Reasons and pretexts for military operations
Nowadays, military operations of the armed forces of the Western countries are carried out under plausible pretexts for the establishment of peace and peace enforcement, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, the restoration of law and the prevention of genocide, etc.
In the “good old days” everything was much simpler and more frank: Western “democracies” did not hesitate to directly state the purpose of the military operations they were conducting. For example, the decision of the Supreme Council of the Entente on November 28 of 1917 to intervene in Russia: “The Allies will take measures to establish for the protection of their interests ... real control over the development of Russian foreign policy. In the implementation of this control, the main role will be played by the United States and Japan, which concluded a special agreement between themselves. ” And after a few months, the military intervention of 14 states against our country began. Americans in May 1918, landed troops in Murmansk, and in August-September - the expeditionary force in Vladivostok. Stocking up weapons all those who fought against our country, the Yankees hoped that their corps would get to the European part of Russia. But the use of chemical weapons did not save the invaders from the collapse of the adventure. It seemed that the lesson taught by Russia was learned in the USA, in England, France and Japan.
However, the Second World War did not have time to end, as the United States immediately began to plan military operations against the USSR. In 1949, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces developed a plan of war against the USSR (Dropshot), which envisaged the defeat of the Armed Forces of the main enemy after several years of military operations, followed by occupation and dismemberment of the USSR in order to achieve world hegemony of the United States.
After the victorious conclusion of the war, the Pentagon planned to divide the territory of the former USSR into several zones of occupation with more than two dozen regions. In each zone, it was planned to form one aviation connection with 7 – 8 air groups (wings) each. In the expanses from the Baltic to the Far East, 26 occupational divisions were to be deployed (two in Moscow, one each in other major cities such as Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Murmansk, Vladivostok). In the Black Sea and the Baltic were supposed to perform police functions on the same carrier strike group (AUG). Nowadays, this planned final stage of the war would be called a "large-scale stabilization operation."
GUIDE TO ACTIONS
In 1992, the Pentagon developed draft defense planning guidelines for 1994–1999, which emphasized: “The United States must demonstrate the leadership necessary to establish and defend a new world order that convinces potential rivals that they should not seek to play more take an active role or take a more aggressive stance to protect their legitimate interests. ” Here is an example of “illustrative” scenarios of possible conflicts developed in support of this document. The “expansionary authoritarian government” of the Russian Federation that came to power (this is the wording of the authors of the directives), with the support of Belarus, demanded that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia grant autonomy to the Russians. After 6-8 months of increasing tension, 18 Russian and 4 Belarusian divisions strike along the Polish-Lithuanian border. Within 30 days, NATO Allied Forces deploy in the adjacent areas, in Poland and on the Baltic Sea, 18 Army divisions (7), including 1 Army divisions and 6 US Marine Expeditionary Division, 66 American AUGs, XNUMX tactical squadrons aviation, of which 45 are American, and provide support for the operation with four American squadrons of heavy bombers. After 90 days of hostilities, US / NATO forces, according to the drafters, celebrate victory.
On paper, all plans seemed doable, in practice, especially in Korea and Vietnam, everything turned out differently. But the past is gradually being forgotten, and the "Vietnamese syndrome" ceased to operate from the 80-s, when the United States slowly but surely began to return to military actions, and then to more and more large-scale military operations farther from the mainland. In 1983, Grenada was conquered, in 1986, an attempt was made to destroy the leader of Libya, in 1989, order was restored in Panama, in 1991, victory was over Iraq, in 1994, an armed invasion of Haiti was prepared, in 1999 from Serbia Kosovo rejected, the Taliban in Afghanistan overthrown in 2001, the Baath Party regime in Iraq overthrown in 2003, M. Gaddafi’s power in Libya overturned in 2011, and the overthrow of Syria’s leadership was planned for 2013 ...
At least part of these actions was carried out on a scale of gradual increase in tensions with the use of information warfare, methods of economic pressure, with the introduction of maritime quarantine, with limited use of weapons to demonstrate determination to use further military force in full. In the last decade of the last century, the establishment of flight zones that were forbidden for a hostile country was begun, while the limited use of various types of non-lethal weapons, means and methods of cyberborder began, and in this century, the United States began the ever-increasing use of reconnaissance-impact UAVs and special operations forces.
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF UNION
In the last 25 – 30 years, the division of military operations of the United States and the NATO countries into two polar types has been quite clearly manifested.
The first type includes operations of joint commands (OC) or joint operational formations (OOF) with the participation of components from all types of aircraft, including ground forces (ground forces and marines), conducted in the ground, air and sea spaces of the opposing state. At the same time, the total number of QA / OOF reaches several hundred thousand people, and the aviation group is brought to 2 – 4 thousand aircraft (LA). This, so to speak, is a classic military operation. Such operations were conducted by the USA with its allies against Iraq (in 1991 and 2003).
The second type includes QA / OOF operations, in which combat operations in the ground, air, and sea space of the opposing state are conducted only by forces and means of air attack (coastal and carrier-based aviation, rocket weapons). This, if we resort to modern terminology, "combined air-sea battles." The total number of OOFs or OC forces involved in such an operation does not exceed 100 thousand, and the aviation group reinforced by US strategic aviation is represented by 250 – 1000 LA. An example is the US / NATO military operations against Yugoslavia in the 1999 year and in Libya in the 2011 year, when the victory was achieved without the participation of the Allied ground forces. To defeat Yugoslavia, it took 37 500 aviation sorties (including 37% to strike) to cover more than 4000 targets using 78 23 bombs, aircraft and naval missiles for 600 days. To overthrow the Gaddafi regime, in 227 days it was necessary to execute over 28 thousands of aviation sorties (of which about 37% per strike) and destroy more than 5900 targets. The experience of the military operation against Yugoslavia to some extent confirmed the ideas of the Italian General Douay, showing that the goals of the modern war against small countries can be achieved by the allies using only forces and means of air attack.
FEATURES OF TRAINING
Activities for the preparation of a military operation are quite complex and voluminous. In the US Armed Forces, they are divided into several stages. First, the course of action is developed. In accordance with the instructions of the civilian military-political leadership (CDF) of the country, the chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (CSC) issued a preliminary order (warning order) in which he defined the purpose and objectives of the military operation, the estimated time of the start of hostilities (D-Day) and duration, rules of engagement of military forces (rules of engagement), estimated time of commencement of mobilization (M-Day), time of commencement of the transfer of troops / forces, military equipment and other materiel from the USA to designated areas (C-Day), organization of command, ste Shade readiness forces (DEFCON), readiness level dedicated to the transfer of forces and means of transferring allocated troops / forces for military operations unified command (UC) and the ports used, and the right to use airspace for rendition troops / forces.
In the same order, the chairman of the KNSH demanded that the OC commander develop a course of action and present his assessment of the situation and calculations for the deployment of forces. Simultaneously with the development of options for action, the OC commander worked out a preliminary plan of the operation, specified emergency plans, determined the necessary power modules. At the stage of choosing the course of action, the chairman of the KNSH gave the order to start planning (planning order) according to the chosen course of action until the final decision was taken by the CDF of the country. At this time, the transfer of troops / forces could be started only with the permission of the Minister of Defense. At the planning stage of a military operation, the chairman of the KNSH, acting on the basis of the course of action already approved by the CDF, and the plan of the operation, issued an alert order to increase the preparedness of the allocated forces and conduct detailed planning of the military operation. The commander of the OC, taking into account the troops / forces he already had and really allocated to him, carried out detailed planning and submitted an order (OPORD) to the CNS for the military operation. Then came the period of the military operation. In accordance with the presidential directive, the Minister of Defense and the KNSH Chairman signed an order to execute the operation (execute order), approving the plan of the OC commander and setting the exact start time for the implementation of the military operation plan (D-Day, H-hour). The troops / forces OK at the appointed time proceeded with the execution of the order of the commander.
In the distant 80-s, such a scenario was presented for preparing the United States for a general war against the background of a sharp and rapid exacerbation of tensions in the world.
For 15 – 17 days before the start of the general war, the United States embarked on a strategic deployment of its Armed Forces. With the announcement for all air forces of combat readiness No. 2 (DEFCON 2) and full mobilization in the country (M-Day), the aircraft were transferred from peace to martial law. With the announcement for the Sun of the day "C" (C-Day), strategic rearrangements of troops / forces from the USA to the advanced regions of Europe and Asia began, and operational deployment of US troops / forces in future theaters of war and theaters of war was performed simultaneously. Paradoxically, but the actual deployment of US troops / forces to conduct a large-scale military operation in a remote theater of operations required more time than the theoretical (scenario) strategic deployment of the country's armed forces to wage a general war.
SCREENING SCRIPTS
How does the scheme for the preparation of a military operation operate in exercises and in practice? At one of the command and staff games at the end of the last century, such a scenario of events in the Pacific Ocean zone was worked out. Three months before the outbreak of hostilities, the US armed forces receive a strategic warning from the CDF about their imminent use. After some time, there is aggression. The UN Security Council is demanding that the aggressor country withdraw its troops by up to 50 days. At the stage of redeployment of troops / forces to the combat mission area and to ensure this area, the United States creates an OOF consisting of components of all types of armed forces. Ten days before the expiry of the UNSC ultimatum, the commander of the PLO establishes an exclusive air zone in the area of aggression (forbidden for the flights of the aggressor aircraft) and enters the exclusive maritime zone (forbidden for entry and exit of ships and ships of the aggressor and its allies).
When practicing smaller-scale actions at command-staff exercises, for example, “evacuating non-combatants” operations, an alert order could be given six days before its commencement, for redeployment of troops / forces and operational deployment for three days - five days and for execution - the day before the operation.
In preparation for the war against Iraq (operation conducted in January – February 1991), an order to strengthen the United Central Command (BCC) grouping by components of the US armed forces was given 164 days before the outbreak of hostilities, and an order to double the strengthening of the BCC group with the statement of the plan and the appointment of a preliminary date for the start of the war is given for 79 days. The decision on the final date and time of commencement of the military operation was taken 11 days before the chosen date, and the order to carry out the military operation from 03.00 17 in January 1991 (local time) was signed by the Minister of Defense and the Chairman of the KNSH for 26 – 27 hours before it began . It is noteworthy that the resolution of the UN Security Council on the use after January 15 to end the occupation of Kuwait of all necessary funds was adopted 49 days before the operation, that is, one month after the decision was made in the United States.
During Operation Storm in the Desert, aviation made a major contribution to the destruction of armored vehicles of the Iraqi army.
The development of a plan for the next large-scale military operation against Iraq in the United States began 14 months before it began. Information training started in more than six months, when the President of the United States called on the UNGA to deprive Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. 86 days before the start of the military operation, the Minister of Defense issued an order to consistently strengthen all components of the BCC. When the transfers and the rapid deployment of US and Allied forces in the Middle East were almost completed, the US president demanded that the head of Iraq leave the country within two days. Two days after the presentation of the ultimatum, 20 March 2003, the US armed forces and their allies officially launched a military operation against Iraq.
Sometimes the preparation of the operation is carried out in a very short time. So, for example, the decision to conduct a military operation against Afghanistan in 2001 was made 20 days before it began, the order to strengthen the BCC group was given for 18 days, and the final decision to conduct the operation was announced 5 days before it began.
UNIFORM STANDARDS
The preparation of a NATO military operation had previously in general corresponded to the American standard, with the difference that it was necessary to agree on the composition of the forces and resources of the participating countries involved in it and act in conditions of unanimity at the highest level. The governing bodies of the bloc (the NATO Council and the NATO Military Committee) determined the objectives, scope and intent of the operation and issued corresponding directives. The overall planning of the operation was carried out by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Supreme Command) of the NATO Supreme Command, detailed by the commander of the OC or the PA. After receiving the directive on the activation of forces (force activation directive), the Supreme Command warned the command of the national armed forces about the upcoming activation of forces (activation warning) and at the same time reported a preliminary list of the forces and capabilities it needed. Then he sent to the command of the national armed forces a request for the allocation of the necessary specific forces for NATO and their preparation for redeployment (activation request), completed the development of a detailed redeployment plan and presented the QA / OOF plan to the governing bodies of the unit. It is noteworthy that part of the released forces could begin redeployment after receiving a warning or a request from the Supreme Command.
The governing bodies of the block after the approval of the plan of operation and the rules for the use of military force sent the directive to the execution of the plan (execution directive). The Supreme Command issued an order to activate the forces (activation order) with the announcement of the composition of the forces, the date of entry into force of the redeployment plan, the procedure for transferring forces from national subordination to the operational control of NATO. After that, all the assigned forces began to redeploy to designated areas of concentration, where they came under the command of the NATO / C / OF commander and undertook operational deployment under his control. Later, the Supreme Command brought up to the QA / OOF the rules for the use of military force (ROE implementation) and announced the time of the start of hostilities (execution date). In turn, the OK / OOF commander gave the order to carry out the plan of operation.
The procedure for organizing and conducting a large-scale NATO military operation was periodically worked out at command and staff exercises and at other NATO operational training activities. As an example, we will give a brief summary of the conditional actions of the block at the end of the last century at one of the training events for the “crisis on the peninsula” scenario.
The UN Security Council makes an ultimatum to the aggressor demanding the withdrawal of troops from the territory they occupied in up to 60 days. Under the auspices of NATO created a multinational expedition OOF of up to 8 divisions CB, more 20 squadrons of the Air Force, 2 carrier strike and 2 carrier-based antisubmarine groups 1 amphibious-landing connection, 4 PL groups, and bone OOF becomes NATO troops numbering 200 thousand. Man . The first stage of the preparation of the operation, including the planning cycle (with the completion of the development and distribution of the draft plan of the operation) and the transfer of the allocated forces to a three-day readiness for the beginning of the redeployment, takes about 24 days. The deployment and intimidation stage (it provided for the development of the establishment of an embargo for the enemy and the protection of their sea communications) lasts about 36 days.
Why was it that at the NATO Joint Forces training activities it was believed that the UN Security Council gives the 60 aggressor of the day for the withdrawal of its troops / forces from the occupied territory? This is due to the time capabilities of NATO to bring the allocated forces to readiness and to transfer them to the appropriate theater of military operations. For example, there were forces of a high-priority deployment of NATO (NATO response force) numbering 25 thousand people. Half of these forces were brought to readiness for the transfer in 2 – 30 days, and the other - in 10 – 60 days. In the ground forces of the Euro-Asian countries of NATO, it is envisaged to have nine rapid-deployment army corps with a nominal number of personnel each up to 100 thousand people (the formation time of the corps is 60 – 90 days).
The timing of alerting and redeploying to the remote areas of the NATO Navy components and especially the Air Force allocated to the NATO PFD is much less than that of the PF, which in general, apparently, determines the ability of the NATO PF to begin a military operation in 60 days after receiving the UN Security Council mandate or the NATO Council. The same is true of the Americans. For example, in the 1990 year, a week after the seizure of Kuwait by Iraq, there were two in the BCC zone, and three weeks later, the United States Navy already had four AUGs. By the end of the seventh day of the crisis, the US Air Force grouping was strengthened by the first wing of tactical aviation and continued to grow in the future. After 18 days after Iraq’s aggression in the BCC zone, the 7 Expeditionary Brigade of the Marine Corps (deployed by air from the United States, its personnel in the number of 18, thousand people received military equipment in advance) was already in full combat readiness, and 52 days later from the beginning of the aggression, the 24 Infantry Division of the SV became completely combat-ready (17 personnel 400 people were delivered from the USA by air, military equipment and other material means were transferred by transport ships). In 2003, the transfer from the USA to the BCC zone (personnel - air, equipment - by sea) was required from the moment the 35 order was announced for the 82 airborne division, 37 days for the 101 airborne assault division, more than 70 days for the US 4 Infantry Division and more than 75 days for the transfer of the UK 1 Armored Division from Germany. The US 3 Infantry Division, which, after being transferred by air, took military equipment stored in Kuwait, Qatar and on ships, was deployed in 35 days.
There is no doubt that the timing of the preparation of operations and the composition of the forces involved in conducting them in reality and at training events vary depending on the actual educational environment or the given one. For example, the timing of the preparation of a US / NATO military operation against Yugoslavia in 1998 – 1999 and against Libya in 2011 is different, and the composition of the forces involved in the operations of the US and its allies against Iraq in 1991 and 2003.
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AND TRANSFER OF FORCES
In preparing the military operation, Western countries carefully plan not only combat, logistical, technical and special support. The ability to carry out offensive information operations (psychological struggle, EW, disinformation, actions in computer networks) to create chaos in the opposing country and in its Armed Forces is becoming increasingly important. The public opinion of Western countries is being tackled by the “forces of good against the forces of evil” and incitement of the population of the “bad” opposing state to anti-government demonstrations and the formation of the “fifth column” in this state.
The EW forces and equipment are preparing to blind and stun the enemy with electronic and fire weapons - suppressing or destroying radar stations, communication centers, radio and television centers and other similar objects. An introduction to the enemy’s coherent, broadcasting and television channels of their means for transmitting disinformation is being prepared. It is planned to commission more than two dozen units of national and combat cybernetic support, which, even before the start of a military operation, are designed to demonstrate to the enemy the threat of consequences if tensions escalate to them, and during the operation to neutralize the work of network infrastructure facilities, the use of information stored in computers management of the CDF and the command and control bodies of the enemy.
Even before the start of hostilities, more 600 reconnaissance and sabotage groups, called upon to launch operations, to neutralize significant military and civilian targets, are planned to enter the enemy’s territory.
Previously, logistics support was at the heart of the preparation of the operation, but now much is built on three pillars — logistics, reconnaissance and connected support. Two examples.
In 1990 – 1991 against Iraq, the Allies concentrated in the BCC zone up to 750 thousand troops with standard equipment and supplies of consumables for 45 – 60 days of combat operations. During the preparation and conduct of the operation, more than 400 of American large military and civilian transport aircraft transferred over 500 thousands of people and half a million tons of cargo to the BCC zone, and 300 of military and American-chartered ships delivered about 3 million tons of dry cargo (and that does not include delivered BCC zone on tankers of all types of fuel). This was how the transport support, the transfer of personnel, the transportation and accumulation of material resources were organized. In 2003, the Allies concentrated 118 reconnaissance manned and unmanned aircraft and 46 airborne early warning aircraft in the BCC zone to ensure a similar operation against Iraq by the Allies. At the same time, 50 spacecraft were used to conduct reconnaissance, maintain communications, implement navigation and other types of support. This is an example of the preparation of combat, technical and special support.
Planning for the organization of the transfer of personnel and military equipment is carried out in accordance with the course of action, which determines the order and sequence of input into the battle of components of the Armed Forces, types of troops / forces of the Armed Forces. For example, in 2003, during 48 hours, special operations forces were first deployed against Iraq, the ground forces and marines launched an offensive the next day, and the Allied air forces joined the air offensive a day later. In 1991, the coalition ground forces participated in the one and a half month operation against Iraq only in its last four days, completing the efforts of the Allied Air Force and Navy. Hence, in 90, the idea of “forming a combat space” gained popularity — creating, within one and a half or a few weeks, an enabling environment for the upcoming decisive offensive of ground forces. The stage of formation of combat space included the conquest of domination of the sea and air superiority, the conduct of a naval landing operation, the conduct of limited combat operations on land by ground forces, the provision of direct air support to the marines and ground forces, the isolation of combat areas, the destruction of WMD, missiles, the execution blockade action and offensive mine settings. Nowadays, the idea of forming a combat space has been developed by the concept of joint operational access.
It is obvious that the revolution in military affairs influenced the preparation of a military operation, raising awareness of the situation, reducing the time taken to decide on the operation and the duration of the planning process of the operation with numerous calculations. But this time gain is not yet accompanied by a sharp acceleration of the timing of the transfer of troops / forces into readiness and the timing of their movement in space. The absence of such a sharp acceleration in Western countries determines the actual terms of transfer to remote areas of destination of large contingents of troops / forces and related materiel and the need for the United States to have potential outlets of troops / forces in advance and stockpiled materiel for on land and on ships at sea for military contingents deployed by aviation.
While preparing regional military operations, the importance of the earliest possible concentration of air attack forces and US / NATO special operations forces in remote areas is also evident. At the stage of preparing a large-scale military operation, the threat and art of implementing offensive cyber operations of demonstrative and precautionary nature, which do not require any long preparation time, become a factor of strategic and regional deterrence.
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