What were the forces of the Third Reich at the beginning of the war with the USSR?

73
What were the forces of the Third Reich at the beginning of the war with the USSR?

The Third Reich was preparing to strike the USSR very thoroughly, by the time the war began, the grouping of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of the satellite countries of Germany was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, which until then had no analogues. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions, in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - put up 141 divisions, 181 divisions were concentrated to attack the USSR, this together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for the war, literally in a few years turning its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because under the Versailles agreements Germany was allowed to have only 100. army without combat aviationheavy artillery tanks, powerful Navy, universal military service, into the best army in the world. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, affected by the fact that in the period preceding the Nazis' coming to power, with the help of the "financial international", it was possible to maintain the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, which transferred its experience to new generations.

The myth that "intelligence reported in time." One of the most stable and dangerous myths, which was created under Khrushchev, and even more strengthened in the years of the Russian Federation, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported the date of the outbreak of war, but “stupid” or in another version “the enemy of the people ", Stalin dismissed these messages, believing more" friend "Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army had been brought to full combat readiness, it would have been possible to avoid a situation where the Wehrmacht had reached Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad, it would be possible to stop the enemy on the border. Moreover, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when the Russian Empire began mobilization and was accused of “initiating war”, Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a chance that I would have forgotten about the creation of the “Anti-Hitler Coalition”.

Intelligence reports were something, but there is a very big “But” - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the people's security and defense commissariats literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports on the “final and firmly established” date for the start of the invasions of Reich troops. At least 5-6 has been reported on such dates. The April, May, and June dates were announced about the invasion of the Wehrmacht and the beginning of the war, but all of them turned out to be misinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one ever reported the date of June 22. The Reich troops were to find out about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, therefore the directive, which spoke about the date of the invasion of the USSR, came to the troops only on June 19 of the year 1941. Naturally, not a single scout reported this.

The same famous “telegram” of R. Zorge that “an attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 on a broad front” is a fake. Its text is very different from real similar cipher strings; in addition, no responsible state leader will take any serious action based on such messages, even if it comes from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such reports regularly. Already in our years, 16 June 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Krasnaya Zvezda" published materials of a round table devoted to the 60 anniversary of the start of World War II, where there were confessions of Colonel SVR Karpov: "Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev times . Such "fools" are launched simply ... ". That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the invasion, was launched by N. Khrushchev, when he “debunked” the personality cult.

Only after the Wehrmacht received directives from 19 on June, various “defectors” began to cross the border and sent signals through the border service to Moscow.



Intelligence was also mistaken in the strength of the Wehrmacht grouping, ostensibly thoroughly dissected by Soviet intelligence officers. The total strength of the Reich armed forces was determined by Soviet intelligence in the 320 divisions, in reality, at that time, the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the Reich forces were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: for 130 divisions, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would send a blow - it was logical to assume that it was against England. A completely different picture would have happened if intelligence had reported that from the 214 divisions of the Reich 148 were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence could not track the process of increasing the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to intelligence from the USSR, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, the build-up of forces was significant, but it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping doubled against England. What conclusions could be drawn from this? It was possible to assume that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which he had long planned to do and actively spread misinformation about it. And in the east they strengthened the grouping for a more reliable cover of the “rear”. Didn't Hitler plan a war on two fronts? Same unequivocal suicide of Germany. And a completely different picture would have happened if the Kremlin knew that in February from all the 214 German divisions in the east were only 23, and by June 1941 had already become 148.

True, there is no need to create another myth that intelligence is to blame, she worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with Western intelligence agencies, there was not enough experience.

Another myth, they say, Stalin is to blame for the fact that the main direction of the strike of the German armed forces was incorrectly identified - the most powerful grouping of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that it would be the main attack there. But, firstly, this decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, the command of the Wehrmacht dispatched at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, and the German Special Command against the Western Special District (OOBO) against the KOVO and Odessa Military District (OVO) concentrated 45 divisions, of which the entire 5 tank. Yes, and the initial development of the plan "Barbarossa", Berlin was planning the main attack in the south-western strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data; we can now put all the pieces of the mosaic together. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, in early June 1941, in reality, there were 10 armored and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and the SS troops. And therefore, opposing them to the 20 tank and 10 motorized KOVO and PSB divisions was quite the right step of our command. True, the problem is that our intelligence missed the moment, as the 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of the 2-th tank group of Gaines Guderian in mid-June were redeployed to the Brest region. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, while 5 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions remained against KOVO.



T-2

What were the forces of the Third Reich at the beginning of the war with the USSR?

The Wehrmacht grouping in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units, they were distributed mainly to theaters of operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to German troops, large forces of the armed forces of Germany’s allies — the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, the entire 29 divisions (15 of the Finnish and 14 of the Romanian) and 16 brigades (of the Finnish — 3, Hungarian — 4, 9, Hungarian — XNUMX, XNUMX, Hungarian — XNUMX, Hungarian — XNUMX, Hungarian — XNUMX, Hungarian — XNUMX brigade forces) - XNUMX).


T-3

The main shock power of the Wehrmacht was tank and motorized divisions. What are they like? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks - 51 light tank Pz.Kpfw. II (according to Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tank Pz.Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 commander tanks without weapons. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could have been armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. In a tank division equipped with German tanks, the state had: 65 light tanks T-2, 106 medium tanks T-3 and 30 T-4, as well as 8 command tanks, total 209 units. In the tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, the state was: 55 light tanks T-2, 110 light Czechoslovak tanks Pz.Kpfw. 35 (t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38 (t), 30 medium tanks T-4 and 14 commander tanks Pz.Kpfw. 35 (t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38 (t), total - 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most of the T-2 and Pz.Kpfw tanks. 38 (t) had time to upgrade, their frontal armor 30 and 50 mm are now not inferior in armor to medium tanks T-3 and T-4. Plus, better than in Soviet tanks, the quality of sighting devices. According to various estimates, the Wehrmacht had just about 4000 tanks and assault guns, with allies more than 4300.


Pz.Kpfw. 38 (t).

But we must bear in mind that the Wehrmacht tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions strengthened: 6 thousand people motorized infantry; 150 artillery barrels, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized sapper battalion that could equip positions, set up minefields or clear mines, organize a ferry; A motorized communications battalion is mobile communications based on vehicles, armored vehicles or armored personnel carriers that could ensure the sustainable management of units of the division on the march and in combat. According to the state, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and cars - 561), in some divisions their number reached 2300 units. Plus 1289 motorcycles (711 units with wheelchairs) by state, although their number could also reach 1570 units. Therefore, tank divisions were organizationally well-balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structure of this compound of the model 1941 of the year, with minor improvements, remained until the end of the war.



Tank divisions and motorized divisions strengthened. Motorized divisions differed from conventional Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the full motorization of all units of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3-x infantry in the infantry division, two light howitzer battalions and one heavy artillery division in the artillery regiment instead of 3-x light and 1-th heavy in the infantry division, plus had a motorcycle rifle battalion, which was not standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900 – 2000 cars and 1300 – 1400 motorcycles. That is, tank divisions were amplified by additional motorized infantry.

In the armed forces of Germany, the first among the other armies of the world not only understood the need to have self-propelled artillery to support their infantry, but also were the first to put this idea into practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 battalions and 5 separate assault gun batteries, 7 battalions of self-propelled tank destroyers, 4 150 batteries of mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the Wehrmacht tank divisions. Assault gun units supported infantry on the battlefield, which made it possible not to divert tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. The divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became highly mobile anti-tank reserve command of the Wehrmacht.

Wehrmacht infantry divisions numbered 16 500 – 16 800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was on a horse-drawn carriage. In the Wehrmacht infantry division, there were 5375 horses in the state: 1743 riding horses and 3632 piggyback horses, of which 2249 horses were related to the artillery regiment of the unit. Plus a high level of motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 - trucks and 346 - cars), 527 motorcycles (201 unit with a sidecar). In total, the German armed forces, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600 000 vehicles of various types and more than 1 million horses.




Artillery

The artillery of the Armed Forces of Germany was traditionally strong: up to a quarter of the barrels of the German divisions were 105 – 150 mm guns. The organizational structure of the military artillery of the Wehrmacht made it possible to ensure a significant strengthening of infantry units in battle. So, in the infantry regiments were 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in combat. When firing direct fire with projectiles weighing 38 kg, 150-mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for the advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry, motorized regiments, division of pulmonary 105-mm howitzers, with the disposal of commanders of infantry and motorized divisions Wehrmacht remained heavy howitzer battalion 150-mm howitzers, and the disposal of commanders of armored divisions - the mixed heavy division 105-mm guns and 150-mm howitzers.



The tank and motorized divisions still had air defense cannons: according to the state, the division had a company of ZSUs (18 units), these were anti-aircraft self-propelled units based on semi-tracked tractor, armed with single or quad 20 anti-aircraft guns. The company was part of the anti-tank division. ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move in the march. Plus, anti-aircraft divisions with 8 – 12-88-mm anti-aircraft guns Flak18 / 36 / 37, which, in addition to fighting the enemy's air force, could fight the enemy’s tanks, performing anti-tank functions.

For the strike on the Red Army, the command of the Wehrmacht concentrated and significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 and 105-mm heavy cannons in each); 37 divisions of heavy field howitzers (12-x 150-mm units in each); 2 mixed divisions (6-x 211-mm mortars and three 173-mm guns in each); 29 Heavy Mortar Divisions (9-211-mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery divisions (by 9-149,1-mm heavy guns in each division); 2 heavy howitzer battalions (four 240-mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank divisions (36-37-mm anti-tank guns Pak35 / 36 in each); 9 separate railroad batteries with 280-mm naval guns (for 2 guns in the battery). Almost all of the artillery of the RGC was focused on the direction of the main strikes, and it was all motorized.



To ensure comprehensive preparation for combat operations, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 division of artillery instrumental reconnaissance, 52 individual sapper battalion, 25 separate bridge-building battalions, 91 construction battalion and 35 road-building battalions.

Aviation: to attack the USSR were concentrated 4 air fleet Luftwaffe, plus allied aviation. In addition to 3217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force included 1058 reconnaissance aircraft, which played a crucial role in supporting the operations of the ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, nearly 60% were the aircraft of the new Bf.109F modification; they outperformed not only the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also new ones, only received in the Air Force of the Red Army "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3."



The Reich Air Force had a large number of units and units of communications and control, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat capability. The Air Force of Germany included anti-aircraft divisions, which provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division had air observation, warning and communication units, logistic and technical support units. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft battalions with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns Flak18 / 36 / 37, 37-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft automatic guns Flak30 and Flak38, including the 20 anti-fire guns, I also use the same options as I-38 and X-NUMX and Flak1. At the same time, the air force anti-aircraft divisions interacted well with ground forces, often moving directly with them.

In addition to the armed forces themselves, numerous auxiliary paramilitary forces, such as the Speer Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps and the Imperial Labor Service, reinforced the strike power. They performed the tasks of the rear, technical and engineering support of the Wehrmacht. There were a lot of volunteers from Western and Eastern Europe who were not formally at war with the USSR.

Summing up, I must say that at that time this military machine had no equal. It was not for nothing that in Berlin, London and Washington they believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall in the course of the 2-3 months. But miscalculated, once again ...




Sources of:
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. Stopped blitzkrieg. M., 2010.
Pykhalov I. The Great Obolgannaya war. M., 2005.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered Leader. Lies and truth about Stalin. M., 2010.
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-06-10/1_2ww.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Операция_«Барбаросса»
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Великая_Отечественная_война
http://vspomniv.ru/nemetskie.htm
http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=588260
http://waralbum.ru/
http://ww2history.ru/artvermaht
http://www.airpages.ru/lw_main.shtml
http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1271220706.php
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

73 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. mitrich
    +12
    22 June 2011 10: 51
    In the 1950-1960s between the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev and the highest generals, a deal took place that was not executed in the form of a document.
    Its essence is that the former did not remind the latter of the failures in the defensive strategy of the Red Army on the eve and summer of 1941, while the latter did not commemorate Khrushchev N.S. his role in repression in Ukraine in the late 1930s
    It was then that all these stereotypes about Stalin were born: "do not succumb to provocations", "believed Hitler to the last", "Sorge reported, but they wiped out", etc. And the fact that they themselves shit not childishly is silent about that, of course. Who until recently insisted that the Germans would strike the main blow in Ukraine, and not in Belarus? The famous commander, who was then the head of the General Staff of the Red Army. Officially, this is how the Supreme "saw the light" almost 3 hours before the war. And about the directive of I.V. Stalin of 18.06.1941/1941/XNUMX on bringing the troops of the western districts on alert why are they silent? Because the truth is INCOMPLETE. If I.V. Stalin would have "dealt" with the generals then, in the summer of XNUMX, in an adult manner, then they would have shot not only Pavlov and Rychagov, but some even higher. Well, after the war, the principle came into force: "Winners are not judged." It was.
    We could then prevent the Germans from reaching Moscow, which is already there. In the photographs of their tanks, you only need to look to understand this. Command and control failed. But the history of the subjunctive mood does not know, so we will commemorate the dead and enjoy the victory over a strong opponent.
    1. Sergl
      +3
      22 February 2012 12: 24
      In fact, not only and not so much communication.
      As far as I know, the reasons for the defeat in the summer-autumn company 1941 of the year in the Red Army are as follows:
      -low training of commanders of all levels, especially middle and lower command personnel;
      - understaffing of parts with material parts and personnel;
      - Lack of communication culture and in a sufficient number of communication facilities;
      -lack of proper interaction between the military branches;
      This and much more was partially corrected during the war, and something was not fixed.
      1. 0
        31 January 2018 11: 13
        Quote: SerGL
        In fact, not only and not so much communication.
        As far as I know, the reasons for the defeat in the summer-autumn company 1941 of the year in the Red Army are as follows:
        -low training of commanders of all levels, especially middle and lower command personnel;
        - understaffing of parts with material parts and personnel;
        - Lack of communication culture and in a sufficient number of communication facilities;
        -lack of proper interaction between the military branches;
        This and much more was partially corrected during the war, and something was not fixed.

        Add;
        - hat-making mood
        -a complete lack of training of troops in the division-division link.
        - lack of rear support
        - lack of military intelligence (it was believed that it would not be necessary to take languages, it’s enough to tell the Germans that they had an army of representatives of the working class in front of them and they would begin to transfer to us, this is not a joke)
        - lack of unity of command (at the beginning of the war, without a commissar’s signature, no commander’s order was valid, after all the blunders on the part of the commissar guys, Stalin at the end of 1942 abolished the institute of commissarism.) The military councils in the command and control of the troops were a collegial body. The principle was as follows; the military council decided, and the commander and chief of staff answered for everything.
        - and other points that have not been eliminated to date in our army. For example; a huge number of deputies, assistants of all stripes. Not one army in the world has such a number of deputies in units and formations as ours.
  2. prokopovich111
    -19
    22 June 2011 13: 54
    The article is complete nonsense ..... our stupid warriors are so crap that the Nazis were allowed to go to the Volga ... probably what would they destroy there .... the whole German army is a bunch of rubbish except for the 88th and 109th .. !!!!!
    1. Alexarrow
      -2
      12 July 2011 16: 06
      And so it happened - the councils crap and the Germans were allowed to the Volga. With such reserves of weapons - and tanks, the Soviets had more and more aircraft (more than in the whole world!).
      That is what a good preparation of a fighter means, the coherence of all arms of service, advanced military theory and reliable quality equipment.
      1. Sergl
        0
        22 February 2012 12: 38
        "Any tank is as cool as its crew."

        The number of tanks in the Red Army for the summer of 1941 only seems awesomely impressive. It all depends on how to count and what to count. In addition, we usually consider the number all tanks, and the Wehrmacht only what was involved in the "Barbarossa". Yes, in the end we had a double superiority in tanks in number, but the tanks alone did not fight!
        As a result, it turns out that at the beginning of the war we were able to provide the German war machine with only mass. But this does not detract from our victories in 1943-1944 years.
        1. 0
          31 January 2018 11: 19
          Quote: SerGL
          "Any tank is as cool as its crew."

          The number of tanks in the Red Army for the summer of 1941 only seems awesomely impressive. It all depends on how to count and what to count. In addition, we usually consider the number all tanks, and the Wehrmacht only what was involved in the "Barbarossa". Yes, in the end we had a double superiority in tanks in number, but the tanks alone did not fight!
          As a result, it turns out that at the beginning of the war we were able to provide the German war machine with only mass. But this does not detract from our victories in 1943-1944 years.

          You can count as you like. Our mechanized corps in 41 had a state-owned 1031 tank (Soviet military encyclopedia). Corps located in the border districts were staffed from 70 and above percent. We had 4's superiority several times. Another thing is that promotion was based on the principle of party devotion and personal devotion. And this principle of nomination is very vulnerable in military affairs.
    2. borkovn
      0
      26 August 2011 23: 29
      The word ORGANIZATION is not Russian.
    3. +6
      16 November 2011 06: 55
      this "heap of rubbish" reached Moscow and the Volga, before that having traveled all over Europe and piled on the Angles at the very most I can not. so maybe it's not a bunch of trash, but a serious opponent? Such an adversary can be respected and you need to be proud of our grandfathers, who nevertheless crushed him
      1. 0
        31 January 2018 11: 23
        Quote: wasjasibirjac
        this "heap of rubbish" reached Moscow and the Volga, before that having traveled all over Europe and piled on the Angles at the very most I can not. so maybe it's not a bunch of trash, but a serious opponent? Such an adversary can be respected and you need to be proud of our grandfathers, who nevertheless crushed him

        We must be proud of the soldiers and it is necessary to instill this pride in our children. But to be proud of our military leadership in the 1941-42gg, and even in the 43g (the rout of ours in Kharkov) is not worth it. We won the blood of our soldiers and junior officers. But they won.
    4. Sergl
      +1
      22 February 2012 12: 33
      Let’s think that there is troop control? Ideally, the regiment commander gives the order: sets the time for the start of the attack, milestones, dates, etc., and the ideal battalion commanders fulfill it brilliantly. In life, any middle-level commander will execute an order according to the templates introduced into him from the school. The failures in the tactical training of commanders of all levels cannot be compensated for by the number of tanks and aircraft.
  3. +2
    22 June 2011 15: 36
    prokopovich111,
    the whole German army a bunch of trash except the 88th and 109th .. !!!!! - crushed the whole of Europe for themselves ??? do not belittle the enemy.
    1. 0
      29 December 2017 10: 35
      and what about Europe? the ancestors of today's gay men they wholesale lay under the German for decency, resisting a couple of days
  4. Marat
    +6
    22 June 2011 22: 39
    The German army of 1941 was ahead of time. It was like NATO at that time. All the power of a united Europe, advanced technology, tactics and strategy. It is interesting to read from Maxim Kalashnikov his version. Victory over such an enemy is a feat of our country and an occasion for reflection to potential opponents
    1. Winchester
      +1
      23 June 2011 13: 40
      Ahead of my time ???
      The latest PCs 3 and 4 at that time were better than the T-34 and KV ???
      The advanced tactics of the time - but nothing that most of the hanging Reich officers studied in the USSR?
      1. Alexarrow
        +1
        12 July 2011 16: 02
        Not the majority studied and studied in the councils only because of the conditions of the Versailles peace treaty of 1919 - the Germans were forbidden to have armored forces and the Air Force. Therefore, they opened 2 schools in the union and there the Germans, under the guise of a commie, honed their military skills.
  5. Winchester
    +1
    23 June 2011 13: 50
    Article is nonsense. For some reason there is not a single word about Soviet weapons. Actually, I understand why. How can you compare the T-1 and KV with their 34 mm guns and normal armor, diesel engines with Pz 76, 3?
    For some reason there is not a word about the quantity of armaments of the USSR. Perhaps Soviet aviation was somewhat inferior to fascist. Only here, according to minimal estimates, the USSR had 41 aircraft in 19 against 000-3 yew Nazis.
    In the USSR alone there were about 34 new T-3s and KVs — almost as many as the Nazis had tanks at all. But what about another 000 tanks of older models that were similar in characteristics to PC 20?
    1. His
      +4
      23 June 2011 14: 08
      It's all about the organization. If the equipment is in a conspicuous place and without fuel, and the soldiers are sleeping somewhere, plus there are no orders, complete confusion with the connection. A kind of prototype of modern centric military. As they say, who had time he ate
      1. Winchester
        -7
        23 June 2011 14: 21
        So the question arises - how could the entire 41st retreat with such a huge advantage and generally fight for 4 years. It would be normal command and sufficient motivation Berlin would take no later than the beginning 42.
    2. Alexarrow
      +3
      12 July 2011 15: 59
      Quote: Winchester
      How can you compare the T-34 and KV with their 76 mm guns and normal armor, diesel engines with Pz 3, 4?

      Well, read that thread on the topic.
      And the T-34 and KV tanks were absolutely "raw" for 41 years.
      For example, the list of defects at the beginning of 41 years for the T-34 was 80 points. And the points are serious. For example:
      1) Low engine life and reliability of the V-2 diesel engine.
      2) Lack of normal modern surveillance equipment from the tank (no teams. Turrets, low-quality optics)
      3) Disgusting gearbox
      4) The lack of radio stations (we went to the attack for the commander of the flags)
      Etc. etc. In general, the tank was ready for war.
      They even decided to produce a new tank instead of the T-34 (the new T-43), but the war changed all plans.

      And if you add the unprepared crews, stupid generals, then this is the reason for such terrible defeats.
      1. macmurdo
        -1
        28 October 2011 21: 13
        Bravo! "Raw" is the same as - very bad! And "absolutely raw" is the same as shit. And the main thing is to read on the topic of stupid ignoramuses.
        1. Sergl
          +1
          22 February 2012 12: 59
          If we talk about tanks, then a simple comparison of horsepower, millimeters of armor and caliber guns is a mistake.

          Imagine a sharp sword with an uncomfortable and slippery handle that will slip out of your hand after each stroke - will you fight a lot with such weapons? So the T-34 in 1941 was only at the beginning of the journey, at the end of which it will be recognized as the best tank in the world of that time.

          How can you fully fight on a machine that has poor and unstable communication, insufficient visibility, a tight tower, the commander is forced to serve as a gunner, the gearbox is switched with two hands and then with the help of a radio operator, the engine does not work for 100 hours, and most importantly, the tank doesn’t armor-piercing shells !!! From the word at all. Well, industry has not mastered the production of armor-piercing shells. And you have to shoot at German tanks with anything, even shrapnel shells.

          But they fought and won. There is reason to think.
    3. macmurdo
      -1
      28 October 2011 21: 08
      Something in my opinion anti-Russian propaganda is working here; all answers like yours are jamming. And the article is unrealistic rubbish.
    4. +1
      26 December 2011 14: 24
      We carefully read the title. An article about the weapons of Germany before the war, and not the comparative characteristics of weapons !!!!!
    5. +1
      14 February 2012 22: 44
      There were 1 new tanks KV-34 and T-1861 in the troops. The fact is that the war found our tank forces under reorganization. The brigades were disbanded, and tank and mechanized corps were formed. In connection with the start of production of new tanks, the production of old and spare parts for them was discontinued. There was a large shortage of engines for older types of tanks. New tanks were mistakenly dispersed in many parts and were not yet mastered by personnel.
  6. David
    +1
    24 June 2011 00: 41
    It's all about the command. Remember - an army of rams, commanded by a lion ... And at the beginning of the war, the spacecraft was an army that was commanded by rams, starting from Chief of General Staff Zhukov, People's Commissar Timoshenko and First Marshal Voroshilov ... And to put an equal sign between KV, T-34 and German T-3 and T-4 are generally absurd. It's like comparing the Messerschmitt and the I-15. The spacecraft had everything to end the war in Berlin in 42 -43. There was only one thing - the command ... By destroying the color of the commanding staff, the VKPB put the country on the brink of destruction .... It was not Stalin, but all VKPB, because the party was afraid of responsibility for the destruction of the October gains. And only the army could ask the Party and ask harshly. And in the war, as always, the people had to take the rap so that the top of the party continued to grow fat.
    1. Joker
      +8
      24 June 2011 08: 28
      And for all other specialists, I will not take command, but I can say a difficult question, and so I would not litter our leadership.

      According to our tanks:
      - corny by means of observation, until about 42-43 the means of observation of the tank commander (he is also a gunner by the way) was a periscope in which polished metal was used as mirror elements, you can imagine quality observations?
      - to this we can add the low reliability of the diesel engine at the beginning of the war;
      - a system for cleaning the air entering the engine which, in principle, did not hold dust;
      - 4-speed gearbox, in which the switching force was about 70 kilograms (!!!) and this, incidentally, forced the fur. water to go on the attack in second gear at higher speeds, which additionally ruined the engine, replaced by a normal 5-speed in the region of the 43rd year;
      - to this you can also add a "single" hatch for the loader and tank commander of the T-34 release from 40 to about 42-43 (depending on the plant), which was unrealistic to lift alone, and besides, if you are wounded;

      I agree we have the best tanks, despite some advantages of the problems the T-3 and T-4 also had enough (I will not paint), we just need to be aware that the German troops really were a formidable force at the beginning of the war, and besides Germany at that time worked all the industry of developed Europe.
      1. 0
        31 January 2018 11: 30
        I agree with you; Hitler is to blame for all the shortcomings of our army. The Communist guys write that Nikolay is to blame for the First World War, and Hitler is the Great Patriotic War. Everyone, according to the Communist Party, is guilty of all but the leaders.
  7. KB-2
    KB-2
    +4
    24 June 2011 11: 33
    Winchester, where do you get these numbers from? is it not at Rezun's? Then you can safely wipe yourself with them. In general, for such a replication of "historical" lies, a prize is awarded - a bust of Goebbels on a desk.
  8. vagon
    +3
    24 June 2011 16: 23
    I also wonder: how could having such a superiority in technology retreat hundreds of kilometers ?? !! But this is all the lyrics.
    See the root. What we see.
    1. In the German army, trophy equipment was widely used. At the beginning of the war, many Soviet light tanks (BT and T-26) were captured. But for some reason the Germans were in no hurry to use them (strange). Although the parts equipped with T-34 and KV were.
    2. Who will tell me how many Soviet soldiers were captured in the first 3 months of the war? Something very much, it seems to me.
    3. Blaming Stalin, Zhukov, or someone else I think is pointless. From our bell tower, we know better: how could an attack be spoiled, because everyone knew everything ... To understand this situation, you need to shovel a bunch of archives (not only domestic ones), many of which are still classified as secrecy. It’s not for us to issue verdicts.
    In general, the discussion is interesting: some with foam at the mouth shout that our tanks are better, others vice versa. Before making conclusions, it is necessary to study not only the performance characteristics, but also the methods of the combat mission and use of the tank, the organizational structure of the units, and so on. Moreover, not according to articles copied from popular art magazines, but from serious sources.
    Then it will be possible to say with a smart air that they ... and we ... then they ...
    1. Sergl
      +2
      22 February 2012 13: 12
      My five kopecks for captured tanks in the Wehrmacht.

      The captured equipment must not only be used, but also maintained.
      The use of French and Czech tanks is justified by the presence of factories for the production of spare parts, engines and the presence of a repair base.
      Where can the Germans get spare parts for the T-26 and BT, if they were not enough in the troops? Yes, and taking into account the fact that only tanks of the later series had combat value, we can say that the sheepskin wasn’t worth the effort in light tanks.

      For mass use of T-34 and KV. All the same, these are medium and heavy tanks, and their potential combat value could outweigh the difficulties in supply. But...
      Have you thought about where the Germans would have taken so many solariums for tank diesel engines? The whole Wehrmacht ate gasoline, and the whole solarium went to the fleet (and then it was not enough). Officially in the Wehrmacht, only a few dozen captured Soviet tanks were used simultaneously during the war.

      In my opinion, so.
  9. Tiger
    0
    24 June 2011 21: 22
    The whole strategy in a geopolitical setting was the time. - The USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when the Russian Empire began to mobilize and was accused of “unleashing a war”, Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a chance that we would have to forget about the creation of the "Anti-Hitler Coalition."
    And who has which planes, rifles and tanks are tactical issues.
  10. Timer
    +6
    25 June 2011 23: 26
    What nonsense they wrote about our intelligence before the war!
    "She was still young, in comparison with the Western special services, she lacked experience."
    The Bolsheviks can be blamed for many sins and mistakes, but one thing is stupid to deny: the comrade communists knew a lot about intelligence and counterintelligence. In fact, the Soviet special services (VChK-OGPU, intelligence intelligence unit of the General Staff, the Comintern) already did not know equal work efficiency, even the vaunted and boasted British intelligence was inferior to the Bolsheviks in quickness, reaction and grasp. In the field of intelligence and counterintelligence, neither the services of the former Russian Empire nor the Third Reich could compete with the USSR. The Germans had a stronger army, but in intelligence and counterintelligence we were noticeably ahead.
    This is generally an axiom, the best intelligence services are created by former revolutionaries, terrorists and conspirators. The Bolsheviks already had almost half a century of experience in an intense, difficult secret, secret political struggle, first with the tsarist regime, then with the whites, the Entente, various socialists of other stripes, all kinds of independent people, etc. This war was different from the semi-diplomatic pirouettes of the Western powers with more fierceness, intensity and sophistication. In intelligence, in general, young players are more aggressive, resourceful, sophisticated, and old players lose their grip over time. The same Mossad very quickly showed itself in due time.
    1. Alexarrow
      0
      12 July 2011 15: 47
      The foreign intelligence of the soviets was not bad (everything is completely Jewish, and these are cunning and smart), but the problem is that she could not provide unambiguous information on the start of the war to Stalin.
      And the army reconnaissance was also very limp in the turning point 43 (read Zamulin with his magnificent series of books about the Battle of Kursk).
      1. Sergl
        0
        22 February 2012 13: 48
        Let us take it as an axiom that no intelligence of that time could give _exhaustive_ information about the state of affairs of the enemy.
  11. Marat
    -3
    28 June 2011 20: 47
    It is not a matter of quantity and quality of weapons. German officers knew how to fight, and under the incompetent command of Voroshilov, Budyonny and the like, Soviet soldiers and commanders were not ready for war.
    Then they spoke? The Red Army man knows everything - both to sing, and to dance, and to read the report on the international situation, only one thing is not able - to fight.
    In addition, Stalin lulled everyone with tales that Hitler would not attack the USSR until he put an end to England. After all, a week before the war, he himself wrote the TASS Statement (his categorical style), which claimed that Hitler was peaceful. The command to start the war was given when 1200 aircraft were destroyed and infantry and tanks suffered heavy losses.
    Hence the result!
    1. Alexarrow
      -1
      12 July 2011 15: 41
      Potsreoty already instructed this very adequate comment "-3".
  12. Georgy
    +4
    2 July 2011 22: 18
    The interest in military affairs, which is so rare in our time - the time of general consumption, pleases me. The Second World War is still waiting for its A. Toynbee. In the meantime, I recommend Heinz Guderian "MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER 1939-1945" ...
    The first act of the war took place according to the scenario of "Nimble Hans" - the genius of the blitzkrieg, which he worked out in France. Russia turned out to be not France, disagreements arose with the Fuhrer and on December 26.12, 1941 - he was transferred to the reserve of the main command of the ground forces, but in fact was removed from influence on the further course of hostilities. It is also significant that by the time of the attack on the USSR the German people were “fed with war,” while the Soviet people were exhausted by the preparations for it. Partly because of this, the mobilization resource, in the confusion of the first months of the war, deserted en masse, having a lower motivation to fight.
  13. Yuri Kansberg
    +3
    2 July 2011 22: 43
    About everything about it is already sickening to read! They knew about the attack - did not know, more tanks - less tanks ... Zhukov was far from my hero, but in a short dialogue with one fascist general, he expressed in concentrated form the whole truth of the war with fascist Germany: the Germans taught the Russians how to fight, and the Russians taught them how to fight Germans. True, it seems to me that the Germans from that time did not acquire the taste of fighting in a new way, but the Russians, as it seems to me, lost their skill and fighting spirit.
    1. Alexarrow
      +2
      12 July 2011 15: 37
      Our fighting spirit has not been lost, but the skill has never been. Always learned to fight on the blood of ordinary and junior officers, and not on the training grounds.
  14. Torres
    +2
    6 July 2011 01: 22
    Ah, power went against us! What was it like with us? Not a word. A shame! And nothing to do with the traitor Rezun. The numbers are needed on both sides.
    And the generals weaned us to fight. Even in Afghanistan and in some places we knew how to fight and fought well. Only here on the hell was Afghanistan? And we did not fail there! These politicians betrayed us then. Thank God that I haven’t been in Chechnya for health reasons. There we, ordinary officers and soldiers, were sold by our generals. They snickered and preferred to trade with the Czechs with our blood. And now they’re finishing off the army. There is only one laugh: oh, in a year I’ve put five dryers in the army! A shame.
    And God forbid again something like 1941!
    1. Alexarrow
      +1
      12 July 2011 15: 35
      Yes, we won’t survive another 41.
  15. North part
    0
    6 July 2011 18: 53
    The fact of striking first gives the attacker significant advantages. And it doesn’t matter if the exact date of the attack is known or not. Like a simplified chess model. Suddenly, there is no equal force at the beginning of the game, but the one who makes the first move has a tangible advantage. This is basically the basis of the Blitzkrieg theory. In the war in the Pacific Ocean, the same thing happened. The Japanese had neither technical nor numerical superiority but reached Australia and India, while American troops in the Philippines and English in Singapore surrendered. So Stalin has nothing to do with it.
    1. Alexarrow
      +1
      12 July 2011 15: 33
      With the quantitative advantage, and in some places and qualitative, which the spacecraft possessed, allowing the enemy to reach the Volga, giving up 50 million of the population, huge industrial and agricultural territories, the professionalism of Stalin and Co. is not clearly visible. So Stalin has to do with it directly.
  16. rpg
    rpg
    -5
    9 July 2011 17: 29
    * We envy all the bourgeoisie the world fire radeum! * - Who sang this, Hitler? 1) Why are 400 deployment areas still classified !!! our armies before the war?
    2) 1 million parachutists is for defense?
    3) Katyusha, T-34, 76mm unguided rockets on fighters, was it the Germans?
    4) our tanks could get to London without thorough repairs; German tanks could only reach 700 km. maximum.
    You can still say a lot, the essence is the same - the communists = fascists ....
    1. German
      +3
      9 November 2011 14: 46
      mon cher! even modern tanks in war conditions are not able to reach London "without overhaul"!
    2. 0
      16 November 2011 07: 06
      especially along the English Channel
    3. 0
      26 December 2011 14: 33
      Young man learn mat.chast. And only after that lay out your thoughts !!!!!
    4. +2
      14 February 2012 23: 16
      What are you talking about my dear! For example, the resource of the T-34 onboard friction clutches was only 500 km. German troops at the time of the attack were fully mobilized and focused on their starting positions, had 2 years of combat experience, the command staff is very experienced, for example, all regiment commanders had experience of the First World War. The rear units are pulled up, the necessary stock of ammunition, fuel and lubricants and food has been created. In addition, they outnumbered our troops in 190 divisions, and the German division was about 1,5 times stronger than ours. The Red Army near the borders had only cover troops, many troops only advanced, that is, were on the way, not provided with artillery, traction, or transport. The command staff basically had no combat, and even life experience, in connection with the repression there were cases of the appointment of commanders of regiments of captains and senior lieutenants. In addition, the directive on the withdrawal of troops to the field areas was given late, i.e. the war found many units in the barracks, in parks and at regular airfields, when on the first day of the war a huge number of aircraft and equipment were destroyed. In addition, our troops were weaker in composition, about 170 divisions, as I said, at that time the German division exceeded ours by about 1,5 times. Even if all our troops were concentrated and defended at that time, the Germans would still have broken through the front and advanced. The forces were too unequal!
    5. Sergl
      +1
      22 February 2012 13: 39
      * We envy all the bourgeoisie the world fire radeum! * - Who sang this, Hitler?

      Well, Hitler sang about something else, about the superiority of the Aryan race and the need to destroy the Unterman.

      1) Why are 400 deployment areas still classified !!! our armies before the war?


      I do not know, but an even figure causes legitimate doubt.

      2) 1 million parachutists is for defense?

      By 1941, we did not have a defense strategy. The Red Army intended to attack in response to the attack of the aggressor. With this strategy, the paratroopers would not be redundant. But let's calculate how many red air fleets had the delivery facilities for paratroopers (transport aircraft and converted TB-3s)? And it was disastrously insufficient.

      3) Katyusha, T-34, 76mm unguided rockets on fighters, was it the Germans?

      For the T-34, the comments already said a lot of objective, I will touch jet weapons.
      Aircraft installed 82-mm (and not 76-mm) RSy. Their combat use against Japanese aviation during the Halkin-Gol conflict showed their low effectiveness. Cases of the defeat of enemy aircraft were more an exception than the rule. Low accuracy.
      The Germans in 1941 had their own rocket artillery - "Nebelwerfer". This is not a copy of the BM-13, but a completely different weapon. Another thing is that it was not massive and was designed for a higher culture of production, and was under the command of chemical forces.

      4) our tanks could get to London without thorough repairs; German tanks could only reach 700 km. maximum.


      Dear, do not confuse 1941 and 1944.

      You can still say a lot, the essence is the same - the communists = fascists ....

      Doubtful, very dubious statement.
  17. Sergei
    +1
    14 July 2011 07: 28
    And in 1940, the French and British, having a numerical advantage over the Germans, were shamefully rabbits and ceded to them almost all of Europe. By the way, the French alone had more aircraft than the Germans, and together with the British - 2 times more tanks. The German army in those years was the most the best in the world. In 1941, our fighters attacked with "troikas", and the German ones with "twos" and hammered our clumsy aviators. The Germans also had night air reconnaissance. Their tanks maneuvered at night, but ours did not sleep off. Therefore, in the end, the operation of the Red Army in the border tank battle near Brody and Lutsk failed. There ours had a great advantage in the number of tanks. They managed to detain the enemy for only 7 days and lost almost 1000 tanks.
  18. svvaulsh
    +1
    20 July 2011 16: 53
    Yes, experts and strategists are unmeasured! It is a pity that you were not in the 41st, otherwise you would have given ......! We would go to the grave of the Unknown Soldier, put flowers for the fact that now you are doing demagogy in front of the monitors.

    - Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side.
  19. Kutuzov
    0
    27 July 2011 15: 26
    General-Field Marshal Kutuzov: how many "generalsimuses" have gathered here on the site, and each with his own absolutely correct opinion, and each fancies himself a strategist - seeing the battle from the side !!!!
    1. LESHA pancake
      -2
      17 August 2011 20: 04
      yayayayayayayayayayayayayayayayay !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  20. erik777
    +2
    31 August 2011 13: 22
    For the motherland! For Stalin! You know, de-Stalinization has already been going on for 6 years, but contrary to this, a paradox occurs and the people, on the contrary, turn to Stalin as a hero and a great man who worked for the good of the Motherland. For me personally, the image of Stalin in my head fits so that, in comparison with the current government, he is like a semi-god. You can endlessly accuse him of repression, but he did not go with a gun and shot everyone. This was done by Beria, Khrushchev, etc. And moreover, most of the repressed were repressed for the cause. + Repression does not mean stupid execution, but a link to work in remote places for a period of 3 to 10 years. Stalin has done more for the country than anyone else, and no one will convince me otherwise. He came to a devastated, impoverished, agrarian country, where 80% were illiterate. But he left - we had a victory in the Second World War behind us, nuclear weapons, universal literacy, there were more universities and students than in all of Europe, science in all areas, medicine, and there were inclinations to space were well developed. So compare, and what is being done now? in 20 years, more than 80 thousand factories and factories have closed, the population is decreasing by 1 million every year, the average life expectancy is terrible, the same as in Papua New Guinea, the production of tractors and combines as in the 20s. every week almost in the news it is reported about the crash of some sort of plane / helicopter, all the weapons from the Soviet era lie. Horror. For the Communist Party in the 2012 elections and the point. Our cause is just, victory will be ours!
  21. macmurdo
    -1
    28 October 2011 22: 28
    What bullshit is this article.
  22. 0
    22 December 2011 16: 42
    The fact that the USSR and its leadership did not know about the impending war is absolute nonsense. It is impossible to conceal 190 divisions that were preparing to attack on the border and sit stupidly with their heads in the sand and not even withdraw their troops to the field areas, which led to the destruction of almost all aviation and tank forces. For this it was necessary to immediately shoot the entire top commanding staff and the army and the leadership of the state. But by the beginning of the war, the Red Army had a huge superiority in tanks, both quantitatively and qualitatively, quantitatively in aviation, the single training of soldiers, sergeants and junior and middle officers was no worse, but much better than the German, of course, the highest command personnel possessed very poor preparation, and the combat coordination of units and formations was also very weak. And even if all that was necessary had been done and the troops had been withdrawn to field positions, they would have had to retreat anyway, the senior and senior command personnel had no experience of war, while the German troops and command had a two-year combat experience. Of course, there would not have been such a "landslide" defeat, perhaps it would have been possible to avoid many "boilers", had time to take out many material values, and maybe the Germans would not have come so close to Moscow. In general, of course, from the point of view of international strategy, Germany's attack on the USSR was a gamble. Hitler did not take into account many factors, for which he paid

    Contrary to popular belief that the German army was saturated to the limit with automatic weapons and almost every German soldier went on the attack with an MP-38 or MP-40 submachine gun is a cinematic fiction. During the war years, all factories in Germany produced about 900 thousand "machines", while the USSR produced almost 7 of them !!! millions, and Soviet submachine guns were better than the German ones in their performance characteristics. So, the German soldier fought the whole war with a Mauser 1898 rifle or carbine of 7,98 mm caliber.
  23. +1
    22 December 2011 17: 39
    The Russian Mosin rifle, caliber 7,62 was approximately equal to the German one in its performance characteristics, but the USSR produced more than 12 million of them during the war years, the Izhevsk plant alone produced more than six million of them, more than all the arms factories of Germany and its allies put together and more than all the US arms factories. Before the war, the Red Army already had about 1,2 million automatic and self-loading rifles SVT-40 and AVS-38, which were very good, but required careful maintenance, so their release in 1943 was discontinued due to the adoption of an intermediate cartridge model 1943 and under which in 1945 the SKS-45 carbine was adopted, which even managed to "make war". During the entire war, the Germans were not able to create a mass sample of a self-loading rifle, they released a trial number of Walter rifles, but they never adopted it. The German army also realized the constant lack of machine guns, the models of which were in service with many. The best of them MG 34 was capricious and sensitive to pollution, and MG-42 had its drawbacks. In the USSR, not everything went well with machine guns, before the war, the DS-38 was adopted, but in the course of hostilities they were forced to withdraw it from production due to frequent failures and return to the production of the old 70 kg. Maxim, who has not met the demand of the time for a long time. It was only in 1943 that Goryunov's SG-43 was adopted, which ended the war and was in service with the Soviet army for a long time, and even now its tank version of the SGMT can still be seen on the T-55 and even T-64 tanks. So I could tell you a lot about weapons, but there is no time.
  24. 0
    22 December 2011 18: 40
    At the time of the attack on the USSR, Germany had 3178 tanks of all types and 547 self-propelled guns, while the armed forces of the USSR numbered 23140 tanks of all types of them KV-1 -636 and 1125 T-34. Of course, both the KV and the T-34 had the same drawbacks, such as a very poor visibility, sights could not be imagined worse, the low resource of some units, for example, side clutches of only 500 km, the driver’s hatch in the front armor on the T-34 and more, but compared to ns German tanks at that time, they were at the top of excellence.
    1. pioneer
      0
      18 February 2012 22: 04
      3178 of their tanks and 547 self-propelled guns of their native German. But something is silent about the French tanks, English, Dutch, Belgian, well, not one leads how many of them were. In 1942, a newsreel showed an attack by the Germans in the Rostov operation, so for some reason there were some French tanks. Maybe this section of the front turned out to be this?
  25. 0
    22 December 2011 19: 11
    The Germans had practically no means of fighting against new Soviet tanks at that time. But the trouble is that the German tanks were in a single armored fist, reduced to tank divisions and corps, and the Soviet gutted into small units, divisions and corps were in the process of formation. Now let's imagine that these 1750 new tanks would be part of the same compound and would be broken from the border to the west! The Germans had to be tight. Of course, they would not have reached Berlin, but the Germans would have spoiled enough blood, and it is not known how the circumstances would have developed.
  26. blind
    +1
    14 February 2012 14: 54
    Guys, I did not understand something comments in general.
    Now on
    Germany had 3178 tanks T-1, T-2, T-3, T-4.
    T-1 - bulletproof armor, gasoline engine, 2 machine guns MG-34 /
    The most advanced T-4, 75-mm short-barreled gun, 2 MG-34 machine guns, gasoline engine.
    Tanks were designed for action only on the roads of EUROPE.
    About optics, I can say that A CASE - IS A CASE.

    And about the readiness of the USSR for war — those who served let them remember the army’s training in tactics — in 90 cases out of 100, the introductory ones — detachment, platoon, company on the offensive — are worked out. Somehow they forget about defense. Well, we do not want to defend ourselves.
    And remember Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa ,,,
    To comb out is not enough space.
    Where there was an order to "Bury in the ground" - the Germans stalled and fell into a panic.
    The Germans didn’t break the field fortifications on the KURSK ARC in 43, and the MANERGAME LINE in the winter war of 38-39, the RED ARMY-HACKED.
    SO WHO WAS READY FOR WAR?
    And about the headless army - so among those who were removed 1/3 was a BALAST and 2/3 were NKVDists. By the way, then they also released - an example - Rokosovsky.
    1. pioneer
      0
      18 February 2012 22: 09
      Well, in Soviet times, exercises were held - regimental annually. And in the 70s, they were carried out with the involvement of allies. Sam participated in the Transcarpathian Military District. Winter was, but in memory for the rest of his life.
  27. lackylu
    0
    18 February 2012 22: 51
    At the beginning of the war, the USSR had a significant amount of equipment, but half refused. The armament was also not very mainly against the tanks, there were bottles of gasoline that were thrown mainly into the engine. Maxim machine guns were armed with machine guns. But right now it’s hard to get to the bottom of the story . And few people can tell about the rules and what actually happened in the great Patriotic war. Germany did not use the captured equipment, it was much inferior to its own. In tanks, Germany had optics and Soviet equipment was created on the model of German, a vivid example of this is the tank is and the royal tiger
  28. iAZAAR
    0
    19 February 2012 18: 14
    Just the Germans were organized and prepared for the offensive.
    The very fact of having a large number of weapons does not really help when the connection is broken and the strategic initiative is lost.
    In 1943, the Germans and their allies had weapons too, but they retreated. The initiative is lost. The battlefield was chosen by ours.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"