American "decline": facts ('The Wall Street Journal', USA)
Among scientists and experts, it is fashionable to declare that the United States is in decline and is no longer number one in the world. Downers call themselves realists. In fact, the alarm they raised has nothing to do with realism.
Early decadentists like Yale historian Paul Kennedy (Paul Kennedy), focused on the alleged weakening effect of America's "imperial overstrain". Recently, authors such as Niall Ferguson and Martin Jacques have written mainly about the weakening of the economy. As for the experts, Paul Krugman and Michael Kinsley on the left and Mark Helprin on the right beat the alarm.
This dispute deals with decay in absolute and relative terms, as well as with such concepts as “stability” and “passivity”. Something can be measured - for example, gross domestic product, military might and demographic indicators. Something cannot be measured - or, at least, cannot be measured precisely.
In absolute numbers in the United States in the last decade there has been an increase. In 2000-2010, US GDP grew by 21 percent excluding inflation, despite the negative effects of the Great Recession 2008-2009. and dot-com bubble in 2001 year. In 2010, US military spending (697 billion dollars) was 55% higher than in 2000. And the US population in 2010 was 310 million, an increase of 2000 percent from 10 year.
The idea that demography is the fate of a nation may seem strained, but demographic indicators are important when, like in the United States, the increase in population due to higher birth rate and immigration than the other developed countries is damping the impact of aging on the country's economy. .
But there was also a decrease in a number of indicators. In 2000, the US GDP was 61 percent of the cumulative GDP of other G20 countries. By 2010, this figure dropped to 42 percent. In 2000, US GDP exceeded Chinese by more than eight times, and in 2010, by a little less than three times. The situation is different with Japan: in 2000, the US GDP was twice as large as Japan’s, and in 2010, before the tsunami and atomic disaster, 2011 was more than 2,6 times.
Other data should be taken into account.
Significantly increased US defense spending. While in 2000 they exceeded the total expenditures of all other NATO member states by 1,7 times, in 2010 they more than doubled. In 2000, they were six times more expensive than Russia, and in 2010, they were seventeen; in 2000, China is seven times more expensive, and in 2010, it is nine times more.
If in 2000, the US population (282 million) was 4,6 percent of the world's population, then by 2010, this proportion (with a population of 310 million) increased to 4,9 percent. In 2000, the US population was 59% of the population of the then 15 countries of the European Union; for 2010, this figure increased to 78% (if you count only 15 states in the EU in 2000) or 62% (if you add 12 states that joined the EU in 2004-2007).
In 2000-2010 US population growth was 10% higher than in Japan and 13% higher than in Russia. With regard to the ratio of the population of China and India (1,3 and 1,2 billion, respectively), in the US population growth was slightly higher than in China (0,16%) and slightly lower than in India (approximately as much).
But it’s not so much the absolute figures that are important as the composition of the population: the ratio of the working-age population to the dependents. Compared with most developed economies and China, the demographic composition of the United States looks quite favorable.
So do these numbers tell us about decline or growth?
Despite the Great Recession, three baseline indicators — GDP, defense spending, and population growth — are indicative of US growth in absolute terms.
But in relative the picture looks more complicated. Although over the past decade, in real terms, GDP has grown significantly, in relation to the countries of the G-20, US GDP has decreased by 19%. In relation to China, the weakening of the United States is even more obvious.
As noted above, in the growth of military spending the United States is ahead of both NATO, and China, and Russia. But numbers alone do not tell us whether the US is spending too much or other countries spend too little. In addition, the numbers do not explain how high defense spending affects economic growth.
As for demography, in the USA there is a slight increase in relation to the population of the planet, a moderate increase in relation to the EU, a large increase in relation to Japan and Russia and a slight decrease in relation to China and India.
And the thing is this: some figures show growth, others - an increase, and others - do not allow to draw definite conclusions. However, what the numbers are silent about is more important than what they are talking about. They are silent about social and systemic factors that stimulate or inhibit creativity, innovation and enterprise.
The numbers do not speak about the short-term and long-term effects of culture, property rights, law and political freedom. It is difficult to conclude from the figures how the so-called “red capitalism” of China will manifest itself in long-term competition with a multicolored American prototype. As for comparing and predicting the sustainability of countries and regions, the numbers are more likely to confuse than to explain anything.
The overall picture is much more complicated than that given by the downfallists. The real world is multifaceted, so a one-dimensional portrait does not reflect, but distorts reality.
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