Pierce armor first shot
Thanks to the development of long-range high-performance weapons there has been a transition from "contact" forms of hostilities to "contactless". But to put an end to contact wars is unlikely. Consider a situation that corresponds to the aggressive policy of NATO. In the case of the offensive "Abrams" and "Leopard" will be used reconnaissance-strike anti-tank complexes.
Given the improvement of active, dynamic and group protection of foreign tanks only 20-30% of them will burst intact. On this, the non-contact defeat of the Abrams will end and the contact form of hostilities will come. For all armor-piercing sub-caliber shells (BPS), the maximum firing range of 2 km is determined by tactical and technical specifications (TTZ), and for ATGM this value will theoretically be 5 km.
The anti-tank guns will be used to fight against the broken tanks: self-propelled 2С25 (on BMD-3 chassis), 125-mm towed with the equipment of the Sprut-B gun, 100-mm MT-12Р. But the MT-12P ammunition includes old low-performance ammunition that is effective only when firing at armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and other lightly armored vehicles. Consider the combat capabilities of ammunition 2S25 guns and "Octopus-B", which includes the old ammunition BPS 3BM42 "Mango" 3BM32 "Vant" 3BM48 "Lead" and rocket 9M119M "Invar", created in Soviet times and designed to destroy tanks M1, M1A1.
Broken Abrams modifications M1A2 SEP have enhanced protection of frontal zones. The above-listed Russian anti-tank artillery systems are defenseless in this case. For this reason, the main requirement for our artillery systems in contact interaction is the defeat of the Abrams' first shot. Let's try to evaluate the results of this duel.
BPS "LEAD", "VAST" and "MANGO" - AMMUNITION FROM THE PAST CENTURY
BPS "Vant", "Mango", "Lead" (table 1), created by the Scientific-Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering (NIMI). BPS "Vant" and "Mango" (photo 1) were a belated response to the introduction in the protection of the frontal part of the hull and the tower of foreign tanks of multi-layer combined obstacles. When creating the Svinets BPS, the possibility of using the built-in DZ, designed to combat BPS, on the M1А2 tanks was taken into account.
The most attention deserves BPS "Svinets", presented in reference books as ammunition for firing at modern modernized and promising tanks, equipped with complex compositional armor, enhanced by dynamic protection.
When firing at obstacles equipped with built-in DZ (BDZ-2) blocks, the Svinets BPS overcame it without initiating an explosive explosion. This was achieved by the fact that at the initial speed of 1600 m / s, the projectile at a distance of 2 km had a meeting speed of 1470 m / s. The pointed tip of the projectile at such a speed created from the upper 15-mm armored plates of the built-in remote sensing unit an echeloned stream of small fragments. The head fragments of this stream caused a shock in the explosives, as a result of which zones free of explosives were created. Therefore, an explosion of explosives did not occur for two reasons. The first is that part of the leading debris due to the velocity of the 1470 projectile, m / s, was unable to initiate the explosive. The second - part of the fragments fell into the zones free from explosives, formed as a result of a hydraulic shock.
Overcoming the “Lead” projectile with a built-in remote sensing without an explosion of explosives was achieved by knowing all the parameters, including the sensitivity of domestic explosives in the integrated remote sensing, adopted as an imitator of foreign remote sensing. But on foreign tanks already used tandem DZ, consisting of two layers of explosives. At the same time, the second layer of explosives may have a higher sensitivity than at which the Lead BPS was tested. For this reason, foreign tandem DZ may be "Lead" is too tough.
In BPS "Svinets", a coil-type master device and sub-caliber stabilizer are used. However, these design innovations did not reduce the drop in velocity of the projectile at a distance of 2000 m compared with foreign models and did not improve the accuracy of the battle.
FALSIFICATION OF GI BPS "LEAD"
Recall that the preliminary tests (PI) are carried out by the contractor with the aim of preliminary assessment of the combat, technical and operational characteristics of the sample to determine its readiness for a GI. In turn, the CI is conducted by the customer in order to verify the compliance of the combat, technical, and operational characteristics of the sample with the requirements of the TTZ in conditions as close as possible to actual military operation, as well as issuing recommendations for adopting the model for service.
The PI and GI programs contain a large amount of testing, including: determining the mass of the propellant charge with checking its ballistic characteristics; checking the strength and operation of BPS firing from a new and worn-out barrel; determination of accuracy of shells firing on the shield at a range of 2000 m; determining the angles of departure of shells; checking armor penetration projectiles firing at a distance of 2000 m and in the above conditions, etc.
Recall that the above conditions mean the placement of guns and armor plates when the distance between them is 100 m, and the powder propellant charge is chosen so as to ensure the speed of the BPS with armor plate equal to the speed of the projectile at a distance of 2 km. But of greatest interest are the tests related to its effectiveness. Such tests include: checking armor penetration of BPS by firing at homogeneous armor plates, at combined multi-layer obstacles, equipped and not equipped with integrated remote sensing.
GI BPS "Svinets" were held at the site of the 33157 military unit and ended in the year 1990. When conducting a GI, shooting a “Lead” projectile on all obstacles was carried out only in the above conditions from the 100 m range. At the same time, the main GI principle was violated - checking the combat characteristics of the sample under conditions as close as possible to real military operation. One of the gross violations was that the lead-free armor penetration specified by the TTZ (300 mm / 60 degrees) at a distance of 2 km was not confirmed.
From the acts of the PI, the results of testing the armor penetration capability of the BPS “Svinets” on the plate of thickness 300 mm / 60 degrees were recalculated. at a distance of 2 km. In this case, only 36 penetration was obtained from 4 shots due to nutation (axial oscillation) of the projectile, which causes the “wrong” angle of approach to the armor plate. At the same time, the bends of the hull and the dismantling of the Lead shell were observed. There have also been cases of breaking off the feathers of the stabilizer.
When conducting a GI, there were no tests on multi-layer obstacles (P30, P60) both equipped and not equipped with built-in remote sensing. These tests were carried out at the PI stage with an extremely small amount of statistical data. However, more attention was paid to shooting with homogeneous armor plates of various thickness. Transfer of negative results of firing from PI (4 penetration from 36 of hits into an armored plate) is a rough manipulation of the GI results.
In the GI materials there is no estimate of the probability of hitting a foreign tank using the “Source Data System on the Vulnerability Characteristics of Typical Elementary Ground-based Armored Targets and the Influence of Anti-Tank Ammunition” (SID-83-PTB). In the process of carrying out GI, the values of the probability of getting the BPS Lead into the tank, the likelihood of overcoming the built-in DZ, the probability of penetration of the frontal protection zones of the Abrams, the probability of damage to the units inside the tanks should be determined.
Multiplying the values of these probabilities allows you to get the probability of defeating a typical foreign tank. However, the State Commission assessed the effectiveness of "Lead" in relation to the defeat of tanks М1, М1А1 conducted using the "range of destruction of multilayer barriers" (ПХNUMX, П60), which do not meet both the characteristics of armor resistance and the structure of the materials used in foreign samples. In this case, the shooting was carried out on simulators installed at a distance of 30 m, but with a mass of propellant charge, which ensures the speed of the BPS meeting, which was the limit of through penetration. After that, the calculation determined which range corresponds to the obtained value of the rate of through penetration.
Using the results of the PI tests allowed the State Commission to conclude that the M1 tank and its modifications are reliably hit by a Lead missile at a range of 3700 m (TTZ requirements are 2000 m). So it was "proved" the over-fulfillment of the requirements of the technical specifications. Such a conclusion should have been reinforced by hitting the “Lead” projectile into a plywood shield that has the contours of an M1 tank at a distance of 3700 m. True, the consequences of a missile ballistic flaw are somehow silent.
On the whole, the Svyintsi GI BPS does not deserve a positive assessment due to the lack of firing at a range of 2 km at the 300x2550x2700 mm plate equipped with BDZ-2; due to the uncertainty of the probability of defeat of the Abrams, as well as due to the flaws in the ballistic and strength characteristics of the projectile. It should be noted that the identified deficiencies according to the results of the State Enterprise BPS "Svinets" took place in the State Institute BPS "Vant" and "Mango". Essentially, the ammunition of anti-tank guns turned out to be ammunition adopted by falsified GI.
CAUSES OF DEFICIENCY OF INVAR 9М119М
ATGM “Invar” badly overcomes the hinged dynamic protection (DZ) of foreign tanks, which has long been known (HBO number 31, 1999 g .; No. 35, 2006 g., No. 4, 2011 g., No. 45, 2011 g., No. 10 2012 g.). In this case, the probability of overcoming a mounted DZ with the Invar missile is 0,5. And, finally, the leading charge (LZ) of the tandem warhead of this missile has insufficient initiating ability when firing at a range of 4 – 5 km at obstacles equipped with a mounted DZ.
ATGM 9М119М “Invar” was put into service in 1986 year according to the results of the GI, which allowed a sample with a short life cycle and gross flaws to be dragged to the Soviet GRAU. In the TTZ for the Invar missile, the requirements for a tandem warhead were defined, which must penetrate armored obstacles equipped with mounted DZ (BDZ-1) units when fired at a range of 5 km. During stationary tests, the tandem warhead was placed in contact with BDZ-1 at point “A” so that the most favorable, but not corresponding to reality, conditions were created for overcoming it (RI 1).
Point "A" is determined by the method of conducting stationary tests and is attractive because it has favorable conditions for overcoming the DZ tandem warhead. The lead charge (5), located inside the head compartment of the rocket, during an explosion completely destroys it and part of the instrument compartment following it. In this position, fragments of an electric torch (1,2) and a BDZ-1 container (I) scattering from an explosion do not affect the main warhead charge (8) and the channel for passing a cumulative jet (7), which ensures the normal functioning of the main cumulative charge on the “bare” armor .
In accordance with the program of state tests (GI), 10 rocket launches of 9М119М were conducted at a range of 5 km using an armor plate 350 mm / 60 degrees thick, but not equipped with BDZ-1. It should be noted that for a reliable hit when launching 9М119М missiles at a range of 4 – 5 km, an armored plate of the size 350x2550x2700 mm was used. The result was positive. The absence of BDZ-1 in these experiments did not give an answer to the question: what will happen if there is a dynamic protection on the M1 and M1A1 tanks?
To check the armor penetration of the Invar tandem warhead of the Invar missile, the GI program provided for launching an armored obstacle with a thickness of 350 mm / 60 degrees. with BDZ-1 in the above conditions, under which the armor plate was used with dimensions 350x1500x1200 mm, and the firing range was 100 m and the rocket in all experiments fell into the region of point “A”, in which a positive result was always achieved. The GI program of the 9М119М rocket was compiled by the customer without taking into account missile dispersion when firing at a range of 4 – 5 km, at which the points of impact are distributed over the entire surface of the BDZ-1, which negatively affects the operation of the tandem warhead.
When launching missiles at a range of 100, there was practically no dispersion, and the tests ended with a positive result. In other words, the replacement of the firing range from 4 – 5 km to 100 m was a gross mistake, which did not reveal the unsatisfactory functioning of the tandem warhead 9М119М. By combining the results of rocket launches at a distance of 5 km and 100 m, the State Commission made an unreasonable conclusion on its adoption.
Experimental studies conducted by employees of the 21374 military unit, the initiating ability of the leading charges with 110 – 150 mm armor penetration, in the “AB”, “VS”, “СD” dynamic protection zones allowed to establish the following. In the zone “AB”, the cumulative jet LZ (5) passes through two EHL (1,2). In this case, OZ is removed from the explosive effect of the DZ and the decrease in armor penetration is minimal. In the “BC” zone, the LZ cumulative jet excites detonation in the upper EDS (1), which is transmitted by the EDS (2). In this position, the RS acts on the main charge (8) through the main engine (6) located in front, which reduces the armor penetration of the OZ.
And, finally, the “CD” zone proved to be insurmountable for the LZ 9М119М rocket. At the same time, the main reason for the lack of solution of the DZ is laid in the design of the TBC. It is known that in rockets due to the mass-dimensional limitations of the LZ has armor penetration 110 – 150 mm. But not all areas of the cumulative LZ jet are capable of causing explosive detonation in the EHD. Only the leading part of this jet with a length of the order of 30 mm causes detonation. After the interaction of the cumulative jet with the top and side of the container (I) and EDS (1), as well as with the side of the next container (II), its leading part is completely spent on overcoming all the listed obstacles. The remaining less high-speed part of the cumulative LZ jet is no longer capable of initiating explosive detonation in EDS (3,4). Under these conditions, the cumulative jet OZ, having provided detonation in EHL (3,4), loses up to 70% armor penetration.
The flaws of the Invar missile are a consequence of the unsatisfactory performance of 3NII MO and Grau on the military-technical substantiation of tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for this model and the TTZ for its development. The weakest point in the documents used is the proposed imitators of the DZ and the Abrams armor protection with underestimated combat characteristics, as well as unrealistic conditions for the combat use of the missile.
INFORMATION TO THOUGHT
General Designer, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Arkady Shipunov published a simulation simulation of the destruction of tanks MXNXX1999 and MX1X1 in 1 in the well-known metropolitan journal. Recall that the tank M2A1 was present in the TTZ as a typical target. Shipunov’s appeal to the M1А1 tank, which has enhanced frontal area booking, was intended to warn about the short life cycle of the Invar missile for the further development of more effective ATGMs.
The data table. 2 indicate that for the reliable defeat of the tank M1A2 requires 5 "Invars", and not 3, as for the M1A1. The number of missiles for reliable destruction of the M1А2 SEP will significantly increase due to the installation of highly effective modern active protection on it. Thus, the presented simulation results for the destruction of tanks М1А1 and М1А2, conducted under the guidance of Arkady Shipunov, convincingly demonstrate the impossibility of defeating the Abrams by one rocket.
A similar situation is observed for BPS "Mango", "Vant", "Lead". So, for BPS "Svinets", which has the greatest armor penetration in comparison with the mentioned shells, the amount of ammunition for reliable destruction of "Abrams" comes to 12 (table 3), which is explained by the high security of the frontal zones of the M1А2 tank.
Data on the number of shells for reliable destruction of tanks indicate that the duel between the Sprut-B and Abrams artillery systems will not end in favor of the anti-tank gun.
Presented ammunition was created without taking into account the increased protection during the modernization of the American tank M1, adopted as a typical target. Tank М1 "Abrams" was adopted in 1980 year. In 1985, a modernized M1A1 appeared, in which depleted uranium was used as part of the protection of the front parts of the hull and the tower. In 1994, the upgraded М1А2 was created, in the construction of which the next reinforcement of frontal protection zones was carried out and the built-in DZ was provided. With 1996, the modernization of tanks M1 - M1A1 to the level MXNXX1 SEP is carried out. Program SEP (System Enfacement Program) provided for the improvement of communication systems, management, navigation, and armor protection.
At the same time, it is difficult to give a positive assessment to the Main Investigation Authority, which in the TTZ for the creation of Mungo, Vant, Lead and Invar ammunition asked the M1 (ПХNUMX, ПХNUMX) tank defense simulators, while МХNUMXАХNUMX protection was significantly strengthened. Thus, the steel equivalent of an armor plate under test conditions for obstacles P60, P30 was 1 mm, which were reliably penetrated by BPS "Lead".
It is known that ACS is being created for the Airborne Forces, which will be manufactured by the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant. The 125-mm tank artillery system 2А46М-5, which is capable of using Leads to pierce the armor of American Abrams and Israeli Merkava tanks, will be installed on the new SAU. The customer and the chief designer of the ACS should examine the results of PI and GI 125-mm tank shot 3VBM20 with BPS 3BM48 "Lead", as well as to consider measures to improve the survivability of the tank M1A2 SEP by installing active protection system combining detection means, tracking of targets, setting passive and active interference (laser and infrared guidance systems of anti-tank complexes), as well as means of destruction. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the new modernization program of the Abrams ESR1, which provides for an improvement in the characteristics of tanks that had previously been upgraded under the МХNUMXА1 SEP program.
It is high time for high-ranking officials to figure out the effectiveness of such weapons and not to deceive the Supreme Commander.
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