Military Review

Tactics of the Afghan insurgents

Tactics of the Afghan insurgents

According to the experience of fighting the armed opposition units and studying captured 1984 documents. Excerpts from documents developed by 1985 by the 40 Army headquarters. The style and spelling of the original source are fully preserved in this memo for the officers of the Uk SV officer.

The leadership of the counter-revolution and international reaction for a long time lead an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The irreversible processes taking place in the DRA cause the furious rage of international imperialism and the Afghan counter-revolution, which are making new attempts to change the existing situation in the country, to restore the old order.

During the struggle against the people's power, the leadership of the counter-revolution, under pressure and with the help of some reactionary regimes, primarily the US, is trying to unite all its forces under a single military-political leadership, to develop a unified line of struggle, setting the ultimate goal of overthrowing the legitimate government of the DRA and the creation in Afghanistan Islamic state by type of regimes in Pakistan and Iran.

The rebels are striving, by any means and means, to step up the struggle against the DRA. For a long time they have been engaged in armed struggle on the territory of the country, combining it with the extensive conduct of sabotage and terrorist actions, and active agitation and propaganda activities. At the same time, armed struggle is invariably put in the first place.

Despite the considerable losses incurred by the rebels during the hostilities, they did not abandon active armed struggle, still believing that it was only in this way that decisive success could be achieved. In this regard, much attention is paid to the improvement of tactics of warfare. Other factors are considered important, but not as effective.

In their struggle against the people's power in the DRA, the leadership of the counter-revolution comprehensively takes into account the national and religious characteristics of the Afghan people, which is one of the factors for the survival of the rebel movement. Islam and nationalism are put at the forefront in organizing the struggle against democratic transformations in the country.

The counterrevolution receives great moral and material support from the United States, Pakistan, China, Iran, as well as a number of countries in Western Europe and the Middle East. From them, the rebels will receive large quantities of modern weapons, ammunition and materiel. Without this help and support of the world reaction, the actions of the counter-revolution would not have such scope.

The basics or, as they call them, guerrilla methods and methods of struggle, which are continuously being improved, are still at the core of the actions of the rebels. Advantageous for the conduct of this kind of fighting is that most of the kishlak zone is controlled by the rebels. The disunity of the population due to physiographic conditions and limited means of communication also favors counter-revolution.

On the basis of the prevailing situation in various parts of the country, the rebels use certain methods and methods of struggle that can bring at least temporary successes. The choice of methods and methods of struggle depends on the physiographic conditions of the area and the composition of the population. In all conditions, high morale and good training of rebel groups are considered important.

The issues of warfare, tactics of insurgent actions in various conditions, the organization of sabotage, terrorist and propaganda activities by them are discussed in detail below.


The tactics of the armed actions of the rebels. The leadership of the rebels considers the war in Afghanistan and the tactics of action in this war from the point of view of Islam, declaring it a holy war against the infidels. On this basis, the ideologists of the Islamic counter-revolutionary movement developed tactics for guerrilla warfare in the conditions of Afghanistan, which they are persistently introducing into the practice of actions of detachments and groups of insurgents.

This tactic includes methods and methods of armed struggle against regular troops and forces to maintain order, as well as methods of conducting sabotage and terrorist actions and agitation and propaganda activities.

The main tactic of the insurgent’s actions is the rejection of open actions by large forces against regular troops. Without engaging with superior forces, they operate in small groups using the surprise factor.

These views of the rebel leadership were most vividly confirmed at the beginning of the Pandshar operation in April 1984, when the leadership of the IOA grouping in the Pandschera area, without engaging in defensive battles, took most of its formations out of attack and hid them in the mountainous areas of the upper ravine ravines and passes, leaving small groups in Pandscher for reconnaissance and sabotage.

The leadership of the rebels requires that all who participate in hostilities have the necessary ideas about the tactics of actions and can practically apply their knowledge. At the same time, it requires focusing on night-time activities, as well as actions in small groups.

High morale, discipline and initiative are considered important. The personnel of the gangs are brought up in the spirit of Islam and personal responsibility, so that each member of the group perceives war as a personal matter. Discipline and responsibility are imposed by the most brutal methods, including the death penalty.

In the practical activities of the groups and detachments of the rebels, the planning of hostilities is being introduced. At present, large groups and detachments are conducting combat operations according to previously developed and approved plans. The rebels refused to conduct a positional warfare and completely switched to maneuverable military operations, constantly changing base areas, taking into account the degree of support of the population and the physical and geographical conditions of the area. Much attention is paid to the intelligence, misinformation and moral degradation of the enemy.

The success of the armed struggle is made directly dependent on the joint joint actions of groups and detachments of various party affiliations. However, such unity has not yet been achieved.

In the tactics of the rebels, guerrilla, defensive and offensive combat operations are envisaged.

Guerrilla actions. According to the views of the leadership of the rebels, guerrilla actions are actions throughout the country, involving not only existing detachments and groups in the armed struggle, but also the majority of the population.

Such actions include ambushes, attacks on posts, troop deployment garrisons, various national economic and military installations, shelling, sabotage and terrorist actions, actions on roads to disrupt transportation and robbery.

In order to avoid defeat from blows aviation and artillery groups and detachments are dispersed, often among the local population, periodically changing their location. Having armed with light weapons and knowing the area well, gangs continuously maneuver, appear suddenly in certain areas, and stay in one place for no more than a day. In order to minimize losses from air and artillery strikes, shelters are equipped, and natural shelters are retrofitted.

To guide the guerrilla actions of the rebels, Islamic committees have been created and function as unified party-political organs of the counterrevolution on the ground.

In general, according to the leaders of the Afghan counter-revolution and international reaction, the guerrilla actions of the rebels significantly weaken the government forces and people's power. The state is allegedly unable to oppose this kind of struggle for a long time.

Defensive actions. Provide stubborn resistance, as well as further hostilities to retaliate. Defense is a forced type of combat and is used in the event of a surprise attack, when the escape routes are cut off and it is impossible to avoid open combat.

When troops attack large counterrevolutionary centers on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in some cases defense is envisaged with the involvement of maximum forces and means.

Offensive action. The decision to conduct joint offensive actions is made depending on the development of the military-political situation, the economic situation, the state of the terrain, the balance of forces and means, and the morale of the parties.

Offensive actions provided for the conduct of so-called. fronts in a particular province, as well as in a number of provinces in order to capture major administrative centers and a certain territory. Also, actions are usually planned and carried out in the border provinces, where you can quickly send reinforcements, and in case of defeat - to go abroad.

In the conduct of an offensive, the choice of direction for the main attack by the main forces is provided. Such actions were carried out by rebels in the provinces of Paktia and Paktika, in the areas of Khost and Urgun to capture major administrative centers and a certain territory in order to create a so-called. free zones and the formation of the "Provisional Government" in the territory of the DRA.

In all cases of combat activity, surprise, initiative, maneuver by forces and means, as well as the factor of independence in the implementation of the plans with good intelligence and warning, are high.

The fighting undertaken by the rebels is usually transient, especially if they are unsuccessful for the rebels. In this case, they quickly leave the battlefield and, under the guise of it, retreat along pre-selected routes. After the end of military operations, the rebels returned to the abandoned areas.

Successful hostilities, according to the views of the leadership of the counter-revolution, are unthinkable without the creation of centers (base districts), bases and districts that are intended to guide and provide comprehensive support for existing groups and insurgent groups.

Centers (base districts) are isolated areas that are significant in territory, from where measures are taken to expand the influence of the rebels. These are the supporting bases, relying on which, they conduct combat operations against the people's power.

The centers are located mainly in mountainous and wooded areas, usually remote from the lines of communication and garrisons, stationing troops, are well protected from enemy attack, have a fairly strong air defense, especially against air targets operating at low altitudes.

Typically, such centers are organized in hard-to-reach canyons, where a multi-tiered defense is created with extensive use of the mining of roads, paths, and places accessible to traffic and personnel.

Centers can be permanent and mobile.

Permanent centers are designed along with the management and supply of existing gangs to carry out activities to expand the "popular resistance". They have significant stocks of weapons, ammunition, food. There are also training centers for military training for the rebels. Permanent rebel centers are divided into primary, secondary and secret.

Mobile centers are created temporarily at the initial stage of the organization of permanent centers. They are intended to organize the defense of the chosen area of ​​deployment of the permanent center and to draw the attention of the population to the struggle led by the rebels.

The bases are designed to house governing bodies, such as Islamic committees, rest, and rebel training. The bases have warehouses with weapons, ammunition, materiel, food supplies and medicines.

All the activities of the armed detachments are directly sent from the bases, the current supply of the rebels is carried out, as well as the management of all aspects of the life and activities of the population, if the area is under the control of the rebels.

A place for the bases is selected in difficult terrain and is usually kept secret. Especially in secret keep the location of warehouses with weapons, ammunition. A limited circle of persons knows about their whereabouts.

Areas are estimated by the rebels in terms of their use. They are divided into the following categories:

areas controlled by the rebels, from where gangs conduct attacks to carry out attacks, shelling, ambushes, etc .;
areas where the rebels, having dissolved among the population, act secretly or penetrate the area secretly to carry out their tasks and from there they can make raids into the neighboring areas;
calm areas. This is a territory under the control of government troops, where the rebels operate in secret and are located there mainly during the operation.
The leadership of the counterrevolution, emphasizing the isolated areas, imposed a strict access control and necessary security there. In some areas, a small part of the rebels remains to be on guard bases, the rest are dispersed among civilians, as a rule, in their villages. This tactic is typical and designed to conduct periodic hostilities for a long time. To monitor the movement of residents, to ensure safety and timely notification, monitoring posts are created (for 10 – 12 people).

Commanders of groups that operate in certain areas are required to impose Islamic rules there, establish their power and strict access control.

When conducting operations by troops, the commanders of groups and detachments are obliged to help each other, especially if they belong to the same party group.

According to the leadership of the rebels, heavy weapons should not be used in large quantities, as they are of little use for maneuver groups and troops. It is recommended to use heavy weapons mainly in the highlands, because on the plain it can be easy prey for the enemy.

When planning and conducting operations, much attention is paid to keeping the upcoming actions of groups and groups secret, increasing vigilance, and working to neutralize the enemy’s agents.

Tactical training of gangs is carried out in centers and training centers for insurgents in Pakistan and Iran, as well as in some other countries of the West and the Middle East. When training, special attention is paid to the training and activities in small groups (from 15 to 50 people).

By the seasons of the year, the actions of the rebels before the winter of 1983 were characterized as follows: in the summer — the conduct of active hostilities in all areas of Afghanistan, in the winter — rest, combat training, replenishment with weapons, ammunition and personnel. And on vacation and replenishment of the majority of gangs went to Pakistan and Iran.

In the winter of 1983, gangs did not leave the territory of Afghanistan abroad, but continued to operate in the same way as in summer. This is one of the features of the rebel tactics.

The leadership of the counterrevolution and international reaction to increase the activity of the rebel movement determined the amount of material remuneration for counterrevolutionary activity depending on the length of stay in the ranks of the rebels: 6 years - 250, 4 of the year - 200, 2 of the year - 150, 1 year - 100 dollars per month . For the leaders of the gangs, a monthly reward in the amount of 350 to 500 dollars is defined.

The leadership of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan intends to take decisive actions to seize power in the country. Based on this, battle plans have been developed and practical instructions have been given for their implementation.

Firstly, it was ordered to activate hostilities throughout the country, to conduct operations in close contact regardless of party affiliation.

Second, the main efforts should be concentrated in the provinces bordering Pakistan with the aim of seizing major administrative centers.

Third, strengthen military operations on highways, especially on roads connecting vital areas of the country, as well as on pipelines, power lines, etc., in order to disrupt the systematic transportation of economic goods and logistics.

Any operations after all-round intelligence are planned by the Islamic Committees (EC) and are carried out on their instructions. After the end of the operation, the IC evaluates the actions of each group, summarizes the combat experience.

The joint ICs, leading the gangs' combat activities, bring their decisions and instructions to the gangs through the lower-ranking ICs. Armed actions are mainly small and lightly armed groups (20 – 50 people), which operate throughout the country. If necessary, when solving complex problems, several groups are united in groups of 150 – 200 people.

The composition and organizational structure of groups and groups in different provinces of the country vary. Alternatively, the following organization of a rebel group (gang) can be cited: the commander (leader) of the group (gangs), has two or three bodyguards, the deputy commander (leader) of the group, three or four intelligence officers (observer), two or three battle groups ( 6 – 8 people in each), one or two DSBM calculations, one or two mortar calculations, two or three RPG calculations, a mining group (4 – 5 people). Personnel in such a group are up to 50 people.

Following their tactics, the insurgents attack military units as they advance to the upcoming battle area, in the areas of operations, and most often during the return of troops after the operation. Usually, the attack is organized on small military and rear columns, as well as on columns with military equipment, when it has poor security and follows without air cover.

Gangs of rebels often shelled guard posts, military garrisons. The shelling is usually carried out at night with the use of mortars, DShK, rockets. According to the leadership of the rebels, such “harassing” shelling keeps the enemy personnel in constant moral and physical tension, exhausting their strength.

Sometimes united gangs conduct operations to destroy organizational cores in counties and volosts, especially where there are no troops, and the people's self-defense units are weak and morally unstable.

In the areas bordering Pakistan, unification of gangs of various party affiliations was noted with the aim of capturing military garrisons and large administrative centers. In the southeast zone, for example, in 1983, combined rebel gangs with a total number of up to 1500 – 2000 people and more acted, which, according to the leadership of the insurgents, makes it possible to more effectively strike troops, convoys and other objects, making it difficult for the troops in controlled rebel areas, conducting more decisive fighting, the organization of active defense, a clear demonstration of their strength in front of the population.

In case of failures, the rebels must go abroad, replenish casualties and armaments, and return to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to resume the struggle.

During the fighting, using the absence of a solid front, the rebels at night are seeping out of the encirclement through the battle formations of the troops or towards the objects of attack between guard posts, occupy an advantageous position, and with dawn they suddenly open fire. The main focus is on the effective fire of snipers. Currently, in some gangs special sniper teams are being organized.

The economic blockade of certain regions of the republic is also a tactical method of the rebels. In this direction, sabotage is widely carried out at enterprises, the transportation of national economic cargo is disrupted, lines of transmission lines, communications, agricultural structures, pipelines, irrigation structures, etc. are disabled.

The rebels skillfully use the protective properties of the area, learned how to carry out engineering equipment of the area. Positions are equipped on the ridges or slopes of heights, at the entrance or exit from the gorges, use caves, holes, specially equipped structures. In the gorges, firing positions of the multi-layered defense are usually equipped in 1 – 2 km from the entrance to the gorge, as well as in the spur gorges. At the dominant heights, DShK positions are equipped, covering the approaches to the gorge, which allow firing at both aerial and ground targets.

Warehouses of weapons, ammunition, materiel are equipped in hard-to-reach areas, in caves, specially built galleries, the entrances to which are well masked, and the approaches are mined.

One of the tactics of the rebels is to enter into negotiations and conclude agreements on the cessation of hostilities. Some gangs enter negotiations, losing faith in the outcome of a hopeless struggle, others to gain time, save their strength, and receive appropriate assistance from the state. Also, the gangs, entering negotiations, continue their combat training, carry out secret subversive activities among the population.

Leaders of gangster groups, going to negotiations, usually seek to hide the amount of weapons in the gang, especially heavy weapons (mortars, BO, RPG, anti-aircraft weapons), underestimate its number in the event of a forced surrender, and hide the rest in caches.

In order to prevent gangs from entering the negotiations and transfer them to the side of people's power, the leaders of the counter-revolution carry out the physical destruction of the leaders of these gangs. When trying to stop fighting, such leaders are removed from the leadership and sent to Pakistan for investigation. Devotees and trusted persons are appointed instead.

In 1984, the leading functionaries of the counterrevolutionary movement arrived in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to study the causes and prevent gangs from ceasing armed struggle, there were cases when the leading leaders of the insurgents themselves led the fighting of groups and detachments against government forces. For example, the leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan personally led 1984 in the summer of fighting gangs in the JAJI area.

It should be noted that the leaders of the counterrevolution came to the conclusion that the effectiveness of the hostilities of small groups of insurgents was low. Therefore, in order to coordinate and improve the leadership of hostilities, it was decided to create larger units - the so-called. shock shelves to guide the fighting in the border areas (KUNAR, NANGARHAR, PACTIA, Paktika, Kandagar).

In addition, in the districts of HOST and DZHAJI (ALI KHEIL) districts, several so-called shock battalions for direct participation in hostilities. In particular, two such battalions are intended for operations in the area of ​​JADJI.

Usually gangs are located on the bases, in separate adobe fortresses with high duels, in caves, tents, dugouts. A group in 30 – 60 people can either be located in one place (fortress) or dispersed in the homes of residents of a village on a person’s 1 – 2. Small gangs (15 – 20 people) are usually placed together. With co-location security and notification is organized.

It should be noted that many villagers do not lead a constant and active struggle against the people's power, are peasants and are engaged in farming for most of the year. They do not want to fight away from their villages, but they guard and sometimes stubbornly defend their villages. In the kishlak zone, the majority of the population, under the fear of cruel punishment, supports the rebels, supplying them with everything they need.

There are many gangs that are constantly among the residents, or the residents themselves are gangsters. Such a gang to perform a task at a certain time gathers at a designated place. After completing the task, the bandits again disperse until the next gathering. In this case, the weapon is formed in certain caches, the location of which knows a limited number of people. For the storage of weapons is often used female half of the house.

The gangs that are the most active, usually located near communications, as well as in areas of green areas and administrative centers. Various meetings and the gathering of gangs are usually held in mosques (they are not attacked by aviation), in gardens, from where you can quickly leave or disguise. The gathering place of the gang is kept in the strictest confidence.

Rebels widely use misinformation, deceptive actions, cunning, spread false rumors about the whereabouts of gangs or ringleaders, use traitors and provocateurs. Especially widely the rebels use disinformation regarding the number, location and routes of gangs in the territory of the DRA, with the aim to mislead the command of government troops, to create a false idea of ​​the number of rebels, to hide the true home areas, the nature of the actions and their intentions.

Cases of actions of insurgents in the form of Afghan soldiers with a view to discrediting and disorganizing troops during the fighting have become more frequent. Replenishment of losses is carried out through recruitment and forced recruitment from among the youth in the field, as well as through the transfer of trained contingents from Pakistan and Iran.

The leadership of the rebels analyzes the experience of conducting combat operations against regular troops, introduces it into the practice of warfare, develops new tactical techniques based on it.

The rebels pretty well studied the tactics of government action. The combat skills of the rebels in recent years has increased, they began to act more cautiously, to avoid risk, to gain experience, constantly improving methods and methods of warfare. Particular attention is paid to the tactics of the rebels in ambush and raids.

Ambush. According to the views of the leadership of the rebels, ambushes should be carried out and practically carried out as small groups - 10 – 15 people, and larger gangs - up to 100 – 150 people based on the tasks. An ambush is planned in advance at the place and time. Especially important is the correct choice of the location of the ambush device. As a rule, they are arranged on the roads in order to destroy or capture state columns with national economic cargoes, as well as against military columns. The main purpose of the actions of the rebels on the roads is the disruption of traffic, which, in their opinion, will cause discontent among the population, will divert a significant part of the troops to protect highways and columns. At the same time, weapons, ammunition and other material and technical means are being seized for replenishment of their reserves, i.e. they are engaged in looting.

When choosing a place ambush skillfully use the terrain. The most suitable places are gorges, narrowness, passes, eaves above the road, galleries. In such places, the rebels secretly prepare positions for ambush in advance. Positions are arranged on the slopes of the mountains or the ridges of heights, at the entrance or exit from the gorges, on the crossing section of the road. In addition, ambushes are arranged in green areas, likely resting places. Before the ambush device is carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain.

As a part of the ambush team, there are usually:

observers (3 – 4 people) for monitoring and alerting. Observers may be unarmed, impersonating civilians (shepherds, peasants, etc.). There is an attraction to the observation of children;
the fire group performs the task of defeating manpower and equipment (the group includes the main forces);
warning group (4 – 5 people). Its task is to prevent the enemy from withdrawing or maneuvering from the ambush zone;
the reserve group takes a convenient position for opening fire. It can be used to enhance the fire group or warning group, as well as a cover during departure.
The zone of defeat during an ambush is chosen so as to include the main forces of the enemy. Ways of departure are outlined in advance and masked. The place of gathering of group after a departure is appointed. It should be secure and discreet. The place of the ambush is well camouflaged.

The fire group is located near the zone of destruction of the enemy. The warning group takes a position in the direction of possible withdrawal or maneuver of the enemy. When an ambush is recommended to avoid the location of the fire group and the reserve on both sides of the road in order to avoid the defeat of personnel from the fire of their own groups.

When attacking columns from an ambush, the main forces of the gang are in a firing group, which may include 1 – 2 DShK, mortar, 2 – 3 grenade launcher, several snipers and other personnel armed with rifles or machine guns.

The personnel of the fire group is located along the road at a distance from 150 to 300 m from the canvas and at a distance of 25 – 40 m from each other.

On one of the flanks is the strike group, which includes grenade launchers, machine guns, snipers. At the heights of the ruling are set DShK, adapted to fire at ground and air targets. In this position are arranged out of reach of heavy vehicles.

At the entrance of the column into the zone of destruction, the first shooters are firing at the drivers and elders of the car, the snipers, others begin to fire on vehicles with personnel. At the same time, the rebels are firing at armored targets from RPGs, BO and large-caliber machine guns.

First of all, the fire is concentrated on the head and radio machines in order to create a traffic jam, disrupt control, create panic, and hence the prerequisites for the destruction or seizure of the column.

It should be noted that the techniques of the device ambush pattern do not have. For example, in the province of KANDAHAR, as well as in some other areas of the DRA, ambushes are organized as follows: several groups of insurgents gather in a certain place, after which along different routes, an ambush is made, usually at night. In the area of ​​ambush are, as a rule, in three lines.

On the first line (position) are small groups of 3 – 4 people at a distance of 3 – 5 meters from each other and 25 – 40 meters from the group with a common front 250 – 300 meters. They are located on the same side of the road. Here are the main forces (fire group).

On the second line (20 – 25 m from the first) are the rebels, designed to connect the leaders of the gangs with the first line, as well as bring ammunition for the fire group. The rebels, located on the second line, usually do not have weapons.

On the third line, at a distance of 30 m from the second, are the commanders of gangs. This is for its intended purpose KP. In addition to the leaders, there are observers and liaisons. The NP is located at altitudes, from where a road is clearly visible on both sides of the ambush location.

In the summer of 1984 in Pandshara, ambushes were usually carried out in the afternoon before nightfall, which allowed the rebels to strike and leave under the cover of darkness when the aircraft were no longer operational.

Sometimes when carrying out ambushes, the rebels seek to break the column. In this case, they freely pass the outposts or most of the column and attack the circuit. Particularly often attacked are lagging cars or small columns, going without appropriate protection and air cover. Attacks on ambush columns are most often carried out early in the morning or in the evening, when the attack is expected the least.

Sometimes the insurgents on the roads act in the form of Afghan soldiers or Tsarandoya in order to rob the passengers and discredit the units of the government troops and Tsarandoya.

Ambushes in green areas are arranged on the paths of probable movement of troops with the aim of a sudden shelling both from the front and from the flanks. Moreover, ambushes from the front can be organized successively on several lines as the troops advance, both in columns and in a deployed battle formation.

It is also recommended to arrange ambushes when troops return from operations, when fatigue affects and vigilance is dulled. Such ambushes are considered the most effective.

When units depart from the blocking area, small groups pursue them, firing from all types of weapons. Often the chosen place of the ambush on the road is mined, in suitable places there are landslides, explosions of bridges on the rivers.

The rebels seek to study the order of movement of state and military columns, to determine the places of rest stops for the purpose of arranging ambushes there. When identifying such places, the rebels can shoot them in advance from mortars or mine them, bombard the stopped column from advantageous positions and quickly escape.

When carrying out ambushes, stealth, surprise, the use of deceptive actions and cunning are characteristic. According to the views of the leadership of the rebels, ambush is one of the main methods of warfare. In general, ambush actions, especially on the roads, insurgents cause serious damage to the state and, at times, considerable losses to government troops. When providing organized resistance to the rebels, they quickly remove their ambushes and hide, without putting up much resistance. With well-organized reconnaissance and guarding of the columns by escort forces, as well as with reliable air cover, the rebels usually do not risk ambushes and attack such columns.

Raid In the tactics of the rebels' actions, such a method of hostilities is widely used as raid. It is believed that a well-developed plan, a secretive approach to the object of the raid, security during the raid, and a swift departure with the use of a maneuver are considered to be successful. At the same time, much attention is paid to the factor of surprise.

Before the flight, training is usually conducted in conditions as close as possible to the actual conditions of the situation and terrain.

As with all other methods of hostilities, on-the-fly is preceded by a thorough reconnaissance of the object (security system, fencing, the possibility of reinforcement, etc.).

Approach to the object of the raid is planned in such a way as to exclude the possibility of contact with the enemy. For these purposes, routes are selected to the source area.

The objects of the raid are guard posts, small garrisons of troops, various warehouses and bases, and government agencies.

Hidden approach to the object is carried out in small groups, which, with a certain distance, bypass the open areas of the terrain, moving afterwards, not crowding and observing the measures of disguise. Management and control of the movement carried out by a voice, specially designed signals or by radio.

At the distant approaches to the raid object, the gang can be concealed even during the daytime, especially under unfavorable conditions for aviation.

During the movement, the provision of security measures is assigned to the sentinel, the groups leading in front, and the lateral observers, who are located in advance at the commanding heights.

The advanced patrol (2 – 3 people) should be separately ahead of the group on horseback or on foot, disguised as shepherds, peasants, etc.

At first one sentinel goes or drives, followed by the second one via 1 – 2. The main group, having received information from the sentinel and observers that the path is clear, is being advanced to the starting area, most often with the onset of dark time.

In order to ensure secrecy and surprise, direct advancement to the object of the raid is carried out at night.

The optimal composition of the raid group is determined in 30 – 35 people. It usually includes:

suppression group;
engineering team;
cover group;
main group of plaque.
The group of suppression is entrusted with the task of neutralizing the guards and thereby ensuring the actions of other groups.

The engineering team provides passages in the barriers.

The covering group blocks the enemy’s withdrawal and maneuver paths, impedes the reserve approach, covers up the withdrawal of their groups after completing the mission.

The main group of the raid is designed to suppress the resistance of the guard and destroy the object or post.

On arrival at the facility, the cover group first takes up a position.

The main group, after removing the sentinel and ensuring passage in the barriers, moves forward to the object behind the covering group and carries out a raid. When an object is seized, it is destroyed by the method of explosion or arson by the main group. After the destruction of the object, the main group quickly departs. Her departure is provided by a cover group.

With the withdrawal of great importance is given to the introduction of the enemy in error. To do this, the personnel of the gang is divided into small groups, which along different routes arrive at the designated gathering place.

The fighting in the settlements. As is well known, the rebels generally shy away from a direct clash with regular troops. However, if necessary, sometimes they are forced to take defensive actions, including in populated areas.

When conducting combat operations in populated areas, a fire system is being developed. Tactically important terrain in open terrain is shot through. In addition, firing positions of DShK, ZSU, mountain cannons can be equipped at altitudes. Approaches to the locality in this case are mined. On the roofs of the houses arranged observers. The defense is engaged behind duels in which loopholes are made, or in residential buildings. For machine guns, BW, RPGs, several firing positions are selected, which change at short intervals. Sandbags can be installed on roofs and windows. Ammunition and explosives are stored deep inside the premises, away from windows and doors.

When firing from buildings in order to disguise and eliminate the defeat is recommended to stay away from windows.

When the troops approach the village, concentrated fire is opened, after which the rebels retreat into the depths of the village, leaving it to half and occupying a new line of defense, usually in the homes of residents.

When the technique and personnel of the enemy enter the village, and the distance between the sides is small, the rebels open fire with all types of weapons. In their opinion, the attackers cannot use all the power of their equipment at the moment, their maneuver will be limited, the use of artillery to aviation is impossible, because their personnel and equipment will inevitably be amazed.

In the event that the enemy has a significant superiority, then the rebels, after a brief shelling of attackers, retreat along predetermined routes, qanats, and gardens to the new gathering place.

During air raids and artillery shelling, they hide in karises, specially constructed shelters, and at the end of the raid (shelling) they take up their positions again.

After the troops leave the settlement, the rebels return to the old place and continue their anti-state activities.

According to the latest instructions of the leadership of the counter-revolution, it is forbidden to conduct large-scale operations in cities or localities where there is a large population in order to avoid the destruction of civilians. It is recommended to send special groups there to commit sabotage and terrorist actions. However, these instructions guide gang leaders in most cases are not followed.

Fighting aviation. Considering that aviation does not strike at peaceful villages, as well as mosques, madrasas, cemeteries and other places sacred for Afghans, the insurgents seek to settle close to such places or directly to them.

Air strikes are the most dangerous for the rebels. Therefore, increased attention is paid to the fight against airplanes and helicopters.

Currently, the rebels have anti-aircraft weapons only for hitting air targets at low altitudes.

As anti-aircraft weapons use DShK, ZSU, welded machine guns, as well as small arms and even RPGs, which are available in most gangs. In some gangs, new air defense systems, such as Strela-2M and Red-Ay, have begun to appear.

The tactic of dealing with airborne targets consists in firing aircraft and helicopters during takeoff or landing, during raids on objects, when they, attacking a target, drop to 300 – 600 meters. In this case, the fire is intense from all types of weapons, usually according to the slave in a pair, which reduces the possibility of detection and retaliatory strike.

In order to destroy aviation equipment at the airfield sites, the rebels often fire their shells from mortars, 76-mm mountain cannons, DShK, and rocket launchers.

Air defense, as a rule, covers the centers (base areas), various bases and depots of weapons and ammunition, as well as other important objects.

For DShK and 3GU, trenches are usually constructed in the form of vertical shafts at the dominant heights with a certain sector of shelling, which are carefully masked. For DShK are also equipped with open positions, adapted for firing at both air and ground targets. Often such positions are even concreted. Positions for DShK have special slots for shelter personnel. The slots are in stellar order from the main position. The order of use of one or another slot for shelter depends on the purpose for which planes (helicopters) attack.

Recently, much attention has been paid to training air defense specialists in training centers, where the rebels are studying air defense weapons, the theory and practice of shooting, tactics of aviation operations.

Despite the fact that the gang of insurgents has a significant amount of anti-aircraft defense, the effectiveness of these funds remains low. The main disadvantage of the air defense of the rebels is the lack of means of defeating air targets at medium and high altitudes.

Mining. The rebels on the territory of the DRA launched a real mine war, especially on the roads, aiming to interrupt or seriously impede the movement of public transport with national cargo, as well as military convoys.

The focus is on mining sites on the main roads: KABUL, HEIRATON; KABUL, KANDAGAR, GEPAT; KABUL, JELALABAD; KABUL, GARDEZ, HOST.

On the roads, mines are installed both on the roadway in the asphalt (concrete) hollows, and on the roadsides, at the places where the columns stop and at the detours of the large hollows.

To defeat military vehicles and vehicles, anti-tank, anti-vehicle mines are installed on the roadway, as a rule, of a push action. Various land mines and anti-personnel mines are set up on the roadsides, at the places where the columns are stopped, in order to undermine the technology when overtaking the columns, as well as when they stop off-road.

Along with the main roads with hard surface, the rebels mine and field roads in the event of military convoys moving along them, as well as roads near the stationing of troops.

Used mainly mines pressure action, the production of various Western countries, as well as land mines with electric fuses. Guided mines and surprise mines are also used, especially in cities, as well as in combat areas.

The setting of mines can be carried out both in advance and immediately before the passage of the columns. For setting mines in large gangs, there are specialists and specially trained mining groups (4 – 5 people). Often, locals and even children after their small training are used for these purposes. Use of mines for non-recoverability.

In some cases, the insurgents with the aim of detaining the columns with the help of an explosion of mines and land mines create debris on the roads in places where a detour is difficult or impossible (ravine, passes, narrowness, etc.).

After the explosion of several vehicles on mines or a blockage device, a column is fired from all types of weapons.

In order to destroy a large number of vehicles at the same time, the rebels are beginning to use the mining "chain" (30 – 40 minutes in the area 200 – 300 m).

Cases (Aliheil, Paktiya Province, Larkoh Mountains, Farah Province, Pandscher) have become frequent bookmarks at mining sites jointly with anti-tank mines or high-powered land mines.

The new element is marked in the application of min-fugasov, filled with fuel (gasoline, kerosene, diesel. Fuel). When they explode, the burning substance is sprayed, which results in ignition of not only the object that has exploded, but also of others that are nearby.

According to the instructions of the leadership of the insurgents in the places of mine, the commanders of the groups should post posts that warn drivers of private cars and pedestrians. Usually a warning fee is charged.

With the help of mining, the rebels intend to inflict significant losses on public transport, as well as military convoys.

Attack on provincial and county centers. Attacks on provincial and county centers are preceded by thorough preparation, including the reconnaissance of the forces and means of people's posts in a particular locality, their placement, study and preparation of the area of ​​upcoming military operations in engineering, propaganda among the personnel of the armed forces. Recently, attacks have increasingly become perpetrated by several groups of different party affiliations.

At the preliminary meeting, the leaders of the bandit groups draw up a plan of action, outline the directions and areas of operation of each group of insurgents. Conducting reconnaissance of targeted objects is generally not particularly difficult, since gangs usually have a wide network of informants in the city, agents among employees of the KhAD, employees of Tsarandoi and personnel of units and divisions of government armed forces, as well as under the guise of local residents move around the city.

First of all, we study the situation in the area of ​​posts of people's power, the number and mood of the personnel, the number and type of weapons, the location of firing points, the time for changing sentries, etc. The combat area in engineering is prepared in advance. Positions for mortars and machine guns, recoilless guns can be equipped in the gardens and courtyards of local residents' houses, escape routes are being prepared, for which ditches, ditches, plantings of vineyards are used, digs are made under duvala or masked passages in them.

Immediately before the attack, the rebels can be located in the homes of local residents, in gardens, abandoned buildings, or take positions on the approaches to the city. At the appointed time or on a conditional signal, the designated groups of rebels open fire on heavy weapon posts, while others, armed with RPGs and small arms, approach the posts and also fire from several directions. After the firing of heavy weapons, the groups begin the attack and, under favorable conditions, seize the object.

Attacks on provincial centers, which are currently all under the control of people's authorities, are relatively rare and aim to maintain tensions in the city by demonstrating strength, exerting propaganda on the local population, undermining their faith in the ability of the people counterrevolution, which should contribute to the departure of residents in refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan, joining the ranks of the rebels. After the attack, gangs do not stay long in the provincial center, and after reprisals against party members and officials, robbery, collecting taxes from the population and carrying out mobilization activities go to the mountains.

County centers can be captured and held for a long time. Currently, the leadership of the counterrevolution plans to seize several counties in one of the provinces bordering Pakistan, in particular in Nangarhar, create a “free zone” there and declare an interim government of Afghanistan there.

The rebels avoid attacking those settlements in which there are garrisons of government troops.

The shelling of settlements, the dispositions of troops, posts of people's power, industrial and other objects. In the tactics of the rebels' actions during the shelling of various objects, one can distinguish such basic stages as reconnaissance of the object, exit of the group from the permanently-based area and gathering at the designated place, occupying firing positions prepared in advance, direct shelling, withdrawal and reconnaissance of results.

In general terms, the rebels are scouting objects of interest to them in the area of ​​activity constantly. But before performing a specific task, including the shelling of a given goal, a detailed study of its location, daily routine and way of life of the personnel (population, employees, etc.) is carried out. Intelligence is conducted with the help of local residents and the rebels themselves, who are passing or passing by the object. Sometimes, isolated members of bandit groups under the guise of shepherds, collectors of brushwood measure the distance from the target to the prepared firing position for launching missiles, installing a recoilless gun, mortars, DShK. If shelling is planned only from small arms, then the terrain in the immediate vicinity of the object is additionally studied, the approaches and departures are outlined, the time and place of gathering after the completion of the task is assigned.

Basically, a group from 15 to 30 rebels is created to carry out the shelling. In order to conspiracy, a specific task is set before going on a mission. When shelling the most important objects, such as the location of the troops, the rebels can act as a combined force from different parties. In such cases, the squad may be 100 and more people. At the time of the operation, a single leader from one of the parties is appointed. Exit to the action area is carried out in small groups along different routes.

Shelling is most often carried out during daylight, less often in the morning and sometimes at night. At night, it is more difficult to determine the forces of the rebels, their positions, organize the mopping up of the area and use aviation. To avoid large losses in retaliatory artillery strikes, the tactics of wide dispersal are used. At the same firing position there are no more than two or three people who are indicated in advance by the shelling sector.

In order to increase the accuracy of the shelling, except for measuring the distance to the target in steps, the rebels sometimes make one or two sighting shots in the afternoon. The shelling can be conducted from all types of weapons that are in the armament of gangs: rocket projectiles, recoilless guns, mortars, DShK, RPG, small arms. A group that does not have a heavy weapon can rent it from another group. The signal to the beginning of the shelling is the first shot from the gun, the launch of the RS. After the shelling is completed, heavy weapons are masked next to the firing position, and the rebels hide from the retaliatory artillery fire. Then, knowing that the terrain is not being combed, they take the weapon and return to the base. In some cases, the rebels begin to divert fire from small arms from a secondary direction, and then from the main heavy. Positions, if possible, are selected in the alignment with the settlement, which creates the danger of the defeat of civilians by return artillery fire.

With the advent of Chinese-made rockets to the rebels, their ability to fire various objects increased. The rebels arrive in the launch area of ​​the missiles by car, in the back of which the launcher is installed. After the shelling, which takes very little time, the car even before the return fire opens from this point. While the effectiveness of rocket attacks low. This is due to poor training of the rebels, inaccurate determination of the distance to the target, low quality of the product itself.

The command to the rebels to withdraw can be a cease-fire from heavy weapons, an order from the leader of the group in a voice, including through a megaphone, or a previously scheduled time. When departing from firing positions, the rebels seek to leave no traces of their stay, carry off the dead, wounded, collect the liner. This is done in order to make it difficult to detect their location in order to use positions in repeated shelling. After the withdrawal, the rebels proceed to the collection point of the group, where the operation is being analyzed. Then part of the rebels returns to the base, and the rest disperse into their villages before receiving the order to appear for the next sabotage.

When conducting reconnaissance of shelling results, the rebels use the same methods as during the operation. The data obtained are taken into account in subsequent shelling.

Sabotage and terrorist attacks. Diversions are committed, as a rule, by rebel groups of up to five people. The most characteristic of them are the undermining of military equipment, the failure of pipelines, the destruction of buildings of public authorities, airports, hotels, etc. For the destruction of military equipment, the rebels mine parking places, trenches of outposts for tanks and armored personnel carriers, which return overnight to the locations of units. Mines and landmines are installed both directly in the parking lots (in the trenches) and on the approach to them. For blasting, not only conventional, but also electric fuses are used.

Pipeline outage is carried out by mining it in one or several sections, by mechanical damage to the pipes, shooting from small arms, etc. After the damage to the pipeline, leaking fuel is set on fire. Often in places where the pipeline is damaged, ambushes are set up to intercept emergency teams that follow to carry out rehabilitation work.

For the destruction of various buildings, mines and land mines are also used, to the installation of which service personnel are widely involved. There have been cases when insurgents used kariz systems to approach a building as close as possible and then made a tunnel directly under the building.

Terror is the most common action of the rebels in the fight against representatives of people's power, leaders of the party and government, the leadership of the armed forces, citizens cooperating with the people's power, disliked civilians of cities and villages, ringleaders and insurgents of neighboring groups and other party groups.

Conducting a terrorist action depends largely on specific conditions. In places where there is no people's power organizer, the rebel groups simply shoot residents they dislike. Representatives of the party and the people's government can be destroyed both by special assignment and by accidental seizures, for example, during an ambush on the roads, during attacks on provincial and district centers, shelling of posts.

After receiving a task for the destruction of any person, a group of up to five people is engaged in studying his lifestyle, work schedule, routes and means of transportation, places of rest, regime and security forces at work and at home, etc. The circle of people around is most carefully studied. Depending on the results of the study of the situation, a method of physical destruction is outlined. These could be car bombing, laying mines at work or at home, using poison, installing guided and magnetic devices on vehicles and other methods.

According to incoming data, at present, the rebels have a large number of toxic substances of an unidentified type, which have neither color nor smell. Poisonous substances in tablets, ampoules and powdery state are intended for mass poisoning of people in the garrisons of military units, catering places, hotels, hotels, for poisoning of wells, open ponds, etc.

On the question of the use by the rebels of artificial underground structures to shelter troops and groups and their hidden withdrawal in the event of danger. When conducting operations to clean the villages, attention is drawn to the fact that often the troops pass through settlements without encountering resistance and without finding rebels, despite the fact that there were reliable, verified data on the location of bandit groups there. In addition, the effectiveness of airstrikes and artillery attacks is sometimes quite low, although it has been established that the accuracy of bombing and firing was quite high. Such phenomena are explained by the fact that in order to preserve their forces, the rebels use artificial structures - karezy.

A widespread network of kariz exists in the Karabag region, controlled by the leader Karim (IPA), which gives him the opportunity to withdraw his people from the blows, to secretly appear in places of overnight stays, and also to store weapons and ammunition underground. For example, according to sources that confirm the interrogation materials of one of the former leaders of the group of Karim detachments, most of the weapons and ammunition are stockpiled in the area of ​​Kalaya-Faiz (100000, 3854-12516 map). However, the exact location of the warehouses has not yet been established, since it is carefully hidden even from the leaders of the groups.

In the Karim zone, karizas are mainly used, in some places cleared, retrofitted and improved as directed by Karim. First of all, these are karezes in the area of ​​Qalayi-Faiz, which connect this base with the villages of Langar (3854-12516), Qalayi-Kazi (3854-12516) and Bagi-Zagan (3856-12518).

The network of qarises between the villages of Karabagkarez (3858-12516) and Kalay-bibi (3856-12516), which Karim most often uses for overnight stays, is well developed. These settlements are connected both with each other and with small villages of Kalain-Karim, Kalay-Hodzhinsmail, Kalain-Gulmured (all 3856-12516).

Almost every fortress and even every house in the Karim zone is equipped with qarises to ensure the safety of residents during the bombardments, some of which have access to the “trunk” kariz.

Karezes, as a rule, are constructed along the channels of groundwater, but this factor is not mandatory. The excerpt of qanats and communication moves is a laborious process due to the difficult soils in the area. The penetration rate is 2 – 3 m for 7 – 8 hours, and sometimes it does not reach 2 meters. The diameter of the wells - 0,5 – 1,0 m. Steps are cut along the walls of the wells used to enter the karezes. The distance between the wells is 8 – 15 m. The average depth of qanises is 3,5 – 5 m, and sometimes it reaches 12 – 15 m. The height of the horizontal adits is up to 1 m. Movement through them is carried out mainly in goose pitch.

The entrances to the karezes are carefully masked, secret entrances are equipped with secrets in various outbuildings inside the fortress, and sometimes directly in the duels. Often with the purpose of masking the inputs used technical means. When a danger arises, the insurgents leave through the karezes, closing the entrances behind them, so planning to clean up the villages in this area should be carried out taking into account the presence of a similar network of qarises and the possibility of leaving the rebels through them.

Transportations of gangs and weapons by caravans. Counter-revolutionary groups use the 34 main caravan routes (24 from Pakistan and 10 from Iran) to transfer trained rebel contingents, weapons, ammunition and materiel from Pakistan and Iran to the DRA. Most of the gangs and caravans with weapons on the territory of Afghanistan are being transferred from Pakistan, since almost all the headquarters of counter-revolutionary organizations are located there and the main stream of weapons supplied to the rebels is sent here.

On the territory of Pakistan and Iran, weapons and ammunition intended for shipment to the DRA are delivered by road to the state border or directly to transshipment bases in the border area of ​​Afghanistan, where caravans are being formed.

When forming caravans and choosing a route through the territory of the DRA, the rebels avoid the pattern, often changing them. In areas where troops are active in the fight against caravans, they are formed on the territory of neighboring states. In order to increase survivability, taking into account experience, caravans follow, as a rule, dismembered groups (2 – 5 pack animals, 1 – 2 car, 20 – 30 people of protection) directly into active gangs, bypassing intermediate bases and warehouses.

The movement is carried out mainly at night, as well as during the day in difficult weather conditions for aviation. During the daytime, the caravan stops and disguises itself in the pre-selected and prepared days (in villages, gorges, caves, groves, etc.).

Each group can have its own route and final destination. Traffic safety is provided by a well-organized system of marching and direct guard, reconnaissance and warning on routes. Rebels often use civilians to perform reconnaissance and warning missions.

Camping caravans usually include the head patrol - 2 – 3 people. (or motorcycle), GPP - 10 – 15 people. (one car), the main transport group with direct protection. The rear guard can be included in the marching order of the caravan. Lateral patrols due to terrain features are rarely sent. In the same manner, organizational cores and trained gangs from Pakistan and Iran are transferred to the territory of the DRA.

Sabotage and terrorist activities. In general, the fight against the DRA, sabotage and terrorist activities are viewed by the leadership of the counter-revolution as an important factor in seriously weakening people's power. Based on the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of the struggle and reducing their losses, the rebels have recently stepped up sabotage and terrorist activities. This activity is closely linked with the armed struggle and agitational propaganda work of the rebels. In this regard, the number of sabotage and terrorist actions carried out by the rebels is constantly increasing.

Training of terrorist groups is carried out in special centers in Pakistan, as well as in some countries of Western Europe and the Middle East. The sabotage activities of the rebels include sabotage at government and military facilities, communications, and in public places. The leadership of the counter-revolution demands that their executives intensify sabotage at airfields, at the locations of government troops, gas storages, at bread-baking plants, water-pumping stations, power stations, power lines, and in parking lots of state and public transport.

The introduction of disorder into the usual rhythm of life, according to the views of the leadership of the rebels, can bring nervousness and cause discontent of the population with public authorities. This can be facilitated, for example, by disruptions in the work of urban transport, interruptions in the supply of the population with food and basic necessities, the spread of false rumors, sabotage in public places, etc.

Much attention is paid to terrorist attacks. Terror is considered one of the most important elements of the guerrilla war of the rebels. The tactics of the actions of the rebels, developed by one of the ideologists of the Islamic movement Abu Tarok Musafer, clearly state that terror is a particularly important moment in the struggle. The author calls to carry out terror against the infidels, wherever they are, to seize them alive or dead, to destroy them physically.

The physical destruction of party and state workers, activists, officers of the armed forces and Tsarandoya is one of the main tasks of the terrorist activities of the rebels. It is also recommended to abduct prominent figures, arrange bombings in cinemas, restaurants, mosques, and attribute these actions to state bodies.

Terrorist activities are carried out by specialists and trained groups. Groups also operate in the capital of the DRA, as well as in many provinces and other administrative centers. Sometimes individuals and even children are involved in such activities for a fee and under duress. Terrorist groups operate in cities, they, as a rule, are well disguised, operate mainly at night. For example, in Kabul and its surroundings, there are small maneuverable groups prepared abroad, as well as isolated from gangs based around the city. These groups have the necessary experience of terrorist activities.

Along with carrying out terrorist acts, such groups are tasked with improving attacks on important objects, firing on security posts, various party and state institutions. For this purpose, it is recommended to use cars and trucks with mortars installed on them, DShK, RPGs, from which short-term shelling of targeted objects is carried out at night, after which the gangs quickly hide. The composition of terrorist groups is usually small (8 – 10 people), they have the necessary weapons and documents of cover.

Thus, the leadership of the counterrevolution strongly recommends that serious attention be paid to sabotage and terrorist activities, since, in their opinion, this is one of the most important ways of reducing the time to achieve goals, causes great material and moral damage to people's power and eliminates the great losses of the rebels.

Agitation and propaganda activities of the rebels in the territory of Afghanistan. Propaganda and agitation, according to the leadership of the rebels, are the most important factor for achieving success in the undeclared war against the DRA. It is primarily aimed at creating political instability in the country, attracting the insurgents to the side, disintegrating the party-state bodies, as well as units and divisions of the DRA armed forces, especially units formed from former gangs and tribal groups. At the same time, much attention is paid to the inclination of the leaders and elders of the tribes to the side of counter-revolution.

Agitation and propaganda work is carried out taking into account national peculiarities, religious fanaticism, relations of various tribes to people's power. This work is active and focused. Much attention is paid to individual work. Mostly propaganda work among the population is carried out by Islamic committees, they actively conduct anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda among the population, skillfully use the blunders and mistakes made by the party-state bodies.

In some provinces, prepared groups of 12 – 15 people are created for advocacy work, which are sent to separate villages where they work with the population. Groups are equipped with loudspeakers, have tape recordings and propaganda literature. Propaganda is conducted taking into account the interests of the local population and the conditions of the area. Clergymen (mullahs) are widely used for propaganda, as well as agitators of relatively large gangs that have undergone special training in Pakistan.

For propaganda purposes, misinformation, the spread of false rumors, etc. are widely used. To disrupt government actions to incite certain gangs and tribes to the side of people's power, the insurgents seek to come in contact with these gangs, disintegrate them and again force them to fight on the side of counterrevolution. A lot of techniques are used to cause discontent with the people's power. One of them is forcing merchants to continuously increase the prices of food and essential goods and ban farmers from exporting and selling products in cities. In this way, the rebels cause discontent among the population, they blame the government for all the difficulties, they suggest that it is incapable of managing and establishing a normal life.

Rebel propaganda work has a wide variety of methods: individual work, meetings, conversations, distribution of leaflets, listening to tape recordings, radio broadcasts of subversive radio stations of the Afghan counterrevolution, as well as radio stations of Pakistan, Iran, the United States and others. gangs intensify advocacy work as instructed by the rebels' subversive centers. On the whole, the propaganda work of the counter-revolution in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at the present stage is being carried out actively, purposefully and without result; therefore, it represents a serious danger to the people’s power in Afghanistan.

The arms of the rebels. The main weapons of the rebels in the DRA are small arms (Bur-303 rifles, carbines, assault rifles, machine guns), RPGs, DShK, PGI, 82-mm and 60-mm mortars, 76-mm mountain cannons, 37-mm and 40 -mm anti-aircraft installations. Some gangs are armed with outdated models of small arms ("Bour" rifles, carbines, rifles). Organized gangs that have connections with counter-revolutionary organizations and operate under their leadership are armed with modern weapons. In these gangs, a large number (up to 70%) of automatic weapons. In large numbers, the rebels have hand grenades, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, as well as improvised land mines.

Much attention is paid to the provision of gangs of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. The number of these funds in gangs is constantly increasing. Appear in service with complexes of MANPADS "Strela-2M" and "Red-A". However, the means of air defense and combat armored vehicles is not enough and they are ineffective. In 1985 – 1986, according to intelligence data, the arrival of a new weapon is expected.

Currently, on average, gangs have 1 RPGs on 8 – 10 people, 1 mortars on 50 people, 1 DShK on 50 – 80 people. In the middle of 1984, the Pakistani government assumed the function of supplying the rebels with weapons. The following collateral standards were defined: per 10 group. 1 RPGs and 9 AKs are allocated, for a detachment of 100 people. and more - one ZSU-1 (or MANPADS), up to 4 DShK, 4 BO, 4 mortar, 10 RPG and the corresponding number of small arms. In addition, organizational cores operating in the areas of aerodromes and other areal facilities are given a rocket launcher.

Plans of the Afghan counterrevolutionary forces to conduct armed struggle. The defeat of the rebel group in the Pandshir Valley in the spring of 1984 and the disruption of the plans of counter-revolutionary forces to create a so-called free zone in the summer period in Afghanistan significantly undermined the authority of the counter-revolutionary movement. These events caused concern in the leadership circles of the United States and the reactionary Muslim countries, which in turn increased the pressure on the leadership of the Afghan insurgents in order to consolidate their actions in the struggle against the people's power, and also expanded the scale of political, military and financial assistance to the counterrevolutionary forces.

Recently, attempts to create the so-called government of Afghanistan in exile by electing it to the Loya Jirga in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan have intensified significantly. However, they in turn entailed sharp differences in the top echelons of the leadership of the Afghan counterrevolution and, as a result, changes in the degree of political influence of individual leaders, led to an increase in opposition between the groups of the “union of seven” and “union of three”, each of which continues to strive to ensure themselves a dominant influence in the counterrevolutionary movement. As a result, in recent months, the “union of seven” has acquired the strongest positions, the armed formations of which will in the near future be the main fighting force opposing the government forces. A certain increase in the coordination of hostilities between the gangs of various parties and organizations belonging to this grouping should be expected.

With the ongoing personal rivalry between B. Rabbani and G. Hekmatyar, the figure of A. Seat’s leader of the union of the seven, which has recently gained increasing political weight and whose authority in the ranks of the counterrevolutionary forces is increasing, is coming to the fore. .

In order not to reduce the activity of hostilities in the more difficult climatic conditions of the winter period 1984 – 1985, the leadership of the Afghan counterrevolution is making vigorous efforts to create on the territory of the DRA in the areas of most active actions of armed gangs of stockpiles of modern weapons and ammunition in food. The main efforts of the counterrevolution are focused on the following issues:

1. Providing the necessary conditions for the declaration of the so-called free zone on the territory of Afghanistan and the creation of a counter-revolutionary government there. The most likely areas for the implementation of these plans will be the south and southeast of the province of NANGARKHAR (ACHIN county, etc.), as well as the border areas of the PACTIA province (the DJAJI and CHAMKASH counties, the HOST district).

2. Expansion of hostilities in the border area of ​​the NANGARKHAR and PACTIA provinces in order to ensure the transfer from Pakistani territory of personnel, weapons, ammunition and other materiel for the gangs of the insurgents operating in the eastern, central and southern regions of Afghanistan with the aim of disrupting measures to close the Afghan-Pakistani border conducted by the leadership of the DRA.

3. Increasing efforts to fight for influence in the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan in order to force them to actively oppose the people's democratic government on the side of the rebel movement.

4. Disruption of the normal life of the capital by disrupting the transportation of essential materials to Kabul, undermining the power supply system, systematic attacks on the city’s facilities, organizing terrorist acts and sabotage to initiate a new wave of anti-Sovietism and discredit the party's and state authorities in the eyes of the DRA as unable to provide the necessary order.

5. Creating conditions for the intensification of internal counterrevolution in the party and state apparatus, the Chad, the Interior Ministry and the Armed Forces, the organization of sabotage at all levels of the state mechanism, the decomposition of the personnel of the army and Tsarandoy through the introduction of agents, the use of tribal, religious and national features of Afghans.

In this case, the tactics of the actions of the gangs in the winter period will have the following features:

The main efforts will be transferred to actions by small groups (10 – 15 people) to commit sabotage mainly on transport routes (mainly in the KABUL – KANDAGAR and GERAT – KANDAHAR, HEIRATON – KABUL, KABUL – GELALABAD directions); (terrorist, sabotage groups on highways, anti-aircraft defense groups, artillery shelling groups, caravan escort groups);
sabotage and terrorist activity will increase in populated areas of the country, as well as the frequency of rocket and artillery shelling of the capital and other major cities. The rebels will take measures to improve the accuracy of artillery firing by adjusting the fire using radio communications (mainly in the VHF range) through agents in the cities, as well as early binding of targets by coordinates;
the technical equipment of bandit formations with anti-aircraft weapons (including MANPADS, small arms and artillery weapons, modern communications and explosive devices will increase;
The activity of underground Islamic committees will intensify, mainly in the direction of intensifying propaganda activities and recruiting new members of counter-revolutionary parties in order to prepare for the beginning of the spring period to mobilize the country's male population in gangs;
Considerable attention will be paid to ensuring the secrecy of the measures planned by the gangs, as well as increasing the effectiveness of the reconnaissance plans of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Civil Aviation Directorate and the Ministry of Internal Affairs for conducting operations against the forces of counterrevolution.
The leadership of the Afghan counterrevolution, taking into account the current military-political situation, has identified the following main tasks for the winter period.

Central region of the country. The leadership of the counterrevolutionary forces intends to maintain tension in the area by intensifying the actions of existing gangs and sending trained replenishment from Pakistan. In particular, at the last in October with. in Peshawar, a meeting of the leaders of the “union of seven” was decided to strengthen the anti-government activities of gangs in the “Center” zone during the winter period. In accordance with this decision, to this zone during November of s. The city was transferred to 1200 rebels from other provinces of the DRA, as well as from Pakistan, including 50 people trained in MANPADS.

The main directions of actions of counterrevolutionary forces in the “Center” zone will remain the same: terrorist and sabotage actions in the capital, artillery shelling of the most important objects of Kabul, more intensive use of anti-aircraft weapons, sabotage on highways, undermining of power lines, inciting anti-Soviet sentiment.

The leaders of counterrevolution will strive to force the embassies of Western countries to leave Kabul with regular shelling of the locations of international and foreign missions, the capital’s international airport, civilian aircraft, thereby demonstrating not only the local population but also the international community the inability of the people’s authorities to control the situation in the capital, but at the same time contributing to the attempts of Western political circles to isolate the DRA in the international arena.

The gangs of the union of seven, especially the IPA and IOA, will act most purposefully and actively in the “Center” zone. From the union of the “union of three” active actions should be expected from the armed formation of the DIRA. Significant steps to unite and coordinate the actions of Shiite armed gangs in the central regions of Afghanistan and a sharp activation on this basis of their anti-government activities are not expected. Large-scale supply of weapons and ammunition to these groups is not planned by the Iranian authorities.

In the eastern and south-eastern regions of the country. The defeat of the largest and most efficient group of rebels in Pandshara showed the impossibility of forming a so-called government in the free zone deep in the territory of Afghanistan. Therefore, the main purpose of the counterrevolutionary forces in the eastern and southeastern provinces of the country will be to seize control of certain areas (HOST district, areas at the junction of three provinces — PACTIA, LOGAR, NANGARKHAR, southern and southeastern areas of NANGARHAR province) free zone, the establishment on its territory of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These areas are directly adjacent to the Pakistani border, the main supply routes of the rebels pass here and therefore there will be a constant possibility of supplying gangs with weapons and ammunition, as well as replenishing them with trained personnel from bases and camps in Pakistan. Troops of A.R. Sayef and G. Hekmatyar will form the basis of the gangs in these areas, as well as the formation of the “union of three”, which plans to devote special efforts to the creation of large gangs on a tribal basis, which will allow active use of Pashtun tribes on the side of counter-revolution, as well as to increase organization and discipline in gangs.

When planning actions in the province of PACTIA, the leadership of the “Union of Seven” identified three main areas for conducting military operations: Judja counties (ALI KHEIL center) and CHAMKANI (CHAMKANI center, PACTIA province) and DJIA-MAIDAN county (HOST district). These areas are the most convenient for the actions of the rebels, as they are adjacent to the border with Pakistan. In winter, the highest air temperature is maintained here, ensuring the movement of gangs in mountainous areas through the passes and supplying them with everything necessary. In addition, the leaders of the "Union of Seven" group believe that the population of these regions is mostly on the side of counter-revolution, and military garrisons located on their territory without the support of aviation are not able to resist the resolute offensive of the rebels. The only obstacle for the implementation of their plans is that the leadership of the “union of seven” considers the impact of aviation.

In order to combat aviation during combat operations in the above areas, it is planned to allocate and train special air observers, develop a warning system for air attack groups, provide detachments of insurgents with anti-aircraft weapons, air defense missile systems, anti-aircraft systems, and air defense missiles.

Despite the outlined consolidation of forces and coordination of actions of various counterrevolutionary groups, there is no doubt that disagreements, contradictions and even fighting clashes between them due to spheres of influence will continue in this zone, since it is this region that is currently defined by almost all counterrevolutionary groups. as a base.

According to available data, the counter-revolution, trying to prevent a decline in military activity in the area, also aims at the extensive involvement of Soviet troops in the fighting in the resettlement zones of the Pashtun tribes. This step would dramatically increase the effectiveness of anti-Soviet propaganda in these politically and politically important areas and finally thwart the outlined negotiations of a number of Pashtun tribes with government bodies.

Southern areas of the country. The area of ​​the most active combat activities of the rebels will continue to be the city and the "green zone" of KANDAGARA, as well as the KALAT-KANDAGAR-GIRISHK highway. Special attention will be paid to gangs in this zone by ambush actions. In the province of KANDAGAR, both leading counter-revolutionary groups, the union of seven and the union of three, plan to conduct active hostilities. At the same time, in winter, this province will be a zone of special attention of the “union of three” grouping, which plans to solve the acute problem of replenishing its armed formations with personnel at the expense of the male population of the Pashtun tribes inhabiting the province. The representative of Zahir Shah Azizullah Waziri, specially arrived in Quetta, who is well aware of the methods and features of working with the tribes of this zone, should lead this work, since during the period of Daud he served as Minister for Border Affairs and Tribes of Afghanistan.

Northern and northeastern regions. Due to the fact that, as a result of operations carried out by government forces in Pandscher, the traditional supply routes for gangs of the IRA group active in the region were cut off, we should expect vigorous efforts from B. Rabbani to restore positions in this zone. To this end, as well as to strengthen its influence among the population of the above-mentioned areas, this group will intensify in the winter period sabotage and terrorist activities, shelling of administrative centers, major economic facilities, first of all, objects of Afghan-Soviet economic cooperation, and blocking the main transport arteries. . The leadership of the IAA will try to transfer weapons and ammunition to these areas. Given that similar goals will also be pursued by the gangs of the second-degree influence in this area of ​​the counter-revolutionary organization - the IPA, we should again expect the aggravation of disagreements and even clashes of these groups.

Western districts. In these areas of the country, large-scale hostilities by the forces of counter-revolution are not expected. The main efforts will be aimed at conducting sabotage and terrorist activities on the roads, power lines, in cities, attacks on border and army posts on the Afghan-Iranian border. Particularly intense sabotage and terrorist activities acquired in Herat and its surroundings. In Herat, the counter-revolution will act like the urban underground, relying on counter-revolutionary elements among the population of the city.

Manage fighting rebels. The general leadership of the rebel movement in Afghanistan is carried out by counter-revolutionary organizations, headquarters, which are located in Pakistan and Iran. Direct control of groups and detachments in the territory of the DRA is carried out by the joint Islamic provincial committees, as well as the Islamic county and county committees under the control of the rebels.

Islamic committees act as local administrative bodies. In addition to armed struggle, sabotage and terrorist activities, they also organize propaganda work among the population, engage in calling gangs for young people, collect taxes, carry out judicial functions, etc.

In addition, so-called fronts, which control the combat activities of the insurgents, have been created for more qualified leadership in the fighting of insurgent groups and groups in important areas of the country in a number of provinces. They have at their disposal insurgent detachments operating in the zones designated for them. The front commander has at his disposal a headquarters consisting of several divisions. Front commanders are appointed from one of the counterrevolutionary groups that have the greatest influence in the area.

The lower links (gangs), the number of which does not exceed 25 – 50 people, are managed by local Islamic committees through the leaders of these gangs. A large number of groups and detachments of various national and party affiliation acts without centralized control, without contact with the front, on their own initiative, engaging mainly in robbery for the personal enrichment of gang members, especially the ringleaders. Organized gangs and squads have connections with their parties, both domestically and abroad, managed by the leadership of these parties and the Islamic committees in the field. In order to organize a clearer management system, attempts are being made to unite gangs of various party affiliations in counties and volosts into teams of one hundred or more people. However, these attempts, due to irreconcilable contradictions both between gangs and in higher spheres, are in most cases not carried out.

The control system of armed formations, despite a number of shortcomings, is being improved. More broadly, radio communications began to be used for control: in the lowest link, VHF, and with external management, in the KB range. The number of radio facilities in gangs is constantly increasing. From fires, smoke, mirrors, and so on. At the beginning of the deployment of warfare, the rebels are becoming more and more confident on radio communications for control and warning.

Along with radio communication, old methods are also widely used for control and notification (messengers on cars, horses, footmen). Foreign advisers and specialists, who are in the majority of large gangs under the guise of doctors, journalists, and correspondents, play a large role in managing the actions of the rebels.

The rebel control system is becoming increasingly stable, flexible and efficient. It mainly provides leadership in the armed struggle of the counter-revolutionary detachments and groups against the people's power. However, it is in dire need of improvement at the present stage.

In order to improve the management of gangs in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the leadership of the counter-revolution, on the recommendation of foreign advisers, decided to form a corps management (I have not yet confirmed its formation).


1. In an undeclared war against the DRA, the rebels combine effective forms of armed struggle against the broad implementation of ideological sabotage, terror, anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda. This tactic is focused on a protracted war with periodic active actions, especially in the summer period.

2. In the course of hostilities, the forms, methods of organization and methods of warfare are improved, and, consequently, the general tactics of armed struggle. The tactics of the rebels became more flexible and competent, it more fully meets modern requirements, takes into account various factors of the conditions of Afghanistan.

3. Receptions and methods of action of the rebels have become more decisive and diverse. They seek to deploy hostilities in the largest possible territory of the country, focusing on intensification in the border provinces, paying great attention to surprise, secrecy, mobility and efficiency.

4. Acting mainly in small groups and with limited goals, the rebels at the same time try to seize individual territories and large administrative centers, especially in the border zone with Pakistan, in order to declare them so-called free areas, on this basis to receive recognition and officially all kinds of assistance from the imperialist states. .

5. In the future, intensification of the armed struggle of the rebels is planned on the basis of combining the disparate forces of counterrevolution, the use of new types of weapons, especially anti-aircraft and anti-tank, the development and introduction of new tactical techniques.
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  1. Semurg
    Semurg April 26 2014 09: 15
    It’s a very long and probably necessary document for specialists, but I liked the preamble most of all, you can take it and change the name of the country and give something out of the little thing today.
    1. cosmos111
      cosmos111 April 26 2014 13: 04
      this is not an article -A DISSERTATION (at least a candidate))) good
      but, extremely interesting !!!

      the author did not take into account one nuance .... if the 40 Army had enough reconnaissance aircraft, both manned and UAVs, the situation would be fundamentally different ....
      Mujahideen would not be able to move around the country so freely and transport caravans with weapons ...
  2. A1L9E4K9S
    A1L9E4K9S April 26 2014 11: 28
    Change cons to pluses and ready-made instructions for actions in the southeast of Ukraine.
  3. Walking
    Walking April 26 2014 15: 02
    If all the help that went to Afghanistan in the 80s, the Mujahideen would have arrived in the 2000s, the Americans and their allies would have had a sweet time probably would have fled Afghanistan.
  4. Russian jacket
    Russian jacket April 26 2014 15: 56
    We had no order to win this war. We were against the whole world for 10 years and left on our own, and this time kept Muslims far from our borders, and the gerych mass was destroyed. So the vanquished do not go away with banners unfurled. We won this campaign. And we showed that a Russian soldier can do anything. just universal people prefer not to remember soldier
    1. Gubru_one
      Gubru_one April 26 2014 22: 31
      A very valuable guide to analyzing the conduct of guerrilla operations in "related" territory. I read it with interest.
  5. sturmovik_vv
    sturmovik_vv 28 May 2014 23: 57
    Very interesting! Thank!