Right to Ukraine
The meeting in Donetsk on Monday of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and the Donetsk and Lugansk republics ended with the achievement of a temporary truce - until June 27. And on Tuesday morning, on the eve of his departure for Vienna, the Russian president turned to the Federation Council with a request to cancel the decision allowing the supreme commander-in-chief to use Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine. The Kremlin explained that this was "in order to normalize the situation and resolve the situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine, as well as in connection with the start of trilateral negotiations on this issue."
“My letter is connected with the fact that my request to give such permission was related during the events in the Crimea,” Putin said at a press conference in Vienna on Tuesday evening. - We used our armed formations in order to guarantee the freedom of expression among the Crimeans. The combat use of Russian forces in the Crimea did not take place, and thank God. "
The cancellation of the permission to use the army that had been in effect for almost four months was a new stage in Russia's struggle for Ukraine - just like the attempt to organize peace talks between Kiev and Donetsk. Putin’s peace plan may break at any moment - this does not mean that one should not try to implement it. What is it essentially?
In the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis so that the United States lost the opportunity to gain a foothold in Ukraine, turning it into an anti-Russian springboard. The civil war in Ukraine was the result of the coming to power of pro-American forces in late February, aimed at quickly and irrevocably separating Ukraine from Russia and its atlantisation. All Putin’s actions after 22 in February, when President Yanukovych was overthrown, are subordinate to the solution of this particular problem. Permission to use the troops was received by them on March 1, a few days before it became clear that the Crimea was leaving for Russia (that is, it was also necessary in case the withdrawal of the Crimea would cause armed resistance of the Ukrainian army and would require open participation of Russian troops in the conflict). The annexation of the Crimea was only an element of the struggle for Ukraine. It clearly demonstrated to the West that Russia would not silently watch the abduction of a part of the Russian world, which, by the tragic accident of 1991, turned out to be separated.
And if at first, the United States and Europe were convinced that the western vector of the Ukrainian path was guaranteed by the forces that came to power in Kiev, then after the Crimea and the sword of Damocles in the form of the Russian army, their optimism diminished significantly. Moreover, the West unanimously acknowledged that it would not fight for Ukraine against Russia and would not provide it with any serious military assistance.
But Moscow did not want to fight with Ukraine. We had to achieve a change in the course of Kiev without military intervention, without the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics taking part in a war with the Russians on the other side of the border. This can be done only by force pressure - using all its forms. Military, economic, political, informational. The Ukrainian political elite had to make sure that the price of the continuation of the pro-Western policy would be the collapse of the country - and in four months it was almost brought to the recognition of this fact.
The uprising in Novorossia was a response to the capture of Kiev by pro-Western forces and the annexation of the Crimea to Russia. At the same time, the scale of resistance in the east of Ukraine turned out to be insufficient for organizing a second, alternative center of power, creating another, pro-Russian, Ukraine on the move (everyone knows that the Russians are slowly harnessed). The local authorities were weak and pro-oligarchic, the repressions from Kiev were able to finally crush the incipient ferment. Only unofficial support from Russia helped the pro-Russian, anti-oligarchic movement in Donetsk and Lugansk to begin and strengthen and begin real resistance.
It is foolish to talk about Russia's intervention or artificially provoking an uprising. The Russian people cannot be separated by an artificial border, just as it is impossible to refuse help to the brothers, over whom a potential threat hangs, the scale of which they are not yet aware of and quickly organize a repulse which they themselves are not able to. Informal assistance to Russia has increased over the past three months - and led to the fact that the militia and volunteers have stood against the attacks of the Ukrainian army. The recognition that it is impossible to physically suppress the uprising and that negotiations need to be conducted is what Russia has been demanding from Kiev and the West for the past two months. And the right to use the army was one of the important arguments that supported our demands. There are two reasons for Putin’s failure to take advantage of them.
The first was to strengthen the resistance in the east of Ukraine. Now it plays the role of a weight that does not allow Ukraine to the West - it is simply not necessary to use the regular army instead. Russia actually brought an army to Ukraine, an army of resistance — or rather, it was introduced by the Russian people, to separate Putin from which there are no grounds.
Secondly, the introduction of regular troops would have made it impossible for Russia to attempt to split the western front, which the United States is building against us. Demonstrating the desire to agree on the future of Ukraine at the negotiating table, Russia is strengthening those forces in Europe that have been restraining the pressure of the Anglo-Saxons all these months, demanding tougher sanctions and in fact breaking ties with Russia. Ukraine’s return to our orbit should take place without breaking ties with Europe - moreover, it can become a tool that will allow us to weaken the EU's peg to the United States, which fully meets our national interests.
The third - and most importantly - the introduction of troops into the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics now does not solve the main question for Russia: what to do with the rest of Ukraine. If it were just about the accession to Russia of the DPR and the LPR (or their quasi-independence), the troops would have stood on the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region for a long time: Putin is also not easy to look at the Slavyansk bombings. But this would mean the actual division of Ukraine and the loss of chances for its reformatting and reorienting. No, the American troops would not have entered Kiev — but, by separating Novorossia, we would have lost the opportunity to directly influence the development of the internal Ukrainian crisis. And as the economic situation deteriorates (the European integration norms will begin to operate in the autumn, the final agreement is scheduled to be signed on June 27 - they were introduced today by the introduction of economic suicide in Ukraine), and the domestic political struggle will go on increasing.
In the event that Ukraine remains formally united and talks about its future structure (actually confederative), against the background of the crisis and falling living standards, more and more regions of the south and east will drift towards Novorossia. At first, ideologically, and then politically, and then already the demand for a neutral, federative Ukraine will be taken by the majority of the residents of the Square as a matter of course.
Of course, the main struggle for Ukraine will be at the geopolitical level - but a lot will depend on the speed and quality of the internal Ukrainian processes. Alas, it is much more difficult to turn Ukraine toward Russia with the help of our army than with the help of the most bitter, but true medicine — famine. Hunger, which dooms Ukraine collapse of its statehood and economy, caused by the anti-Russian policy of its rulers.
The combination of all three factors was the reason why the decision of the Federation Council of March 1 was not used by Putin. But it became historical - the “Russian spring” began with it, the gathering of the Russian world and the open resistance to Anglo-Saxon globalism began on all fronts. This resistance takes the most different forms, the most different methods are used. Now it is the turn of the diplomatic game of coercion to negotiate.
To put pressure on Kiev, Putin will resort to all three means at his disposal — economic (gas plus trade), political (including through Europe’s interest in at least ceasing to fire in Ukraine) and, most importantly, in the military. Poroshenko understands that the New Russia, which is now in the position of defending, in the case of the continuation of Kiev military operation will increase significantly faster than the Kiev forces. And sooner or later go on the offensive.
Of course, Kiev is not yet ready to recognize Donetsk as a party to the negotiations - but this is the main intermediate task of Putin now. And there is no doubt that he will reach it. Most likely, not from the first attempt — the likelihood of a break in the truce is too high, Kiev has not yet finally been convinced of the futility of the military solution, and the United States does not immediately put up with the failure of attempts to defeat the insurgent East. But when Poroshenko sits down at the negotiating table with the leaders of the DPR and the LPR, a new stage in the battle for Ukraine will come. Regardless of whether it will continue by military or political means, and how long it will take, Putin will never give up Russia’s right to Ukraine. Yesterday in Vienna, the president confirmed this, stating that "we will always protect ethnic Russians and that part of the Ukrainian population that feels part of the Russian world."
Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.