. Nevertheless, KV crushed artillery positions, shot and rammed light tanks 35 (t) of Czechoslovak production.

In 17: 30, the Acht-Comma-Akhty arrived in the area of ​​operations of the Zeckendorf battle group - 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The Germans managed to stop and even reverse the Soviet tank attack and destroy several steel giants. The study of the remaining Soviet tanks on the battlefield and the interrogation of captured tankers gave them a fairly complete picture of the technical characteristics of the KV-1 and KV-2.

Incredible Caliber

24 June 1941 of the year was the day of the mass entry into battle of new tanks - the time difference was a matter of hours. Soviet counterattacks followed Grodno (6 th mechanized corps), Nemirov (4 th mechanized corps). However, the attacks T-34 and KV did not become all-destructive. Later, the commander of the 4 Tank Division, which had fought under Grodno, General Potaturchev, during interrogation in captivity, said: "Light German anti-tank guns were ineffective against heavy Russian tanks (50 – 68т), with other tanks, including T-34, they fought successfully"

It was 24 of June that the diary of General Halder made an entry: “A new heavy type Russian tank appeared at the front of Army Groups South and North, which apparently had a 80 caliber mm gun (according to a report from the North Army headquarters - even 150mm which, however, is unlikely). ” In fact, it was absolutely true: KV-2 tanks with 152-mm guns operated in the MT-1 unit operated under Raseiniai.

25 – 26 June increased the use of new tanks. They counterattacked the German infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns on the Narew, on the outskirts of Lviv, near Raseinia, and under Brody, Dubno and Radzehov. The “invulnerability” of the new tanks turned out to be rather conditional. Thus, the losses of the 12 armored vehicles of the tank division in the counterstroke under the Brods 26 June amounted to the 33 tank, including five KV and eighteen T-34. 26 June was set a kind of record: under the Radzehov in one battle, nine KV tanks were destroyed at once. The maneuverable nature of the border battle also had an effect, which led to the gradual withdrawal of the T-34 and the KV from the system for technical reasons. Their reliability and service life at the time left much to be desired.

Why didn't a miracle happen?

However, one should not think that Soviet tank counterattacks were completely useless. They only did not achieve the effect expected from the wonder tanks. Even counterattacks using light tanks made the German units stop. Without this, the collapse of the defense of the border armies stretched along the front of the rifle divisions would be much faster. The constant threat of tank counterattacks forced the Germans to worry about the flanks and carefully move forward. Particularly effective were the counterattacks in which the KV tanks participated. For example, in the battle log of Army Group “South” 29 June, it was explicitly stated that the advance of German troops to Lviv was “held back by counterattacks carried out with the support of heavy tanks.”

A natural question arises: was the tactics adopted by the command of the Red Army expedient? It was more or less useless to sit and wait for the enemy in ambush in the summer of 1941, if only because it was not known where and in which direction the Germans would strike the next blow. Moreover, the Germans changed the direction of the strike literally on the move. One solution was suggested - counterattack. The weaknesses of the organization of the mechanized corps and the tactical blunders of the Soviet commanders led to attacks with a weak support of artillery and infantry. This unleashed the Germans with the use of heavy cannons against tanks, ranging from 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to 105-mm cannons and 150-mm howitzers, and also allowed them to fire on the sides of the new tanks. If for KV the direction of shooting was not decisive, then for T-34 shots into the board from the “door hammers” often became deadly.

They did everything they could

At the end of June 1941, in Belarus, the KV tanks became a battering ram for breakthroughs from encirclement in the Bialystok region. With their help, groups of encirclements managed to escape from the "boiler". In the tank battle under Dubno, the German 16-I tank division suffered heavy losses. The 88-mm anti-aircraft guns remained the main means of fighting the HF. In late June and early July, in view of the worsening of the situation, the general withdrawal of Soviet troops to the old border began. Damaged and failed KV and T-34 had to throw.

It is clear that T-34 caused much less emotion among Germans in the summer of 1941, than KV. Actually, when German memoirists in 1950 – 1960-s write about “T-34” in the first months of the war, it is in most cases about HF. In the documents as the main character are "52-ton" and "super heavy" tanks. Later in the memoirs, they became the average Soviet tank, how much of the war was the T-34-76. The nickname "door knocker" 37-mm anti-tank gun received for its impotence against the KV.

The real story is terribly far from the legends and tales of the miracle technology. Nevertheless, T-34 and KV have made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan. In September, 1941-st at the gates of Leningrad, realizing the impossibility of taking the city by storm, the German staff from the 41-th motorized corps wrote a phrase that best describes the use of new Soviet tanks: “He [the enemy] does not have enough infantry, but heavy tanks an obstacle, the struggle with which takes a lot of time. "

Comments

[Shadowcat]

The article is nonsense.
The reason for ignorance about Soviet tanks is the good work of our counterintelligence.
The reason for the high losses (most of the non-combat) is in the underdevelopment of technology and its childhood diseases
The fact that 88mm guns were nonsense in all parts. Of course, more than 17 thousand of them were built, but this is a drop in the bucket and they certainly would not be enough for all parts. Plus they were not supposed to work on tanks, but work on aviation. They were supplied to the infantry and, in general, began because of new Soviet tanks with which the 41st German main Pak36 was not able to fight. But Pak38 never became so massive and 10 thousand guns do not solve anything (and if we take more precisely 2500 equipment for the 41st year).
You can write a lot about this, but the cause of Rezun and Solzhenitsyn lives on, and alas, is not going to rot.

[maxvet]

Though they shouldn't have, they worked, and not only on the eastern front.
The fact that the article is nonsense, I do not agree
On the first day of the war, the fate of all three KV tanks of the 11th mechanized corps was decided. One toppled over and sank in a swamp. The second was immobilized by hits in the chassis. This was the first KV tank that the Germans encountered in battles. Oddly enough, there were no reports of this clash. Apparently, the tank was disabled before it showed its invulnerability. The third HF remained in the workshops due to a malfunction, later it was blown up when leaving
и
The reason for the high losses (most of the non-combat) is in the underdevelopment of technology and its childhood diseases
I see no contradictions

[Shadowcat]

Quote: maxvet

On the first day of the war, the fate of all three KV tanks of the 11th mechanized corps was decided. One toppled over and sank in a swamp. The second was immobilized by hits in the chassis. This was the first KV tank that the Germans encountered in battles. Oddly enough, there were no reports of this clash. Apparently, the tank was disabled before it showed its invulnerability.

Can I read where?

[maxvet]

Quote: ShadowCat

Can I read where?

in an article, or didn’t you read it?

[Evgeniy-111]

On what documents (articles, archives) was the article written? Links?

[creak]

The commissar of the 8th mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front N. Popel left an interesting memoir about the battles of this corps in June 1941 in the infamous tank battle Lutsk-Brody-Rovno. In the border battle in Western Ukraine, T-34 and KV tanks were actively used, and before the war there were more of them in the Kiev Military District than in other districts. By the way, the author mentions that our commanders also knew almost nothing about the performance characteristics of new German tanks Apparently this process is mutual ... The memoirs are interesting in that N. Popel took a direct part in the battle in the combat formations of the corps and was a living witness of those events. The books are called: "In difficult times." "The tanks have turned west."

[krpmlws]

Poppel wrote that his T-34 had more than twenty direct hits, and the tank remained in service. The article was generally superficial and controversial, put a minus. It was written in the spirit of all scribblers scribbles. They showed on TV a German veteran tanker who fought on T- 3, he said that as soon as he saw the T-34, he immediately reversed. Here is the eloquent assessment of the T-34 as a front-line soldier, and not the verbiage that this scribbler is engaged in. It’s possible to take apart all this nonsense for a long time, but in general everything is clear .

[Avenger711]

Over 20 hits from 37 mm? For God's sake. The joke is that the order beats the class, and the Germans in the 41st had more order and not without a German mat, but they quickly coped with the T-34, plus a numerical superiority. Maybe he will take the T-34 with him a couple of dozen Fritz, but sooner or later it will be lost.

As for your fritz with the T-3, then nothing is said about what kind of gun was on this T-3, that is, just verbiage, similarly our taankists remember that sometimes they just jumped out of the tank, seeing how the "tiger" is directed.

[Setrac]

Quote: Avenger711

The joke is

The trick is that the God of War is artillery, it was the superiority (numerical) in artillery that determined the success of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war, and no "golden" tanks could compensate for this.
Artillery caused the main damage to the enemy, and tanks and infantry killed the survivors. And what you wrote about class and order is abstract reasoning.

[Drummer]

Well, and evil tongues all about some kind of interaction between the military branches slander.

[Setrac]

Quote: Drummer

Well, and evil tongues all about some kind of interaction between the military branches slander.

The interaction of the military branches is of course necessary, but it is aimed at ensuring that artillery knows where to shoot!

[krpmlws]

The Germans' task was to detect Soviet tank columns in advance (for example, reconnaissance aircraft from the first days of the war intensely searched for the 1MK, which in reality was near Leningrad, and the motorized division of this corps was the first to enter the battle only in the Western Dvina ) .Next, the Germans pulled artillery, forming strong anti-tank strongholds. If there were tanks, they ambushed them and counterattacked from different directions, trying to draw the enemy into crossfire. The Soviet tactics of using tanks in 41g were extremely poorly developed and that’s exactly what the main reason for the failures of counterattacks by Sov.MK. Frontal strikes with the support of motorized infantry did not bring the result that was expected. Only later did they begin to use more active reconnaissance to identify enemy strongholds that were used by tanks and were surrounded and destroyed by infantry. various factors (low motor resources, poor art support, etc.), which certainly influenced the results of the battles, but all these factors alone did not determine the failures. If everything was perfect in the Red Army and the MK were properly organized and fully equipped, they would have support aviation, it would still have little effect on the outcome of the fighting. And vice versa, if the Red Army owned the rules This tactic of battle, including tank forces, would radically change the situation. I can’t speculate how much, but it’s a fact. It’s very relevant now, because the commander usually does not have an ideally armed and organized army, so he should be able to extract the maximum of what has, thanks to the construction of tactics based on the knowledge of the pros and cons of their troops and the enemy, this is the art of a warlord. Then the general, explaining the reasons for his failures, will not have to refer to the lack of anti-slip armor in his tanks, the surprise of the attack and tp

[tomket]

Actually, in Wehrmacht, in 41, there was an obscure tank fear, which was then observed in our troops in 43, the phenomenon itself is quite natural, the Germans weren’t stupid enough to rush to the square, so people in funnels hid from them on 20 .

[alone]

t-34 in TTX was superior to any German tank they had in 1941.not to mention the KV

[Setrac]

Quote: lonely

t-34 in TTX was superior to any German tank they had in 1941.not to mention the KV

Well, the T-54 was also superior to any 1941 German tank, what's the difference if the T-34 got rid of childhood diseases only by 1942 and started fighting?

[aviator46]

The T-34 in 1941, yielding in a number of positions (separation of crew member functions, the quantity and quality of surveillance devices), had the same reservation as Pz.IV, somewhat better mobility and significantly more powerful weapons.
After installing a long-barreled gun in early 1942, the Pz.IV was able to hit Soviet and American tanks beyond the reach of their guns. Until the end of 1943, the combat characteristics of the T-34 remained virtually unchanged, and the Pz.IV took first place among medium tanks, and to be precise - actually until the summer of 1944.

[Stas57]

Quote: lonely

t-34 in TTX was superior to any German tank they had in 1941.not to mention the KV

Well, why are you like that .... mediocrely sketched?)))
communication - the cornerstone of success in battle along with the review - no connection! how to organize cooperation in battle with flags ....
I recall that the availability of high-quality communications + air and artillery gunners on some kind of sd kfz, allowed the Germans to quickly respond to changing circumstances.
there is no review either, the commander is busy with anything except the review of the battlefield in the whom’s tower (which is also missing), the assessment of the situation and the adoption of a decision.
and you can continue for a long time ...
all this negated all the advantages of 34
ps, well, the classic tanks are not fighting in a vacuum ..

pps in WOT do not play, then you have such an example, very conditional

2 teams - one on stock t-34, chat communication. crews are also stock. people gathered for the game by chance.
the second one is on upgraded 3s and 4s, the crews are upgraded, there are high-level 3 artifacts, Skype communications, the team has been playing together for a year now.
who will win?

[slava_sherb]

cool thanks

[krpmlws]

Communication is an important factor, but more important is the tactics of the combat use of tanks. Example from WOT: aspect ratio in favor of the Soviet group of tanks, consisting of kv1, k2, t-34 and light tanks, without skype, but with adequate tactics and centralized command; ": T-4, T-3 and light tanks. Who will win? Three arts fail, there were howitzers in the Soviet TD. I bet they were Soviet.

[Shadowcat]

began to compare the spherical tanks of the WOT with the real ones. In a real tank, even if you tear your ass to the British flag, but neither the caterpillar, nor the motor, nor the gun will begin to work after five seconds. if you can still fix the goose after climbing out of the tank (and this is all on the battlefield and shooting such a brave fighter for a sweet soul) then the rest is only in workshops and field workshops. It turns out that a tank with a broken track / gun / motor is all no longer capable.
So do not compare the toy with real - this is at least stupid.

[Shadowcat]

Quote: maxvet

Though they shouldn't have, they worked, and not only on the eastern front.

Due to the fact that there was no alternative) If there was an alternative, everything would be nya

[Vodrak]

The article, frankly, is quite controversial: the Soviet tanks were clearly better than the German ones, but the unpreparedness of the crews and mediocre leadership nullified all the remarkable technical features of these vehicles. It got to the point that diesel tanks were refueled with gasoline, like tanks of previous models. Basically, all the victories of our tankers in the early days of the war were only due to their personal dedication and heroism. Later, when the equipment was further developed and the crews taught, plus an analysis of real combat experience, these tanks became a real, all-devastating fighting force.
As for the T-34, they were in service in the Soviet Army almost until the 60s. This indicates the reliability and good potential of this model of our tank construction. Even in the last battles in Yugoslavia, they took part, this suggests that the potential of these machines has not been exhausted at the moment. In any case, the T-34 and KV are weapons of victory, something on which our grandfathers won us Freedom and the opportunity to live.

[Stas57]

Quote: Vodrak

As for the T-34, they were in service in the Soviet Army almost until the 60's. This indicates the reliability and good potential of this model of our tank construction.

you confused the T34-76 produced only half a year, with a bunch of problems, and the T34-85, which was in service until the 90 years.

[Aleks21]

Actually, the T34-85 appeared only at the beginning of 1944. And before that, six months had to scratch the paint on tigers and ferdinants from a 76mm beater ...

[Stas57]

Sorry, produced six months before the start of the war, I meant it
A85 yes, 44

[Alex]

Quote: Alex21

I had to scratch the paint on tigers and ferdinants from 76mm beater ...

Yeah, especially "Ferdinands" made the weather ...
A young (or aged, I don’t know) man, these notorious machines were already 90 pieces (for reference - we had 50-55 pieces of T-35, and no one considers this a serious tactical force) and after the Battle of Kursk they only met occasionally. So before you shine with erudition, take care of knowledge.

[Vodrak]

I read somewhere that the number 34-85 was not great. Throughout the war, all the same, the main ones remained 34-76.
I don’t know if it is true or not. Correct me if I'm wrong.

[chehywed]

Quote: Vodrak

I read somewhere that the quantity of 34-85 was not great.

General release of T-34-85 tanks
1944 1945 Total
T-34-85 10499 12110 22609
T-34-85 com. 134 140 274
OT-34-85 30 301 331
Total 10663 12551 23 214
Judge for yourself.

[slava_sherb]

Yes, only those T-34 tanks of 41 years were no longer in service, but there were others, for example, T-34-85

[aviator46]

"He was not ergonomic, unreliable, very vulnerable, ineffective. And all these shortcomings had to be compensated for with human patience and human lives."
"In the fall of 1942, the T-34 and KB-1 tanks were sent to the United States for study. Their tests overseas began on November 29 and lasted for exactly a year. As a result, the T-34's engine failed after 72,5 hours, and KB-1 - in 66,4 hours. T-34 covered only 665 km. The engine worked under load for 58,45 hours, without load - 14,05 hours. In total, 14 breakdowns occurred. In conclusion, according to the test results, it was noted that the air cleaner was completely not suitable for this engine, practically does not retain dust, but on the contrary, contributes to accelerated wear and decreased reliability. "
"From March 1943 to April 1947, the BT-Polygon Research Institute conducted warranty tests of 129 vehicles (T-34, T-44, self-propelled guns). They showed that in 1943 the service life of the main components and assemblies of the power plant was barely enough for 300-400 km ... "

[Rico1977]

I’m guessing that such a fishing rod as Isaev wrote all these stupid books of the 90s about the war. Isaev - most of our tanks were either destroyed from the air, or destroyed by crews due to lack of shells and fuel. But not in battle. Such historians need to be hung up in columns for Faberge, and not his insane books should be published

[aviator46]

In the 41st it was ..
Almost all of them in the first months of the war were abandoned due to the lack of fuel and / or ammunition or breakdowns escaping from the encirclement of the crews.
As a result, by the end of the year, slightly more than a thousand tanks remained in the entire USSR, and the troops had to be packed with ersatz like the T-60, and thirty-four did not make up half of the Soviet tanks until the 43rd.
However, it’s incredible, but for some year the designers managed to simplify the Koshkin prodigy almost to a stone hammer, and the factories transferred to the Urals began to supply tanks again, but in quantities never seen before.

[Alex]

Quote: maxvet

I see no contradictions

It's a pity. But everything is on the surface: comparing the BATTLE EFFICIENCY or the inefficiency of tanks with the TECHNICAL problems that affected this efficiency are two different things.

[Papakiko]

Quote: ShadowCat

You can write a lot about this, but the cause of Rezun and Solzhenitsyn lives on, and alas, is not going to rot.

Yes, there are enough Sorosovo feedings!
And the article "bloody viper of a dead donkey."
If our grandfathers were "weird" with wooden sticks on broomsticks, the Wehrmacht in the Urals met Christmas.
And since this did not happen, then "Uyoi" on the plywood wafers were the forces of the Fascist eaten geyrope.
And our grandfathers and great-grandfathers are immortalized in an impenetrable and inextricable feat for the defense of the fatherland.

[slava_sherb]

no one disputes courage and heroism, only at what price and after paying this price what happened

[Drummer]

Isaev cites excerpts from the German railways on the effectiveness of the Pak-36 - at the beginning of the war it was considered sufficient, then the Germans had enough conventional field artillery besides Pakov and Flakov (10,5 cm field howitzers played an important role in repelling the Soviet attacks at Rassenyai and Rasekhov).

[Airman]

Quote: Drummer

Isaev cites excerpts from the German railways on the effectiveness of the Pak-36 - at the beginning of the war it was considered sufficient, then the Germans had enough conventional field artillery besides Pakov and Flakov (10,5 cm field howitzers played an important role in repelling the Soviet attacks at Rassenyai and Rasekhov).

Firstly, the caliber of guns WORLDWIDE is determined in MM or inches, but not in cm.

[Drummer]

As for the whole world, you got excited about it - see the German nomenclature of weapons, it was about 10,5 cm LeFh 18

[Airman]

Quote: Drummer

As for the whole world, you got excited about it - see the German nomenclature of weapons, it was about 10,5 cm LeFh 18

In Russia, caliber has always been measured in MM, and when it comes to Russian weapons, it's silly to talk about the German system. Then the caliber of the "three-ruler" will sound like 0,762 cm, and the cartridge is not 7,62. And our guns were three-inch, or 76,2 mm.

[Vodrak]

M ... Yes, it's hard to be stupid ....
When you buy a TV, they tell you that it has a .....- inch screen, do you always ask to convert to millimeters?
Each country has its own standards in various measurement measures.
Centimeters were taken for artillery in Germany at that time.
Just accept it, well, if it's really hard to keep a calculator close by.

[Corsair]

Quote: Vodrak

M ... Yes, it's hard to be stupid ....
When you buy a TV, they tell you that it has a .....- inch screen, do you always ask to convert to millimeters?

Why unreasonably "run into" a person?
Your example with the "diagonal", after all, it is also not indisputable, because not long ago, the diagonal of the kinescope was indicated in centimeters

[Vodrak]

I agree with you and apologize to my opponent, but so categorically to say that the caliber is measured ONLY in millimeters is also not correct.
Once again I apologize, a little out of stupidity flared up.
Thank you.

[Airman]

The article is about the Soviet T-34 tanks with a 7,6cm gun, and the T-26 tank with a 4,5cm gun. And I did not understand, if the author wrote this article for the Germans, why did he post it on this forum? In the USSR and Russia, the caliber of guns is measured in mm. Here on the forum, one author recently measured the speed of a helicopter in knots. How tired of these links to everything foreign, do we have that the Russian language is so poor, or will we adapt to the west?

[Stas57]

Quote: Povshnik

The article is about the Soviet T-34 tanks with a gun of the caliber 7,6cm, and the T-26 tank with a gun of the caliber 4,5cm. And I did not understand, if the author wrote this article for the Germans, why did he post it on this forum?

the author did not post anything here, this is a copy-paste from the American popular science magazine.
in my opinion this is obvious and there is no secret.

[Xeueys]

It seems to me that you are a stupid person.

[Shadowcat]

mmm ... you are not quite right sir. In mm in the USSR and in my opinion France, in Germany in cm, and in Britain just in inches.

[Yemelya]

Quote: ShadowCat

In mm in the USSR and in my opinion France, in Germany in cm, and in Britain just in inches.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, too, it seems, in inches.

[Shadowcat]

in lines. remember the famous three-ruler)

[Yemelya]

Quote: ShadowCat

in lines. remember the famous three-ruler)

The line, as I recall, is 1/10 inch.

[73petia]

Quote: ShadowCat

and in Britain just in inches.

In my opinion in Britain at that time the caliber of artillery was measured in pounds. As now the caliber of hunting smooth-bore weapons. (Something like this, 12 gauge hunting rifle means the diameter of a ball obtained from 1/12 of a pound of lead). For example, on "Matilda" there was a "two-pound" cannon (40mm).

[Aleks21]

In Britain in general, horror - I have not figured out their "5 pound", "8 pound" guns.

[Stas57]

Tell the Germans, dead ends, they counted in centimeters

[nnz226]

by no means! The Germans just measured the calibers of their guns in centimeters! Even our trophy 3-inches went under the index 7,6 cm with the addition of the letter "R", denoting belonging to Russian cannons. Their "akht-akhty" also have a name from the caliber in cm: 8,8 cm, hence the name: "eight-eight" in German, naturally.
And Isaev writes just the truth, and is not a "Soros fosterling", for the first one skillfully spread the ravings of the traitor Rezun with his "Icebreakers", etc. see "Antisuvorov". The supertanks T-34 and KV could not, in spite of their qualities, in 1941 strongly influence the battles due to their inability to use, maintain, "childhood illnesses", etc. As the cynical proverb says: "Technique in the hands of a barbarian is a piece of scrap metal." But this only emphasizes the greatness of the feat of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, untrained to fight in 1941, and still broke the Wehrmacht, and erased it to dust !!!

[geniy]

At the beginning of the war, the Germans considered their 37 mm caliber “door knocker” sufficient simply because the Soviet troops initially had a lot of high-speed tanks such as BT-5, BT-7, and even amphibious T-38s. And then the light tanks of Astrov began to arrive, and this was until 1943.

[Yemelya]

Quote: ShadowCat

Plus they were not supposed to work on tanks, but work on aviation. They were supplied to the infantry and, in general, began because of new Soviet tanks with which the 41st German main Pak36 was not able to fight.

Soviet aviation in 1941 did not shine, and anti-aircraft gunners had experience in fighting tanks - they knocked out "Matilda" in France.

[Avenger711]

No, not nonsense.
The issue has long been considered, a small amount of 88 mm with a competent approach can knock out a sufficient number of T-34s with HFs, again the author has repeatedly indicated this in his books, the lack of infantry in mechanized corps led to the exchange of their tanks for German infantry. And there are 105 mm guns.
Once again, jamming of the tower near the HF is noted when practically anything falls into the turret joint, moreover, the Germans already had information about this in July throughout the army.

50 mm guns even KV perfectly take on board.

[zmey_gadukin]

Quote: ShadowCat

but the cutter

Well, just the reason for the article would not be approved)))

[Alekseev]

Quote: ShadowCat

The article is nonsense.

I do not think so.
Although the answer to the question: why the "miracle" KV and T-34 tanks did not crush the advancing German troops in June-July 1941 and where have thousands of soviet tanks gone Among the border districts, it has long been known to both specialists and those who are seriously interested in military history.
And without Suvorov-Rezun.
Yes, tanks that were good in design were not at all the pinnacles of technical excellence, the time between failures was not at all great.
And the tank formations of the Red Army were just forming, they managed to put a lot of tanks, including the KV and T-34, but there was neither skillful, experienced command, nor normal combat, technical and rear support, nor a sufficient number of trained crews, nor proper combat coordination of units.
And without this you can’t fight, tanks will simply turn into piles of scrap metal! (which happened really in the summer of 1941)
So it was, as the author writes, one in the swamp, the other under repair, the third was knocked down, the fourth was lost without fuel, the fifth without ammunition, the sixth stood on the march from those. malfunctions or untrained crew, etc. etc.
So 10500 tanks in the border districts melted (though historians have an opinion that only 3800 were supposedly serviceable, which just raises the issue of technical support and training), of which 1475 are KV and T-34
As G.K. Zhukov said (in an interview with K. Simonov): “It must be said clearly that by the beginning of the war the German army was better than our army, better prepared, trained, armed, psychologically more ready for war, drawn into it ... that the Germans had an advantage in all respects. "
Therefore, the Germans did not crush the KV and t-34 in 1941.

[Shadowcat]

The article is nonsense because the author just doesn't write about it. He cites fights, quotes. But it does not go deep into the details that you said. In addition, if the Germans could not "adjust" to the battle, they would have bent back in Czechoslovakia. They knew how to adapt, knew how to think, knew how to make decisions. Their generals went through battles in Europe and had EXPERIENCE, moreover, the experience of wars is practically unrelenting.
We had experience with the generals, but the experience was Civilian (on carts and if lucky with armored trains), HalkinGol (which we just won due to ordinary soldiers biting into the ground despite the betrayal of the general (Blucher and Co)), Spanish where light tanks still dominated.
In fact, it all came down to the fact that we had breastfeeding on the embrasure with faith in the ultimate goal (guys, I’m not so much pushing the feat of Matrosov and many of our soldiers, purely expression), and the Germans’s tank for embrasure and suppressing it (purely practicality).
As you can see, I fully share your opinion. But you yourself understand - in the current war the main thing is how to give in to the dish. Now it is filed negatively, not deeply in details that people who are savvy in the subject know, and so superficially. And this is precisely what makes the article negative.

[maxvet]

[quote = ShadowCat] The article is nonsense because the author just does not write about it. He leads fights, quoting. But that does not go into the details that you said [/ quote
if the author did this, the article would be five times larger

[Shadowcat]

Do you prefer two lines of unsubscribe or serious analysis?

[755962]

ACCORDION...

And no comment.

[vjhbc]

you probably from a parallel reality you probably beat the Germans there and waged war on foreign territory and we had everything very bad Germans generally did not notice our tanks and approached Moscow and Stalingrad

Quote: ShadowCat

The article is nonsense.
The reason for ignorance about Soviet tanks is the good work of our counterintelligence.
The reason for the high losses (most of the non-combat) is in the underdevelopment of technology and its childhood diseases
The fact that 88mm guns were nonsense in all parts. Of course, more than 17 thousand of them were built, but this is a drop in the bucket and they certainly would not be enough for all parts. Plus they were not supposed to work on tanks, but work on aviation. They were supplied to the infantry and, in general, began because of new Soviet tanks with which the 41st German main Pak36 was not able to fight. But Pak38 never became so massive and 10 thousand guns do not solve anything (and if we take more precisely 2500 equipment for the 41st year).
You can write a lot about this, but the cause of Rezun and Solzhenitsyn lives on, and alas, is not going to rot.

[alone]

Quote: ShadowCat

Plus they were not supposed to work on tanks, but work on aviation.

because of the huge losses of Soviet aviation, the Germans could use these 88 mm anti-aircraft guns against tanks. And do not forget that German aviation, especially fighter, completely dominated the air.

[aleks]

Why are all the links based on the opinion of the adversary - is this a new historical technique? And ours, senior lieutenant Kolobanov, August 20, 1941. in the composition of 3 KB2 he shot 44 tanks, what factor should be attributed? And there are many such examples.

[aviator46]

Most of the T-34s in the summer of 1941 were not destroyed by the enemy, but abandoned with breakdowns or from running out of fuel in order to escape from the encirclement even for their two.
However, the glorious German anti-aircraft gunners should not be forgotten.
Back in the 37th year in Spain, and then in the 41st in Africa, the Germans began to use anti-aircraft FlaK 36 caliber 88 mm against tanks.
And here neither millimeters of armor nor tilt saved.
Artillerymen with 105-mm divisional cannons also did not lag behind, so the few thirty-four who reached the enemy without breaking down and not getting lost along the road, though belatedly, turned out to be a worthy welcome.
The main armor file is the mechanic’s hatch and a machine gun hole in the frontal sheet. When hit, it is driven inside, with the corresponding result ...

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: ShadowCat

The article is nonsense.
The reason for ignorance about Soviet tanks is the good work of our counterintelligence.

Why nonsense? Maybe you just didn’t like it?
A. Isaev has a lot of good, detailed materials about the Great Patriotic War, and not only about it.
And this article is some kind of squeeze, I suspect that the author (or site managers) did not want to abuse the time and place. I recommend "10 Myths about WWII" edited by the same author.
About information about tanks.
If the Fuehrer, on the eve of the attack, declared that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay, which would collapse at the very first blows, and the Wehrmacht victoriously walked through the fields of Europe, and the MAIN part of the Red Army tank formations were less powerful than the T-34 and KV-1 tanks, then why "drive the wave"?

[EvilLion]

For idiots, I report that against 88 mm, and even more so 105 mm, no armor of those years saved, then only a question of quantity. Although Rommel's troops managed to crumble low-vulnerable British tanks with EMNIP only 3 tens of 88 mm. It is possible and 50 mm, hitting the hatch of the mechanical drive, or the side of the unambiguous serious defeat for the T-34. In general, at the end of the 42nd year, 34-4 hits were required to disable the T-5. Childhood illnesses do not play a special role in a short period of time, although jamming of towers near KV from any bullet hitting the joint is a childhood illness? On "Sherman", for example, the shoulder strap of the tower is covered with armor and bullets with oxolki cannot get there.

Cannons of high power are not in the first line, they are not very vulnerable to attacking tanks, therefore it is not necessary to kill a lot of skill in the leaning tanks from 88 mm. Subsequently, not so much tanks fought with the anti-tank movement, as artillery, which interfered with the ground, the tanks only cleared. And if there is not enough infantry with artillery, then any 34 will sooner or later get on board even from 37 mm, but in conditions of retreat, any irreparable instant damage means dropping the tank.

So there shouldn’t be any questions, just look at the armor penetration tables of the guns of those years to understand that the invulnerability of tanks is very arbitrary.

And yes, 88 mm guns are different, there is a 71 caliber anti-aircraft gun, and there is a less powerful 56-caliber gun, which was on the "tiger", the task of these guns is not to fight aviation (the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun against attack aircraft is generally completely useless, its task bombardment of bombardier formations at high altitude, and there the main thing is to set the fuse correctly and the bombers will be hit with fragments), and the destruction of bunkers. Well, something, but there is never enough artillery in infantry chats, and up to such calibers from which it is useless to arm.

So we learn materiel.

[Eugene]

Controversial article. But still liked it.

[Iraclius]

The article is complete nonsense. The cases when the BT and T-34 were confused did take place.
Confusion with the calibers of Soviet tanks also took place. But to confuse the heavy KV-2 and T-34 or BT - this is not ignorance, but the lack of professionalism of Hitler officers.
In general, I did not really understand the idea of ​​the article. Show that Soviet tanks were not "wunderwaffe"? Who claims this? There is no perfect weapon. But the fact remains that there were no rivals to our KV at the initial stage of the wars. That tanks were used illiterately? So even Soviet historiography does not hide this. But there was no other choice.
The author somehow completely forgot that the army was actively re-equipped and there were very few new types of tanks so that they could somehow significantly affect the outcome of the battles.
This will all be later ... And the crews worked out, and the tactics of competent tank ambushes, and the interaction with the infantry, and the invulnerability of the KV will fully manifest itself. The Voyskovitsky battle of Zinoviy Kolobanov was recently dismantled! .. What kind of German tank can it boast of a hundred and a half hits and maintain combat efficiency?
The article is a well-deserved "minus". And it gives off "rezunovism" ...

[maxvet]

Quote: Iraclius

And it gives off "rezunovism" ...

In fact, Isaev is one of the main opponents of the rezun. The article is excerpts from his books where he just says that there is no miracle of weapons and is unlikely to be.
And the conclusion from the article ..., then your comment can be understood like this - "we already know this, and there is nothing to write about it"

[Drummer]

Where in the article did you find about "Hitler's officers who confused KV and BT"?
The article does not claim to be original (especially since Isaev has long been bogged down in self-copying), but it is completely true. By the beginning of the war, more than 34 T-2000 and KV tanks had been riveted; far from all of them were out of order for technical reasons (this is a separate issue, the author did not touch upon it). The article directly indicates the battles in which the T-34 and KV took part (Nemirov, Razdekhov, Rassenyay, Alytus), combat losses and the results achieved, where they were.

Quote: Iraclius

This will all be later ... And the crews worked out, and the tactics of competent tank ambushes, and the interaction with the infantry, and the invulnerability of the KV will fully manifest itself.

When "KV shows itself to the full," it will be called a burden to the army and the development of the KV-1S will begin hastily.

Quote: Iraclius

Voyskovitsky battle of Zinoviy Kolobanov recently disassembled the same!

This bullshit was disassembled many times.

[recruit6666]

and you read his book, everything is written according to documents and memoirs! according to the recollections of tankers who fought in the t-z4, according to the moim it is called "I fought in the t-34", this tank was good only at the beginning of the war (if it was not far to go), there are only memories of those who came to fight in 43-44 ! and even then they did not enter into head-on collisions with enemy tanks, but tried to fight from the flanks. the article says that one should not exaggerate the performance characteristics of the t-34, it was not a miracle tank! the article says that Soviet soldiers constantly counterattacked the enemy, without the support of the infantry, surrounded, knowing that with a high probability they would not return from the battle! before the t-34-85 modification went on, surviving in a battle in a tank was not easy! and I think who is shouting about patriotism more than anyone else, probably they didn't even serve in the army, not to mention the enemy's attack under fire !!!

[Shadowcat]

Ahem sir, but what's the point of hitting an opponent in the forehead where does he have the thickest armor? Or do you think that is so op, and all the tanks that at the front are made of t-34-76 t-34-85t? They began to cross over to them in the 44th year, because industry was able to produce the necessary. and there was an opportunity to give re-equipment and retrain the crew. And expand it to one person.
You won’t do it in a day. Therefore, it was necessary to fight on the old t-34-76 in the 43-44th year, giving the opportunity to retrain the crews and rearm the units.

Quote: recrut6666

the article says that it is not necessary to exaggerate the TTX t-34

no one exaggerates. The tank was good in the first months of the war. But the enemy would be a fool if he had not developed methods of dealing with them. The Germans have never been. Why do you think there were instructions to withdraw and after to take the tanks into pincers and hit the side projections of the t-34 in the first months of the war (it’s very strange - the Germans hit the side, and it’s shameful for us to do this when tanks with thicker armor appeared)? Recommendations for the destruction of HF? After all, it was not casual.

[timeout]

Another version of how the Nazis - the Russians bent down. The would-be writers have already gotten with their thousands of destroyed Soviet tanks, but none of them admits that 70% of the losses are not combat ones (breakdowns, lack of fuel and lubricants and ammunition). These graphomaniacs also simply forget that the Germans fought offensive battles and simply could not use anti-tank artillery, and during counterattacks they used everything up to heavy artillery. And the "historian" Isaev decided to rewrite the chronicle of the Second World War in the same way as it is now taught in the West, where, according to their version, the Second World War was won by the Americans and the Americans, and here at the end of the article he contradicts himself.

[maxvet]

Quote: Timeout

"historian" Isaev decided to rewrite the chronicle of the Second World War in the same way as it is now taught in the West, where, according to their version, the Second World War was won by the Naglichians with the Americans

Have you read Isaev at all? There is no judgment on the commentary. Your comment from the series "Pasternak has not read, but I condemn"

[timeout]

Here is one of the creations of this author, what do you want to say, even the name speaks for itself? The fact that this comrade for 4 years tried to rewrite the history of the Second World War in his own way, is that also nothing? At the same time, relying on the memoirs of Nazi officers who were published in the west. For me personally, there is a more authoritative opinion of my maternal grandfather who was engaged in field repairs of both Soviet and captured equipment. And it’s worth remembering the child prodigy that the Russians didn’t come up with. Not one agitist or wartime newspaper ever wrote about miracle weapons, but wrote about the heroism of the Soviet soldier in the above privacy, of the Soviet people as a whole, this is a miracle weapon!

[maxvet]

This topic was spelled out by Isaev as an answer to Rezun, when he (Rezun) wove about Soviet "super tanks" that did not roll out the Germans just because before the war (Stalin had to start it on Rezun on July 10) all Soviet tanks were dismantled and were being repaired

[de bouillon]

Quote: ShadowCat

The article is nonsense.
The reason for ignorance about Soviet tanks is the good work of our counterintelligence.
The reason for the high losses (most of the non-combat) is in the underdevelopment of technology and its childhood diseases
The fact that 88mm guns were nonsense in all parts. Of course, more than 17 thousand of them were built, but this is a drop in the bucket and they certainly would not be enough for all parts. Plus they were not supposed to work on tanks, but work on aviation. They were supplied to the infantry and, in general, began because of new Soviet tanks with which the 41st German main Pak36 was not able to fight. But Pak38 never became so massive and 10 thousand guns do not solve anything (and if we take more precisely 2500 equipment for the 41st year).
You can write a lot about this, but the cause of Rezun and Solzhenitsyn lives on, and alas, is not going to rot.

88 matches have always been actively used against tanks

from the fields of Normandy and the southern steppes of Russia to the desert of northern Africa. "Long arm" has always helped to fight enemy tanks

[Shadowcat]

I do not deny it. But if there is a good anti-tank gun, why use an anti-aircraft gun for this? And if not, you have to get out otherwise the gut wraps around the geese.

[Stas57]

"" "" "" The fact that in all parts there were 88mm cannon nonsense. "" "" "

He invented and denied it himself?
88, in most cases, was attributed to the army team, especially those who were at the tip of the strike, neither in the front, nor in the whole country.

The pro 36 is also stupid, I took it on board, the reports of the State Academic Bolshoi Theater are in Shein’s book

[fzr1000]

Sorry, but first of all it was an anti-aircraft gun, there were more than 2000 of them at the beginning of the war on all fronts and the territory of Germany, and the need for them was never satisfied for the entire 2 MV. These guns began to arrive in the ground forces only in 1941 in a rather limited amount. So to think that the Germans were always at hand, where necessary, on the Eastern Front, had these anti-aircraft guns, is not true.

[Stas57]

Anti-aircraft, I didn’t say anywhere that it was PTO.
At the expense of quantity, one of the characteristics of the Germans is the 41 ability to concentrate what is needed where necessary. The initiative is with them.
Plus, the above 10cm penetration guns were not inferior to 88, and they were in almost every TD + RGK

[Shadowcat]

Do you think 126 guns (according to Wiki) from the landmen were enough for the front from the North Ocean to the Black Sea, assuming only that it was all placed on the Eastern Front? Or less than 2000 cannons to the front of the whole of Europe, and northern Africa (consider here that anti-aircraft gunners not only work at the front, but the protection of strategic objects and cities is not unimportant)?
How many guns were there to meet the needs of the army? It's like saying that one S-400 regiment will cover all of Russia now.

[Stas57]

Answered above.
I repeat, when you know where to beat, then you know what and what awaits you, therefore you need to have 88 and 10cm at the tip of the strike, and there you will get behind the mallet and hammer. 10cm guns were also few, however.

[Shadowcat]

I will not argue. But I think you yourself understand that counterattack for that and counterattack to ideally eliminate (or at least slow down) the enemy’s strike. So the question of concentration here was easy because everything was in the tank division (hopefully decrypted correctly). But given that our fighters did not just die, but beat out the selected and seasoned, time-tested and seasoned German units and depriving them of materiel, they might not have time to replenish them (the speed of movement of the unit plus the industry should be able to produce). As a result, everything results in a crisis.
Moreover, I add that even our generals, gaining experience, realized that it was not necessary to stretch troops along the entire front, namely to concentrate them on the tip of the main strike. By the way, the PTOPs (or somehow I don’t remember the names) appeared in the mass used on the Kursk.

[Selevc]

Recently, for some reason everywhere they write that the Germans did not know about the T-34 and KV before the attack on the USSR ... Well, I really doubt it !!! How did they not know if before this the USSR actively used KV tanks in the Finnish War and some of them were even captured by the Finns - and so that the Germans did not know about it? Well, I can’t believe it at all !!!

The caliber projectile for the 50-mm anti-tank gun PAK-38 pierced 100 meters twice as much - 120 mm of armor

Well, this author completely bent !!!
The frontal armor of the tiger was 100 mm and could not be penetrated by the Soviet 45s, in principle, but the 76 mm guns didn’t take the forehead either, but they took the side at distances of no more than 300 m ... And in the article, a 50 mm shell pierces 120 mm of armor! !! Is the author even familiar with the basics of physics or skipped classes?

[maxvet]

On June 24, a general entry appeared in General Halder’s diary: “A new type of Russian heavy tank appeared on the front of Army groups South and North, which apparently has an 80 mm gun (according to the report of the headquarters of Army Group North, even 150 mm, which, however, is unlikely) "

Agree, if Halder had known about the t-34 and kv before, he would have written differently. If you have any other information on this score, post it.
Is the author even familiar with the basics of physics or skipped classes?
I don’t know how Isaev’s physics is, but he cited German data.

[Stas57]

And where does 45?
Magpie had problems with bb to 43go
In general, before you run into and blame the author for something, you read books and reports, but you can, ignoramus, look directly at the penetration of Pak38 directly on the wiki so as not to disgrace yourself.
There are sources given
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pak_38
Armor penetration by a caliber armor-piercing projectile at an angle of 90° at a distance of 1000 m 51 28 51 (914 m) 61 (47[4])
Armor penetration by a sabot projectile at an angle of 90° at a distance of 500 m 81 61 (457 m) 120 (70[5][6])
↑ Zemtsov V.M. 50-mm German anti-tank gun mod. 38 (5cm PAR-38) is a quick guide to installation and operation. - Publication of the Art Academy, 1943. - S. 58. - 64 sec. - (Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army).

[Selevc]

You are a respected ignoramus and write different nonsense - but you never know what is written on Wiki, you should not blindly believe this !!! The fence also says - what of that? A 50-mm shell, in principle, cannot penetrate armor of about 100 mm and even more so 120 !!! The mass of the projectile is too small and do not speed it up - its armor penetration is growing very slightly ...

Soviet 76-mm anti-tank gun had armor penetration up to 100 mm !!! By the way, it’s also written in the same Wiki ... And even then, for a more or less equivalent match with the Tiger, a 34-mm gun was put on the T-85 since the 76-mm gun was already not enough to guarantee the penetration of the same 80-100 mm Tiger armor. ..

That is why the Germans successfully used an 34-mm gun against the T-88 and KV, and this is a completely different scenario ...

[Drummer]

Quote: Selevc

You are a respected ignoramus and write different nonsense - but you never know what is written on Wiki, you should not blindly believe this !!! The fence also says - what of that? A 50-mm shell, in principle, cannot penetrate armor of about 100 mm and even more so 120 !!! The mass of the projectile is too small and do not speed it up - its armor penetration is growing very slightly ...

The penetration depth also depends on the ratio of the density of the material of the projectile (core) and the armor; in a pzGr 40 sub-caliber grenade, its core is made of tungsten and its penetration is much higher than that of a steel shell of the same mass. By the way, initially the T-34 was to be armed with a 57 mm Zis-4 cannon, only because the Zis-4 was not ready, a 34 mm cannon was inserted into the T-76 turret, which immediately led to problems (cramped space, small air defense, high gas contamination of the combat branches).

Soviet 76-mm anti-tank gun had armor penetration up to 100 mm !!! In the same Wiki, by the way, it is also written ...

The characteristics of the Soviet 76-mm guns are far from the standard, especially since the Zis-3 was not a purely anti-tank gun, but was inferior to 57mm Zis-2 in armor penetration.

And even then, for a more or less equivalent match with the Tiger, a 34-mm gun was delivered to the T-85, since the 76-mm gun was already not enough to guarantee the penetration of the same 80-100 mm Tiger armor ...

T-34 The Tiger is not an opponent, the 85 mm cannon was put on it not for the fight against the Tigers, it was necessary to do something with medium German tanks (Pz-IV of the F2 series and higher, Panthers).

[EvilLion]

And this is already the achievement of German technologists, their medium-caliber armor held up well, although it was pricked from a groats.

There is no need to write nonsense about ZiS-4, it was put in the autumn of 41, like an anti-tank gun, it was overkill, so anti-personnel, even when they mastered its production in 43, they didn’t even put it, even 85 mm by high-explosive action turned out to be completely inadequate.

[geniy]

Few people know that the sub-caliber shells of the Second World War were reel-shaped, unlike modern feathered ones with a detachable pallet. But the reel shape has a huge aerodynamic drag and makes the projectile just somersault over long distances. therefore, a German (and Soviet, too) sub-caliber projectile could hardly penetrate armor at a distance of over 100 meters.

[Stas57]

Kindergarten, chesslovo.
I understand there is nothing to refute the report of 43 of the year, everything else is without comment.

[Alex]

Quote: Selevc

The mass of the projectile is too small and do not speed it up - its armor penetration is growing very slightly ...

You are not right. Penetration (other things being equal and unchanged) depends on the kinetic energy of the projectile, which is determined by the well-known formula (mv ^ 2) / 2. That is, an increase in speed in 2 times leads to an increase in energy in 4 times.

In practice, everything is much more complicated. The increase in speed leads to an increase in air resistance, which, in the general and simplified case, is related to the speed exponentially. Hence a very complex design dilemma: to increase speed (increasing the charge of the charge, the length and configuration of the barrel are some other tricks) or to go on a simpler way - to increase the mass of the shell (increasing the caliber of the gun). This path is also quite promising: the mass of a cylindrically-conical body is proportional to its volume, and it (while maintaining the length) is directly proportional to the square of the diameter of the body (gun caliber). In reality, the length of the projectile also grows, and at the same initial speed it gains more energy.

True, there is a third way - changing the design of the projectile: introducing various cores, changing the shape and design (projectile shells), other methods of destruction (cumulative ammunition). Which way to choose, or to what extent to use all three, depends on many factors: scientific and technological school, design decisions, possibilities of industry, availability of raw materials (the Germans, by the way, had great strains with tungsten), the general ideology of military design, and so on. other, other ...

[Drummer]

In the Finnish war, not a single HF was captured, the Finns examined and removed part of the equipment from the heavy QMS (mine) mentioned in article T-35C.

Quote: Selevc

The frontal armor of the tiger was 100 mm and could not be penetrated by the Soviet 45-ts, in principle, but the 76-mm guns also didn’t take their foreheads, but they took the board at distances of no more than 300 m ...

The Soviet magpies are a complete analogue of the German 37 mm Pak-36 / KWK-36 and do not differ from them in armor penetration (ours have more fragmentation effect), the 50 mm Pak-38 / KWK-39 is much more powerful.

And in the article, a 50-mm shell pierces 120 mm of armor !!! Is the author even familiar with the basics of physics or skipped classes?

The given thickness of the frontal armor of the T-34 reached 90 mm (taking into account the angle of inclination), nevertheless, it was penetrated by subcaliber shells of 50 mm from Pak-38 (or a similar tank KWK-39/60) at a distance of more than 1000 m. subcaliber ("reel") ammunition by the Germans in the spring-summer 42 caused a real shock and a trial at the very top - losses in tanks jumped sharply.

[Avenger711]

Yes, they simply squandered the barrel so that at least the noise from the explosion would frighten them.

[Selevc]

In the Finnish war, not a single HF was captured, the Finns examined and removed part of the equipment from the heavy QMS (mine) mentioned in article T-35C.

So it wasn’t? Have you seen the photo of the tank museum in Password? T-34 and KV-1 with crosses on the towers? So ours have not lost a single HF? - and this is in the most difficult conditions of the taiga and marshy terrain ... So in 1941, on the plains of Belarus and Russia, the KV was unreliable and in the Finnish taiga, when overcoming an excellent defense line, it was invulnerable and reliable?
Something clearly does not fit !!!

[Drummer]

One experienced KV participated in the Finnish war, nothing happened to him.

Quote: Selevc

So it wasn’t? Have you seen the photo of the tank museum in Password? T-34 and KV-1 with crosses on the towers?

Obviously, these are trophies of the war of 1941-44.

[Yemelya]

Quote: Drummer

One experienced KV participated in the Finnish war, nothing happened to him.

We managed to send several more HFs with a large tower (future HF-2).

Quote: Selevc

So it wasn’t? Have you seen the photo of the tank museum in Password? T-34 and KV-1 with crosses on the towers? So ours have not lost a single HF?

There is one KV-1 shielded, summer 1941 release, the second KV-1 with a reinforced tower, 1942 release

[Drummer]

We managed to send several more HFs with a large tower (future HF-2).

I don’t remember the details. Irincheev seemed to write that they did not participate in the battles (did not have time).

[Yemelya]

Quote: Drummer

I don’t remember the details. Irincheev seemed to write that they did not participate in the battles (did not have time).

The data is inconsistent. M. Svirin also writes that they did not have time, although one can find such quotes:

K.A. Meretskov: “When breaking through the front in the Sumy region, heavy KV tanks armed with large-caliber guns were used for the first time. Tanks passed through the area of ​​Finnish fortifications without the slightest harm to themselves, despite numerous direct hits. At our disposal was an almost invulnerable tank. From that time I fell in love with HF and always tried to have them at my disposal. ”

The commander of one of the tanks, Lieutenant Glushak, recalled the events of those days: “The fortifications of the Mannerheim Line were solid. Large granite troughs stood in three rows. To make a passage 6-8 meters wide, we had to shoot concrete-piercing shells five times. While we were clearing the bumps, the enemy fired at us quickly. We quickly discovered a bunker and crushed it with two shots. After the battle, we counted 48 traces of hits on the armor, but not a single shell pierced the armor. ”

[ruslan207]

You dear, you don’t know the topography of Belarus around the forest, and swamps

[Stas57]

Selevets, what are you arguing, funny, c. Finnish not a single HF is lost, Read Kolomiyets, about the Leningrad HF1

[Alex]

Quote: Selevc

Have you seen the photo of the tank museum in Password? T-34 and KV-1 with crosses on the towers?

These are later trophies: KV-1 was used in battles near Leningrad almost until the very end of the blockade (which was then repaired, there was also something left of the pre-war backlog). And the T-34 was certainly not used in the Winter War.

[zombirusrev]

The Germans SOLD a lot of dates to captured equipment. the forerunner Pavlov allowed them to arrange a catastrophe in the central direction. During the Finnish War, dates captured only the T-26. The rest of the samples or already during the Second World War or the Germans sold them. But the fact that we with the command in the beginning was a big mess is Yes, it was.

[Stas57]

Drummer, differ, due to violation of production technology, the 45 shells were worse, the report is in Shein’s book.

[Drummer]

With overheated tips it is not entirely clear: they were all like that or the batch was defective. The fact that the magpie and the "door knocker" have a common origin practically do not differ in design and characteristics.

[Stas57]

If only one batch ...

At least according to 42 reports, this problem has not disappeared.
The fact that they are relatives, I do not argue, but you said about armor penetration)))

[Alex]

Quote: Stas57

but you said about armor penetration)))

Passport and real armor penetration, unfortunately, are not always the same. And defeat tables are often simply calculated from bench tests based on reduced gunpowder mounts that mimic the increase in distance. Not entirely correct, but such is the practice of that time in all countries of the world (as it is now, not in the know, maybe that has changed).

[timeout]

Quote: Drummer

The reduced thickness of the T-34 frontal armor reached 90 mm (taking into account the angle of inclination), nevertheless, it was pierced by 50 mm subcaliber shells from Pak-38

Dear, the sub-caliber projectile in all calibers was called PzGr 40, only in the year 42 for the Pak-38 they were no longer manufactured, released mainly for large calibers. And released in the year 42 of these shells for example for PaK-40 only 7 thousand. And in the years 44-45, not one single-caliber projectile was released! To destroy one T-34, up to 6 PzGr 40 shells from the Pak-38 went, and only 5 of them were included in the VET ammunition!

[EvilLion]

Where is 90 mm? 60 maximum. The core of the sub-caliber could simply crumble into dust after breaking, therefore they switched to 75 mm, make a hole a little, you also need to shave something inside.

[geniy]

You correctly noted that the reduced thickness of the inclined armor of the T-34 = 90 mm. But do not take into account the fact that in a real battle any tank does not necessarily stand at an angle of 90 degrees to the enemy. In principle, this can be any angle - from 0 to 90. And then the reduced thickness of the T-34 armor can be from 150 to 100 mm.
Few people know that the sub-caliber shells of the Second World War were reel-shaped, unlike modern feathered ones with a detachable pallet. But the reel shape has a huge aerodynamic drag and makes the projectile just somersault over long distances. therefore, a German (and Soviet, too) sub-caliber projectile could hardly penetrate armor at a distance of over 100 meters.
Although the German sub-caliber shells did indeed penetrate the armor of Soviet medium tanks, it probably happened in favorable conditions for the Germans - when Soviet tanks were approaching very close to German positions, and it was also likely that when a German tank was knocked out, a German cannon disguised itself immediately this itself, and immediately destroyed by other Soviet tanks in this attack.

[Alex]

Quote: Selevc

Recently, for some reason everywhere they write that the Germans did not know about the T-34 and KV before the attack on the USSR ... Well, I really doubt it !!! How did they not know if before this the USSR actively used KV tanks in the Finnish War and some of them were even captured by the Finns - and so that the Germans did not know about it? Well, I can’t believe it at all !!!

In the Winter War, the T-100, SMK and KV tanks were used in combat in quantities of one each - front-line tests of experimental samples. So forget about the plural: only the QMS was knocked out and not evacuated, which the Finns, for some reason, did not thoroughly study. In any case, EMNIP, after the war, the QMS stood practically where it remained. By the way, all the manhole covers were also in place (this is about the myth of a non-armored cover). But why the Finns did not inform the Germans about such a wonder, for some reason they never wrote. You see, not so cloudless relations were between the allies.

[wulf66]

"The author is Alexey Isaev - the author of many books on the history of the Second World War." Judas Rezun also sprinkled many libels and also calls himself a writer and historian.

[Avenger711]

Isaev is the author of "Antisuvorov". Learn materiel.

[Stas57]

In general, I am delighted by some screaming commentators who managed to pour mud on the author, although all the questions about the application of 88, penetration of the T34, the use of the Kv tank have already been sucked a thousand times according to Soviet and German documents,
We read Shein and Ulanov, Kolomiyets, Svirin and so on. There are reports there, with the details of the tanks, the nature of the damage, the reasons for the loss of equipment in the summer of 41, for the reader on the topic, Isaev did not say anything new.
I am ashamed not to know the history of my country, ashamed.

[maxvet]

Quote: Stas57

Isaev said nothing new

I agree, it’s just easier to read, and more accessible (in terms of bookshelves)

[Stas57]

But some ignoramuses who have not even read the Baryatinsky topic have a break in the template.
It is bitter to watch.

The article is for the poppie, and it is written in simple language, and the point is that there is no miracle weapon if you do not have an emergency weapon, and a third of the brigade are illiterate, even though you give 90, it still will not help.
What we have in 41, that the Germans have their super tanks at the end of the war, there is still a stronger crowbar.

[AK-74-1]

I liked the article. But the author is very one-sided considering the situation. Firstly, the first hours and the surprise of the attack were not taken into account. Secondly, the circumstances of internal degradation of command and communications (combat and non-combat losses of officers, the destruction of communications centers and rear institutions) were not taken into account. Thirdly, the work of aviation is not taken into account as a means of reconnaissance and attack. The same Kolobanov battle is evidence of the competent actions of the Russian wars and the degradation of the military command of the Nazis, which led to huge losses. Surprise is a decisive means.

[maxvet]

Quote: AK-74-1

the first hours and the suddenness of the attack are not taken into account

Read the same Isaev and Drabkin "June 22 Black Day of the Calendar", there are a lot of interesting things

[AK-74-1]

The fact is that hostilities are not specifically tank platoons or companies in the field, but primarily interaction and an hourly comparison table should be made where the actions of the parties would be described. To talk about a single battle or about one part is not to say about anything. That is, we see a seemingly situation that the T-34 Lavrinenko has smashed 52 tanks, and in another situation we see how a certain Hartman has smashed 300 aircraft. Isaev wrote correctly, but one-sidedly. It seems he didn't lie, but he threw a piece of shit. Well, liberoids are forgivable. I personally liked Pokryshkin's memoirs. It gives a full layout, up to the height and results of the work of ground services. I heard a lot about "Black Calendar Day" and tried to analyze it. But it is written in such a way that it is completely unclear who acted how. But it is impossible to consider the actions of "Brandenburg" in isolation from the Wehrmacht and the actions of the units of the USSR.

[maxvet]

Quote: AK-74-1

I heard a lot about "Black Calendar Day" and tried to analyze it. But it is written in such a way that it is completely unclear who acted how. But it is impossible to consider the actions of "Brandenburg" in isolation from the Wehrmacht and the actions of the units of the USSR.

There the atmosphere of the first day is transmitted very well

[ruslan207]

The article delusional Germans in the early days of the war had air supremacy. Junkers could destroy our tank columns effectively from the air.

[Avenger711]

Sorry, but you just blurted out nonsense. I'm not even talking about the insignificance of the number of "laptezhniki" and the overwhelming superiority of the USSR Air Force in the early days.

[ruslan207]

A comrade why he shot himself in the Air Force Commander because he could not give an order to his falcons, the airfields were destroyed with airplanes and the Lappetniks were a symbol of the blitzkrieg

[zmey_gadukin]

Quote: Avenger711

but you just blundered nonsense

this is nonsense:

Quote: Avenger711

the overwhelming superiority of the USSR Air Force in the early days.

[zombirusrev]

Someone Medinsky :) says that in the first days of the war the Germans had the biggest losses FOR THE DAY up to the moment of the seizure of air power by the Soviet Air Force. I myself didn’t know this, but because our air bosses in every possible way counteracted the introduction of radio communications (I'm not talking about encryption), it was not possible to come up with different flags or check the banners, even if we were on airplanes, it was not possible to call them or redirect them in the air.

[olviko]

"The real story is terribly far from the legends and tales of the miracle technology"



“Another event hit us like a ton of bricks: for the first time, Russian T-34 tanks appeared! The amazement was complete. How could it happen that up there, they did not know about the existence of this excellent tank? T-34 with its good armor, perfect shape and the magnificent 76.2-mm long-barreled gun thrilled everyone, and all German tankers were afraid of it until the end of the war. " Our most dangerous adversaries in Russia were the T-34 and T-34-85 tanks, which were equipped with long-barreled 76,2 and 85 mm cannons. These tanks posed a danger to us already at a distance of 600 meters from the front, 1500 meters from the sides and 1800 meters from the rear. "The commander of the 2nd company of the 502nd battalion of heavy tanks, Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Oberleutenant Oberleutenant Otto Carius

"
"Those who had already fought were still under the terrible impression of the Russian T-34 tanks." Commander of the 14th Army. Knight's Cross Knight General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin.

"


Now I will focus on the Russian tank troops, which entered the war, having a great advantage - they had a T-34 tank, much superior to any type of German tanks ....
Russian tank designers knew their job well. They focused all their attention on the main thing: the power of a tank gun, armor protection and cross-country ability. During the war, their suspension system was much better than in German tanks and tanks of other Western powers ... "General F. Mellentin. Chief of Staff of the 5th Panzer Army.

"

... the Russians, having created an extremely successful and completely new type of tank, made a great leap forward in the field of tank building. "Lieutenant General Engineer Erich Schneider

"
"The Soviet T-34 tank, which had great maneuverability and maneuverability, proved to be surprisingly good. The T-34 tank was reliable everywhere on any terrain. Russian tanks could operate where, according to our standards, it was considered impossible. The armament of the T-34 tank was also exceptional. effective. For the Soviet infantry, he was an excellent path-maker and a very effective means of support. " ... General Oberst Hans Friesner, commander of Army Group South Ukraine.

"
"October 6 ... For the first time the superiority of the Russian T-34 tanks manifested itself in a decisive form. The division suffered significant losses.

...

Particularly disappointing were the reports we received about the actions of Russian tanks, and most importantly, about their new tactics. Our anti-tank weapons of that time could successfully operate against T-34 tanks only under particularly favorable conditions. For example, our tank IV with its 75 mm short barrel. the cannon had the ability to destroy the T-34 tank only from the back, hitting its motor through the blinds. This required a lot of art. General of the tank forces Heinz Guderian.

And the best commentary on the article is the story itself. After all, it was not the Germans on their Tigers that rode through the cobblestones of Red Square, but our T-34s, KV and IS triumphantly entered the Brandenburg Gate.
...

...



.

"

...

[Drummer]

Quote: olviko

And the best commentary on the article is the story itself. After all, it was not the Germans on their Tigers that rode through the cobblestones of Red Square, but our T-34s, KV and IS triumphantly entered the Brandenburg Gate.

Entered there is far from the T-34 model of 40 years, and even more so not KV.

[zmey_gadukin]

Quote: Drummer

Entered there is far from the T-34 model of 40 years, and even more so not KV.

progress does not stand still, and progress in wartime is taking leaps and bounds.
at 45, the Germans also did not fight in PZ-1

[zombirusrev]

The problems of the T-34 are the general indifference of the tank authorities. Those. formally, a good tank, not a radio station, not a command tower (surveillance devices) .... well, the generals didn’t have enough time to ride the T-34 during the exercises. on this occasion there is a good book by Yu.I. Mukhina "If not for the generals." In there, the topic is grasped well. Those. He didn’t have tanks and planes, but in generals. Our generals are all professionals, only wartime generals are professionals to take warm places and knock out stars, then wartime generals like Rokossovsky and Gorbatov are wartime generals. Those. Until this change took place, everything was okay.

[Gari]

Quote: olviko

And the best commentary on the article is the story itself. After all, it was not the Germans on their Tigers that rode through the cobblestones of Red Square, but our T-34s, KV and IS triumphantly entered the Brandenburg Gate.

[solomon]

Interesting photo. On the starboard side of the T-34-85, a counter "faustpatron" new screen is visible.

[sergey158-29]

The right question! But if this 1000 miracle tanks had not been spread from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but brought into several shock tank groups ... but, history does not tolerate subjunctive ...

[spd2001]

When the Red Army became steeled in countless battles, then the weapon in its hands became a miracle. "Miracle" of the Wehrmacht technique 1944-45. did not work any miracle. The result is the Banner of Victory over the Reichstag.

[solomon]

In my opinion, the author, citing negative examples of the beginning of the Second World War, wanted to make a sensation. And so, just a thickening of colors and biased conclusions.

[xomaNN]

It rests on the obvious anyway - frames decide everything! Poorly trained tankmen + nervous commanders incompetence + crude (because new and technologically unworked) equipment didn’t give in 41 even 50% of the KV and T-34.

[unknown]

On the issue of "renegades"

Official science could not contrast anything with Rezun’s books.
The events of the initial period of the war, when the Red Army suffered a catastrophic defeat in terms of the number of personnel, the number of military equipment and the quality of its quality, having lost almost all equipment and about 4 million prisoners, including dozens of generals, by the end of the year, the Soviet and Russian official historical science prefers not to study, but to replace it with various nonsense.

That is why Rezun received such recognition. He only filled the vacuum created by the officials themselves.
Of course, his judgments and conclusions are not undeniable.
But at least his pro-English position is understandable.
But, no one could argue with him, arguably, without emotions.
The only worthy official book is Meltyukhov's monograph "Stalin's Lost Chance", in which the author recognizes the superiority in numbers, and the mobilization that began before the war, and "The Thunderstorm".
There are other worthy authors: Bunich "Operation Thunderstorm", Beshanov "Tank pogrom", Solonin, but they have nothing to do with official science.

[slava_sherb]

I agree, but about the pro-English position is unlikely

[unknown]

What are the negative examples?

The army is larger
Techniques more at times
Quality is not worse
Mobilization began before the war

But in the end?
Catastrophic rout:
by the end of 41 years, 4 mln. prisoners, including dozens of senior officers
Almost all pre-war equipment and weapons are lost
Huge territory left

And the almost deathly silence of official science
It is not surprising that Rezun’s books were received with a bang, even in his explicit pro-English position
Themselves to blame.
The only decent answer is
Meltyukhov's monograph "Stalin's Lost Chance" (in which, by the way, the presence of "The Storm" is recognized)

Other worthy authors: Bunich (operation "Thunderstorm"), Beshanov ("Tank pogrom of 1941"), Solonin, who investigated the causes of the disaster in 1941, have nothing to do with official historical science.

[Setrac]

Quote: ignoto

The army is larger

On the western border of the USSR, the Wehrmacht with its allies exceeded the Red Army by one and a half times, the enemy had a numerical advantage.

Quote: ignoto

Techniques more at times

This is also a lie.

Quote: ignoto

Quality is not worse

There, too, where the "technique at times".

Quote: ignoto

Catastrophic defeat

The catastrophe did not happen, the USSR won.

Quote: ignoto

the end of 41 years-4 mln. prisoners, including dozens of senior officers

At the beginning of the war in the western direction, the USSR had an army of 3.2 million people, even the delivant can see that the number of 4 million prisoners is very high, apparently those who were stolen in Germany were taken as prisoners.

[geniy]

You don’t understand a damn thing on all counts, but especially on the latter, comparing 3,2 million prisoners available as of June 22 and 4 million prisoners as of December 31, 1941. Therefore, although although the number of troops at the beginning really was also there, immediately from the first days of the war mass mobilization began and the number of new soldiers was constantly added and most of them were captured.

[Setrac]

Quote: geniy

and most of them were captured.

And who then stopped the Wehrmacht?
Before you write on the dates you admire.

[sdv68]

Quote: ignoto

The army is larger

Wehrmacht with more than 7 million. The Red Army a little more than 5 million (and even distributed throughout the USSR). Is it time to go to school?

Read Meltyukhov's biography first before referring to such "authorities".

[geniy]

But the Wehrmacht fought not only with the Soviet Union. The mass of German troops was also spread throughout Europe, including in Africa and Greece, not to mention France, Norway, etc.

[Setrac]

Quote: geniy

But the Wehrmacht fought not only with the Soviet Union. The mass of German troops was also spread throughout Europe, including in Africa and Greece, not to mention France, Norway, etc.

Why all these tricks? At the time of the beginning of World War II, 5.5 million Wehrmacht fighters with satellites were concentrated near the western border of the USSR against 3.2 million Red Army fighters. And all the main participants in the hostilities and the Third Reich and the USSR and the USA and Japan had other fronts.

[Ivanovich47]

Wehrmacht soldiers can evaluate our tanks for justice. Here is the opinion of the famous German tank commander of the 2 company of the 502 battalion of heavy tanks of the cavalier of the Knight's Cross with oak leaves of the Oberleutenant Otto Carius. It seems that this opinion is quite authoritative. He began the war in June 1941 ordinary soldier loading on the tank Pz.Kpfw. And the knights' crosses were not given to German tankers for trifles:
The first Russian tanks appeared T-34! The amazement was complete. How could it turn out that up there, they did not know about the existence of this excellent tank? The T-34, with its good armor, perfect shape and magnificent 76.2-mm long-barreled gun, thrilled everyone, and all German tankers were afraid of him until the end of the war.
And more:
Our most dangerous adversaries in Russia were the T-34 and T-34-85 tanks, which were equipped with long-barreled 76,2 and 85 mm cannons. These tanks were already dangerous for us at a distance of 600 meters from the front, 1500 meters from the sides and 1800 meters from the rear. If we got into such a tank, we could destroy it from 900 meters of our 88-mm. cannon. The Joseph Stalin tank, which we met in 1944, was at least equal to a tiger. He was a big winner in terms of form (as did the T-34). "

[Snoop]

So much noise))) What leads Isaev really has long been chewed by many. It is strange that BTT lovers do not know this. Miracle weapons were not and never will be, that’s the whole story. Many T-34-76, KV-1 were thrown during the retreat in view of the fact that they failed. Read Drabkin. Books with tanker memories. T-34-76 sample 40, 41 years. was unreliable, a march of 100-200 km. one hundred percent failure of the transmission or engine. The KV-1 was equally unreliable. Plus, insufficient development of new technology by crews. The Germans opposed these tanks with good cooperation between the military branches, but we had problems with this.

[Stas57]

I allow myself a brief conclusion from reading the literature on the subject.
Sorry, from the tablet, because the links later.
Regarding the pack.5Yes, the pack37 had problems with t34, but this does not mean that it was not vulnerable. At real combat distances, the T34 was struck in a lateral projection, yes, it required some effort, but there is one more point, when firing the 45 armor it did not break through, but the shell knocked out the cork, hitting the crew with fragments of the inside of the armor.
The data is in any serious book on t34, in particular by Shein and Ulanov.

Ref 88
88 anti-aircraft gun, in the vast majority of cases it was attached TD or PD in the tank direction, so a small one. their number was not reflected in the application, the Germans could choose.
I repeat, in addition to everything in the TDK and RGK there were 10cm guns that confidently hit any Soviet tank at a range of more than 1km, but heavy 10cm howitzers had medium characteristics.
But, even if these types of guns were not available, the anti-tankers coped with the task, with a creak, but coped, using the blindness of the 34, they let them get closer and hit the sides.
Again in TD and tanks were not rarely used together, having art and air cover forced us to use equipment on unfavorable conditions, cutting off the rear and infantry,
Not to mention the problems of new tanks, crews and commanders.

regarding t34
t34-76 and t34-85 are not the same tank, as mentioned above, and most importantly! these are different crews, with different levels of technical knowledge. they are different commanders, although they are the same people, they are different armies, even though the country is one.
I think our soldier of the 45 model of the year, would have torn the Germans in 41 even on t26 and in a couple of months,))

regarding a common problem41
as noted above, the systemic problems of the outbreak of war were superimposed on one another — new equipment with childhood illnesses and new crews that knew their weapons, were ahead of schedule and deployed. the weakness of the rear, the new tactics of the enemy and the loss of initiative by us, etc., and so on and so on.
All in total, I repeat, did not give advantages to our side, despite the fact that we had miracle tanks, but could not apply them properly.

for the concept of the whole 41 problem. I advise you to read a lot, I myself did not fully understand, however. to start--
Isaev-boilers 41
Shein and Ulanov-Order in the tank forces

[Yemelya]

Quote: Stas57

for the concept of the whole problem 41. I advise you to read a lot, I myself did not fully understand

To understand the losses of the Soviet BTT in 1941, I advise you to explore the topic of restoring wrecked armored vehicles in the conditions of advance / retreat.

This will largely explain where thousands of Soviet pre-war tanks disappeared and why "Tigers", "Panthers", etc. did not save Germany.

[maxvet]

Quote: Emelya

This will largely explain where thousands of Soviet pre-war tanks disappeared and why "Tigers", "Panthers", etc. did not save Germany.

Tanks cannot save, a tank is an integral part of the Stas57 army, by a soldier of model 45, he meant an army of model 45 years (structurally, psychologically, and of course experience)

[maxvet]

Quote: Stas57

I think our soldier of the 45 model of the year, would have torn the Germans in 41 even on t26 and in a couple of months,))

if the rules allowed 10 "pluses" for this alone. I absolutely completely agree with you !!!!!! In principle, Baryatinsky writes about this and writes that our T26 and BT5-7, if used correctly, could fight on equal terms with all Germans (except m4-and with him almost equal)

[Drummer]

Quote: maxvet

if the rules allowed 10 "pluses" for one.

IMHO, the opposite is true. Positive changes in 1943-45 more related to the optimization of OSH and the saturation of new technology, while the level of training of personnel during the war only fell (all participants write about this).

Quote: maxvet

In principle, Baryatinsky writes about this and that our T26 and BT5-7 could, with proper use, fight on equal terms with all Germans (except for the T4-a and almost equal with it)

Most of the BT and T-26 did not reach a meeting with German tanks - they were controlled by German infantry and anti-tankers. There are no miracles, compare the protection of BT / T-26 and Pz-III / IV from the fire of standard anti-tank weapons and everything will fall into place (there is no question about the gun). We must pay tribute to the Soviet tankers who went into battle on these coffins.

[Mark III]

For the first time I read that the T-34 is a "miracle weapon". It is believed that the T-34 is a legendary tank. And legendary because he reached Berlin and won. Moreover, he became the `parent 'of armored vehicles up to the T-90.

[yur20100]

you feel the hand of the liberalist who wrote this article

[Des10]

More than the article was pleased with the comments, especially Rezun's clever opponents.
And the article is a plus. At least some attempt to explain the losses in the initial period of the war.

[7ydmco]

The dominance of German aviation, also made a significant contribution to our losses in tanks.

[bubble82009]

Well, the Nazis could not write about the T-34 taking them for BT-7 or T-26. the shape of the tower is almost the same in the distance. Well, the technique itself is just iron. you still need to be able to fight on it. Wehrmacht tankers on their tanks have long traveled and knew far and wide. and our village boys T_34 and KV only mastered. and even because of the carelessness of the rear, it was necessary to shoot fragmentation shells at the enemy tanks. lacked armor-piercing shells.

[papik09]

Quote: Emelya

Quote: ShadowCat

In mm in the USSR and in my opinion France, in Germany in cm, and in Britain just in inches.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, too, it seems, in inches.

In pre-commercial Russia in lines, not in inches (line - 1/10 of an inch)

[Yemelya]

Quote: papik09

In pre-commercial Russia in lines, not in inches (line - 1/10 of an inch)

Small arms caliber, clear stump, in lines (for convenience), art. guns in inches - 3x-6-inch, etc.

[Tver]

Almost none of the "experts" remembered aviation! Or the article was discussed by artillery tankers? German "pieces" shredded our tanks, perhaps more than all the tankers and gunners put together. At 41, the overwhelming superiority of the Luftwaffe ensured victories throughout Europe.

[Lopatov]

Quote: Tver

German "pieces" shredded our tanks, perhaps more than all the tankers and gunners put together.

?
You are very confusing something. "Experts", unlike you, know that the share of aviation is 4-5%

[Kars]

Quote: Spade

You are very confusing something. "Experts", unlike you, know that the share of aviation is 4-5%

To this does not hinder to add losses from depleted vehicles with fuel and supplies for the same tanks. And the weakness of the air defense, especially mobile, which allowed to storm the supply columns is almost unpunished.

[Lopatov]

Do you have numbers for abandoned vehicles? Interest?

[Kars]

Quote: Spade

Do you have numbers on abandoned vehicles? Interest?

Somewhere there is Ulanov. And they will not be small. It will only be difficult to distribute. But I hope you will not deny attacks on the supply columns and their effectiveness by German aviation? Well, or to whom do you count if the aviation destroys the steam engine that the T-34 was carrying, and the composition of the German infantry unit capture?
About more air strikes on the railway nodes, there is also fuel and ammunition (in principle, there were very few spare parts) for tanks.

[Drummer]

Well, let's say not 5%, but 10%. All the same, this does not give grounds to assert that "the pieces have smashed the tanks, perhaps more than all the tankers and artillerymen combined."

[Stas57]

Well, Rudel’s guy read it, it happens ...

[Kars]

Quote: Drummer

All the same, this does not give grounds to assert that "the pieces have smashed the tanks, maybe all the tankers and artillerymen combined."

I would not share at all, everything needs to be considered in a complex.

[Lopatov]

This is not serious. Let's calculate how many tanks the Red Army missed because of the evacuation of Kharkov, the blockade of Leningrad and the termination of the work of Stalingrad, and we attribute all this to the "merit" of German tanks, as the main striking force of the blitzkrieg.

Yes, they started keeping statistics only in 1943. When they came to their senses. But the largest number of Soviet tanks until 1942 suffered from the "long" 50-mm cannon. If I am not mistaken, about 50%

[Kars]

_______ only I don’t know the aircraft stopped him, but such cases could well be.

[olviko]

The author of the article confused God's gift with scrambled eggs. One thing is insufficient training of crews, poor material and technical and repair services, another is tactical and technical characteristics of the T-34. Compare the reasoning of the armchair "expert" with the opinion of those who experienced the power of this "legend"
"A large number of Russian T-34 tanks were thrown into the battle, causing great losses to our tanks. The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which had taken place so far, has now been lost and now passed to the enemy. Thus, the prospects for quick and continuous success have disappeared. I wrote about this new situation for us in my report to the command of the Army Group, in which I described in detail the advantage of the T-34 tank over our IV tank, indicating the need to change the design of our tanks in the future. I ended my report with a proposal to send it immediately. a commission on our front, which should include representatives from the armaments department, from the ministry of armaments, tank designers and representatives of tank-building firms.Together with this commission, we were supposed to inspect the tanks knocked out on the battlefield and discuss the design of new tanks. demanded to speed up the production of larger anti-tank guns capable of penetrating the armor of the T-34 tank ... Prominent designers, industrialists and officers of the armament department came to my tank army to get acquainted with the Russian T-34 tank, which was superior to our combat vehicles; on the spot, they wanted to understand and outline, based on the experience gained in the conduct of hostilities, measures that would help us again achieve technical superiority over the Russians. The proposals of the front-line officers to produce exactly the same tanks as the T-34, in order to correct the extremely unfavorable situation of the German armored forces in the shortest possible time, did not meet with any support from the designers. The designers were embarrassed, by the way, not with aversion to imitation, but the impossibility of producing the most important parts of the T-34, especially the aluminum diesel engine, with the required speed. In addition, our alloy steel, the quality of which was reduced by the lack of the necessary raw materials, was also inferior to the alloy steel of the Russians. It was decided to make up for this shortcoming as follows: to release the previously developed design of the "Tiger" tank weighing almost 60 tons and, in addition, to design a lighter type of tank weighing 35-45 tons, which was later dubbed the "Panther". general of tank forces Heinz Guderian
"We will open the German Memorandum on the fighting of the company of heavy Tiger tanks (Merkblatt 47a / 29 von 20 Mai 1943). The main task in battle for the Tigers was ... the destruction of Soviet T-34 tanks! Moreover, the crews of the Tigers were also prescribed each disabled if possible, detonate the thirty-four with the help of explosive charges transported inside the Tiger "Looks like the thirty-fours were badly annoyed by the Fritz, since each of them was to become a personal target of the Tiger. Moreover, in order to destroy them for sure, the crews were assigned a sapper task.




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[Stas57]

The author of the article confused God's gift with scrambled eggs. One thing is insufficient training of crews, poor material and technical and repair services, another is tactical and technical characteristics of the T-34. Compare the reasoning of the armchair "expert" with the opinion of those who experienced the power of this "legend"

why is there an opinion, forgive me for the political too .. like Heinz, whether he was talking about "an example of a backward Bolshevik technology"
and as the tail was pinched, the general was immediately to blame frost general dirt new super tanks, though for some reason only in October, he didn’t see them in a lot.
memoirs, they are such memoirs .....

[olviko]

Okay, let’s leave Guderian. But here is what the German historian, former Wehrmacht officer Werner Haupt, writes today:

"Among the enemy’s tanks were also completely unknown to the Germans, excellent in their maneuverability and combat power T-34 tanks, against which at that moment all anti-tank weapons were powerless."
The famous German military historian Major General B. Müller-Gilebrandt, whose book "The German Land Army 1933-1945" is recognized in the world historical circulation as the most authoritative and most objective encyclopedia of the Wehrmacht, comes to the conclusion that the significance of the T-34 tank in the war comes out far beyond the outstanding technical characteristics of the armored vehicle.
“By the beginning of the campaign, the Red Army had received a new T-34 tank, to which the German ground forces could not oppose either an equivalent tank or a corresponding defensive means. The appearance of the T-34 tank was an unpleasant surprise, since it was due to its speed, high maneuverability, armor protection, armament and mainly the presence of an elongated 76-mm cannon with increased accuracy and penetration of projectiles at a long, hitherto unattainable distance, was a completely new type of tank weapon. The appearance of T-34 tanks radically changed the tactics of tank operations. If until now certain requirements were imposed on the design of the tank and its armament, in particular to suppress the infantry and the means supporting the infantry, now the main task was the requirement to hit enemy tanks at the maximum distance in order to create preconditions for subsequent success in battle. In this At the same time, new tank designs appeared, on the basis of which tanks of types V ("Panther") and VI ("Tiger") were later introduced.
I would like to note that of all the quoted German officers and generals, there is not one who wrote his own lines, being in Soviet captivity, living under the supervision of the staff in the GDR or experiencing fears for their lives in other places. Nobody pulled their tongue. In general, they write about the battles of the Wehrmacht in excellent tone and do not hide their antipathies to the USSR. But obviously the outstanding qualities of the thirty-four in comparison with the German and Allied tanks were so obvious that it was simply impossible not to mention it. No other model of Soviet military equipment has received such close attention of German memoirists, and not a single report of the Aberdeen training ground on testing samples of Soviet weapons has been quoted by our Russophobic democrats so often. Do you hope that you will be able to shut up, wipe the opinions of those for whom during the war years the T-34 was a constant nightmare?

[Drummer]

Compare the losses in the tanks of the USSR and Germany, then we'll talk about what and for whom it was a nightmare.

[olviko]

I don’t know about you, dear, but personally I don’t have any arguments against, cited in earlier posts, estimates expressed by German military officers and generals who are familiar with this problem, as I understand it, not from movies and articles.

[zmey_gadukin]

Yes, and capture the 34-ku and use against ours, the Germans were not fools either ...
They knew a lot about good tanks.

[Lopatov]

This is not an indicator. Do you know how many Churchills were in our troops, which even their own tankers did not really like, and Churchill himself said that "this tank has more flaws than me"? How many "Shermans", which the British called "Rollson Lighter" and the Germans called "British Frying Pan"?

[Rico1977]

I’m guessing that such a fishing rod as Isaev wrote all these stupid books of the 90s about the war. Isaev - most of our tanks were either destroyed from the air, or destroyed by crews due to lack of shells and fuel. But not in battle. Such historians need to be hung up in columns for Faberge, and not his insane books should be published

[Stas57]

Are you not a practicing solubist?
they all abandoned it, and went to give up.
In reality, the photo from the damaged 41 summer equipment is enough, as well as the combat episodes of the collision with our tanks.

[Vadim117]

guys, do not forget that until the 43rd year, German aircraft did what they wanted in the air! The Junkers attack aircraft burned our tanks, as well as all the ground units in batches! Yes, and German optical instruments Karl Zeiss were much better than ours, which is sad!

[Sergl]

While the Wehrmacht was advancing on all fronts - the command did not pay much attention to the individual successes of the Red Army and the features of new tanks. When, for a number of reasons, the German offensive stalled - then the search for the guilty party in the camp of the enemy begins, clouds of tanks appear in the reports, well, frost, how could it be without them.

[oracul]

From the article an unpleasant aftertaste. Firstly, the T-34 was recognized as the best medium tank not by the results of 1941, but by the entire war. Secondly, the beginning of the war was marked, first of all, by the failure of the generals and many unit commanders, who forgot that they were responsible for the direct preparation of soldiers for military operations, and not Stalin, to whom many pseudo-historians and haters of Soviet power. Now it’s not just known, but it’s proved that we had more modern technology than the Germans, i.e. industry gave the army what it promised, but the training of officers and soldiers left much to be desired. Not for nothing that Stalin wanted to understand shortly before his death the reasons why in most districts the directive to bring troops into full combat readiness, which was sent a few days before June 22, was not implemented.