Why? The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war
Hundreds, thousands of books, articles were written about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, films were made, and many “copies” were broken in various disputes. But still there is a question - how so? Why is the powerful Red Army possessing, as it turned out in the last two decades, a large number tanks, aircraft, could not survive on its borders and allowed the enemy to break through to Leningrad, to Moscow, to the Volga?
The anti-Stalinists have a simple answer: they say, the Stalin regime is to blame for everything — destroyed the best commanders, believed Hitler, did not believe intelligence, poorly prepared the army, etc. But archival documents and recent research by Russian authors (for example, you can read the ") They say the opposite: there was no accurate intelligence data, there was a huge amount of conflicting information; Army, economy, society was prepared for war for real (without concessions). The “purge” of the officer corps did not worsen the combat capability of the country's officer corps, but rather increased, the opportunists were repressed, drunkards were fired, and so on; real military commanders, who had gone through military school, from the simple soldier to the division commander and corps, came to the fore. About this, for example, you can read in the book of Igor Pykhalov "The Great Slandered War."
In the field of diplomacy, the USSR also showed itself from the best side, having won a number of victories on the diplomatic (foreign policy) front: the issue of the security of Leningrad was resolved, the borders were significantly pushed to the west, they returned a number of their territories, they won time for preparation. Militarily, the Red Army gained experience of fighting in Spain, on Hasan, Khalkin-Gol, in China, in Poland, in the war with Finland, despite all the cruelty of it, but without such a “school” you cannot learn to fight.
An interesting version was put forward by the writer Yuri Mukhin, he suggested that one of the main factors of the defeat of the initial period of the war was the so-called “problem of the military class”. This is not only a disease of the Red Army, this problem originated in the Russian Empire, passing by inheritance to the USSR, and then to the Russian Federation. Its essence is as follows: after the nobles were given the opportunity not to serve, or to serve immediately as an officer, the officer corps of the empire began to degenerate. Prior to this, commanders began their service from the bottom (for example, Peter I forced the aristocracy’s children to serve with soldiers and sailors), so Suvorov and Kutuzov were “fathers” to their soldiers. They thoroughly knew their psychology, ate with them, slept with them, stood in the same line, "did not bow to the bullets," they were an indisputable authority for the soldiers, they were loved, believed in them and were ready to perform any task. After the elimination of this system, the mass of inexperienced people, often opportunists and careerists, became officers. For them, the army was a place of "warm", status life, a place of making a career. This was one of the main reasons for the defeat in the Crimean War, when terrible vices were uncovered behind external brilliance and window dressing, when real heroes (such as Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, hundreds of thousands of officers and fighters) died to correct the mistakes of others and prevent empire catastrophes. This was the cause of the protracted Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the defeat of the Russian-Japanese 1904-1905, the failures of the First World War. And it became the cause of catastrophic failures in the Great Patriotic War. The main reasons Mukhin calls are incompetence, cowardice, lack of will, lack of professionalism of higher commanders. And even a direct betrayal. Thus, according to Yuri Mukhin, the command of the Western Military District (Front), Pavlov and K., simply allowed the destruction of forces standing on the Central Strategic Direction. Opening the way to Smolensk and Moscow.
Yuri Mukhin
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the border guards were not ready for an attack, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were on alert, the Kiev military district withstood the strike and even counterattacked, and a catastrophe occurred in Belarus.
But apparently, after all, the main cause of the catastrophe of the initial period is the power of the blow. He would not have survived any of the existing armies at the time. To withstand such a blow, it was necessary to be the Red Army of the 1944-1945 model. People, including a significant part of the commanders, did not have the psychological readiness to die, but not to retreat. A part (everyone knows the heroic example of the Brest Fortress, and there are quite a few such examples) survived and fought until the last gasp. And the majority, especially where there were no passionaries (in Russian, fierce, full of vitality), able to lead and inspire mortal combat, retreated and surrendered. Even on the columns led by the prisoners, everything is clear - if there are no people who will lead the attack on a few escorts, the rest will simply go to the slaughterhouse.
This confirms and Wehrmacht's complete superiority on the main thrusts is 3-x-5-multiple superiority in manpower and technology.
It is also very important that Wehrmacht soldiers were already at warrather than peaceful (like most of the Red Army), they have already “tasted blood” in Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. They had a psychological willingness to kill, Were absolutely sure that we were right - It is very important in battle, to be absolutely confident in your strength. They are the highest race, and against them "subhuman orcs," the program worked.
But soon the situation changed, their family memory awoke in the Russians, they again became Warriors. The Russian people, Russia cannot be defeated on their territory, in open battle, the Russian Spirit has awakened, and all the deceitful programs of the Nazis did not withstand its strikes.
Sources of:
Great Debated War - 2. Under the general ed. A. Dyukova. M., 2008.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M. 2006.
Lebedintsev A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Fathers commanders. M., 2004.
Mukhin Yu. If not for the generals! Problems of the military class. - M., 2006.
Mukhin Yu.I. Crusade to the East - M., 2004.
Pykhalov I. The Great Obolgannaya war. M, 2006.
Human factor. Under total ed. Yu. I. Mukhina. M., 2003.
The anti-Stalinists have a simple answer: they say, the Stalin regime is to blame for everything — destroyed the best commanders, believed Hitler, did not believe intelligence, poorly prepared the army, etc. But archival documents and recent research by Russian authors (for example, you can read the ") They say the opposite: there was no accurate intelligence data, there was a huge amount of conflicting information; Army, economy, society was prepared for war for real (without concessions). The “purge” of the officer corps did not worsen the combat capability of the country's officer corps, but rather increased, the opportunists were repressed, drunkards were fired, and so on; real military commanders, who had gone through military school, from the simple soldier to the division commander and corps, came to the fore. About this, for example, you can read in the book of Igor Pykhalov "The Great Slandered War."
In the field of diplomacy, the USSR also showed itself from the best side, having won a number of victories on the diplomatic (foreign policy) front: the issue of the security of Leningrad was resolved, the borders were significantly pushed to the west, they returned a number of their territories, they won time for preparation. Militarily, the Red Army gained experience of fighting in Spain, on Hasan, Khalkin-Gol, in China, in Poland, in the war with Finland, despite all the cruelty of it, but without such a “school” you cannot learn to fight.
An interesting version was put forward by the writer Yuri Mukhin, he suggested that one of the main factors of the defeat of the initial period of the war was the so-called “problem of the military class”. This is not only a disease of the Red Army, this problem originated in the Russian Empire, passing by inheritance to the USSR, and then to the Russian Federation. Its essence is as follows: after the nobles were given the opportunity not to serve, or to serve immediately as an officer, the officer corps of the empire began to degenerate. Prior to this, commanders began their service from the bottom (for example, Peter I forced the aristocracy’s children to serve with soldiers and sailors), so Suvorov and Kutuzov were “fathers” to their soldiers. They thoroughly knew their psychology, ate with them, slept with them, stood in the same line, "did not bow to the bullets," they were an indisputable authority for the soldiers, they were loved, believed in them and were ready to perform any task. After the elimination of this system, the mass of inexperienced people, often opportunists and careerists, became officers. For them, the army was a place of "warm", status life, a place of making a career. This was one of the main reasons for the defeat in the Crimean War, when terrible vices were uncovered behind external brilliance and window dressing, when real heroes (such as Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, hundreds of thousands of officers and fighters) died to correct the mistakes of others and prevent empire catastrophes. This was the cause of the protracted Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the defeat of the Russian-Japanese 1904-1905, the failures of the First World War. And it became the cause of catastrophic failures in the Great Patriotic War. The main reasons Mukhin calls are incompetence, cowardice, lack of will, lack of professionalism of higher commanders. And even a direct betrayal. Thus, according to Yuri Mukhin, the command of the Western Military District (Front), Pavlov and K., simply allowed the destruction of forces standing on the Central Strategic Direction. Opening the way to Smolensk and Moscow.
Yuri Mukhin
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the border guards were not ready for an attack, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were on alert, the Kiev military district withstood the strike and even counterattacked, and a catastrophe occurred in Belarus.
But apparently, after all, the main cause of the catastrophe of the initial period is the power of the blow. He would not have survived any of the existing armies at the time. To withstand such a blow, it was necessary to be the Red Army of the 1944-1945 model. People, including a significant part of the commanders, did not have the psychological readiness to die, but not to retreat. A part (everyone knows the heroic example of the Brest Fortress, and there are quite a few such examples) survived and fought until the last gasp. And the majority, especially where there were no passionaries (in Russian, fierce, full of vitality), able to lead and inspire mortal combat, retreated and surrendered. Even on the columns led by the prisoners, everything is clear - if there are no people who will lead the attack on a few escorts, the rest will simply go to the slaughterhouse.
This confirms and Wehrmacht's complete superiority on the main thrusts is 3-x-5-multiple superiority in manpower and technology.
It is also very important that Wehrmacht soldiers were already at warrather than peaceful (like most of the Red Army), they have already “tasted blood” in Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. They had a psychological willingness to kill, Were absolutely sure that we were right - It is very important in battle, to be absolutely confident in your strength. They are the highest race, and against them "subhuman orcs," the program worked.
But soon the situation changed, their family memory awoke in the Russians, they again became Warriors. The Russian people, Russia cannot be defeated on their territory, in open battle, the Russian Spirit has awakened, and all the deceitful programs of the Nazis did not withstand its strikes.
Sources of:
Great Debated War - 2. Under the general ed. A. Dyukova. M., 2008.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M. 2006.
Lebedintsev A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Fathers commanders. M., 2004.
Mukhin Yu. If not for the generals! Problems of the military class. - M., 2006.
Mukhin Yu.I. Crusade to the East - M., 2004.
Pykhalov I. The Great Obolgannaya war. M, 2006.
Human factor. Under total ed. Yu. I. Mukhina. M., 2003.
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