The ongoing scientific and technological revolution, the introduction of social technologies of society transformation into the practice of preparing and waging war led to the emergence of new types of military conflicts, new forms and methods of warfare (operations).
CONFLICTS OF THE NEW KIND
Today, concepts such as information warfare, cyber warfare, the struggle for supremacy in aerospace, global strategic attack, etc. have become familiar to hearing. Today, these and other forms of struggle are actively discussed both by professionals and amateurs, they have heated debates, and proposals to the military-political leadership for the development of the armed forces and the military-industrial complex of the states entrusted to them are being accumulated.
Many of them are deeply developed and in demand. So, in 2013 "Independent Military Review" published a series of articles by the candidate historical sciences, reserve colonel Igor Popov on the new nature of the war of the future. In one of them, almost a year before the events in Ukraine, the author focused on the emergence of a new type of military conflict in the XNUMXst century: can be called a new type of war of the modern era.
Such a war goes beyond the traditional concepts of it, acquiring a combined character, turning into a tangled tangle of political intrigues, a fierce struggle for resources and financial flows, and irreconcilable civilizational clashes. All possible means are used in the course, the parties resort to any, the most dishonest methods and methods of actions, both forceful and non-force ones. ” No less interesting conclusions can be found in the materials of some other domestic researchers.
However, even a superficial analysis of publications in the domestic media on the topic of future wars testifies to the systemic flaw that has developed in military science. The absolute majority of the conclusions of specialists are aimed at explaining how to fight on the front lines (at the front line), which troops and weapon this requires, in what organizational structure it is better to have them and in what forms it is better to use, etc. Of course, these are very important questions of military theory, the quality and completeness of the answers to which directly affect the quality of preparation for the war of the future of any state. The problem is that equally important issues of countering the enemy throughout the rest of the state remain undeservedly forgotten - issues of organizing territorial defense.
Formally, of course, everything is there. For example, in Russia, the need to organize territorial defense is enshrined in Article 2 “Organization of Defense” of the Federal Law “On Defense”: “Organization of Defense includes: ... 9) planning and implementation of civil and territorial defense measures ...” The importance of the task is emphasized by the fact that the documents for its resolution — the Statute on the Territorial Defense of the Russian Federation, the Territorial Defense Plan of the Russian Federation and the Civil Defense Plan — are approved by the President of the Russian Federation. The same approach exists in almost all developed countries of the world. And yet, it can not be considered reasonable for modern conditions.
To clarify this thesis, it is necessary to understand: when did the need arise for the organization of territorial defense, under what conditions are its methods of conduct effective and will the character of future wars be in line with these conditions? To answer these questions we will consider the development of territorial defense in a historical retrospective.
GENERAL BATTLE AS A METHOD OF VICTORY IN WAR
Almost until the second half of the XIX century there was no need for the organization of territorial defense. And although some modern scholars say that territorial defense was organized in ancient times during the reign of Tsar Pea, in order to impart scientific knowledge to its research, in fact this is not the case.
In fact, until the end of the XIX century, the army of opponents "chased" after each other, trying to defeat during the general battle. At that time, this idea was in the minds of the generals of all European armies, including the Russian one. Indeed, by the age-old experience of wars, the winner of such a battle received the entire defeated country. There was no reason to be distracted by other actions, including the organization of hostilities in the rear of the enemy. For the Russian-speaking reader, the initial stage of the Patriotic War of the 1812 of the year (from June to September of the 1812 of the year) may be the most obvious. During this period, the Russian army, striving to unite its 1 and 2 th Western armies, retreated from the borders of Russia to Moscow, and Napoleon all the time tried to stop it and force it to accept a general battle. How sad this endeavor ended for him, we all know well.
The question arises: why did the troops in those days so eager to come together in a giant meat grinder? Why for centuries no one even planned to deploy large-scale actions in the deep rear of the enemy and did not expect such actions in his rear? There were many grounds.
At first. Weak army capabilities and fleet intelligence operations outside the area of operations of the main forces. Various raid units were forced like a wind, headlong rushing through the army rear of the enemy and returning to the location of their troops as soon as possible. There were several reasons for this. The main one is the difficulties in ensuring the actions of the troops outside the location of the main group with both information and various material means. The reconnaissance was organized mainly by riding, whose capabilities were limited by the endurance of horses and the range of visual detection of riders. Even when organizing a raid deep into the enemy’s defense, the detachment commander, in order to maintain the minimum permissible size of the main group, was forced to devote insignificant forces to reconnaissance. Otherwise, his entire detachment could be destroyed in parts even by local residents.
Secondly. Low means of information transmission. Pigeons and messengers did not provide a stable connection with the main forces. Therefore, the army commander could not “scatter” in the theater of military operations with his troops. He always sought to have an iron fist that could oppose the enemy.
Thirdly. Insufficient possibilities for transporting its troops to the depth of the enemy’s territory. The daily cavalry transfer using fodder could reach 50 km, and at the pasture (in summer, for fresh horses) 25 – 30 km. If this rate was exceeded, 1 – 2 rest days should be done every few days. Such rates, of course, were not enough for the rapid penetration and long-term actions of large masses of cavalry in the deep rear of the enemy.
Fourth. The military economy in almost all countries of the world until the twentieth century was rather relative. This was due to the fact that the main vehicle was a horse, and the main armament in the army was a saber and a rifle. Special powerful industries for their production and maintenance was not required. Horses, though of low quality for cavalry, could be requisitioned in every village, and with regular lubrication and careful handling, weapons could be stored and stored for decades and centuries in any region of the country.
Fifth. Even if significant detachments, ignoring the enemy's army, and broke through into its deep rear, there were no significant objects, the capture or decommissioning of which would give a cardinal advantage to the main group. For example, until the twentieth century, in many European countries there were few pronounced industrial centers. Yes, and their capture could not dramatically affect the strategic situation. A typical example is Napoleon’s seizure of Moscow. In addition, the main steel mills and weapons factories were located at a distance of several hundred, or even thousands of kilometers from the state border, which made the likelihood of unimpeded access to them and their sudden attack by the enemy almost zero.
At sixth. The rural way of life of the majority of the population also did not allow to cause critical damage to the rear. Constant clashes in each village with its subsequent “stripping” would not only slow down the pace of the enemy’s advancement, but were fraught with the approach of larger enemy groups and defeat.
THE APPEARANCE OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
The consequence of these reasons was that until the beginning of the broad motorization of the army in the twentieth century, in the deep rear of the enemy, only individual saboteurs or small detachments with tactical targets could operate effectively. Their actions could not have a significant impact on the strategic position of either their own or foreign armies - their combat capabilities were too insignificant. Therefore, the arson and technical sabotage by the hands of the saboteurs were the main method of damage to the economy and rear units of the enemy.
For the fight against them for a long time there were enough militias or militias formed according to the territorial and residual principle of recruitment. The provision of material and other means, including weapons, was carried out at the expense of the local base. The leadership was entrusted to the local nobility. Of course, such a militia, even with the police, was incapable of long and methodical actions against the regular army, but there were enough forces against the saboteurs and small enemy units.
In the wars of a new generation of cavalry raids gave way to central network operations.
Sometimes you can find the statement that the task of territorial defense in Russia was solved by the Internal Guard, which existed from 1811 to 1864 year. However, this is not quite true. In effect, the Inner Guard was a purely police body that had a military organization. Indeed, in accordance with the “Provision for the Internal Guard” approved by Emperor Alexander I, its main tasks were: “assistance in the execution of laws and court sentences; capture, prosecution and extermination of criminals; pacification of disobedience and violence; catching fugitive, departed criminals and deserters; assistance in collecting taxes and arrears; preservation of the order and tranquility of the church rites of all confessions, by the law of the tolerant; maintaining order at fairs, trades, folk and church festivals; escort recruits, criminals, prisoners and prisoners ", etc.
Within the framework of these tasks, the Internal Guard, of course, fought against saboteurs, but only as criminals. For the first time, the task of ensuring preparedness for the protection of objects and main transport communications from enemy sabotage and terrorist groups was formulated in 1864 for local troops.
The role of territorial defense, along with the attitude of the military-political leadership to it, began to change only in the twentieth century, as the industrialization of states, the transition to mass armies and their increasing dependence on timely and versatile logistics and technical support.
First of all, this was manifested in the allocation at the theater of military operations of the frontline strip - a strip of terrain adjacent to the front line, within which the formations, units and rear institutions of the operational-strategic association were located. A special regime for the civilian population was established in the territory and the actions of its troops were envisaged in the event of the appearance of regular enemy troops in it. The allocation of a special legal regime in the front-line zone was caused by the fact that even individual terrorist or sabotage actions by the enemy (for example, the destruction of front headquarters or front-line depots with ammunition) could seriously affect the course and outcome of combat operations in the theater of operations. In the rest of the territory of the state, territorial defense was planned in the old manner, in order to counteract individual saboteurs.
A new factor that directly influenced the organization of territorial defense was aviation. Its effective actions during the First World War, along with the demonstrated capabilities to inflict damage on the population and the economy in the strategic depths of the defending forces, forced the military-political leadership of the leading European states to create air defense forces on the territory of the border military districts. The basis of the organizational structure of the new type of troops in the 20s of the last century was air defense points, which were part of the air defense sector, whose command was responsible for the air defense within the district.
Subsequently, an increase in the radius of action of the enemy’s combat aviation required new approaches to the organization of territorial defense in airspace. In particular, in the USSR in November 1941 of the year, despite the desperate situation on the fronts, the Air Defense Forces built up the country's territory - a type of armed forces designed to repel enemy air strikes against the main administrative and political centers and other important forces and groups in the rear, which form the basis of the economic and military power of the state. This was a revolutionary step, which recognized the beginning of fundamental changes in the nature of the organization of territorial defense. After all, the Air Defense Forces of the territory of the country, in fact, were the troops of territorial defense against an air enemy!
AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURIES
After the end of the Second World War, it would seem that military science would inevitably have to take the next step in its development and propose a new theory of the organization of territorial defense as a system of interrelated actions on the ground and in the air. However, the rapid introduction of nuclear weapons into the troops, a fundamental change in the nature and content of military conflicts had a negative impact on the development of the main provisions of territorial defense. Neither the military science nor the practitioners made correct conclusions from the cardinally increased maneuverability and combat capabilities of the formations and units of the types and types of troops. For example, in the USSR, the task of air defense of a strategic rear was recognized as a nation-wide one, and its decision was entrusted to the commander-in-chief of the country's air defense forces.
However, the solution of the problem of territorial defense on earth for some reason still continued to be considered a matter of secondary, insignificant. No one began to take into account the sharply increased operational capabilities of ground forces, capable of organizing, together with aviation, a new front in the deep rear of the enemy. Even in the 80 of the twentieth century, the attitude to the organization of the defense of its rear in the depths of the country remained the same. It was supposed to counteract individual saboteurs and small enemy detachments performing private, tactical tasks. Accordingly, if the country's Air Defense Forces were preparing to fight against the enemy air formations and formations as part of its regular army, many military leaders still believed that the main tasks of the troops in the framework of territorial defense in the strategic depth of defense would be to combat individual saboteurs and small sabotage detachments.
Subsequently, at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the influence of the results of the scientific and technological revolution on the organization of state defense only increased. Today, organizing an effective state defense requires interconnecting the actions of dozens of ministries and departments and tens of millions of people. For example, at the end of January 2013, at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported that the actions of 49 ministries and departments are interconnected in the submitted state defense plan for approval. It is clear that not all of these state structures are involved in active hostilities, but it is indisputable that the activity of each of them directly affects the effectiveness of defense. This is confirmed by the comment of the Minister of Defense at the above meeting that "... for the first time it was possible to take into account all the programs related to the defense of our country: the armament program, the mobilization program, and the programs of all ministries and departments throughout our country."
An approved defense plan should certainly be the basis for territorial defense planning. There are certain theoretical and practical groundwork for this. For example, the practice of organizing joint actions of multi-departmental forces and means in solving a common task. To this end, territorial defense zones are created in each military district, which, in turn, are divided into territorial defense districts. As a rule, military commissars of the respective republics, territories and regions are appointed as commanders of territorial defense zones, and district (city) military commissars, in some cases commanders of formations and units, and commanders of military schools, are appointed commanders of territorial defense districts. An important role is also played by the authorities of the subjects of the state and local self-government, which are required, together with the military authorities, to participate in planning and ensuring the implementation of territorial defense measures on their territory. There are a number of provisions on the organization of territorial defense that can ensure its effective organization.
LACK OF APPROACHES
However, all efforts and achievements here negate the preservation of the two main combat missions of the territorial defense forces (forces): guarding the most important state and military infrastructure facilities and fighting against enemy assault and sabotage forces and illegal armed formations. This, in our opinion, is the main discrepancy between the existing approaches to the organization of territorial defense and modern conditions.
Initially, it is assumed that the fighting in the deep rear will, like 100 years ago, be of a tactical scale. Of course, this approach is very convenient for many: it is still possible to allocate forces and funds from formations, units and institutions of various law enforcement agencies and other ministries and departments on a residual basis, as necessary. But is effective rear protection provided? Hardly.
Complete disregard for fundamental changes in the economy, industry, weapons, and social technologies of the last decades is fraught with grave consequences for any country. The lag in understanding the essence of modern military operations is especially dangerous in conditions when more and more armies of the world are being rebuilt in accordance with the new technology of war, the main points of which were published 25 years ago. For example, in October 1989, the article “The Changing Face of War: The Fourth Generation,” published in the American Marine Corps Marine Corps Gazette newspaper, stated: “The war will be non-linear to such an extent that it is quite possible there will be no identifiable battlefield and front lines. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” is likely to disappear. Actions will be simultaneously directed to the entire “depth” of the parties involved, including their whole society, understood not only in its physical, but also in the cultural aspect ... Success will greatly depend on the effectiveness of joint operations, since the dividing lines between tasks and responsibilities of different participants will be blurred ".
In Russia, they also engaged in theoretical research in this area. Thus, at the beginning of 2000, the author of these lines worked on the basics of the theory of promising forms and methods of conducting military operations. The results showed that the active development by the likely adversary of new complex forms and methods of conducting modern military operations requires similar changes in the theory and practice of organizing and conducting military operations not only at the front, but also within the framework of territorial defense. After all, the whole country became a battlefield.
Today, operations have received new content, initially involving the holding of quick and decisive maneuvers not only on the flanks, but also in the rear of the enemy. The main factor determining the nature of hostilities was the ability to conduct central network operations of multi-purpose tactical groups controlled from a single strategic center and simultaneously operating on individual key elements of the state and military control system, units and divisions of retaliatory forces throughout the opposing side.
This conclusion means that the tactical unit of the enemy’s regular army, supported by all its might at any distance from the front edge, may be the object next to any strategically important object for the defending side. The commander of such a unit does not need to be directly subordinate to any specific specific expensive weapon systems - he only needs to make an application through the network for their use in a given area at a given time to solve a specific task or bring the current situation to a higher commander - and support will be provided . Will the “network” of such interspecific tactical groups acting according to a single plan and plan throughout the territory of the victim of aggression, hastily assembled “troops and territorial defense forces”, not supported by aviation, nor by EW forces, or cyber warriors, not having a single plan and plan with your regular troops? A rhetorical question.
For example, the attempt of the military-political leadership of Iraq in 2003 to organize territorial defense based on the approaches of the second half of the twentieth century turned out to be a catastrophe. After all, initially no action was taken against the regular army in such a deep rear, and when, a day after the outbreak of hostilities, a large American group was in their rear, the situation was not even saved by the suicide attacks of the Guardsmen.
It can be assumed that over the past 11 years, the capabilities of the US Armed Forces to conduct central network operations have only grown. For example, the most important feature of modern operations that directly affects the organization of territorial defense is the misleading of the military-political leadership of the country - the victim of aggression about the evolving military-strategic situation due to the pseudo-partisan (pseudo-terrorist) actions of his troops, causing damage under the guise of man-made disasters or natural disasters, actions of the population with religious, ethnic or other slogans. Such actions today can be widely observed during the so-called color revolutions, when the first persons of the state - victims of aggression fall into prostration, not understanding what is happening around.
"FAMILY" BECAME "HUNTER"
What is usually supposed to be opposed to the new methods of hostilities of the enemy in their deep rear by the leadership of the majority of modern states, importing not only material means, but also military theory not of the first freshness?
Probably all that 70 had accumulated years ago to the end of World War II: special operations, combat service, operational activities, operational combat operations, search, cordoning, blocking, regime-preventive, isolation-restrictive actions, rescue-evacuation , emergency restoration work, etc. It is hardly possible even theoretically to recognize them as adequate to the modern conditions of the situation.
Today, the relevance of new approaches to the organization and conduct of territorial defense has increased even more than even 10 years ago. The division into operations in the front line and the conduct of territorial defense loses its original meaning. A rethinking of the whole theory of state defense organization is required.
The main thing to understand: "game" has become a "hunter". In the rear of the state - victims of aggression - not lone saboteurs who dream to go out to the object of sabotage and just leave unnoticed, but regular troops operating according to a single plan and plan and having appropriate systems of intelligence, control, fire destruction and support, will act.
The hope that, within the framework of existing approaches to territorial defense, it will be possible to effectively disrupt the operations of the regular troops of the enemy by different departmental, rather heterogeneous groups of their troops, may not be justified. Moreover, the focus of the regular army only on countering the enemy’s regular forces in the forefront, along with the expectation that the Internal Troops or other formations such as the US National Guard will cope in the rear, is fraught with the consistent defeat of the entire military organization of the state. This conclusion is well illustrated by the events in Libya, Syria and Ukraine.