A year ago, I had the opportunity to meet with one interesting person, now an agronomist scientist, and in the past, the commander of a reconnaissance team who fought with the “green brothers” in 1952..1953gg in Estonia. I was primarily interested in the experience of use and operation weaponswhat and how it showed. However, the information was so unusual and interesting that I decided to present it in this article. Perhaps it will be interesting for the modern military.
Our meeting was held in the All-Russian Institute of Plant Protection, in the office. This person during a personal acquaintance turned out to be an ordinary cheerful grandfather of 70 years with kopecks. His past gave only a scar on his head, and blue eyes, unexpectedly clear, attentive and dashing, perhaps, inappropriate age and appearance. In addition, a maskkalat with strings instead of buttons, rather new in appearance, and a leather brown pouch on the wall led to certain thoughts. As it turned out, the camouflage is already more than 50 years old, and the cartridge pouch is even bigger - it is from the German MR.
He felt in 1952..1953gg fighting in Estonia, was the commander of the reconnaissance group, and then in 1954 in Korea, was injured and commissioned for health reasons. Further will be stated in his words.
The strength of the Soviet intelligence group was usually 32..34 people. According to the state in service were carbines arr. 1944g, PCA, 2 radio stations and one PD per group. The actual armament of the group was the 8 RP MG-34 / 42, 10..12 PCT units with installed PU and PCA with box magazines. On average, they tried to keep every fourth armed with a machine gun, every third with a sniper rifle, and the rest with automatic weapons.
With regard to light machine guns, it was believed that the more the better, preferably 2..3 for each compartment. MGShniki got from where you can, mostly of course trophy. They were shot from them in frequent short bursts - on a flash, down under a tree, on the right, on the left, and the fire is transferred to the next target, regardless of the results. Preference was given to them, and not DP, because of the possibility of "mining" from the enemy, and because of the tape feed. In the case of incomplete, DP was also used.
The Tokarev self-loading rifles also got it by hook or by crook. The rifle was modified with automatic control for automatic fire, the single was manually cut off. The reason for such unexpected tricks is the need for the squall of fire in case of ambush and the imitation of many RPs in a group to demoralize the enemy. Bipods were not used because of the transience of a forest battle. PU got to where and how much you can, if possible - on all rifles. Blends did not, the case is regular on PU.
There were enough automatic machines, but only box store was used for PPSH: it is better than disk drive - more reliable, especially if you have to touch at night. Plus, less clearance and weight. PPP was not enough, and did not like them because of the lack of a normal butt. Lead bullets were used, one of the three bullets was cut with a cross. Whether it gave any advantages in terms of stopping power - the author does not know, this was the way the recommendation of the sergeant who went through the war was done. If, however, each is filed, then penetrability falls, incl. shrub. Tracer and armor-piercing were not used.
On the whole, the weapon revision included the adjustment “for themselves” and the descent polishing, which was very strong for the SVT.
Shooting a sound at night is unsuccessful. Better on the backlight (clock, glasses, shadow). The main tactic when ambushed is the “fire hedgehog” (although it wasn’t called that yet), which is why the modified SVT is needed. Side patrols are not used. The rest of the tactics are fairly standard.
Pistols were at the commander of the group and his deputies, according to the state of the TT, and in fact - two Nagana. The reason - the drum (the ability to shoot a second time in the event of a misfire). Other systems are not used. Pistols were used in houses during sweeps, during hand-to-hand combat (RB). The main method of cleaning rooms - shooting prone, under the furniture. The fighter rolls into the room and falls to the floor. In this case, one hand may be under the body, or be in an uncomfortable position for firing. For this, two crooks are needed - in each hand.
The main task during stripping is to shoot first. The enemy, after even passing a bullet that flew past, will have a jim-jams, and he will not fall back into you anymore. The second you dump him. The first shot is fast, the second one is accurate. It should be aimed at the hand, not at the front sight. They shot in the chest, the head did not heal.
The stopping effect is better with TT than with Nagan, and with Parabellum slightly better than TT. In fact, there was no case for someone to miss one hit.
Grenades in the management of the database in the forest did not use, but just in case (cleaning the strong point, buildings) were worn - 4 pcs. RGD-33 without shell. Used mainly without fuses, to trick. The fuses are either in a pomegranate or in a box on a belt (not on the chest).
Optics - 1 binoculars for platoon. Covers it did not sew.
In terms of cold arms, the MPL was actively used, including in RB. It was sharpening the contour. It was cut along the neck from the side down, "along the ear" into the collarbone (there is a lot of iron on the body, it can ricochet from any flags). In addition, the MPL in the Republic of Belarus can be put under the ricochet (if you see where the enemy is aiming) - there was a precedent with the author's grandfather in the war (see below). They trained to throw knives, but there was no precedent for using the author’s memory.
A spotted camouflage suit was used (tricolor, which hung on a hanger). Masks, mittens, disguise weapons are not used (not thought of it, according to the author). Camouflage nets and “shaggy” camouflage were not used — they cling to bushes, you don’t run much in the forest.
During the war, our troops cut their heads - a way to recognize their own, plus it is more convenient in the Republic of Belarus. The Germans wore long hair. Also used in Estonia.
Below are two memorable cases that the author told me about.
- The only precedent for the use of grenades and pistols from the author (1953, Estonia).
Situation - they surrounded the village house, inside which the group of 5 militants was blocked (the leader, radio operator and 3 fighter). They offered to surrender, otherwise they will burn them from grenade launchers. Militants put the children in the windows - it turned out that there was also the host family in the house. We decided to wait for the special group of the MGB. An order came to storm the forces of the reconnaissance, and to take the radio operator alive.
Storming plan: Two grenades under the very windows without shirts - explosions (splinters up) - two grenades into the windows without fuses. The first group is a 2 man with two footpieces each. Rolled into the door crosswise, one for the stove on the radio operator, the second under the window for the leader (the location of their allegedly, the layout in appearance, pipe, and analogies with typical houses). Cut them down while they shrank in anticipation of the explosion. Then they shoot at the rest lying under the furniture.
The second group is 3 person with PCA. They follow in, fall to the floor and shoot at the ceiling, for demoralization.
The actual performance - the second group did not fall to the floor, began to shoot standing up and was destroyed by the militant (one successful line from the MR), which the first group did not have time to finish. Account - 3: 3. Civil are intact. The leader and the radio operator are taken alive.
- The situation of hand-to-hand combat at the Pulkovo Heights of the author's grandfather (1941, Leningrad Front).
Situation: A group of militias around 30 people in the defense at a high-altitude. Assumed the onset of the Germans. Armament: rifles, 2 clips for cartridges, 2 grenades RGD-33 and gas masks. The commander (actual, who became them in the trenches) - the author's grandfather, a non-commissioned officer in the past and a veteran of the German war.
Commander's actions: separated those who honestly passed the Voroshilovsky shooter and know how to shoot. The 5 man is out. Gave them rifles and all bullets. Then he separated those who know how to fight, mostly punks. 7 man is out. He gave them sapper shovels, told them to sharpen, lie in the first line and jump out with him at the expense of "two." Of the rest, selected those with brains. He gave them grenades with a fuse and said to throw at the command "once". The rest (stupid, blind and unable to fight) distributed the grenades without fuses and told to throw at the command “two”. Then yell "Hurray", without getting out of the trenches.
The actual implementation - they shot the Germans lightly while they were walking. Cartridges ran out. Laid on a throw, threw grenades. The Germans lay down. Explosions. Thrown the second time. The Germans lay down, waiting for the explosions. At this moment, a group with deminers jumps out and runs towards them. From the trenches begin to shout "Hurray." While the Germans were rising, they reached it. Germans scored. Losses were incl. many of those who were supposed to sit in the trenches, but rushed to the attack, unable to fight, with boards and so on. In the author’s melee grandfather, he “beat off” a German bullet with a spatula — he saw a German aiming at him from Parabellum — he put the spatula at an angle — he heard a shot and seemed to be ringing — slashed the officer's neck. Then they collected weapons, food and alcohol, and retreated to their original positions. More Germans did not storm.
In general, what I heard and what I decided to share. A lot of this for me personally was very unusual, perhaps it would be interesting for specialists as well.
Features of weapons and tactics of the Soviet counter-guerrilla groups on the experience of the war in the Baltic States
- Vasily Smirnov