Pointless running in place
No one who fell into the hands of air defense and missile defense forces, and was not going to create the East Kazakhstan region, but only solved the narrow departmental and personal tasks
Today, despite the abundance of decisions made and actions taken, a situation has arisen that directly threatens the creation of Russia's aerospace defense. Moreover, the threats are internal and are generated for the most part by both actions and inaction of scientists who have taken on the problems of aerospace defense. Due to the fact that these threats are internal, they represent the greatest danger for the creation of the East Kazakhstan region. Consider them in order.
The first threat is the absence of a coherent theory of aerospace defense, formed for modern realities and the actual needs of the practice of creating the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation at the present time.
This is explained by the fact that the existing theory of aerospace defense was developed in terms of threats to the Russian Federation, the purpose, construction and methods of application for the Air Defense Forces of the country as a type of the RF Armed Forces, consisting of full-blooded air defense and air defense missile forces. In addition, this theory was developed mainly for the traditional tasks of air defense and missile defense, taken mainly separately for air defense and missile defense, and only the tasks of combating hypersonic aircraft (GZLA) and operational-tactical ballistic missiles (OTBR) were considered as common for air defense, and for RKO. At that time, integration of the country's full-blooded air defense systems and the missile defense system global was recognized as the main way of creating aerospace defense in terms of anti-aircraft missile systems and local control systems and a local missile defense system in Moscow.
At present, the above has either sunk into oblivion, has either changed significantly, or, for example, in terms of the integration of air defense and missile defense systems, can be questioned. The latter will be shown below when considering the next threat to the creation of the East Kazakhstan region.
The result of this was that the existing theory of aerospace defense does not provide a modern and unambiguous answer to a number of questions. The first of them can be formulated as follows: why does Russia need the East Kazakhstan region? Whether the EKR is needed by the Russian Federation to defeat and defeat the most dangerous aerospace adversary, or to defend the main objects of the country and groups of troops of the RF Armed Forces by fighting against an aerospace adversary, or as an element of a system of deterring aggressors from attack by short-term ( at the time of application) of the defense of the troops, forces and means of a retaliatory nuclear strike of the RF Armed Forces, or to achieve all these goals together.
Without knowing the answer to these questions, it is impossible to unambiguously answer the following: what is the East Kazakhstan oblast? Here the range of definitions is very wide. At the same time, aerospace defense is simultaneously defined both as a set of simple measures and combat actions, and as soon as combat operations, but for defensive purposes, and as a global defensive weapon in the form of a global technical system of collective use, and as an integrated system of traditional troops and air defense forces and RKO. This series can be continued further, but this is enough to understand what kind of discord exists in the area under consideration. And in general, it is necessary to point out a superficial definition of the concepts with which modern military science operates in the field of aerospace defense. How else can one explain the mixing in one definition of the system of measures for the preparation of military operations and the actual military operations of the troops and forces of the East Kazakhstan region in the struggle against the aerospace enemy?
Without knowing and what is the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, and why it is needed, it is impossible to answer the questions: will the aerospace defense extend to the whole territory of Russia or only to its part? If a part of the territory of the Russian Federation, where should it be anti-air, and where is it aerospace?
Without answering these questions, it is impossible to determine the composition and organizational structure of the troops and forces of the East Kazakhstan region and their deployment in the territory of the Russian Federation and in space.
Today, scientists working in the field of problems of East Kazakhstan Oblast have not proved to the rest of the scientific community and top management of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation a number of fundamental scientific statements that underlie the theory of East Kazakhstan. These include the provision that the course and outcome of modern wars and armed conflicts determine the troops, forces and means operating from and through aerospace; the provision that militarily "air" and "space" from the physical media of moving various technical devices and weapons were transferred to the category of the theater of war.
It is necessary to point out that such a situation is determined not only and not so much by the inertia of the thinking of the scientific community and senior management of the RF Armed Forces, but by the passivity, lack of perseverance and “flexibility” from the “do it yourself” series in asserting their ideas, as well as their insufficient propaganda and weakness evidence and reasoning.
In order to remove this threat, it is necessary to redefine the problems of aerospace defense and further develop the theory of aerospace defense as applied to modern conditions.
The second threat to the creation of the aerospace defense of Russia lies in the fact that the method now adopted for forming aerospace defense through the integration of air defense and missile defense systems is partly incorrect in its ideology and has partially fulfilled its task and is therefore outdated.
We explain this. Currently, the full-blooded implementation of the integration of air defense and missile defense systems is carried out only for the city of Moscow on the basis of technical solutions created in the last century of air defense and missile defense systems. At the same time, the ideological basis in this integration is determined by the tasks of combating GDLA and ballistic missiles (including OTBR). However, the greatest threat in terms of the mass (quantity) created, accuracy and cost are not GZLA and ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles and attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as attack and attack weapons dropped and launched from enemy aircraft and drums WTO class.
In addition, with such integration, questions arise: why is the integration and creation of the East Kazakhstan region only for Moscow? Just because geographically the missile defense system is on the defense of the capital? And what does it give for the defense of the Russian Federation, etc.
At present, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the previously adopted ideology of integrating air defense and missile defense requires a fundamental revision, not only for Moscow, but also for the entire territory of Russia. In addition, the integration of air defense and missile defense of the capital, which is currently being implemented, is absolutely not oriented towards the existing realities of the struggle against the air and space enemy. These should include the following.
It can be considered proven that a future war of any level of developed countries will be predominantly non-contact for all types of armed forces, and for troops and air defense, aerospace defense and air force-only non-contact. At the same time, the leadership of the armed forces of developed states refused to enter manned aviation in the zones of fire of anti-aircraft missile defense and air defense, for this they equipped their Air Force with "remote" weapons, dropped and launched outside the anti-aircraft missile defense zone (SRO). Thus, in ZVR fire zones, the main objectives will not be manned aircraft, but the means dropped and launched by it. At the same time, in our integration, we continue to orient ZROs mainly on the destruction of manned aircraft and only along the way on the destruction of GLA, BR and KR, which is methodologically incorrect.
In addition, the leading states have equipped their air forces with high-precision weapons, the presence of which makes it possible to inflict not surface, but pinpoint strikes on the elements inside the defended objects. In other words, the air enemy will not strike at our objects, as in the area. We are still defended both Moscow and other objects as an area without structuring them into point objects.
It should be added that the efforts of the scientists of the Military Academy of the East Kazakhstan region named after Marshal of the Soviet Union GK Zhukov conceptually developed the internal maneuverable anti-aircraft defense of areal objects and justified the need to bring the ZRV forces inside such objects to impart their anti-aircraft defense anti-missile properties. At the same time, comprehensive practical recommendations have been developed, however, the “integrators” not only do not rush to implement them, but are not even interested in them.
The considered state of affairs is dangerous in that the VKO of the city of Moscow is declared the head section with the subsequent spread of its incorrect ideology throughout the territory of Russia, where VKO will be created.
One more important circumstance should be noted. Today, integration as a way to create the aerospace defense has fulfilled its task - the air defense and missile defense systems of Moscow, albeit with losses, have been preserved. At the same time, the integration has exhausted itself, since there is nothing more to integrate, it has a very limited area of use, and therefore cannot be used further to create the East Kazakhstan region. It is necessary to go further and move from simple integration of obsolete to the creation of new weapons systems, and from them - not to an integrated, but to an integral system of the East Kazakhstan region.
For this, it is necessary to eliminate two methodological gaps in the creation of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, namely, to create a unified control system for the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation with the level of real-time automation, space flight speeds and massive use (dropped, launched) of the aerospace attack. You should also create a long-range detailed reconnaissance of an aerospace enemy capable of solving operational and strategic tasks. It should be borne in mind that long-distance reconnaissance should not only and not so much signal, allowing aircraft to be deployed to the frontier lines of the enemy’s airborne assets and to ensure timely target designation of the Russian-German missile defense system and the anti-aircraft artillery missile system. First of all, it needs to be a semantic one, allowing both in advance and directly to reveal the operational and strategic plan of the aerospace enemy and promptly put into action its strategic and operational counter-plans.
Without the formation of unified control systems and intelligence systems as the backbone elements, it is impossible to create an integrated system of the East Kazakhstan region.
Also, when forming new weapons systems, one should take a critical approach to the approach that is being preached now in the design offices: “Higher and farther”. This approach, if it is uncritically and indiscriminately used in the development of weapons designed to destroy aerospace attack weapons using the “iron against iron” principle, is a waste of money, since it is unrealizable. The fact is that the air enemy, and the cosmic enemy all the more, has the original and permanent superiority over the EKR Troops (without their access to space) in kinetic and potential energy tens of thousands of times in the air and tens of millions of times in space. The pursuit of distance and height for such a "high-energy" adversary with the initial zero potential and zero kinetic energy of the aerospace defense facilities is unpromising. Most likely, when creating a new striking armament, aerospace defense should focus on increasing not the range and altitude, but its rate of fire, multi-channel, bandwidth and accuracy at the already reached heights and ranges. Do not try to take the Lord God by the beard.
The third threat to the creation of the East Kazakhstan region consists in the inadequate and partly self-serving practice of applying even the existing theory of the East Kazakhstan region, not to mention its numerous distorted versions.
The inadequacy is that an unpromising approach was initially chosen to resolve such a management problem as the creation of the East Kazakhstan region.
There are many approaches to resolving management problems: systemic, integrated, integration, marketing, dynamic, reproduction, process, regulatory, quantitative (mathematical), administrative, behavioral, situational. They do not conflict, but complement each other, but there are two approaches that are opposite, functional and objective.
The functional approach involves moving in solving the problem from the consumer, which is the Russian Federation as a state, its society, social institutions (including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), social groups and citizens of this society. In the future, this social need should be clearly defined as a goal to be achieved. After a clear goal has been set, the system of tasks to be solved (accomplished) to achieve it is determined. Then, alternative systems, organizational structures, objects, etc., are created, modeled, and, if necessary, those that require the minimum total cost of creating and maintaining their life cycle per unit of their efficiency (useful effect).
The functional approach is based on the so-called causal triangle of technical progress: social needs - technical capabilities - economic feasibility.
Currently, in the formation of the East Kazakhstan region and in general, when guiding the theory of East Kazakhstan administration, a substantive approach is mainly used in which existing systems, organizational structures, and facilities are improved without creating their new analogues and samples. In other words, with a substantive approach, the task of creating a new and finding innovative ways to meet even old social needs is simply not set. As a result, with this approach, at best, the existing, previously created, are integrated, then it is modernized to the possible limit of old technical solutions, the organizational squares in the socio-technical systems are rearranged, etc.
The functional approach assumes an innovative movement forward, and a substantive approach - dooms to catch up with yesterday and does not allow to adequately meet the social needs of the Russian Federation in the fight against the aerospace enemy and will ultimately lead to wasting huge amounts of money.
We in the field of struggle with the aerospace enemy have reached the limit of applying a substantive approach. It is necessary to proceed to the implementation of the functional approach. It should be borne in mind that cautious theorists and practitioners, contrasting the functional and the subject approaches, lead such arguments that, they say, the objective approach is cheaper than the functional one. At the same time, they deliberately mislead and do not indicate that the functional approach of roads in the development and creation of a new one, as well as in the risks, of creating something that is not cheap, but cheap in the operation and application of the new during its life cycle. The objective approach is cheap in the modernization of the existing one, but in the long term it is a waste of funds and by its futility it is more expensive than the functional one. Miser pays twice.
If we now rely on existing publications and practical studies, based on the above, we will have to admit that various movements around and in the direction of the organization of aerospace forces and their corresponding commands have a limit to the use of a substantive approach in their futility.
In developed countries, the Air Force is trained as troops of war, and not battlefields in this war. Our Air Forces, having “reposted” in military districts, did not undertake independent war tasks (they take on only battlefield tasks within the operational tasks of the military district), and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces did not set a war task for them (especially as put no one). But all the same, commanders and generals without troops and the Air Force as a whole without setting new tasks with tasks and worldview of the battlefield claim the troops and systems designed to deter, prevent, and if necessary, to end the war victoriously.
Such a creation of the next troops, forces and commands in the impasse of the substantive approach will end only with the next and at best unproductive rearrangement of the squares in the financial and staff schedule of the RF Armed Forces.
The self-interest in the practice of applying the theory of aerospace defense lies in the fact that after the development was completed, it ceased to belong to the authors and, without proper supervision, fell into the hands of politicians in uniform. The latter did not go into the subtleties of the theory itself, its main ideas and scientific propositions, but simply emasculated the content of the theory of aerospace defense and turned it into an empty brand.
Further to this day, politicians of all stripes, right up to the highest and not only in uniform, this brand is used mainly to fight for ranks, crosses, titles and financial flows, as well as to show everyone how we react to threats to national security. Of course, you can earn money on the EKR RF brand, which is done. In market conditions, this is correct. But it is impossible even in market conditions to apply the brand VKO without a serious intention to actually create the VKO of the Russian Federation. Otherwise it will be a deception of those who pay for it.
If you look back, you get the impression that no one who got into the hands of the Air Defense and Space Forces armies, with the exception of the Air Defense Forces of the USSR Armed Forces, was not going to create the East Kazakhstan region, but under the cover of the need to form them, it was narrowly departmental and even personal. It seems that having limited to the change of names, no one wants to create the East Kazakhstan region even now, having a direct prescription in the form of relevant (and not one) presidential decrees.
I wonder how long this will last?
Today, despite the abundance of decisions made and actions taken, a situation has arisen that directly threatens the creation of Russia's aerospace defense. Moreover, the threats are internal and are generated for the most part by both actions and inaction of scientists who have taken on the problems of aerospace defense. Due to the fact that these threats are internal, they represent the greatest danger for the creation of the East Kazakhstan region. Consider them in order.
The first threat is the absence of a coherent theory of aerospace defense, formed for modern realities and the actual needs of the practice of creating the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation at the present time.
This is explained by the fact that the existing theory of aerospace defense was developed in terms of threats to the Russian Federation, the purpose, construction and methods of application for the Air Defense Forces of the country as a type of the RF Armed Forces, consisting of full-blooded air defense and air defense missile forces. In addition, this theory was developed mainly for the traditional tasks of air defense and missile defense, taken mainly separately for air defense and missile defense, and only the tasks of combating hypersonic aircraft (GZLA) and operational-tactical ballistic missiles (OTBR) were considered as common for air defense, and for RKO. At that time, integration of the country's full-blooded air defense systems and the missile defense system global was recognized as the main way of creating aerospace defense in terms of anti-aircraft missile systems and local control systems and a local missile defense system in Moscow.
At present, the above has either sunk into oblivion, has either changed significantly, or, for example, in terms of the integration of air defense and missile defense systems, can be questioned. The latter will be shown below when considering the next threat to the creation of the East Kazakhstan region.The result of this was that the existing theory of aerospace defense does not provide a modern and unambiguous answer to a number of questions. The first of them can be formulated as follows: why does Russia need the East Kazakhstan region? Whether the EKR is needed by the Russian Federation to defeat and defeat the most dangerous aerospace adversary, or to defend the main objects of the country and groups of troops of the RF Armed Forces by fighting against an aerospace adversary, or as an element of a system of deterring aggressors from attack by short-term ( at the time of application) of the defense of the troops, forces and means of a retaliatory nuclear strike of the RF Armed Forces, or to achieve all these goals together.
Without knowing the answer to these questions, it is impossible to unambiguously answer the following: what is the East Kazakhstan oblast? Here the range of definitions is very wide. At the same time, aerospace defense is simultaneously defined both as a set of simple measures and combat actions, and as soon as combat operations, but for defensive purposes, and as a global defensive weapon in the form of a global technical system of collective use, and as an integrated system of traditional troops and air defense forces and RKO. This series can be continued further, but this is enough to understand what kind of discord exists in the area under consideration. And in general, it is necessary to point out a superficial definition of the concepts with which modern military science operates in the field of aerospace defense. How else can one explain the mixing in one definition of the system of measures for the preparation of military operations and the actual military operations of the troops and forces of the East Kazakhstan region in the struggle against the aerospace enemy?
Without knowing and what is the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, and why it is needed, it is impossible to answer the questions: will the aerospace defense extend to the whole territory of Russia or only to its part? If a part of the territory of the Russian Federation, where should it be anti-air, and where is it aerospace?
Without answering these questions, it is impossible to determine the composition and organizational structure of the troops and forces of the East Kazakhstan region and their deployment in the territory of the Russian Federation and in space.
Today, scientists working in the field of problems of East Kazakhstan Oblast have not proved to the rest of the scientific community and top management of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation a number of fundamental scientific statements that underlie the theory of East Kazakhstan. These include the provision that the course and outcome of modern wars and armed conflicts determine the troops, forces and means operating from and through aerospace; the provision that militarily "air" and "space" from the physical media of moving various technical devices and weapons were transferred to the category of the theater of war.
It is necessary to point out that such a situation is determined not only and not so much by the inertia of the thinking of the scientific community and senior management of the RF Armed Forces, but by the passivity, lack of perseverance and “flexibility” from the “do it yourself” series in asserting their ideas, as well as their insufficient propaganda and weakness evidence and reasoning.
In order to remove this threat, it is necessary to redefine the problems of aerospace defense and further develop the theory of aerospace defense as applied to modern conditions.
The second threat to the creation of the aerospace defense of Russia lies in the fact that the method now adopted for forming aerospace defense through the integration of air defense and missile defense systems is partly incorrect in its ideology and has partially fulfilled its task and is therefore outdated.
We explain this. Currently, the full-blooded implementation of the integration of air defense and missile defense systems is carried out only for the city of Moscow on the basis of technical solutions created in the last century of air defense and missile defense systems. At the same time, the ideological basis in this integration is determined by the tasks of combating GDLA and ballistic missiles (including OTBR). However, the greatest threat in terms of the mass (quantity) created, accuracy and cost are not GZLA and ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles and attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as attack and attack weapons dropped and launched from enemy aircraft and drums WTO class.
In addition, with such integration, questions arise: why is the integration and creation of the East Kazakhstan region only for Moscow? Just because geographically the missile defense system is on the defense of the capital? And what does it give for the defense of the Russian Federation, etc.
At present, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the previously adopted ideology of integrating air defense and missile defense requires a fundamental revision, not only for Moscow, but also for the entire territory of Russia. In addition, the integration of air defense and missile defense of the capital, which is currently being implemented, is absolutely not oriented towards the existing realities of the struggle against the air and space enemy. These should include the following.
It can be considered proven that a future war of any level of developed countries will be predominantly non-contact for all types of armed forces, and for troops and air defense, aerospace defense and air force-only non-contact. At the same time, the leadership of the armed forces of developed states refused to enter manned aviation in the zones of fire of anti-aircraft missile defense and air defense, for this they equipped their Air Force with "remote" weapons, dropped and launched outside the anti-aircraft missile defense zone (SRO). Thus, in ZVR fire zones, the main objectives will not be manned aircraft, but the means dropped and launched by it. At the same time, in our integration, we continue to orient ZROs mainly on the destruction of manned aircraft and only along the way on the destruction of GLA, BR and KR, which is methodologically incorrect.
In addition, the leading states have equipped their air forces with high-precision weapons, the presence of which makes it possible to inflict not surface, but pinpoint strikes on the elements inside the defended objects. In other words, the air enemy will not strike at our objects, as in the area. We are still defended both Moscow and other objects as an area without structuring them into point objects.
It should be added that the efforts of the scientists of the Military Academy of the East Kazakhstan region named after Marshal of the Soviet Union GK Zhukov conceptually developed the internal maneuverable anti-aircraft defense of areal objects and justified the need to bring the ZRV forces inside such objects to impart their anti-aircraft defense anti-missile properties. At the same time, comprehensive practical recommendations have been developed, however, the “integrators” not only do not rush to implement them, but are not even interested in them.
The considered state of affairs is dangerous in that the VKO of the city of Moscow is declared the head section with the subsequent spread of its incorrect ideology throughout the territory of Russia, where VKO will be created.
One more important circumstance should be noted. Today, integration as a way to create the aerospace defense has fulfilled its task - the air defense and missile defense systems of Moscow, albeit with losses, have been preserved. At the same time, the integration has exhausted itself, since there is nothing more to integrate, it has a very limited area of use, and therefore cannot be used further to create the East Kazakhstan region. It is necessary to go further and move from simple integration of obsolete to the creation of new weapons systems, and from them - not to an integrated, but to an integral system of the East Kazakhstan region.
For this, it is necessary to eliminate two methodological gaps in the creation of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation, namely, to create a unified control system for the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation with the level of real-time automation, space flight speeds and massive use (dropped, launched) of the aerospace attack. You should also create a long-range detailed reconnaissance of an aerospace enemy capable of solving operational and strategic tasks. It should be borne in mind that long-distance reconnaissance should not only and not so much signal, allowing aircraft to be deployed to the frontier lines of the enemy’s airborne assets and to ensure timely target designation of the Russian-German missile defense system and the anti-aircraft artillery missile system. First of all, it needs to be a semantic one, allowing both in advance and directly to reveal the operational and strategic plan of the aerospace enemy and promptly put into action its strategic and operational counter-plans.
Without the formation of unified control systems and intelligence systems as the backbone elements, it is impossible to create an integrated system of the East Kazakhstan region.
Also, when forming new weapons systems, one should take a critical approach to the approach that is being preached now in the design offices: “Higher and farther”. This approach, if it is uncritically and indiscriminately used in the development of weapons designed to destroy aerospace attack weapons using the “iron against iron” principle, is a waste of money, since it is unrealizable. The fact is that the air enemy, and the cosmic enemy all the more, has the original and permanent superiority over the EKR Troops (without their access to space) in kinetic and potential energy tens of thousands of times in the air and tens of millions of times in space. The pursuit of distance and height for such a "high-energy" adversary with the initial zero potential and zero kinetic energy of the aerospace defense facilities is unpromising. Most likely, when creating a new striking armament, aerospace defense should focus on increasing not the range and altitude, but its rate of fire, multi-channel, bandwidth and accuracy at the already reached heights and ranges. Do not try to take the Lord God by the beard.
The third threat to the creation of the East Kazakhstan region consists in the inadequate and partly self-serving practice of applying even the existing theory of the East Kazakhstan region, not to mention its numerous distorted versions.
The inadequacy is that an unpromising approach was initially chosen to resolve such a management problem as the creation of the East Kazakhstan region.
There are many approaches to resolving management problems: systemic, integrated, integration, marketing, dynamic, reproduction, process, regulatory, quantitative (mathematical), administrative, behavioral, situational. They do not conflict, but complement each other, but there are two approaches that are opposite, functional and objective.
The functional approach involves moving in solving the problem from the consumer, which is the Russian Federation as a state, its society, social institutions (including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), social groups and citizens of this society. In the future, this social need should be clearly defined as a goal to be achieved. After a clear goal has been set, the system of tasks to be solved (accomplished) to achieve it is determined. Then, alternative systems, organizational structures, objects, etc., are created, modeled, and, if necessary, those that require the minimum total cost of creating and maintaining their life cycle per unit of their efficiency (useful effect).
The functional approach is based on the so-called causal triangle of technical progress: social needs - technical capabilities - economic feasibility.
Currently, in the formation of the East Kazakhstan region and in general, when guiding the theory of East Kazakhstan administration, a substantive approach is mainly used in which existing systems, organizational structures, and facilities are improved without creating their new analogues and samples. In other words, with a substantive approach, the task of creating a new and finding innovative ways to meet even old social needs is simply not set. As a result, with this approach, at best, the existing, previously created, are integrated, then it is modernized to the possible limit of old technical solutions, the organizational squares in the socio-technical systems are rearranged, etc.
The functional approach assumes an innovative movement forward, and a substantive approach - dooms to catch up with yesterday and does not allow to adequately meet the social needs of the Russian Federation in the fight against the aerospace enemy and will ultimately lead to wasting huge amounts of money.
We in the field of struggle with the aerospace enemy have reached the limit of applying a substantive approach. It is necessary to proceed to the implementation of the functional approach. It should be borne in mind that cautious theorists and practitioners, contrasting the functional and the subject approaches, lead such arguments that, they say, the objective approach is cheaper than the functional one. At the same time, they deliberately mislead and do not indicate that the functional approach of roads in the development and creation of a new one, as well as in the risks, of creating something that is not cheap, but cheap in the operation and application of the new during its life cycle. The objective approach is cheap in the modernization of the existing one, but in the long term it is a waste of funds and by its futility it is more expensive than the functional one. Miser pays twice.
If we now rely on existing publications and practical studies, based on the above, we will have to admit that various movements around and in the direction of the organization of aerospace forces and their corresponding commands have a limit to the use of a substantive approach in their futility.
In developed countries, the Air Force is trained as troops of war, and not battlefields in this war. Our Air Forces, having “reposted” in military districts, did not undertake independent war tasks (they take on only battlefield tasks within the operational tasks of the military district), and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces did not set a war task for them (especially as put no one). But all the same, commanders and generals without troops and the Air Force as a whole without setting new tasks with tasks and worldview of the battlefield claim the troops and systems designed to deter, prevent, and if necessary, to end the war victoriously.
Such a creation of the next troops, forces and commands in the impasse of the substantive approach will end only with the next and at best unproductive rearrangement of the squares in the financial and staff schedule of the RF Armed Forces.
The self-interest in the practice of applying the theory of aerospace defense lies in the fact that after the development was completed, it ceased to belong to the authors and, without proper supervision, fell into the hands of politicians in uniform. The latter did not go into the subtleties of the theory itself, its main ideas and scientific propositions, but simply emasculated the content of the theory of aerospace defense and turned it into an empty brand.
Further to this day, politicians of all stripes, right up to the highest and not only in uniform, this brand is used mainly to fight for ranks, crosses, titles and financial flows, as well as to show everyone how we react to threats to national security. Of course, you can earn money on the EKR RF brand, which is done. In market conditions, this is correct. But it is impossible even in market conditions to apply the brand VKO without a serious intention to actually create the VKO of the Russian Federation. Otherwise it will be a deception of those who pay for it.
If you look back, you get the impression that no one who got into the hands of the Air Defense and Space Forces armies, with the exception of the Air Defense Forces of the USSR Armed Forces, was not going to create the East Kazakhstan region, but under the cover of the need to form them, it was narrowly departmental and even personal. It seems that having limited to the change of names, no one wants to create the East Kazakhstan region even now, having a direct prescription in the form of relevant (and not one) presidential decrees.
I wonder how long this will last?
Information