Catastrophe 1941 of the year is around the corner
At the latest in 2014, a global crisis will break out, which, in fact, has not yet begun.
Exactly one month left until June 22, when 70 will turn years with the perfidious attack of Nazi Germany on our country.
Media war on this issue is already in full swing. And the key question again will be the determination of those responsible for the 1941 summer crash of the year. Indicative here is an article by Captain First Rank Retired Valery Kalinin in the “Independent Military Review” for 13 in May with the saying “Intelligence and the Kremlin on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.” Intelligence provided irrefutable evidence. ”
The author, of course, shows the alleged inadequacy of the “Kremlin” with the Soviet intelligence as accurate as a clock: “The military-political leadership of the country received from the Soviet intelligence reliable and timely information that Germany was preparing to attack; indicated the date and time, the strategic construction and the numerical composition of the shock groups. This intelligence information made it possible to correctly assess the current military-strategic situation and draw adequate conclusions both to the political leadership of the country and to the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. ”
However, the author is indignant, despite the fact that everything was done by intelligence, and in abundance, the “military-political leadership of the USSR” (Stalin, Beria, Molotov are listed below) failed to use intelligence data and up to June 22, “not believing” in Germany’s attack, made a tragic mistake
That is, the idea of a retired kapranga can be expressed in almost the same stem style as that of the notorious Mlechin, who recently stated the following on Ekho Moskvy: “Only two people did not know that Hitler was going to attack the Soviet Union : it is Molotov and Stalin. Everyone else saw that this was going on ... ".
However, there is nothing new in such statements. All of this is a rehash of the famous fantasies of Nikita Khrushchev in his infamous “report” at the XX CPSU Congress, where Nikita Sergeevich creatively analyzed the 1941 situation of the year, indicating that no surprise in Hitn's attack on 22 on June 1941 of the year could be, because “As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany, he immediately set himself the task of defeating communism. The fascists spoke directly about this without hiding their plans. ” That is, according to Khrushchev, Stalin not only did not listen to his valiant intelligence, but even Hitler himself did not notice 8 for years at close range!
However, it is precisely the absence of any novelty in the article by Valery Kalinin, and even in the so respected “Independent Military Review,” that requires asking the question: why did all this nonsense play again?
Obviously, in order to solve two problems.
First, to kick the dead lion once again - I.V. Stalin, and with him - the entire leadership of the country and the USSR.
Secondly, once again to raise its departmental corporation (this time - intelligence, and the army) at the expense of the political leadership, respectively, by downplaying the latter.
In fact, today there is no doubt that the Soviet intelligence failed to identify the strategic plan of the main potential enemy and, therefore, systematically disoriented the country's top leadership. This follows exhaustively from the main document of those pre-war months - the report of the Chief of Intelligence of the General Staff of the Red Army Lieutenant-General Golikov to the NPO USSR, SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) “Sayings, [organizing] and options for fighting the German army against the USSR” from March 20 1941
At the end of that analytical note, a conclusion was drawn from two points, which confidently stated that it was impossible for Germany to attack the USSR until “Hitler’s victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable world for Germany”.
As you know, 22 June 1941, when Hitler attacked the USSR, he had neither victory over England, nor peace with her. That is, according to Soviet intelligence, Hitler could not start the war with the USSR on June 22, and did it, obviously, by mistake, without being familiar with the report of Golikov. Moreover, the chief military intelligence officer in the name of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate in that report directly demanded that the political leadership of the country regard “rumors and documents speaking of the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year” as disinformation.
These two points are:
"Conclusion:
1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the commencement of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable world for Germany.
2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability in the spring of this year of the war against the USSR should be regarded as misinformation emanating from the British and even, perhaps, German intelligence. "
Obviously, spring in the text of the Golikov’s report was taken rather tentatively, like the forecast “for the quarter,” but, without a doubt, they meant at least the first months of summer. Otherwise, intelligence would have to emphasize that with the beginning of the summer, an assertion about the dependence of Germany’s actions against the USSR on Germany’s reconciliation with England no longer works. But - not written. Thus, to call such “information”, as Kalinin does this time, “reliable and timely” is not just wrong, but now, 70 years after those events, is a direct lie.
Contrary to Kalinin’s bravura assertions, the findings presented by intelligence not only did not allow “correctly assessing the evolving military-strategic situation and drawing adequate conclusions both to the political leadership of the country and to the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff,” but on the contrary, led the country’s leadership to a disastrous link the moment of the attack on the USSR with the victory of Germany over England or the achievement of peace with it. That is, the country's leadership was asked to wait for the outcome of the confrontation between Germany and England, to which the spring-summer of that tragic year was still far away.
I do not in any way wish, as Kalinin and the darkness of other “historians” and “analysts” do, to belittle such leaders as Golikov and intelligence in general. All our discussions and reflections are made in the situation of knowledge about what happened on June 22 and in the first months of the war — that is, with the presence of that fundamental factor, which Golikov and the Soviet leadership were completely deprived of. Clever, possessing knowledge, is easy, and they had to make decisions in a situation of gigantic uncertainty and purposeful action to misinform them from both Germany and (especially) England.
And it is clear to the children that the same England was vitally interested in Stalin's beginning the war against Germany or giving Germany a reason to attack the USSR. All the more ridiculous today to refer to Churchill's telegrams, which, they say, also warned Stalin about Hitler’s impending attack. And it’s not even the fact that to receive such “information” from Churchill meant de facto to be convinced of the opposite, that Churchill just skillfully bleeds, but Churchill himself, beyond any doubt, “subjectively” provided “unique information” on 90% exclusively in order to hook Stalin and maximize the Soviet leader against Hitler.
And here is the key point. Not resolving the situation with England and attacking the USSR, Hitler made an absolutely adventurous, and therefore extremely difficult to predict move. Hitler in a situation of extremely limited time and resources, in fact, had no other choice. And at the same time he had good reasons to use this blitzkrieg technology, a “blitzkrieg”, and with the help of a tremendously powerful army to solve this almost impossible task.
Not to attack the USSR, Hitler could not, but to attack the USSR was tantamount to suicide. And it is time to recognize that in this regard, both Soviet intelligence and Stalin did not expect Hitler’s suicidal decision.
The most important thing in the end is that the 1941 disaster of the year, paradoxically, is one of the surest indicators of the greatest, unprecedented feat of the Soviet people and its leadership.
Going on an adventure, Hitler and his pan-European, in fact, military machine were supposed to grind the USSR with everything in their crazy frenzy and with an outstanding organization. But the country has withstood the blow of an unprecedented over-concentrated force of the furious suicide enemy. Moreover, in the shortest time in the most difficult conditions, in two years an absolutely new Red Army was created, which after Stalingrad became the strongest army in the world.
That is why we are faced with not just war, and not just World War II, but the Great War with the Great Victory.
As for the allegedly clever intelligence and stupid political leadership, all this has long been studied and re-studied. As historian Mikhail Meltyukhov wrote 15 years ago, “Soviet intelligence failed to uncover the strategic intent of the German command. Information about the directions of the offensive of the Wehrmacht was too controversial and did not always correspond to reality ... Moreover, Soviet intelligence did not have accurate information about the possible nature of hostilities against the USSR ". Qualitative and with a good syllable analysis of this issue is in the books of Alexey Isaev and Igor Pykhalov.
And the point, of course, is not at all that in retaliation to such unscrupulous writers as Kalinin, Mlechin and Co., to begin to accuse Soviet intelligence and intelligence agents. But it is time for the patriots of the military intelligence and the army to enter the mind. It’s also time to recycle the article of the “long-term” Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, Army General Peter Ivanovich Ivashutin, published on the eve of the 45 anniversary of Victory in Trud, with the program name “Intelligence reported exactly ...”.
What were the real reasons for the defeat of the beginning of the Great War?
Firstly, the German army was at that time objectively the strongest, and technologically it was simply an outstanding army, which also represented the combined might of all of Europe.
Secondly, the attack is always more powerful and at the first stage gives phenomenal advantages. But the Kremlin and the country needed to strategically attack themselves so that the absolutely obvious aggression against the USSR would become the basis for all subsequent political and diplomatic actions, including the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition itself.
In this regard, it is striking how inadequate the former military intelligence officer of the country for a quarter of a century was inadequate when, in that article in Trud, he stated: “The country's leadership essentially ignored intelligence data about the looming threat to the security of the USSR, since they did not meet then established political attitudes and subjective assessments of Stalin and his entourage. "
What intelligence data actually were, we already know, and the trouble is that the government did not ignore them. As for the "political attitudes," we are confronted not with the main military spy of the late USSR, but with a little toddler who cannot assess where he sits on a pot - in which institution and in which country.
Equally flagrantly inadequate are the arguments of Marshal Vasilevsky, even two decades after the end of the war, he still didn’t understand that any leader of the USSR simply had no right to allow any provocation and erosion of German aggression in the pre-war 1941 weeks — especially if this leader was a brilliant geopolitics.
Vasilevsky’s reasoning about the need for “forced mobilization” even then seemed to be complete nonsense: “After all, fascist Germany, especially the last month, in essence, openly carried out military preparations on our borders; more precisely, it was the very time when it was necessary to carry out forced mobilization and transfer of border districts to full combat readiness, organization of tough and deeply echeloned defense. I.V. Stalin, who had a great influence on the foreign and domestic policies of the party and the government, apparently could not correctly grasp this turning point ... The fact that Stalin was unable to make such a decision in time is his most serious political miscalculation. "
Again, behind such clever ideas is the desire to shield the failures of the General Staff and the military intelligence that was subordinate to it.
Thirdly, the Germans really developed and organized a new type of war, when they simply did not give the same “legal” days of 10-14 textbooks to mobilize and deploy troops.
And fourth, the main thing. Overwhelmingly, we all were not ready for a deadly war, because we did not prepare well and were extremely careless.
In a situation of collision with a perfectly mobilized, shelled and attacking according to the plan of the strongest German army in the world, the Red Army inevitably had to be a victim.
One of the best writers about the war, Viktor Nekrasov, in the novel 1946 of the Year In the Trenches of Stalingrad gave perhaps the most accurate answer to the question why we were not ready.
Here is the dialogue between Farber and the lieutenant Kerzhentsev:
“Have you ever thought about your past life?
- Well?
- Do not you think that we to some extent led an ostrich lifestyle?
- Strausovsky?
- If you draw parallels, perhaps it will be the most successful. We barely poked our heads out from under the wing.
- Decode.
- I'm talking about the war. About us and about the war. By us, I mean myself, you, in general, people not directly connected with the war in peacetime. In short, did you know that there would be war?
- Perhaps he knew.
- Not perhaps, but they knew. Moreover, they knew that they themselves would participate in it.
It is deeply drawn in several times and exhales smoke noisily.
“Before the war, you were the reserve commander.” Right? VUS-34 ... Higher military training or something like that ... Once a week you had a war day. You all diligently missed it. In the summer - camps, drill. Right, left, round, step march. Commanders demanded a clear turn, fun songs. In tactical exercises, hiding in the bushes, you slept, smoked, looked at your watch, how much was left before dinner. I think that I am a little mistaken.
- Frankly, not enough.
- Here the dog is buried ... We all relied on others. We stood on the sidewalk during the May Day parades, pens in trousers, and looked at the people passing by. Tanks, on planes, on walking soldiers in the ranks ... Ah, how great, oh, what power! That was all we were thinking about. Is it true? And the fact that we someday will have to walk, and not on the asphalt, but on a dusty road, with a bag over our shoulders, that life will depend on us - well, not hundreds, but at least dozens of people ... Did you think we then about it? .. And who is to blame for all this? Who's guilty? Uncle - as my foreman says? No, not uncle ... It's my fault. Before the war, I just was not interested in doing military affairs ... ”
But the most important thing is that it was not interesting for many of the military, who lived well in those days, to do military affairs.
The best professional analysis of the beginning of the war was given by our best commander Konstantin Rokossovsky in his memoirs “Soldier's Duty”. Here is a small piece of the first chapters:
“On the road [from the headquarters of the Kiev Military District], I involuntarily began to think about what had happened, that we suffered such a heavy defeat in the initial period of the war.
... Somewhere, in the depths, according to the real calculations of the General Staff, our main forces must have time to turn around. They had to meet the enemy in an organized manner and strike him with a counterstrike. Why did this not happen? .. What plan did our General Staff develop and submit to the government? And did he even exist? ..
Well, let's say the General Staff did not have time to draw up a real plan for the initial period of the war in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany. How, then, to explain such criminal carelessness, admitted by the command of the district (border districts)? .. The troops of this [Kiev] district from the very first day of the war turned out to be completely unprepared for meeting the enemy ... ”.
Why go far? Suffice it to recall the five-day war to protect South Ossetia in August 2008. It was all the same, only an order of magnitude worse.
And, discussing the 70-old catastrophe, it’s time for us to mature and sober up after all this Khrushchev-perestroika chatter. Learn the right lessons and draw adequate conclusions for us today.
If the Comber Farber called the pre-war lifestyle of that time “ostrich”, then for our present carelessness even this assessment would have looked like an undeserved compliment.
The main war is now in geoeconomics. At the latest in 2014, a volcanic global crisis will erupt, which has not actually started yet. No later than the spring of 2013, the prices for oil and gas will be maximally lowered - in particular, as one of the methods for delaying a crisis explosion. Even without more than possible during the 2013-2015 period. real war, we will be crushed and shattered in geoeconomic terms.
And tell me, which of our top officials and “ordinary” people are preparing for the coming “sudden” cataclysm? And what will happen as a result of our immobilization? ..
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