Analysis of trends in the development of means of warfare and methods of their use at the turn of the XX – XXI centuries suggests a fundamental change in the nature of warfare. Its center of gravity and the main efforts are transferred to the air and outer space. The militarily leading states of the world rely primarily on gaining dominance in the aerospace sphere.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range air, sea-based and land-based cruise missiles in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment pose the greatest threat to the security of the Russian Federation emanating from the aerospace sphere.
Up to 2020, additional threats are expected to emerge due to the creation and adoption of unmanned X-37В spacecraft, hypersonic aircraft, aerospace planes and planning warheads.
Military scientists and practitioners are aware of the pattern: the course and outcome of military actions is largely determined by successful operations in air and space. This is convincingly shown by the experience of military conflicts in the second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Active actions or inaction of the national air defense systems of the state and the armed forces determined the course and outcome of the armed struggle. So it was in Vietnam, where active and effective actions of the national air defense forces forced the aggressor to abandon the war. Conversely, the inaction or weakness of national air defense systems led to the collapse of a number of states. So it was in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia.
Therefore, in these conditions, the problem of creating a reliable aerospace defense system (EKR) capable of countering threats from the aerospace sphere is now becoming more urgent than ever. It is one of the main strategic components of the national security of a country and its role is constantly increasing, and its creation is a state task, in its significance and complexity comparable to the creation of nuclear weapons in the 40 of the last century. weapons.
The current state of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation can be described as transitional.
The once unified air defense system of the country is today divided into separate components subordinate to military districts, air defense forces and air forces, without a single command, and the withdrawal from the composition of air defense units is fighter aviation deforms the basis of a triad-based system that includes anti-aircraft missile forces, fighter aircraft and radio-technical troops. This can lead to unpredictable consequences in the matter of solving the tasks of the country's aerospace defense.
At present, the main task during the construction of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation is the creation of its technical basis - the aerospace defense system, which is understood as a set of organizationally and technically interconnected forces and means ensuring the solution of the problem of repelling an aerospace attack of the enemy according to a single plan and under a single command, in a single battle control circuit.
The aerospace defense system should be created as a single integrated modular structure with an open architecture, complexing the tools and systems already in service, modern weapons and military equipment and future weapons of the future. It should consist of three main subsystems:
- systems of reconnaissance and warning of an aerospace attack;
- systems of destruction and suppression of the forces and means of aerospace attack;
These systems are designed to ensure the effective solution of the main groups of problems of aerospace defense. The first is the provision of strategic nuclear deterrence; the second is the protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, the control of the airspace and the prevention of violations of its use, the control of outer space; the third is the aerospace defense of troops and objects in local and regional military conflicts with the use of conventional weapons.
The aerospace defense system as a subsystem of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation should contribute to the fullest possible completeness of the tasks assigned in the new conditions and taking into account the characteristics of the tasks themselves.
Creating a system of intelligence and warning of an aerospace attack (SRPVKN) requires the solution of a number of problems.
Considering the participation of the SRPVKN in strategic nuclear deterrence, it should be noted that it is intended to ensure the task of warning the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation about beating and disarming SVKN strikes, thereby realizing the potential of a retaliatory strike by the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Assessing the capabilities of the space-based and ground-level missile defense systems for warning of the impacts of ICBMs and SLBMs, it can be stated that they are at the proper level and are continuously increasing. But it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the United States, along with ballistic missiles, also have the enormous potential of nuclear strategic cruise missiles, in which they have always had an advantage over us. It is aggravated by the actual lack of accounting for these missiles in the last Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
Low-altitude unobtrusive strategic nuclear cruise missiles with the current state of the radar field of the Air Force and the EKR Troops pose a serious threat to the Russian strategic nuclear forces. Under these conditions, special attention should be paid to measures to counter this threat, which may include, among other things, the enhancement of the radar field by means of ground-based, airborne, and, in the long run, space-based reconnaissance.
These measures will also contribute to the solution of the task of protecting the state border in airspace and controlling the procedure for its use. It should be noted that at present the length of the radiolocation-controlled sections of the state border of Russia does not allow us to speak about the effective solution of this problem. Difficulties due to the unique size of the territory of Russia.
The system of destruction and suppression of SVKN (SPP) must be able to carry out fire, functional, interfering effects on all means of the enemy's aerospace attack in order to defeat them, disable or neutralize them.
The main problems of the development of the weapons system of the aerospace defense in the part of SPP are
-the lack of a unified information space that ensures the interaction of diverse forces and means of NGN;
- the insufficient effectiveness of the means of ensuring the stability of the ZRV groups and the protection of objects under the conditions of the massive use of precision weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles.
We believe that the main efforts of NGN, ensuring the effective use of limited resources, should focus on the facilities of the strategic nuclear forces of the Strategic Missile Forces. The primary nature of their cover is due to the fact that the main nuclear potential of the SNF is in these forces.
Considering the possibility of participation of NGN funds in solving the problems of the aerospace defense in the course of military conflicts of local and regional scale, the following should be noted. Considering the limited composition of resources in the regions of possible conflicts, the main requirements for the NGN weapon system are mobility, the ability for strategic deployment in a short time to the conflict region by various types of transport (flight, air, land / water, combined) and ensure jointly with the strike component of the Armed Forces the maximum degree of realization of opportunities to create the required balance of forces of the parties for conducting armed struggle in the air sphere in the conflict region.
The control system of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation is the backbone element of the aerospace defense system. The main issues of concern for creating a control system for aerospace defense include:
- low efficiency of communicating to the troops (forces) of commands and combat control signals, intelligence information about the aerospace situation;
-moral obsolescence of special software for automation;
-the lack of automation to solve the problems of planning operations (combat operations) and managing the daily activities of the troops;
- insufficient capacity of the EKO communication system to ensure sustainable exchange of real-time data.
The main ways to solve these problems:
-development (modernization) of automation equipment KP of various levels of management, including the creation of new technical means to ensure the joint processing of information about SVKN;
-Equipment by means of the command-signal path of control points of aerospace defense of all levels;
-creation of a unified network for real-time data exchange, increase in throughput and the number of areas of communication system exchange;
-creation of automation tools for solving problems of planning operations and managing the daily activities of troops.
The implementation of these measures will significantly improve the efficiency of command and control of troops, forces and means solving the tasks of the East Kazakhstan region.
A completely logical question arises: who should solve the problems of creating the technical basis of the aerospace defense system? We believe that the need to create an integrated structure of the aerospace defense in the military-industrial complex - the unified center of the aerospace defense (EC of the East Kazakhstan region) or the Strategic Armament of the aerospace concern has long been overdue. Relevant proposals for the formation of a system integrator of the East Kazakhstan region, agreed with the concern "RTI-Systems" and the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Central Research Institute" Kometa ", were prepared and reported by the Presidium of the Independent Expert Council on the problems of aerospace defense.
We believe that the purpose of creating the EC of the East Kazakhstan region is to form a scientific, technical and economically sound, organizationally legally issued, high-tech multi-profile domestic scientific and industrial base providing equipment to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of VVT East, allowing to achieve guaranteed superiority in the aerospace field preparation and conduct of hostilities using the country's aerospace defense system.
Separately, we should dwell on the issues of improving the organizational structure of troops (forces) that solve the tasks of the East Kazakhstan region, since at present it is far from optimal. The combination of the strike and defensive components in the air force and air defense associations, as experience from the operational training of troops shows, does not contribute to the effective solution of the planning and use of troops (forces). So, during the exercises, the commander of the association had to participate in the KP of the military district in planning the use of all strike components of the military district (strike aircraft, air force and A, forces fleet), while the chief of staff of the association solved the air defense tasks at the command post of the command of the Air Force and Air Defense.
Historical experience indicates the urgent need to separate the strike and defensive components of the RF Armed Forces operating in the air. Certain steps in this direction have already been taken. So, in 2011, the East Kazakhstan forces were created. However, the implemented version of the structural changes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation did not fully ensure the unity of responsibility for the construction of aerospace defense throughout the country, organize a unified command of troops (forces) that solve the tasks of aerospace defense, in strategic, operational and tactical links management, and also to eliminate the occurring duplication in the work of the military command and control bodies.
In the course of an active discussion, there were discussions of two main options for further improving the organizational structure of the troops (forces) solving the tasks of the aerospace defense. The first option involves the development of the country's aerospace defense system and the Armed Forces based on the East Siberian Armed Forces troops, ensuring unity of command and responsibility, the second is the creation of the Aerospace Forces (WAC) with the inclusion of the East Kazakhstan region troops and the separation of operational and administrative functions between the commander of the armed forces and military counties.
To solve the problem of justifying a rational version of the structure of the troops (forces) of the East Kazakhstan region solving the tasks of the East Kazakhstan region, the Independent Expert Council on the problems of the East Kazakhstan region analyzed these options by the “cost-effectiveness” criterion.
The analysis shows that under the creation of the VKS, which was developed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the greatest problems will arise in solving the problem of ensuring strategic nuclear deterrence. This is due to the large predictable difficulties of creating a unified system of guaranteed opening of the fact of beheading and disarming attacks and bringing information about them to state and military authorities, due to the various subordination of intelligence forces and means.
When solving the task of protecting the state border in the airspace of the Russian Federation, the first option is more advantageous in terms of the total capabilities of the aerospace defense forces and facilities. This is caused by the inclusion in the chain of command, according to the version of the VKS, of additional units of command and control of personnel on air defense by forces and means and, as a result, a decrease in the efficiency of management.
When solving the problem of aerospace defense of troops and objects in regions of military conflicts, as shown by the analysis of the results of mathematical modeling, for the first option compared to the second one it’s typical:
-optimal targeting and the safe use of fighter aviation forces in the ZRV zone of fire, due to the unity of control of EKR facilities;
higher management efficiency due to fewer decision levels.
These factors confirm the advantage of the first option over the second.
If the organizational structure options are considered from the standpoint of providing the best conditions for the construction of the East Kazakhstan oblast, then it should be noted that the best conditions will be created if sole responsibility for the construction of the East Kazakhstan region’s system and the assignment of this task to the commander of the East Kazakhstan Army will be created, otherwise the following Problems:
the commanders of the VKS will be overloaded with a variety of tasks for the construction of the aerospace defense system (orbital grouping, PSA VKN, SCP, missile defense, air defense) and the Air Force (long-range, bomber, assault, army and military transport aviation), which will not allow it to concentrate efforts to solve the strategic task of creating a country's aerospace defense system;
Many years of experience in building integrated military structures shows that creating a new type of aircraft based on one of its member structures is fraught with a great risk of skewing its construction.
It must be admitted that the unification of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces in 1997 was a necessary measure during the period of a total reduction in the number of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the lack of funds for their maintenance. This made it possible, at least at a minimum level, to maintain their combat readiness and prevent them from falling apart completely.
However, times are changing, international and internal conditions of existence of Russia are changing, which requires new approaches in building the defense of the country and its Armed Forces. The increasing role and importance of aerospace attacks in the course and outcome of hostilities led to the creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces (ASD) of the Russian Federation.
The time has come to study in detail the results of the scientific substantiation and the experience of building the country's Air Defense Forces, which, de facto, already in the 80s, were in essence EKR Troops. This is due to the need to concentrate all efforts on the implementation of the main task of building the aerospace defense system and solving a multitude of interspecific problematic issues, primarily on priorities, with the GRU, Navy, Army and Air Forces.
Thus, the implementation of the above directions for creating a technical basis for the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation and improving the organizational structure of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation on the basis of the aerospace troops will, in our opinion, provide an effective solution to the tasks of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation in the aerospace sphere.