In discussions of today's most pressing European problems, such as the crisis in the eurozone with the prospect of a number of countries or the situation in Ukraine departing from the European Union, there is clearly a lack of an analytical approach.
Short-term assessments and conclusions prevail, and few people dare to look at the situation in its historical context. This is due to the fact that such a review will open a lot of negative points about which in Europe do not want to hear. For example, he will show that such phenomena as the eurozone crisis, growing poverty in the “new” EU countries, the wave of anti-Russian hysteria in Eastern Europe, attempts to revise the outcome of the Second World War, and the events in Ukraine are not heterogeneous or random events, but are related a tough pattern.
All this is an expression of the fact that the policy of European integration since the beginning of the 1990-s has become very similar to the Hitlerite plans of the Grossraum Kontinentaleuropa. This idea may seem absurd, but below I will give arguments in favor of such a point of view.
In consideration stories European integration is dominated by the point of view, which throws out the most important historical fact from consideration - Maastricht was by no means the only option for European integration. The history of the formation of the European Union is now served as a smooth and straight line, in which European countries gradually penetrated the idea of accepting common European values and entered into integration processes.
However, this was not the case. The current version of European integration was born right in the center of the global confrontation, the Cold War between the USA and the USSR, which in Europe, and in particular, in Germany, was probably the most stressful. It is enough to recall that the first integration institutions of Western Europe were created with direct assistance and with the participation of allies in the anti-Hitler coalition: the United States, Great Britain and France as early as the end of the 1940s. At the same time, integration did not at all prevent Germany from splitting into Germany and the GDR, which was initiated by the Americans.
The USSR, with its Eastern European allies, also established its economic integration organization - the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecom), and most actively contributed to the restoration of the economies of Eastern European countries, in particular the GDR, and the creation on this basis of a single international socialist economy. Up until the end of the 1980s, there was a sharp rivalry between these two integration associations, which took place against the backdrop of regular crises in Germany over West Berlin.
In this era, filled with confrontation and saber-rattling weapons, Western European integration (here we have to introduce a more precise term to distinguish it from Eastern European socialist integration), of course, in general served the military-political and economic goals of the Atlantic bloc and the United States, but practically did not pursue expansionist goals. With the help of the institutions of Western European integration, the allies (the USA and Great Britain) eliminated one of the causes of the Second World War, opening the world market for Germany and allowed it to carry out a wide export of goods and industrial products. The country also received wide access to raw materials, primarily oil.
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the situation changed dramatically. The Western European Union opened up the prospect of expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, which had lost its leader, who provided raw materials, a sales market for products and the former Warsaw Pact military core. And the West European Union took the path of its political and economic expansion, starting with the Anschluss of the GDR under the pretext of restoring the unity of Germany.
The East German state in 1990 was simply liquidated, and its economy was divided between West German concerns. Immediately after this, the current European Union was politically formalized by signing the Maastricht Treaty, which was entered into by European countries that were not part of the socialist bloc.
Germany has played a huge role in this political design of the European Union, both theoretical and practical. European integration was based on the theory of "social market economy" (die soziale Marktwirtschaft), within which it was assumed that a free capitalist economy, limited to certain norms, rules and government intervention, would be aimed at social progress of society. Of course, this theory, which emerged at the beginning of the 1930s, and which was booming in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s, was to a certain extent opposition to the national-socialist views on the economy.
The “Ordoliberals” did not adhere to the extremes of the national-socialist doctrine, such as racial theory or the forceful seizure of “living space”, but the “social market economy” and the national-socialist doctrine also had common moments. First, the interrelation of the economic and social order. Secondly, the idea of social justice. Thirdly, government intervention in the economy in order to achieve greater social justice.
At the same time, the Potsdam agreements, which provided for the liquidation of German concerns and the denazification, were grossly violated in Germany. The German concerns continued to exist after a minor reorganization, and now we see among the flagships of the German economy all the same concerns that produced weapons for Hitler. Even the well-known concern IG Farbenindustrie, on which there is no place to put stamps for crimes during the war, existed until 2003, and its shares were traded on the market until very recently. Prominent national socialists managed to largely escape persecution in different countries, and the rest received short sentences.
In such conditions, the national-socialist concepts of economic structure, in a slightly modified form, exerted their influence on the economic course of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the formation of Western European integration. These are ideas already developed during the war: Grosswirtschaftsraum - common market, government and customs union, European confederation. These developments of the National Socialists, cleared of racism, hatred of the Slavs and the occupation policy, were quite suitable for the post-war structure of Europe. Now, many in Europe and even in Germany believe that Hitler was the true father of Western European integration, and Jacques Delors - the former head of the European Commission - was even accused of realizing Hitler’s dreams.
Another national-socialist idea, known as Hungerplan (Plan for Hunger), which Hermann Goering put it like this: "If there is a famine, then not the Germans should starve, but others," went over to "ordoliberalism" in a modified form. Now, of course, no one expresses it in Germany, but this idea of ensuring the welfare of the Germans at the expense of other European countries has found expression in the policy of the European Union after Maastricht. Germany, through the creation of the European Union, secured a market for its export goods. In 2010, the EU accounted for 69,5% of German trade, 69,8% of exports and 69,2% of imports.
Germany before the 2009, was the leading exporter in the world, and after the loss of this provision exported goods and services for a huge amount of 1,1 trillion. Euro. In 2013, the trade surplus amounted to 241,7 billion euros, most of which was obtained through trade with EU countries. This is the net profit of the German economy. At the same time, many European countries had a trade deficit: France - 73 billion euros, Spain - 2,5 billion euros, Romania - 5,7 billion euros, Latvia - 2,25 billion euros, Lithuania - 1,4 billion euros and so on .
How did it happen? The introduction of the euro in the 2002 year provided Germany with the best conditions for foreign trade and led to a sharp increase in its trade surplus, that is, profit. Since 2004, when the new countries began to join the European Union, now East European countries, the process of destruction of their economic and industrial potential began. New members were subject to strict requirements, rules, quotas, which led to a reduction in domestic production and an increase in imports. Many countries have lost entire industries, for example, the sugar industry was destroyed in Latvia, Portugal, Bulgaria, Ireland, Slovenia. In 2009, the European Commission explicitly prohibited Latvia from resuming sugar production. Bulgaria, which was the largest producer of agricultural products in the CMEA, now imports up to 80% of consumed vegetables and stopped growing tomatoes. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was an industrialized part of Yugoslavia and retained its industry during the war years, has now become a de-industrialized country with an unemployment rate of 44%. Similar examples can be multiplied and multiplied.
The goal of this policy is obvious - the transformation of Eastern Europe into the markets for German export products. Poverty, unemployment and social unrest in the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe is the modern expression of the National Socialist Hungerplan. For comparison, in the CMEA economy was arranged differently, on the basis of reciprocity of supplies. If the USSR supplied, for example, iron ore and oil to the GDR, then the GDR supplied engineering products to the USSR. The entire Soviet Union traveled in passenger cars made in Ammendorf. Cranes, excavators, conveyors and other equipment from the GDR was widely used in Soviet industry.
Together with the expansion of the EU in Eastern Europe, an epidemic of struggle against the "crimes of the communists" began. There were all sorts of institutions of national memory, there was talk about equating Nazism with communism, in some countries they even started talking about compensations that Russia should pay. With regard to Latvia, it turned out that the amount of compensation in 4,7 is more than the amount invested in the Latvian SSR from 1945 to 1985. In the light of the problems of European integration, it becomes clear that these anti-Russian attacks of some Eastern European countries are nothing but attempts to replenish their wealth, which has flowed to Germany, at the expense of Russia.
Such a strange economic system, created in the 2000-ies in the European Union, was supported in two ways. First, lending to consumer countries and a variety of financial assistance. These loans and assistance created the illusion of well-being and development, leading to an increase in wages and consumption. Secondly, the export of consumer countries to countries outside the European Union, which made it possible to reduce the trade balance and keep the deficit at a minimum. This system existed as long as there was an opportunity for such exports. However, the global economic crisis 2008 of the year has undermined it. The countries of Eastern and Southern Europe lost a significant part of their exports outside the European Union, energy prices jumped sharply upward, and these countries could no longer make ends meet.
Germany also made every effort to strengthen its exports, both within the EU and beyond. German exporters succeeded in regaining most of the pre-crisis positions in the EU and expanding their presence in foreign markets. Unemployment in Germany fell from 7,1% in 2007, to 5,9% in 2001, while in the EU the average unemployment rose from 8,6% to 9,6% over the same period. But this is an average figure, and in some countries the unemployment rate has reached colossal values - 30-40%. German Hungerplan in action, only renamed to Arbeitslosigkeitsplan. "Fat Herman" could now say: "If there is unemployment, then without work the Germans should sit, and others."
As a result, Germany only aggravated the situation and got the problem of bankruptcy of a number of EU countries, which, within the framework of the established relations, have absolutely no way out. But then there are problems for Germany itself, since the fall in such profitable trade for her as a result of the bankruptcy of the PIGS countries threatens her well-being. Continuing the distribution of money in debt is also not an option; these debts will not be returned by countries with a ruined economy, and this will, in fact, be a non-repayable subsidy. Yes, and the European Union, it seems, can not afford such a policy. It is in these conditions that it becomes clear why events occurred in Ukraine and what kind of hidden drive of the conflict there is.
Of course, German politicians are not too worried about the fact that they support frank fascists and thugs in Ukraine. But Ukraine would be a tasty morsel. A large country, with a population of 45,5 million, would become a very large market for European goods. But the main thing is not this, but the fact that Ukraine, at the expense of numerous economic ties with Russia, would cover the costs of importing German goods through trade with Russia. Ukrainian goods and so were sold in Russia on the verge of dumping. Additionally, the masses of Ukrainians would go to Russia to earn money, the translations of which would partially pay for German imports. In other words, Ukraine’s European integration would be at the expense of Russia, and Ukraine would become the gateway through which Russian wealth would flow to Europe, primarily to Germany. There is nothing new in this endeavor. Russia had been dreaming of making Russia a raw materials appendage since the time of Bismarck, and it was seriously counted on at the time of the Dawes Plan, in the 1920s.
In this regard, little remained to be done - to bring a government to Ukraine that would agree to European integration without any reservations. And here the problems started. Russia took a tough stance. The reasons were more than enough, but the main one is the unwillingness to subsidize the German Grosswirtschaftsraum under the sign of the European Union. A general analysis of the situation suggests that the Ukrainian crisis is the end of European integration in the form in which it has developed over the past 20 years. Maaastricht and its specific economic system came to its historic end.
The order created in Europe ruined a part of the European countries, the further expansion of the European Union and its economic zone rested against resistance of Russia. A further historical choice is not rich: either to fundamentally revise the European economic structure and policy, or the economic crisis will reach Germany, with all the ensuing consequences. Although Goering said that others should starve, his policy ended with the Germans themselves having to end up starving, living in ruins and losing a quarter of the country. Historical experience in this sense is very, very instructive.