Military Review

Paper cuts overseas strategic offensive arms

8 April was four years since the signing of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) between Russia and the United States. Since its entry into force - February 5 2011 - more than three years have passed. In Russia, these dates were marked by formal interviews of officials and experts about the "full fulfillment by the parties of their contractual obligations," which, however, does not correspond to reality regarding the Americans.

The results of the system analysis show that the United States commits a significant number of violations and circumvention of those articles of the START Treaty and its Protocol, the implementation of which is not provided for by the inspections. At the same time, the shortcomings of the contractual documents are pragmatically used, creating conditions for themselves to achieve military-technical superiority in the field of strategic offensive arms.

The American side, unlike the Russian one, did not even think about starting disarming and eliminating deployed carriers and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. For more than three years, the United States engaged in the modernization of strategic offensive arms and the destruction of missile-aircraft scrap.

At the same time, Washington periodically comes up with and throws in the media facts of violations of the INF and START treaties that the Russian side allegedly allows.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on Security and Disarmament Issues, recently said in an interview about the possibility of the Russian Federation withdrawing from the START Treaty, “if the United States continues to develop the missile defense system”. At the same time, it is noted that Washington is not fulfilling the provision of the Preamble of the START Treaty on “the existence of a relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons, the growing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing strategic nuclear weapons and the fact that current strategic defensive weapons do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic weapons offensive arms of the parties. "


Indeed, for Moscow this “interconnection” and its dynamics do not correspond to the interests of military security, since the deployment of a global US missile defense system and regional missile defense systems is in full swing. Despite the Iranian leadership’s adjustment of its nuclear program, the United States and NATO said that “the European missile defense system is not aimed at protecting against any particular country. It's about protecting against real and growing threats, but against real threats, we need real defense. ”

As a result, the Americans successfully completed the first stage of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) program and began work on the second program. In violation of the open-ended INF Treaty, they develop target rockets and successfully test the elements of a missile defense system. In the near future, they are planning to work out anti-missile interceptions using undeclared ICBMs as target missiles, which means that they have already violated the START Treaty. Romania is deploying a ground-based missile defense system Standard-3 mod. 1B. The same complex is planned to be brought to combat readiness for the 2018 year in Poland. At the same time, the transformation of this antimissile into a medium-range missile can pose a serious threat to Russia's military security.

Sergey Anuchin in his article “Umbrella from Dark Forces” (“NVO” No. 12 for 2014 a year) professionally proved that the “Standard-3” anti-missile is a mini- “Pershing-2” near the borders of Russia with flight time 5 – 6 minutes . Simply put, the European missile defense system is a carefully concealed means of the inevitable destruction of Russia, while the time to take decisions on retaliatory actions will not be enough. ” The infrastructure equipment for deploying four US Navy ships equipped with the Standard-3 missile defense system and the Aegis control system has been deployed at the naval base of Roth (Spain), and the first Donald Cook ship is already at the base. In addition, the American partners announced plans to deploy a third positioning area of ​​the anti-missile complex of the GBI in the United States. The reason for this is the alleged increase in the North Korean nuclear missile threat and the need to increase funding for the creation of a missile defense system in Japan. It should be emphasized that this regional missile defense system is being created against the eastern grouping of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

It is appropriate to recall that at the Moscow conference on missile defense (2013) using computer models, it was stated that by 2020, the EuroPRO system would be able to intercept part of the Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. In response, the Americans said: “... your models are imperfect, and the initial data used is questionable. We have our own models ... "

The question is quite reasonable: what is the mechanism for assessing the progress of the deployment of the global US missile defense system and the European missile defense system and their impact on Russia's nuclear deterrence potential? Unfortunately, such a mechanism is not specified in the texts of the contractual documents. There are only the term "anti-missile" and the Seventh Agreed Statement "Converted mine launchers (silos) of ICBMs at the Vandenberg Air Force Base." We are talking about launchers (launchers), which, in violation of the “old” START-1 Treaty, were secretly re-equipped as anti-missiles. At present, they are being used to conduct test launches of anti-missile missile systems with a view to modernizing them, and they may also be eliminated. At the same time, notifications to the Russian side about planned launches are not presented, which is fraught with nuclear incidents, especially as the GBI product is identical to an ICBM of the Minuteman-3 type.

Meanwhile, the Americans believe that paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty has been developed in the interests of the Russian side: “Each Party does not retool and does not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers to place anti-missile systems in them. Each Party does not convert and does not use anti-missile launchers to deploy ICBMs and SLBMs in them. ” It can be argued that the Americans will not engage in such costly re-equipment, since there are other cost-effective ways to increase the strength and resources of the SNA and antimissiles. Also, the provisions of the START Treaty do not prohibit the "digging" of new mines for anti-ballistic missiles in the continental United States or in another part of the world, which the Americans are supposed to do after selecting the third position area.

It is necessary to emphasize that the author proposed to issue this “interconnection” in a special coordinated statement, which would contain: composition, tactical and technical characteristics, combat capabilities of antimissiles; data presentation on US missile defense; the composition and content of notification and control and inspection procedures; the procedure for submitting information on building up elements of the US missile defense system, regional missile defense systems and other data. This would allow, with the involvement of research organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, to form reasonable conclusions necessary for making decisions, including the withdrawal from the contract.

However, these proposals were rejected. Therefore, it is strange that the governing bodies of the Russian Federation expect from the USA any written legal guarantees about the non-directionality of the European missile defense system against the Russian strategic nuclear forces. There is no doubt that these guarantees will be violated by the Americans, as happened with the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, the START-1, the START-2, on the START, the NPT, the CTBT, the MTCR, the Geneva Agreements in connection with the situation in Ukraine, etc.

Probably, the public of NATO member countries is still not sufficiently informed that the facilities of the European missile defense system and tactical weapons as a priority, they will be hit by high-precision rocket-bombing strikes and other adequately asymmetric means, the effectiveness of which is beyond doubt.

It should also be pointed out that the United States is violating the provision of the Preamble of the START Treaty, which provides for taking into account the “influence of ICBMs and SLBMs in conventional equipment on strategic stability”. It has long been known that the creation in the US of a group of non-nuclear strategic missiles has a clearly destabilizing character. Even the US Senate does not agree with this, which does not approve the program of financing the work until the Pentagon provides convincing evidence that launching these missiles, especially from SSBNs, will not lead to nuclear incidents with Russia and China. In addition, in violation of the INF and START treaties, non-nuclear equipment such as the Minotaur, GBI and hypersonic weapons are used to test non-nuclear ICBMs. In non-nuclear (and possibly nuclear) equipment they will be included in the new strategic triad. In addition, four Ohlan-type SSGN systems were converted to Tomahawk SLCM bl. IV in non-nuclear (and possibly in nuclear) equipment (up to 154 on each boat), which are periodically on combat patrols.

It should be noted that Washington within the framework of the START Treaty has not yet provided information on the purpose and objectives of ICBMs and SLBMs in non-nuclear equipment.

The US side also violates Article XIII, since it is engaged in selling the SLBM Trident-2 to a British NSNF undeclared at the time of signing the START Treaty. In addition, Americans are training British specialists; assist in the development of operational and technical and combat documentation; work on the technical pairing of the American Trident 2 SLBMs with British warheads and SSBNs, etc.

In violation of Article XIII, the Americans are involved in undeclared cooperation with the United Kingdom under the SaxESSOR program, which envisages the development of 3 – 4 new SSBNs to replace British Vangard-type submarines. The laying of the head SSBN is planned in the 2021 year with the date of its adoption in the 2027 year. It is stated that the rocket compartment is being designed by the American corporation General Dynamics with predetermined overall parameters for promising American-made SLBMs.

It is worth mentioning that, in accordance with the provisions of the strategic concept of NATO, various types of US cooperation with Great Britain and France are carried out, and that the START Treaty is not regulated. Of particular concern is the organization of a unified planning of the use of strategic nuclear forces of the United States, Britain and France. Thus, in the context of the deployment of the European missile defense system, there is a “triangle” of nuclear allies, and besides, there are also NATO nuclear forces that have tactical nuclear weapons in service.

Moreover, the United States, deploying tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of a number of NATO member countries (150 – 200 aerial bombs of type B-61), is in flagrant violation of Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which prohibits nuclear powers from transferring or providing control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, and article II prohibiting non-nuclear powers to acquire and use nuclear weapons. In this regard, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov stressed: “The deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries goes beyond the NPT. Placed in Europe, TNW can theoretically be delivered to the borders of the Russian Federation in a short time, while Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons cannot be transferred in a short time to the US border, and it does not pose a threat to America’s security. Nuclear weapons must be returned to the United States, and the infrastructure must be destroyed. ”

However, in the US nuclear strategy we read: “The tasks of deploying and using tactical nuclear weapons outside the United States are considered exclusively within the framework of the negotiation process within NATO, and it is considered necessary: ​​to keep tactical fighter aircraft armed with tactical nuclear weapons (currently F-16C / D) the measure of adoption - F-35); complete the B-61 aerial bombs life extension program for use by F-35 aircraft; ensure the storage of TNW on the territory of NATO allies ”.

In this regard, in 2013, the development of a project to extend the life of bombs of the B-61-3, -4, -7 type began with the start of work on their modernization in 2018. As part of the modernization of these air bombs, it is planned to develop a new type B61-12 air bomb, which will be qualified as strategic. In the future, promising F-61 fighter bombs and strategic bomber aircraft will be equipped with B12-35 air bombs aviation USA. In the interests of basing tactical aviation aircraft - carriers of nuclear weapons and refueling aircraft, the airbases Zoknyai (Lithuania), Lillevard (Latvia) and Emari (Estonia) have been prepared, their development during the exercises and combat duty has been organized.


According to the START Treaty, “each party reduces START so that seven years after its entry into force (by 5 February 2018 of the year) and further their total quantities do not exceed 700 units for deployed ICBMs, TB and SLBMs; 1550 units - for warheads on them; 800 units - for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB. "

The modern combat composition of the SNA and the results of the implementation of US treaty commitments were recently announced by well-known American experts G. Christensen and R. Norris in the next issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (see Table 1, 2 and 3). Based on these data, we can conclude about the "paper" nature of the abbreviations of the US SNA.

In particular, it is well known that two Ohio-class SSBNs are constantly undergoing major repairs and are contained in the operational structure of the NSNM. Strategic bombers (SB) B-1В have once again been declared as carriers of conventional weapons, although there are still opportunities for their re-equipment for performing nuclear tasks. At the same time, Russian officials and so-called independent experts and disarmament wise men are silent about the fact that within the framework of the “old” Treaty on START-1, these bombers were already nuclear-free. They also do not notice that in Article III, paragraphs 8 and 8 from the START Treaty, as existing types of ICBMs and PUs to them, as well as the Security Council, are declared to PUs and ICBMs "Minutemen-II" (actually steps) and Peeciper ( also steps), and B-52G bombers (developed), long decommissioned. The term "existing" in the first chapter of the Protocol to the START Treaty "Terms and definitions" in relation to these missiles and their stages is absent. There is also the question of the technical appearance and initial position of the missile systems with the Minuteman II and Psiper ICBMs: there are no warheads for them, and the missiles are not loaded into the silo. Meanwhile, the stages of these missiles, in violation of the INF and START treaties, are used to assemble Minotaur-type ICBMs for the purpose of testing non-nuclear equipment of the warheads. Americans traditionally do not respond to Moscow’s claims.

Of course, when preparing and agreeing on a treaty, it was possible to understand that the outdated stages of the ICBM and the Security Council were intentionally included by the Americans in the text of the treaty as a reduction quota, instead of the modernized Minuteman-3M, S, which was confirmed. As a result, for more than three years, the US reduced the warheads of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and destroyed obsolete stages of non-deployed missiles, sky-ready bombers and collapsed silos.

This conclusion is confirmed by the answers of G. Christensen in an interview with Russian media: “In fact, the United States previous years of the new US START Treaty, in essence, dealt with the elimination of the so-called ghost launchers. For example, “airplanes and rocket mines, which, being heavily outdated, were no longer involved in the nuclear mission,” but they still “were on the balance sheet. Only at this stage is the United States embarking on a genuine, rather than on paper, reduction of its nuclear arsenal. ”

Further G. Christensen emphasizes: “Currently, the United States is entering a new phase - this is a reduction of launchers that actually carry the nuclear mission today. In addition, the number of warheads deployed on ICBMs is in full swing. This year, the US administration will announce the procedure for reducing the number of ICBMs, presumably from 450 to 400 units. Approximately 30 of X-NUMX B-76H bombers will be re-equipped so that they cannot carry nuclear weapons, and in the 52 year, the US Navy will cut back on the number of launchers on each SSBN from 2015 to 24. Providing further reductions in US SNS is clearly in the interests of Russia, since the United States now has a significant superiority in the number of missiles and bombers and the number of warheads that can be placed on these carriers. ”

All these figures have long been known, because the United States officially published the promising combat composition of the SNS back in 2010 year. The next report of the Congressional Research Service details the planned targets for the SNA for 2018 year (table 2), according to which, by 5 February 2018, the combat strength of the US SNA will include 420 ICBM of the “Minuteman-3” type in monoblock equipment (with this technical capabilities for the assembly of platforms for the breeding of warheads with three warheads are preserved), all of the Ohno SSBNs are planned to be maintained, and the number of launch shafts will be reduced from 14 to 24 per boat. It should be noted that such a reduction of mines and missiles for combat readiness of USSLN is not critical, since there is the possibility of quickly increasing the number of warheads on other Trident-20 SLBMs up to 2 – 8 units each. At the same time, it is doubtful that the dismantling and re-equipment of the SSBN start-up mines will be irreversible. Procurement of SLBMs is continuing, modernization of these missiles and SSBNs is planned. It is planned to conserve combat starting positions, launch control points and other infrastructure facilities.

The number of deployed security forces in nuclear equipment will be 60 units, how many warheads will be credited to them is unknown. In reality, the B-52H is capable of carrying cruise missiles up to 20 (Russian Tu-160 - up to 12, Tu-95MS - up to 16). Meanwhile, in accordance with paragraph 2b of Article III of the treaty, the so-called conditional calculations were invented for the bombers: “For each deployed heavy bomber, one nuclear warhead is counted”. How to apply these rules in practice is not known to the authorities of the Russian Federation. Therefore, their interpretation is ambiguous when assessing declared levels of nuclear warheads in 1550 units; planning the implementation of the START Treaty; the development of strategic exercises; plans for the use, construction and development of SNF (ASNS); the formation of state weapons and defense order programs; financial justification of various projects, etc.

The above forms and methods of the “phantom” US implementation of its contractual obligations are largely due to the logical incompleteness of the content of certain articles of the START Treaty, “working” in the interests of the Americans. So, from the text of the contract it is clear that the intermediate stages, levels and terms of reducing strategic offensive arms, as was the case in the previous START-1 Treaty, are not defined. In this regard, the Americans are conducting ghostly cuts in strategic offensive weapons, observing with satisfaction as we destroy unique, outdated strategic offensive weapons.

It is realistic that in the event of force majeure affecting the interests of the national security of the United States and its allies, the Americans will withdraw from the treaty and increase the combat capabilities of their SNS. Moreover, they have found a solution to the problems of extending the service life, ensuring the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons in the conditions of the moratorium on nuclear testing.

At one time, the author proposed to define in Article II of the treaty three intermediate stages with specific levels of reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms and the parties conducting control and inspection procedures with reports to the leadership of the states on the results of each stage. However, the proposals were not accepted - and as a result, the Americans for more than three years carried out "paper" reductions in strategic offensive arms.


Ultimately, it can be concluded that the United States does not fulfill the main thing - irreversible cuts in strategic offensive arms, primarily carriers and launchers. At the same time, the judgments of a number of Russian experts look naive that the Americans will flee to reduce and destroy the upgraded ICBMs, SLBMs, SSBNs and the objects of the command and control system of troops and weapons.

There is no doubt that Americans will accomplish the reduction of strategic offensive arms (left 3,5 of the year) to the declared levels by decommissioning part of the ICBM (as happened with the Peacekeeper ICBM in the 2005) and SLBM and transferring them to the storage mode, reducing the number of warheads with preservation of platforms for breeding. Special attention will be paid to the preservation of carriers, launchers and facilities of the combat command and control system of troops and nuclear weapons with an adequate reserve of operational resources. Especially since paragraph 4 of Article III of the Treaty is in the interest of the American side: “For the purposes of this Treaty, including the counting of ICBMs and SLBMs: c) in relation to ICBMs or SLBMs that are serviced, stored and transported in steps, the first step of the ICBM or SLBM A certain type is considered as an ICBM or SLBM of this type. " The content of this article concerns the “Minuteman-3” ICBM and the Trident-2 SLBM, since the Russian ICBM and SLBM are serviced, stored, transported and liquidated as a whole.

In addition, there is paragraph 2 of section II of chapter III of the protocol, which also “works” in the interests of the Americans: “The elimination of solid ICBMs and solid-propellant SLBMs is carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph: a) the first stage is destroyed by an explosion, a notice is submitted; b) the fuel is removed by burning and in the case of the first stage rocket engine one hole is cut or punched with a diameter of at least one meter, or the case of the first stage rocket engine is cut into two approximately equal parts; (c) The fuel is removed by a washout method, and the body of the first stage rocket engine is crushed, flattened or cut into two approximately equal parts. "

Thus, regardless of the method of destruction of the first stage, the withdrawal of American ICBMs and SLBMs from the count will be recorded to eliminate their first stages. Where the second and third steps go in the protocol to the contract is not defined. Such a liquidation option has already taken place in the implementation of the START-1 Treaty with regard to the Peacekeeper missiles, which are now declared as an “existing” type, although in general they do not exist. That is, favorable conditions are created for the incomplete elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs (only in the first stage) and the creation of a return potential for missiles. It can be argued that the item 2 will provide unconditional preservation of the steps of the Minuteman-3 ICBM and the Trident-2 ICBM, as making the first steps is not a problem. By the way, the Americans completed activities to concentrate the production of all the stages of the Minuteman-3 ICBM at one enterprise.

We also note that the Americans, in violation of the requirements of Article XIII, together with the nuclear allies carry out various types of cooperation in the field of strategic offensive arms. As a result, the Pentagon can reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads to the level of 1550 warheads and below, since the list of objects of the likely enemy and the composition of nuclear weapons for their destruction are annually updated and redistributed among allies during joint nuclear planning.


Moscow, unlike Washington, punctually and responsibly fulfills its contractual obligations by eliminating unique types of strategic offensive weapons with a repeatedly extended service life. Undoubtedly, the pace of development, adoption and combat duty of promising strategic offensive weapons equipped with modern US missile defense systems will be increased.

The United States, formally carrying out reductions in its strategic offensive weapons, pays special attention to building returnable capacity by preserving carriers, launchers, and nuclear warheads. In the event of threats to the national security of the United States and its allies, Americans have the opportunity to quickly increase the combat strength of the SNA (Table 3). As if there were no cuts in American START!

It must be emphasized that the proposed expert estimates do not take into account: the possibilities of translating the X-NUMX bomber B-51B into nuclear status; the ability to equip the Trident 1 SLBM with twelve BG; up to 2 of undeployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB, which, according to the START Treaty, may be included in combat strength; the presence of nuclear allies (Great Britain and France) and NATO nuclear forces; the influence of the US global missile defense system and its regional segments on the Russian nuclear deterrence potential.

It is important to note that in June 2013, the United States announced some adjustments in its nuclear strategy. The results of its refinement are set forth in the “US Nuclear Weapon Use Strategy Report”. The document pays special attention to the maintenance of combat readiness, construction and development of the SNA with the creation of a new strategic triad. The document provides for a full-scale US nuclear weapons modernization program, calculated over more than 30 years with program funding, in the first decade alone in the amount of 200 billion dollars.

Table 1 Modern SNA combat composition and results of US implementation of treaty commitments

Paper cuts overseas strategic offensive arms

Table 2 Planned composition of the US SNA

Source: Amy F. Woolf, US Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, Issues, February 22, 2012.

Table 3 US capabilities to increase the combat potential of the SNA

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  1. KBPC50
    KBPC50 24 May 2014 08: 45
    You can never trust the enemy! And the US is enemy number 1, and not only of Russia, the enemy of everything living on the planet. With such a stock of weapons from Plutonium and Uranus, the ball can be erased in a few minutes. It is time for the Russian government to think about the deployment of medium-range missiles to destroy all, I repeat, all states on whose territory the "elements" of the amerikos are deployed. Send letters to all civil and public organizations of these states on the inadmissibility of placing these weapons. All governments to send NOT and get maximum media coverage by paying all publications for a front page article. Let everyone know that Russia does not need war. Enough with us 1941-1945. and massacres in the Caucasus. Russia and its people want to live in peace with all good neighbors, and not only. !!!
  2. andj61
    andj61 24 May 2014 09: 31
    In order to ensure effective security in Europe, it is necessary to denounce the INF Treaty. At the time of its conclusion, Pershing with not very intelligible characteristics (Pershing 1 range up to 800 km, Pershing 2 - up to 1770 km + a number of rather unsuccessful Tomahawks BGM-109A) changed to the same number of the best medium-range RSD-10 complexes in the world (range up to 5500 km, not much worse than Poplar), and as a bonus to the Americans, 1000 missile launchers went worse. Now we do not have nuclear weapons to deter NATO forces in Europe, well, maybe, with the exception of the Tu-22M2, M3. The strategic nuclear forces are intended primarily for overseas purposes. Iskanders are weapons (practically!) Of the battlefield (up to 500 km). With the accumulation of ground and naval forces of the enemy near (from 500 km) our borders, we have nothing to meet them.
    I believe that the main thing is not reduction agreements, but ensuring the country's security.
  3. free
    free 24 May 2014 09: 40
    missiles on a cube!
    1. AVV
      AVV 24 May 2014 12: 37
      Caribbean crisis number 2 could put this American evil spirits in their stall !!!
  4. lotar
    lotar 24 May 2014 11: 35
    For me, people in many European countries are confused about missile defense and what it can threaten them with. And the politicians who are at the helm of power carefully hide and protect this. One of the tasks that confronts us is to open our eyes to ordinary Europeans the essence of the danger that these missile defense systems pose primarily for them. If it is necessary to destroy any element that threatens our national security, we really need to understand that these systems will be destroyed. Moreover, with those weapons that will make the Europeans change their minds. about any illegal actions against our state and our allies. And we all perfectly understand what kind of weapon will be used.
  5. Brummbar
    Brummbar 24 May 2014 12: 18
    Dimka "Aifonchik" signed and was very proud, but it turned out that they were cheated again as with Libya, but you were then the President and you had to calculate all the options.
  6. Nitarius
    Nitarius 24 May 2014 12: 30
    long time to leave the contract! Hitler's United States raised! and you think that they are honest! IT'S TIME TO STOP PLAYING WITH THE NAME TO DAMAGE YOURSELF!
  7. Observer2014
    Observer2014 24 May 2014 15: 01
    1. andj61
      andj61 24 May 2014 15: 37
      You can manage one wagon. The United States has dozens of military satellites. And each one will have to spend at least a carriage.
      It is necessary to revive combat space stations such as the Almaz series, better known as Salyut (manned). In addition, the Air Force seemed to be armed with anti-satellite missiles, and in a stationary version, too
  8. zoknyay82
    zoknyay82 24 May 2014 21: 45
    You cannot play with cheaters honestly, or rush for cards or distort.
  9. Andrey82
    Andrey82 25 May 2014 11: 23
    The question is, why do we need to bind ourselves with some kind of agreement when, in 2009, it was clear that there would be a missile defense system in Europe? I hope this is not a deliberate fit of our strategic nuclear forces to the capabilities of the multi-echelon US missile defense of land and sea (in the future, probably space-based)?
    At the same time, they will re-equip something there, while retaining the possibility of re-equipping into nuclear options.
    We must take an example from China, which does not bind itself to anything and is free to build its strategic nuclear forces as it needs it.
    Stop talking and negotiating with those who want to destroy both Russia and all Slavs in general. Gorbachev was also negotiating, looking for consensus. What all this led to is known to all.
  10. Zomanus
    Zomanus 25 May 2014 12: 53
    Yes, it seems to me that the Kremlin is aware of all this. There are Iskanders, who may well carry a vigorous loaf, there are Yarses, which are allowed just to medium radii. So they rake everything in full. It’s just that Europeans have not yet been prompted. Here we have the Crimea, from there you can hold the Mediterranean countries at gunpoint. So it’s not so bad. And with amers, we are no longer friends for a long time, as in 90's.
    1. Andrey82
      Andrey82 25 May 2014 14: 56
      Neither the Iskanders nor the bases in Crimea threaten the United States directly. And their missile defense is a threat to our strategic nuclear forces. Do you feel the difference? And if they there, in violation of all treaties, deploy medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in the mines? In general, until there is an immediate threat to the United States itself, as in the days of the Cuban missile crisis, they will be preparing to destroy us. Our lethargy and passivity only strengthens the Anglo-Saxons in their desire to finally resolve the "Russian question" in one fell swoop. It's not even about geopolitics, but about the fact that they hate us because we are different. This is at the genetic level. So it was not even worthwhile to negotiate with them and limit ourselves. They only need one thing from us - that there is no Russia at all.
  11. Sobol
    Sobol 25 May 2014 18: 10
    START, START. In general, this 3.14ndostan should be reduced. Clean up.
  12. resh
    resh 26 May 2014 02: 44
    Why is diplomacy needed if all decisions are not implemented?