On the portal "Military Review" 21.01.14 was published an article "Light fighter? ”, Which appeared immediately after the NTS MIC dedicated to this issue. The consolidated decision of the NTS can be stated in three words: "To a light fighter - to be!". However, the author of the article has his own particular opinion on this matter. Without rejecting the author’s right to have his own opinion, we will try to analyze the article from a scientific point of view, asking a number of systemic and technical questions.
Question one: Can we talk about the inexpediency of including a light fighter in the weapons system without considering the system itself as an object of analysis?(Note: a system (from the Greek. Systema is a whole made up of parts; a connection) is a set of elements that are in relationships and relationships with each other, forming a certain integrity, unity). In all textbooks on systems theory, there is a solid "NO." The author of the article, proceeding from the substantive reasoning with the use of information that is of a particular, non-systemic nature, makes a systemic conclusion: “Thus, it can be concluded that the feasibility of developing LFIs is currently not obvious due to difficulties with implementation in this dimensional class of key elements of stealth technology, applied in F-22 and PAK FA. As well as the lack of a large guaranteed market, which would justify the huge investments in the development of the machine. In addition, there is no LFI and in the near future a suitable engine will not appear. ”
The author put the whole system analysis in the following phrase: “... Huge spaces in a rarefied aerodrome network rely on heavy machines, at least it makes sense to have a lot of them, and it’s not a fact that it is more expensive than using mostly light equipment, t. because the latter will need more. " Very similar to: “Everyone thinks he is a strategist, seeing the fight from the side” from the famous work of Shota Rustaveli. And: “Yes, and pilots for one built aircraft during its service it prepares a lot, for each goes the money break even before he first sits in the cab of the car, which will serve. And the notorious relationship - 70% light, 30% heavy, - taken from the ceiling. " And this is A.P. Chekhov: "This can not be, because there can never be." That is, in fact, the whole solution to the most complex system issue.
And what has been said and is still not completely destroyed by the applied military aviation the science? Science by the results of mathematical modeling suggests that only by optimizing the structure of the two-aircraft fleet of fighters can an increase in the complex indicator “efficiency / costs” be achieved up to 20% (Fig. 1). When optimized at the level of the entire operational-tactical aviation (OTA), the gain due to the inclusion of a light fighter in the OTA combat weapon system will be about 5% (Fig. 2). It should be so, because the higher the level of the quality index of the system, the more its dependence on the argument parameter flows (the smaller the gain). However, in any case, this is hundreds of billions of rubles of Russian taxpayers for the life cycle.
The results shown in Fig. 1 are obtained by the method of mathematical modeling of the combat operation of the calculated aviation formation (RAF) of a mixed composition. They were obtained under the condition of optimal distribution of tasks between light and heavy fighters in accordance with the following logic:
- when solving problems of providing strike aviation to a depth beyond the limits of the radar field, heavy fighters (TI) are used. Powerful radar and increased USP allow them to create their own information field and maximize the number of serviced targets;
- when solving the tasks of covering the troops and objects of the front, light fighters (LI) are used, since in terms of the detection range of air targets (CC) ground-based radar, limited by a horizon, the combat capabilities of a heavy fighter will not be fully used;
- heavy fighters are used in case lung losses exceed the value requiring replenishment of the RAF.
Actually, the author of the article agrees with this, for example: “If you return to Russian conditions, first of all we need to provide our own air defense, and if attack aircraft can be thrown into a threatened area in the event of a threat of war, then air defense fighters should be ready to fly at any time. "
Shown in Fig. 2 results were obtained under the condition of optimal distribution of PTA tasks among all aviation complexes (AK) within its structure, taking into account the degree of their multifunctionality (the ability to effectively solve heterogeneous tasks without AK re-equipment). The results were obtained on condition that a unique two-aircraft fleet of fighters, differing in dimension, was realized in Russia. This circumstance determined the relevance of their classification by weight.
Thus, the above conclusion about the inexpediency of the development of a light fighter at the present time seems unreasonable. In addition, it does not correspond not only to the Russian conditions, for which the above results of the optimization of parks were obtained, but also to world experience. According to the author himself: “The lungs are just the cars that form the basis of the fleet of developed countries' air forces”.
Question two: So what should be understood as a light fighter?The attempt to classify fighters as weapons by mass should be recognized as not entirely successful. The abundance of parameters and indicators used by the author in the analysis of almost all aircrafts created in the world for all history jet aircraft with different objectives, different purposes, differing in structural-layout schemes, tactical and technical characteristics (performance characteristics), number of engines, etc., allowed him to only strengthen his own opinion. The reasoning contained in the article is far from science, since science ends where the generalizations end.
Experience shows that in the conditions of the fundamental impossibility of a single definition of an object, the most constructive solution is an attempt to reach an agreement. The question here comes down to the position (mercantile, corporate, scientific) on which an agreement should be made. The scientific position is the most rational in determining the dimensions of fighters, since the formation of a standard-sized fighter range is a stage in solving the park problem (one of the classical problems of the theory of operations research).
From a scientific point of view, any classification of objects presupposes the isolation of those who satisfy certain general conditions and characteristics from the whole of their set. In order to be objective, the classification should be based on certain laws. It should be borne in mind that the combat properties and efficiency of the fighter will be determined by the values of its performance characteristics, which are optimized when forming the technical appearance, are set in the customer's TTZ and are checked in tests for a normal take-off mass. Naturally, it should be used as a classification feature.
Considering the classification conventionality, we can agree with the proposed in the article the division of all PTA aircraft into AKs of the “super-light”, “light”, “medium” and “heavy” classes. Moreover, in a number of publications there are even some justifications for such a classification. However, it should be borne in mind that the dimension of the fighter should be considered, first of all, not from the point of view of the mass of an empty aircraft, but from the point of view of its combat capabilities and its combat properties. The experience of developing front-line fighter 4 generation (Su-27, MiG-29, MiG-31) and research on fighter 5-generation show that the autonomy of action is fundamental in deciding whether to assign a fighter to a light or heavy class. - the ability to solve combat missions without the support of ground-based radar to a greater depth.
To ensure the autonomy of actions of fighters in the interests of solving the task of accompanying strike groups and air defense-missile defense, it is necessary:
- ensure the possibility of creating their own information field (preferably circular) using only onboard surveillance and sighting equipment (OPS);
- to provide a greater depth of action (outside the radar field of ground-based radar and AK RLDN);
- to expand the nomenclature and increase the number of weapons in the ammunition;
- to increase the survival rate of the fighter (the ability to avoid the impact of enemy air defenses or to oppose it).
The fundamental differences in the requirements for the autonomy of actions in solving problems of cover and escort caused the division of front-line fighters of the 4 generation into two classes: light,
decisive combat missions in terms of ensuring combat use by external systems, and heavy decisive combat missions at great depths autonomously, in the absence of such support.
In addition, the classification should be carried out in relation to promising, or at least to modern combat aircraft with approximately the same combat properties. Analysis of the main directions of development of tactical (operational-tactical) aviation and the existing fleet showed that the majority of aviation complexes can be attributed to multi-functional AK. With this in mind, the classification should be applied to modern multi-purpose fighters.
In fig. 3 shows the distribution of the set of multifunctional fighters (MFIs) according to mass attributes in the coordinates “normal take-off weight - empty aircraft weight”. Analysis of this set shows that, unlike the distribution of combat aircraft by dimension into four classes proposed in the article, modern and prospective multi-purpose fighters can be divided into three classes according to the normal take-off mass:
- light class, which includes tactical fighters of the type "Mirage" 2000, "Rafale", F-16C,
EF-2000, Russian versions of the MiG-29;
- middle class, which include tactical fighter type F / A-18C / D, "Tornado", F-35C, MiG-35;
- heavy class (type F-15E / I, F-14D, F-22А, various variants of Su-27 and Su-30).
Rafale fighter in combat configuration with six air-to-ground Hammer, four MICA medium and long-range UR and two Meteor long-range Meteor-type URs, as well as three 2000 outboard suspended fuel tanks
Source: Dassault Aviation
Source: Dassault Aviation
At the same time, MFIs with a normal take-off mass up to 18 t can be attributed to the light class, the middle class can range from 18 to 23 t, and to the heavy class, over 23 tons. An ultra-light class, including combat AKs, created, as a rule, on the basis of training aircraft, can hardly be considered fighters in the currently accepted sense of the word, even taking into account the fact that they are capable of conducting close air combat (BVB). The ability to conduct BVB - a necessary condition for any fighter. However, it is not a sufficient condition for solving the tasks of fighter aviation that require a number of other properties of the fighter. This, in turn, does not allow to classify them as multi-functional AK. Studies show that with a fighter's mass of less than 10, it is impossible to achieve a level of efficiency that allows it to at least withstand a potential enemy in air battles, due to the impossibility of providing the necessary performance values for this mass up to 10.
In addition, in relation to modern multi-purpose fighters, the classes “heavy” and “medium” can be combined. Comparison of the fighters of these classes indicates that they have no differences of a fundamental nature, necessitating the necessity of distinguishing them into independent classes. Multifunctional fighters of these classes differ slightly in maneuverability. In terms of flight range and composition of weapons, a heavy fighter is usually somewhat superior to the average. And these are the differences between types in the same class.
Thus, all OTA multifunctional fighters are proposed to be conditionally divided (like front-line 4 fighters) into heavy ones with a normal take-off weight of up to 18 t and light ones below 18 t. This classification will be valid only for multi-purpose fighters. And this is just a proposal aimed at achieving at least some unambiguity in determining the dimension of fighters in solving the park problem, justifying their role and place in the weapon system, resulting from operational tactical requirements and the effectiveness of solving combat missions, to which the author of the article is reasoning about the dimension was forced to periodically apply.
Question three: How does the effectiveness of light and heavy fighters correlate?When searching for an answer to this question, it is proposed to distinguish between the combat effectiveness of the MFI and the effectiveness of its combat use. Combat effectiveness is the defining characteristic of an MFI, assessing the degree of its adaptability to inflicting combat damage on an enemy. It depends solely on the performance of the fighter - weapons, using which the pilot solves the task assigned to him. The effectiveness of combat use is the combat effectiveness of MFIs achieved (calculated) in specific combat use conditions as part of the RAF, taking into account the capabilities of combat control and support systems. The introduction of this term is due to the need to take into account the contribution of supporting systems to the efficiency of the use of MFIs in solving fighter aircraft tasks. With a very high combat effectiveness of a fighter, the effectiveness of its combat use may be zero, for example, due to the inability to provide refueling.
Quite rightly, the author of the article addresses the equation for the existence of an aircraft: "In aviation, there is such a thing as the equation for the existence of an aircraft, from which it follows that the proportion of each component of an aircraft among machines of the same purpose with the same flight data is the same." However, this treatment is purely theoretical. Who can give an example of “cars (meaning planes) of the same purpose with the same flight data”?
The author uses the purely constructive meaning of the existence equation (the sum of the relative masses of the LA subsystems is equal to one) and at the same time misses its no less important component - the dependence of the combat properties, and, consequently, the combat effectiveness of the MFIs on the distribution of the relative weights of its subsystems. For example, in order to increase the fighter’s depth of action (basic tactical performance) in order to accomplish the tasks of accompanying strike groups, it is necessary to increase the relative masses of fuel, sight and sight system and armament, sacrificing for this purpose the relative masses of the structure, propulsion system life activity. Fortunately, with an increase in the normal take-off mass, for which VF recorded. Bolkhovitinov is the equation of existence, and the constancy of the absolute masses of these subsystems, their relative mass decreases.
The equation of existence is the same fundamental law as the laws of conservation of energy, mass, and momentum. By analogy, it can be represented as the law of conservation of the combat properties of the AK, which establishes the laws of their change in accordance with the redistribution of the relative masses of the aircraft. For example, reducing a medium-range SD (ammunition load) ammunition while maintaining a normal take-off mass of a fighter can provide an increase in the relative mass of the power plant, thrust-weight ratio, maneuverability and, as a result, increase in efficiency in melee air combat.
The search for optimal combinations of AK relative masses, and, consequently, the optimal distribution of its combat properties, is a complex scientific task, the solution of which requires special knowledge and special training. Its popular presentation can start with the well-known axiom: you have to pay for everything. So, do you need to pay for an increase in the dimension (mass and linear dimensions) of a fighter in the interests of increasing the autonomy of its use? And what? Or do not need to pay anything? After all, there is a point of view that the combat potential of a fighter is proportional to its mass! Let's try to figure it out.
Yes, indeed, an increase in combat power (by increasing the ammunition and increasing the effectiveness of means of destruction) leads to an increase in combat potential. But all this is not so simple, otherwise the MiG-31 with a normal take-off mass of 37 T would have to have the largest potential of Russian fighters. Combat potential must be assessed in relation to specific tasks and conditions for their implementation. The task of covering is solved in conditions of limited RL-field, which limits the line of interception. This, combined with the rapidity of air combat, does not allow a heavy fighter to realize its full potential, it is oversized for this task.
Negative impact of the increase in the dimension of the fighter on the characteristics of combat readiness. For example, the take-off time of the MiG-29 light fighter from BG-1 is 3 minutes, and the heavy MiG-31 fighter - 5 minutes. In the conditions of centralized management, when the rise of duty vehicles is carried out only after the detection of an air enemy, this is essential. For example, with a target speed of 900 km / h, an increase of 2 min of take-off time will lead to a decrease in the interception line by 30 km. The reduction in the combat readiness characteristics will also have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the combat use of MFIs for solving shock tasks in the context of the network-centric nature of combat operations, the implementation of reconnaissance and percussion actions, and the defeat of operational targets.
The reduction in the line of interception as a result of reduced operational efficiency is the payment for ensuring the possibility of solving the most complex combat task of fighter aviation — accompanying strike groups. But large ammunition, together with a powerful radar, multi-channel escort / shelling of the CC will provide the most effective solution to this problem. The heavy fighter is also irreplaceable when solving the country's air defense and anti-missile defense tasks in Russian conditions, first of all, in the conditions of underdeveloped infrastructure, sparseness of the airfield network, for example, when repelling air raids from the north and northeast directions. This, in fact, writes the author of the article.
It should be borne in mind that the final stage of any of the tasks of the fighter is air combat (WB): long-range - beyond visual visibility (DVB) and close-range - under the condition of visual visibility of the target. It is at these stages that combat effectiveness is manifested as a defining characteristic of the quality of MFIs. To assess combat effectiveness in the WB, it is customary to use the probabilities of hitting a target with a fighter and a fighter target. One of the peculiarities of air combat is the widespread use of REP.
Naturally, the enemy can interfere with airborne radar. However, this cannot completely deprive the fighter of the possibility of establishing information contact with the target. The impact of interference will affect, first of all, the possibility of maintaining the DVB in adverse weather conditions that make it difficult to use the opto-electronic channel, since it can not be maintained at large (30 ... 50 km and more) distances under interference conditions. And even if the DVB takes place, under the influence of interference, the defeat of an enemy of medium and long-range SD is far from reliable. Consequently, in the conditions of interference BVB may be the main, and possibly the only way to accomplish a combat mission.
The condition for the BVB set is the detection of each other by the opponents. The probability of detecting a VC in the optical range will be determined by many factors, the main one being the linear dimensions of the object of observation. In fig. 4 shows the dependence of the detection probability of a CC on its size. The simulation results of the BVB hypothetical light and heavy fighters showed that, on average, the light fighter will exceed the heavy one by more than two times over the entire set of possible fighters positions. Such simulation results are explained by the fact that when a target is lost during combat maneuvering, a pilot of a light fighter who has a smaller size detects an enemy earlier. This provides him with an earlier use of weapons. As a result, the effect named by the author of the BWB model “the first start effect” is triggered. Its essence lies in the fact that the fighter in BVB, who used the weapon first, receives the initial probability of hitting the enemy, which can no longer be reduced under any circumstances.
Thus, the superiority of a heavy fighter in terms of fuel supply, in terms of ammunition size, in multi-channel use of USP can be fully realized only when solving problems in the absence of an RL-field. When solving other tasks, its combat capabilities will be redundant. That is why heavy fighters have found limited use both as part of the Air Force of the producing countries (excluding the poorest among them - Russia) and of the importing countries.
Question four: What is the role of a light fighter in the global aircraft market?The MiG and Su fighter jets are part of the world's 55 parks, while the fighters of both brands are operated in the 20 countries. Of these, 9 countries should be excluded from the potential Russian market segment, since 7 countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, the Czech Republic) joined NATO, and the DPRK and Iran are under international sanctions. The type and number of combat aircraft of the Russian market segment are shown in Fig. 5.
Sighted see. And no reasoning like: “Countries that could theoretically buy from us hundreds of modern fighters in the world can be counted on the fingers: India, China, Indonesia. India ordered 3 hundreds of Su-30, but in order to purchase a light fighter, contacted the French, China is trying to do its own, Indonesia could buy it for a long time, but apparently it doesn’t hurt. Vietnam with its large population and very serious flocks with China acquired 48 Su-30, the rest of the buyers took from 6 to 24 machines in different configurations. That is, as soon as the Indian market closes, you can forget about the serious export of combat aircraft. ” Speaking about the "serious export" of combat aircraft, the author shyly misses the words "heavy fighters", from which the conversation began. Very unprofessional sophistry (sophistry - reasoning based on deliberate violation of the laws of logic)!
The last Su-30CM built on the airfield in Domne built 2013 of the year (tail number "10 black", serial number 10МК5 1016). Domna, 17.04.2014
Source: Alexey Kitaev / VKontakte
Source: Alexey Kitaev / VKontakte
But other results of the assessment of the state and market development forecast. Analysis of the potential capacity of the Russian market shows:
1. The total number of combat aircraft of Russian (Soviet) production, delivered abroad and currently in operation, is ~ 5,4 thousand aircraft or 45% of the total world market of tactical aircraft.
2. Among them ~ 3,4 thousand fighters and ~ 1,5 thousand shock. Considering that during Soviet times there was the possibility of delivering airplanes of any purpose to a friendly country, it can be concluded that most countries consider the priority task of protecting their airspace.
3. The Russian market, as well as the global market as a whole, is focused on light-class airplanes. So, among the fighters ~ 76%, and among the drums ~ 72% belong to the light class (normal take-off weight to 18 t).
Such a market structure was caused by the fact that, of the total revenue that the aviation industry has consistently received, up to the present, more than 80% were revenues from the sale of combat aircraft of front-line aviation. The lack of development in Russia that can satisfy through 10 ... 15 for years the market needs for new AT models will inevitably lead to the loss of a significant share of the market for combat aircraft. An objective forecast of the dynamics of market changes in the period up to 2030 year as a result of the appearance of China on it, obtained back in 2010 using the model of forecasting the results of the tender (see the monograph by V.I. Barkovsky and others. “Methodology of the formation of the technical appearance of export-oriented aviation complexes” ) is given in table. 1 and fig. 6.
Options for market proposals of China and Russia
When the forecast was taken into account:
- the Russian market segment was formed as a result of deliveries to friendly countries by barter, on account of the national debt or as a fraternal help of combat aircraft of a predominantly light class (Fig. 5);
- meeting the needs of supplying a heavy fighter of the 5 generation to it at market prices seems even too optimistic at its market price of $ 100 million or more;
- for many countries of the Russian market segment, the tactical and technical data of the heavy T-50 fighter are redundant;
- Deliveries of T-50 can disrupt regional stability.
Analysis of the results shown in Figure 6 shows that the absence of Russian proposals in the class of light fighters will make it impossible to curb Chinese expansion in the AT market. The loss of the Russian market segment only due to the need to share it only with China for 2030 g will amount to:
~ 30% with a heavy-duty MFI for export policy (from 46 to 32 countries);
~ on 25% in the case of creating an export-oriented MFI of the light class (from 46 to 39 countries).
That is, we will lose 7 countries anyway. It should be noted that the loss of 30% of the market with the degree of uncertainty characteristic of the conditions for solving such problems is not tragic. However, the picture changes when moving from the number of countries of the lost market to the number of aircraft. Thus, we have already lost the market in more than 1200 morally obsolete and practically exhausted MiG-21 resources, since Russia has nothing to offer in such a price class of fighters. And in the subsequent period (2020 ... 2030), there will be a further collapse of the Russian market due to the withdrawal of 3-th and 4-th generation fighters. The service life of the MiG-23 (620 units) and MiG-29 (760 units) put on the market in the last century will end. In addition, Russia will lose almost the entire market of attack aircraft (180 fighter-bombers MiG-27 and 470 Su-17 / 22), which could be replaced by a double version of a light fighter, given its multi-functionality.
Thus, the situation in the terminology of the theory of safety emerging in the Russian segment of the aviation technology market can be assessed as “controlled movement to the point of catastrophe”, when the object is in good condition and controllable, and the crew is unaware that its movement parameters inevitably lead to death. In this case, the aviation industry may die.
While on the Russian market “Irkuts” together with “dry”, supported by “Rosoboronexport”, are fighting with “Mikoyans”, the Chinese are actively seizing our market (Fig. 6). And with the meager needs of the Russian Air Force in combat aircraft of operational tactical aviation and the absence of a weighted technical policy (the Russian type surpasses the total type of American and European countries), it is possible to enter production volumes that ensure profitability only by promoting the products of the Russian aircraft industry to the foreign market. One can not disagree with the estimates of the author of the article: “The Russian Air Force now has 38 fighter squadrons. This gives the full strength in 456 machines. When fully replaced with the PAK FA and LFI in the ratio of 1: 2, only 300 machines fall on the LIF. Of course, there are still exports, where LFI should have an advantage over PAK FA at the expense of a lower price. ”
If the problem of a light fighter is viewed not from corporate, but from state positions, from the position of preserving the aviation industry in Russia, then it turns out that the question is not in the relationship between light and heavy fighters. In this situation, even for T-50, it will be problematic to organize a decent series. The question of the future of the aviation industry of Russia, its ability to create combat aircraft in demand on the world market and engines for them, which are an independent export item. There will be no light fighter, one more object of Russian export will disappear, and with it another engine.
But all these arguments and assessments will make sense on the condition of technical feasibility of a light class fighter meeting the requirements of the Russian Air Force and importing countries. And it was gratifying to hear in speeches on the NTS MIC an awareness of the special significance of the light fighter for the development of the market and the preservation of the Russian aviation industry.
Fifth question: Is the idea realizable? The author of the article devoted a lot of space to this question, as if trying to please someone, and not try to at least get closer to the truth. Here, for example: “... With LFI, everything will be much harder ... the LFI project can very easily eat years of labor of qualified engineers and generate something unintelligible at the exit, and a full-fledged stealth like PAK FA does not pull, and for the mainstream like MiG-35 too expensive…".
Of course, it is expensive, since to implement the idea of a light multifunctional fighter (LMFI) will require a lot of intellectual work of designers and scientists. However, it should be borne in mind that the creation of the LMFI will not be done from scratch. The country has a scientific and technical reserve (NTZ), created in the process of developing the PAK FA. It is impossible to agree with the author on the issue of using the received NTRP "... To develop, however, it is necessary not only the engine, but all the other equipment that cannot be taken from the PAK FA ...".
Why it will not work? After all, the NTZ was created for state money, and it is difficult to imagine that the state customer, who paid for it, will not be able to "incline" the sukhovets in this matter. There would be a will. And with the use of the already created NTZ, the cost of OCD can be significantly reduced. There are other ways to reduce the financial burden on the budget, for example, implementing a strategy for the phased implementation of OCD, involving the use of an RD-33MK engine in the first stage of OCD according to the LMFI, which virtually negates the problem of the engine. And even if you do not conflict with the owners of the NTRP, it turns out that the cost of developing the LMFI will be negligible compared with the averted losses of the Russian market, and, possibly, of the aviation industry. There was money for the political PAK DA, with which only expenses are connected.
The specialists are not interested in the author's reasoning about the feasibility of a lung MFI such as “... a more interesting question with a hypothetical perspective LFI. Obviously, developing and introducing new aircraft into production only makes sense if it promises a sharp increase in combat capabilities compared to upgrading existing models. All sorts of radar with AFAR can be installed on the old modernized aircraft, thereby saving a lot of resources on OCD and the restructuring of production ... ". This recommendation is on the surface, however, there is the concept of "modernization potential", and if it is exhausted, the modernization is meaningless.
I would like to remind you that the existence equation, which the author refers to when considering the classification issue, should be performed not only when creating new aircraft, but also when modernizing existing ones. At the same time, since the modernization is carried out with the aim of improving the combat and operational qualities of the sample, and, consequently, increasing or at least maintaining its achieved level in more difficult combat conditions by increasing the functional characteristics of the subsystems, its mass increases. Thus, the normal take-off mass of the MiG-29 increased in the process of its phased modernization from 14,8 t from MiG-29 to 18,5 t from MiG-35, that is, it passed the dimension of light-class fighter jets. An attempt to further increase the combat properties will lead to a further increase in mass, a reduction in thrust-capacity and a decrease in efficiency in the BVB, that is, to the transformation of a fighter into a strike aircraft. But this is a theory. It seems that the author’s proposal to try to submit MiG-35 to foreign customers as LMFS of a new generation is destructive.
MiG-35 at the Bangalore Air Show in 2007.
Source: Alexander Rybakov
Source: Alexander Rybakov
Even if you do not take into account the lack of efficiency, the MiG-35 can not be considered as a fighter of the light class of a new generation for the following reasons:
1. The glider of the aircraft, optimized for the requirements and technological capabilities of 70-ies of the last century, is morally obsolete and does not provide the technical capabilities to meet the requirements for aerodynamic characteristics, mass perfection of a promising fighter, determined by aviation materials and technologies, and visibility of the aircraft in the RL range.
2. Aircraft avionics does not meet modern requirements for equipment integration, which will not allow implementing modern concepts of an integrated MFI board, increasing its intelligence, creating a BASU that provides not only automation of aircraft control, but also the development of optimal solutions in a specific tactical situation, which is especially important for a fighter.
3. The survival requirement of the LMFI cannot be fulfilled due to the absence of a circular information-control field, which will not ensure full use of the capabilities of promising USP (anti-missile and SD in anti-missile mode).
4. The absence of the SCS mode for the MiG-35 will lead to a decrease in the efficiency of its use for the defeat of quickly detected objects in the network-centric nature of future wars.
As a result, the fears that the LMFI on the basis of the MiG-35 will not have a high export potential are fully justified, since the well-known marketing condition will not be fulfilled: “a good product is in its original packaging”. The structural layout of the MiG-29 is no longer as such. Actually, this was confirmed during the Indian tender, despite the fact that the tender presented a slightly different MiG-35.
In addition, it is equally important for Russia to consider the need to preserve and develop unique technologies for the development and production of light class fighters, design and production teams that own them. Indeed, in the time that has passed since the development of the MiG-29, a twin-engine fighter with 14,8 t mass, no one in the world managed to repeat a similar project (the F-16 is, in general, in aviation circles, not a fighter, but according to our classification the fighter bomber, that is, a multifunctional shock AK).
As for the technical feasibility of the LMFI project, the author should be aware of projects executed in Russia on this topic. The openness of the article does not allow to give specific data in it. We can say one thing: Russia is losing a lot without advancing the development of the LMFI, the fighter of the new generation of the light class, both with the internal placement of weapons and with the USP conformal suspension. The reasoning in this article makes it possible to doubt the truth of the assertion that there is no “sukhovskaya” and “Mikoyan” design school, expressed as one of the arguments for combining design potential in creating the KLA.
In the author's arguments there is such a passage: “If you look at the history of the Soviet and then Russian Air Forces over the past 30 years, then it is clear that, contrary to the assertions of evil Pogosyan, who suffocates MiG and light fighters as a class, the very topic of LFI was not more pictures and in the USSR. The C-54 / 55 / 56 family did not find support. ... It seems to me that Pogosyan has nothing to do with it ... ". Do not roll on the individual. It seems that MA Pogosyan is really “innocent” here. After all, every period in the history of the state requires the appearance of their personalities, their, as they say, heroes. And, nevertheless, the above statement raises the following question.
Question six: "Is there a subjective factor in the history of a light fighter?" The answer to this question is likely to be positive. At the beginning of 1990-ies in the conditions of economic depression, the production capabilities of the aviation industry created during the Soviet era turned out to be excessive, and the load of enterprises began to be determined more than ever by the personal qualities of their managers, their ability to adapt to the chronic lack of funds. Under these conditions (“there is no money and there will not be”), the task of finding effective solutions to bring the aviation industry out of crisis has acquired particular urgency. The demand for ideas could not help but generate suggestions. One of them was the least costly for the budget idea of embedding in the global aviation industry, in its simplicity that everyone understands.
What is the realization of this idea, today almost every day they write the Russian media. The great desire to find a solution did not allow the authors of the embedding idea to take into account that simple solutions, as a rule, lead to the emergence of new problems, even larger than the original ones. It was necessary to pay for the integration, to sacrifice something. With such tacit consent of all levels of management, the A.I. Mikoyan.
For Russia, it was a big sacrifice. At that time, the Design Bureau named after A.I. Mikoyan carried out a project on the 5 generation fighter of the IFI, which was an integrator of all the latest technologies in the aircraft industry and related industries. In addition, the OKB would complete the upgrade of the MiG-29 light fighter, while the MiG-29M would be the main threat to Western manufacturers in the global market for combat aircraft. It is even hard to imagine what would have happened to the market, appear on it in 1990-ies of the MiG-29М at prices corresponding to that period of time.
Only the need to sacrifice to foreign aircraft companies can explain the adoption of a number of decisions that are not amenable to common sense, such as:
- termination of work on the Su-27M and MiG-29M, which were in the final stages of testing (on the MiG-29M
a preliminary conclusion has already been received), despite the obviousness of a reasonable solution: certify the fighters, and if you don’t have enough money to buy them for your own air force, deliver to the Russian market segment;
- termination of the R & D "Direction Finder" at the stage of preparation of the design documentation, carried out by the A.I. Mikoyan, later again open, but already by the PAK FA and given by the P.O. Sukhoi, the TTZ for which they did not reach the agreed upon TTZ for the MFIs, according to various estimates for 20 ... 30%;
- the cessation of work on the MiG-AT UTS joint development with France, to a greater extent than the Yak-130, which corresponded to the advanced training concept of the UTS “minimum training costs for the combat-ready pilot,” which led to the loss of the French Alfa Jet trainer market;
- the loss of the competition of avant-projects on the LVTS, in which the MiG-110, whose mock-up was already in the workshop of the pilot plant, lost to the paper Il-112 because of the “high technical risk”. At the same time, an objective evaluation of the projects in terms of 12 indicators showed that in 10 of them, the MiG-110 won against IL-112, and in two it did not lose;
- organization of the competition between the certified Tu-334 and absent at that time, even on paper, on 80% foreign SSJ-100, in which the paper won;
- the lack of promising topics for RAC "MiG" for several decades, without which, sooner or later, any project organization turns into a workshop.
We will give the judgment of the history of the decisions taken, perhaps we misunderstand something due to lack of awareness in the strategic plans. Maybe in vain for more than 20 years, warnings of system analysts are heard that eventually Russia will turn from a country selling planes into a country buying them? Maybe, indeed, the bright future of the aviation industry of Russia will come after all the air carriers change to Airbus, Boeing, etc., Russian-made military planes disappear completely, and the once famous OKB named after P.O. Dry left to support the operation of the Su-30 and T-50, will design the flaps of Chinese fighters? Interestingly, one of the authors of the concept of embedding in the global aviation industry wondered why China does not set itself a similar task? After all, he has a shortage of aviation technology much more.
That's how many questions arise with LMFI. They will be withdrawn only under the condition that they make constructive decisions in accordance with the recommendations of the Scientific and Technical Council of the MIC, that is, after the discovery of a well-balanced OCD. The aviation industry has never come so close to the line beyond which to divide. In this situation, strong solutions are needed, first of all, for a light fighter, not such as, for example, conducting research with 2016 for a year, 3 ... 4 for a year, then an advance project of the same length for XRUMX 10 years. This is the road to nowhere.
Published in the magazine "Aviapanorama" №2-2014