No strategic reserves
Problems of recruitment and accumulation of military-trained mobilization human resources and ways to solve them
Recently, the final meeting of the third division of the Academy of Military Sciences "Military (defense) construction of the state military organization." A lot of attention was paid to the problems that have been disturbing the Russian public and its younger generation for many years, and recently they have also become a source of contradictions between military scientists and experts from various scientific schools and views. It was about closely interrelated problems of staffing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, training and accumulation of military-trained human mobilization resources.
In general, the problems of recruiting and accumulating military-trained mobilization human resources require the urgent resolution of a number of contradictions. On the one hand, between limited (eligible for military service) conscription human resources of the Russian Federation and the great needs of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation for staffing them. On the other hand, between the need for military-trained human mobresources necessary to deploy the required composition of groups of troops (forces) to repel aggression against the Russian Federation, and insufficient capabilities of the Armed Forces to prepare and accumulate them in peacetime. We should not forget about resolving the contradiction between the financial and economic needs of the Armed Forces, in particular, current expenses, and the capabilities of the Russian Federation to ensure them.
Solvable contradictions
It is no secret that in the coming years, the Russian Federation will find itself in a deep “demographic hole”, which will significantly affect its ability to recruit the state’s military organization with personnel. In absolute terms, the ability of the Russian Federation to recruit the state’s military organization in peacetime, taking into account the state of health of recruited youth and the existing system of deferments (no more than 15 percent of the total number of conscription is called up) will make 2015 in the 681,7 year, including for the Armed Forces 477,2, 2020 - 640,7 and 448,5, in 2025 - 618,4 and 432,9 thousands of people, respectively. The requirements for draft troops for recruiting the RF Armed Forces with sergeants and privates today and in the medium term are no less than 780 thousand people. Thus, the deficit in recruiting as a private and non-commissioned officers for conscription only for the RF Armed Forces will be at least 300 – 350 thousand people.
The resolution of this contradiction has been seen for many years in the transition to a contract method of recruiting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The rationale for this was one argument - the annual demand for recruiting resources acceptable to the Russian Federation, which could be made up of a three-year term for concluding a contract for military service 260, and a five-year one - 156 thousand people. Such a decision was justified not only from the point of view of the mobilization tension of the state, but also from a military-strategic point of view, since it was not planned to use the RF Armed Forces in large-scale military conflicts and deploy numerous groups of troops (forces) for this. However, this decision was contrary to the principle of equal responsibility of citizens for the defense of the state and was not provided financially and economically. In particular, the low level of pay and social conditions of service under the contract was the main reason for the failure of the experiment on the transition of the Armed Forces to this method of recruitment.
All this necessitated the transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to a mixed recruitment method. However, this raises the problem of justifying a rational balance between the rank and file and the sergeant staff serving military conscription and contract. Obviously, the criteria for the effectiveness of the decision may be the allowable number of annual recruitment and hiring of citizens for military service and acceptable (rational) social and economic conditions of service and life of military personnel, decent pay and appropriate social guarantees and benefits.
At the same time, the solution of this task is impossible without resolving the second contradiction - without assessing the compliance of the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces with training and accumulating military-trained human resources to deploy additional numbers of military formations necessary to create the required groups of troops (forces).
If the first component being compared mainly depends on the number of servicemen undergoing military service on conscription and contract, the duration of this service and the time of citizens in the reserve and their quantitative values are known, then the second one depends on the number of reduced units and military units unknown to us frames, as well as the need to create new military units and to compensate for irretrievable losses in the first months of the war.
Strategic reserve
It is known that the combat strength and structure of the Armed Forces depend on the nature of the wars in which their use is planned. At present, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with general-purpose forces without significant mobilization deployment are capable of solving tasks only in armed conflicts and, in part, local wars. At the same time, in the future, the participation of the Russian Federation in regional and large-scale wars cannot be excluded, which will differ from armed conflicts and local wars not only by political and military-strategic goals, but also by significant spatial scope and long duration (from several months to several years) . This will require the deployment of significant militant groupings of troops (forces) and the maximum military-economic and mobilization pressure of the state. To increase the combat potential of groups of troops (forces) in the interests of conducting large-scale military operations during the war, it is obviously necessary that such a combat force of the Armed Forces be able to deploy additional numbers of combat-ready units.
However, the composition and structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, formed as a result of the 2008 – 2012 reforms, make it possible in wartime to only slightly increase the combat strength of the groupings of troops (forces) due to the mobilization of the weapons storage and repair base (BHIRVT), and the lack of strategic reserves significantly limits the possibility of the influence of the Supreme Command on the preparation and conduct of large-scale military operations. Therefore, in the future, as part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, along with strategic deterrence forces and general-purpose forces, it is necessary to have strategic reserves.
Based on the size of the Armed Forces of Peacetime, it is proposed that, as part of the strategic deterrent forces, to have formations and military units of permanent readiness, as part of general-purpose forces - formations and military units of permanent readiness, reduced personnel and personnel, and as part of strategic reserves - formations and military units of the frame . According to their functional purpose, these units and military units are subdivided into immediate use forces with readiness periods up to 24 hours, rapid deployment forces with readiness periods up to М10, reinforcement troops - USC reserves and primary strategic reserves with readiness periods М30 and from М30 to М60, respectively. The staffing, AME and material resources should ensure that the formations and military units are ready to carry out missions in a timely manner.
Introduction of reduced reserves and personnel to the structure of the RF Armed Forces strategic reserves, as well as formations and military units, while maintaining the total peacetime strength of the Armed Forces, will increase the number of military units that make up the groupings of troops (forces), increase the base of the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and ensure the combat strength The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation before the needs of war
Previous studies have shown that to recruit newly deployed formations and military units (reserve formations) based on the forecast of military threats to the Russian Federation, the need for military-trained human resources can be 2017 thousands of officers and sergeants 280 million 1 thousands by 820 year to the 2021 th officers - 450 thousands, soldiers and sergeants - 2 million 800 thousands, to 2025 th officers - 680 thousands, soldiers and sergeants - 3 million 900 thousand people.
Is a contract army able to prepare and accumulate so many mobresursy? Let's try to answer this question.
What is a contract army capable of?
With the average term of active military service officers 20 years (up to 40 years) and 15 years in service (stay in reserve: 1-th category - to 50, 2-th category - to 55 years), taking into account the available resource (150 thousands man) and the natural annual loss of 10 percent can be accumulated for each of the calculated years no more than 150 of thousands of reserve officers. At the same time, the shortage of officers will turn out to be 2017 thousands by 130,3, thousands 2021 by 300,62, and thousands by 2026 th.
To recruit a peacekeeping officer in the peacetime with an officer corps, the required average annual graduation rate of officers from military schools to 2021 must be at least 11, after 2020, thousands of people must be 17,5. For the training and accumulation of officers in the interests of deploying groups of troops (forces) and conducting military operations during the first months of the war, at least 43 – 44 thousands of reserve officers must be produced annually at the expense of the military departments of civilian educational institutions.
How to solve this problem?
At present, covering the need for peacetime officers is provided by the capabilities of the established network of military schools of the RF Armed Forces. To ensure the deployment of reserve units for wartime, reserve officers are being trained today at 35 military departments and 33 military training centers of civilian universities. In a speech by the head of the State Defense Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the last collegium of the Ministry of Defense, the university’s 72 figure was made, which is only seven percent of the total number of civilian educational institutions. At the same time, their annual output differs significantly from the above-presented needs and amounts to no more than 10 of thousands of reserve officers. It is necessary at least four times to increase the capacity of civilian universities to train reserve officers for strategic reserves, the total capacity of which should be at least 44 thousands of reserve officers every year.
At the same time, it is necessary to agree both with the duration and with the forms of training of reserve officers in civilian universities proposed by the head of the State Defense Committee of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. At the same time, it seems inexpedient, because of the great need for reserve officers, to carry out training in civilian higher educational institutions of sergeants and reserve soldiers. To do this, it is better to attract educational institutions of secondary and vocational education.
As regards the training and accumulation of military-trained mobresursov ordinary and non-commissioned officers, it should be noted that subject to the creation of strategic reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with the contract method of recruitment and annual hiring 78 thousands of citizens for military service are not able to prepare the required number of military-trained mobresursy sergeant and rank-and-file personnel, the shortage of which will be 2017 by 661, 2021 by 1685, and 2026 by thousands of 2825.
The way out of the situation created is obvious and it is possible only with a mixed method of staffing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and substantiating the rational ratio of the number of sergeants and privates serving under contract and conscription, as well as the periods of military service and service in reserve (being in reserve).
Taking into account the previously listed negative factors, the required number of military-trained mobresurs of private and non-commissioned officers, not exceeding the annual capacity of the Russian Federation to recruit citizens - 432 – 477 thousand people, can be prepared and accumulated only if there are at least 54 in the Armed Forces percent of sergeants and soldiers (421 thousand people), undergoing military service under the contract, and the duration of military service on conscription - one year, under the contract - five years and in reserve (stay in reserve) - 15 years.
At the same time, no more than 360 thousand people will be required for recruitment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and up to 83 thousand for hire, which in total (443 thousand) does not exceed the above-mentioned possibilities of the annual call of the Russian Federation (432 – 477 thousand).
With a share of contract soldiers of less than 54 percent, the opportunities for training military-trained mobresursov sergeants and privates increase, the need for conscription of citizens for military service will exceed the maximum possible values.
If the percentage of contract servicemen is more than 54, the need for conscription for citizens will be less than the marginal capabilities of the Russian Federation for conscription for citizens, and the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces for training the required number of military-trained sergeant and privates will be reduced.
Thus, the number of sergeants and contract soldiers in the Russian Armed Forces within 421 – 425 thousand people is optimal from a military-strategic point of view.
Quality and incentives of preparation
The solution to the problem of the quantitative accumulation of military-trained mobresursov sergeants and soldiers is inextricably linked with the accounting and quality control of their training. Therefore, it is quite natural that the reduction in the number of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the transition to a mixed way of completing them, sharply raise the question of the need to create a national reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, recruited on a voluntary (contract) basis, while maintaining the existing mobilization reserve of the Armed Forces. However, it will be possible to talk about the structure and composition of the national reserve only after conducting an experiment on the organization of service in the human mobilization reserve of the RF Armed Forces of a limited number of citizens who have signed a contract for such a service.
In the conditions of changing the method of recruiting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, their numerical reduction, introducing a voluntary method of recruiting the reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, expanding the territorial principle of recruiting and improving the training of military-trained resources will support military units and formations in the required calculated number and combat readiness in accordance with operational plans troops (forces), to preserve the basic basis of the mobilization readiness of the country in case of military danger.
At the same time, the transition to a new system of recruitment, preparation and accumulation of military-trained resources should be sufficiently resourced, economically and financially. It is required to create attractive conditions of military service under the contract both in formations and military units of permanent readiness and reduced strength, and in reserve formations.
To confirm the feasibility of the above proposals, the calculation of the monetary allowance of servicemen, including soldiers and contract sergeants of the Russian Armed Forces, was carried out as one of the incentives to increase the prestige of military service.
According to military experts, the payroll of officers should be no less than 70 thousand rubles, and the rank and file and non-commissioned officers of contract servicemen must be at least 35 thousand rubles. These indicators are taken as the minimum necessary criterion values of the monetary allowance of servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
With such a level of monetary support for military servicemen, the total expenditures this year will not exceed the budgeted appropriations of 372,1 billion rubles. At the same time, the share of the monetary allowance of servicemen in the expenses for maintaining the RF Armed Forces will be 51,9 percent, and the total expenses for maintaining the RF Armed Forces - 1012,77 billion rubles or 52,8 percent of the construction and maintenance costs of the RF Armed Forces.
By 2017 year with the release of the estimated number of contract servicemen in the RF 421 200 sergeants and soldiers within the allocated expenses for the maintenance of military personnel 454 billion rubles, the average maintenance of officers can be no less than 96 thousand rubles, sergeants and conscripts - two thousand rubles, and contract workers - 38 thousand rubles. At the same time, the share of the total pay for all categories of military personnel will be 56,5 percent of the cost of maintaining the Armed Forces. And 40,8 percent - from the cost of construction and maintenance of the Armed Forces.
By 2021, the officers' salaries can be increased up to 120 thousand rubles, sergeants and conscripts up to three thousand rubles, and contract soldiers - up to 50 thousand rubles. At the same time, the share of the total pay for all categories of military personnel will remain as it was and will amount to 56 percent of the cost of maintaining the RF Armed Forces. And 40,6 percent - from the cost of construction and maintenance of the Armed Forces.
Thus, already by 2016, it is possible to increase the number of sergeants and soldiers under military service under the contract to 420 thousand people with an increase in the prestige of military service and the status of a military man, which is caused not only by the military-strategic feasibility, but also by the financial and economic possibilities of moving to the system of manning the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, based on a mixed method of manning.
In terms of payments to citizens in reserve, it should be noted that in accordance with federal law of December 30 2012 of the year No. 288-ФЗ “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on the Creation of a Human Mobilization Reserve” such a payment. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, in 2014 – 2016, the number of reserves for 5000 people is envisaged. According to the calculations of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense can make 2014 million rubles in 279,4, 2015 million in 288,3, and 2016 million rubles in 324,9 to ensure this reserve. It can be assumed that the monetary content of one “reservist” in the period of 2014 – 2016 will cost 5 – 5,5 thousands of rubles. These expenses in the budget for national defense represent no more than 0,03 – 0,05 percent of other expenses for national defense.
The data on the number and financial parameters of the national mobilization reserve can be taken as benchmarks for conducting an experiment to assess the effectiveness of the performance of the service system in the national reserve. In the future, by the year 2021, it is necessary to fully transfer citizens who are in reserve and credited to the national reserve, to contract service with determining the amount of money for officers - 15 thousand rubles, sergeants and soldiers - 10 thousand rubles. The total annual expenditure on this monetary allowance will be 204,3 billion rubles, or five percent of the costs of national defense.
Recently, the final meeting of the third division of the Academy of Military Sciences "Military (defense) construction of the state military organization." A lot of attention was paid to the problems that have been disturbing the Russian public and its younger generation for many years, and recently they have also become a source of contradictions between military scientists and experts from various scientific schools and views. It was about closely interrelated problems of staffing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, training and accumulation of military-trained human mobilization resources.
In general, the problems of recruiting and accumulating military-trained mobilization human resources require the urgent resolution of a number of contradictions. On the one hand, between limited (eligible for military service) conscription human resources of the Russian Federation and the great needs of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation for staffing them. On the other hand, between the need for military-trained human mobresources necessary to deploy the required composition of groups of troops (forces) to repel aggression against the Russian Federation, and insufficient capabilities of the Armed Forces to prepare and accumulate them in peacetime. We should not forget about resolving the contradiction between the financial and economic needs of the Armed Forces, in particular, current expenses, and the capabilities of the Russian Federation to ensure them.
Solvable contradictions
It is no secret that in the coming years, the Russian Federation will find itself in a deep “demographic hole”, which will significantly affect its ability to recruit the state’s military organization with personnel. In absolute terms, the ability of the Russian Federation to recruit the state’s military organization in peacetime, taking into account the state of health of recruited youth and the existing system of deferments (no more than 15 percent of the total number of conscription is called up) will make 2015 in the 681,7 year, including for the Armed Forces 477,2, 2020 - 640,7 and 448,5, in 2025 - 618,4 and 432,9 thousands of people, respectively. The requirements for draft troops for recruiting the RF Armed Forces with sergeants and privates today and in the medium term are no less than 780 thousand people. Thus, the deficit in recruiting as a private and non-commissioned officers for conscription only for the RF Armed Forces will be at least 300 – 350 thousand people.
The resolution of this contradiction has been seen for many years in the transition to a contract method of recruiting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The rationale for this was one argument - the annual demand for recruiting resources acceptable to the Russian Federation, which could be made up of a three-year term for concluding a contract for military service 260, and a five-year one - 156 thousand people. Such a decision was justified not only from the point of view of the mobilization tension of the state, but also from a military-strategic point of view, since it was not planned to use the RF Armed Forces in large-scale military conflicts and deploy numerous groups of troops (forces) for this. However, this decision was contrary to the principle of equal responsibility of citizens for the defense of the state and was not provided financially and economically. In particular, the low level of pay and social conditions of service under the contract was the main reason for the failure of the experiment on the transition of the Armed Forces to this method of recruitment.
All this necessitated the transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to a mixed recruitment method. However, this raises the problem of justifying a rational balance between the rank and file and the sergeant staff serving military conscription and contract. Obviously, the criteria for the effectiveness of the decision may be the allowable number of annual recruitment and hiring of citizens for military service and acceptable (rational) social and economic conditions of service and life of military personnel, decent pay and appropriate social guarantees and benefits.
At the same time, the solution of this task is impossible without resolving the second contradiction - without assessing the compliance of the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces with training and accumulating military-trained human resources to deploy additional numbers of military formations necessary to create the required groups of troops (forces).
If the first component being compared mainly depends on the number of servicemen undergoing military service on conscription and contract, the duration of this service and the time of citizens in the reserve and their quantitative values are known, then the second one depends on the number of reduced units and military units unknown to us frames, as well as the need to create new military units and to compensate for irretrievable losses in the first months of the war.
Strategic reserve
It is known that the combat strength and structure of the Armed Forces depend on the nature of the wars in which their use is planned. At present, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with general-purpose forces without significant mobilization deployment are capable of solving tasks only in armed conflicts and, in part, local wars. At the same time, in the future, the participation of the Russian Federation in regional and large-scale wars cannot be excluded, which will differ from armed conflicts and local wars not only by political and military-strategic goals, but also by significant spatial scope and long duration (from several months to several years) . This will require the deployment of significant militant groupings of troops (forces) and the maximum military-economic and mobilization pressure of the state. To increase the combat potential of groups of troops (forces) in the interests of conducting large-scale military operations during the war, it is obviously necessary that such a combat force of the Armed Forces be able to deploy additional numbers of combat-ready units.
However, the composition and structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, formed as a result of the 2008 – 2012 reforms, make it possible in wartime to only slightly increase the combat strength of the groupings of troops (forces) due to the mobilization of the weapons storage and repair base (BHIRVT), and the lack of strategic reserves significantly limits the possibility of the influence of the Supreme Command on the preparation and conduct of large-scale military operations. Therefore, in the future, as part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, along with strategic deterrence forces and general-purpose forces, it is necessary to have strategic reserves.Based on the size of the Armed Forces of Peacetime, it is proposed that, as part of the strategic deterrent forces, to have formations and military units of permanent readiness, as part of general-purpose forces - formations and military units of permanent readiness, reduced personnel and personnel, and as part of strategic reserves - formations and military units of the frame . According to their functional purpose, these units and military units are subdivided into immediate use forces with readiness periods up to 24 hours, rapid deployment forces with readiness periods up to М10, reinforcement troops - USC reserves and primary strategic reserves with readiness periods М30 and from М30 to М60, respectively. The staffing, AME and material resources should ensure that the formations and military units are ready to carry out missions in a timely manner.
Introduction of reduced reserves and personnel to the structure of the RF Armed Forces strategic reserves, as well as formations and military units, while maintaining the total peacetime strength of the Armed Forces, will increase the number of military units that make up the groupings of troops (forces), increase the base of the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and ensure the combat strength The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation before the needs of war
Previous studies have shown that to recruit newly deployed formations and military units (reserve formations) based on the forecast of military threats to the Russian Federation, the need for military-trained human resources can be 2017 thousands of officers and sergeants 280 million 1 thousands by 820 year to the 2021 th officers - 450 thousands, soldiers and sergeants - 2 million 800 thousands, to 2025 th officers - 680 thousands, soldiers and sergeants - 3 million 900 thousand people.
Is a contract army able to prepare and accumulate so many mobresursy? Let's try to answer this question.
What is a contract army capable of?
With the average term of active military service officers 20 years (up to 40 years) and 15 years in service (stay in reserve: 1-th category - to 50, 2-th category - to 55 years), taking into account the available resource (150 thousands man) and the natural annual loss of 10 percent can be accumulated for each of the calculated years no more than 150 of thousands of reserve officers. At the same time, the shortage of officers will turn out to be 2017 thousands by 130,3, thousands 2021 by 300,62, and thousands by 2026 th.
To recruit a peacekeeping officer in the peacetime with an officer corps, the required average annual graduation rate of officers from military schools to 2021 must be at least 11, after 2020, thousands of people must be 17,5. For the training and accumulation of officers in the interests of deploying groups of troops (forces) and conducting military operations during the first months of the war, at least 43 – 44 thousands of reserve officers must be produced annually at the expense of the military departments of civilian educational institutions.
How to solve this problem?
At present, covering the need for peacetime officers is provided by the capabilities of the established network of military schools of the RF Armed Forces. To ensure the deployment of reserve units for wartime, reserve officers are being trained today at 35 military departments and 33 military training centers of civilian universities. In a speech by the head of the State Defense Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the last collegium of the Ministry of Defense, the university’s 72 figure was made, which is only seven percent of the total number of civilian educational institutions. At the same time, their annual output differs significantly from the above-presented needs and amounts to no more than 10 of thousands of reserve officers. It is necessary at least four times to increase the capacity of civilian universities to train reserve officers for strategic reserves, the total capacity of which should be at least 44 thousands of reserve officers every year.
At the same time, it is necessary to agree both with the duration and with the forms of training of reserve officers in civilian universities proposed by the head of the State Defense Committee of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. At the same time, it seems inexpedient, because of the great need for reserve officers, to carry out training in civilian higher educational institutions of sergeants and reserve soldiers. To do this, it is better to attract educational institutions of secondary and vocational education.
As regards the training and accumulation of military-trained mobresursov ordinary and non-commissioned officers, it should be noted that subject to the creation of strategic reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with the contract method of recruitment and annual hiring 78 thousands of citizens for military service are not able to prepare the required number of military-trained mobresursy sergeant and rank-and-file personnel, the shortage of which will be 2017 by 661, 2021 by 1685, and 2026 by thousands of 2825.
The way out of the situation created is obvious and it is possible only with a mixed method of staffing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and substantiating the rational ratio of the number of sergeants and privates serving under contract and conscription, as well as the periods of military service and service in reserve (being in reserve).
Taking into account the previously listed negative factors, the required number of military-trained mobresurs of private and non-commissioned officers, not exceeding the annual capacity of the Russian Federation to recruit citizens - 432 – 477 thousand people, can be prepared and accumulated only if there are at least 54 in the Armed Forces percent of sergeants and soldiers (421 thousand people), undergoing military service under the contract, and the duration of military service on conscription - one year, under the contract - five years and in reserve (stay in reserve) - 15 years.
At the same time, no more than 360 thousand people will be required for recruitment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and up to 83 thousand for hire, which in total (443 thousand) does not exceed the above-mentioned possibilities of the annual call of the Russian Federation (432 – 477 thousand).
With a share of contract soldiers of less than 54 percent, the opportunities for training military-trained mobresursov sergeants and privates increase, the need for conscription of citizens for military service will exceed the maximum possible values.
If the percentage of contract servicemen is more than 54, the need for conscription for citizens will be less than the marginal capabilities of the Russian Federation for conscription for citizens, and the capabilities of the RF Armed Forces for training the required number of military-trained sergeant and privates will be reduced.
Thus, the number of sergeants and contract soldiers in the Russian Armed Forces within 421 – 425 thousand people is optimal from a military-strategic point of view.
Quality and incentives of preparation
The solution to the problem of the quantitative accumulation of military-trained mobresursov sergeants and soldiers is inextricably linked with the accounting and quality control of their training. Therefore, it is quite natural that the reduction in the number of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the transition to a mixed way of completing them, sharply raise the question of the need to create a national reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, recruited on a voluntary (contract) basis, while maintaining the existing mobilization reserve of the Armed Forces. However, it will be possible to talk about the structure and composition of the national reserve only after conducting an experiment on the organization of service in the human mobilization reserve of the RF Armed Forces of a limited number of citizens who have signed a contract for such a service.
In the conditions of changing the method of recruiting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, their numerical reduction, introducing a voluntary method of recruiting the reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, expanding the territorial principle of recruiting and improving the training of military-trained resources will support military units and formations in the required calculated number and combat readiness in accordance with operational plans troops (forces), to preserve the basic basis of the mobilization readiness of the country in case of military danger.
At the same time, the transition to a new system of recruitment, preparation and accumulation of military-trained resources should be sufficiently resourced, economically and financially. It is required to create attractive conditions of military service under the contract both in formations and military units of permanent readiness and reduced strength, and in reserve formations.
To confirm the feasibility of the above proposals, the calculation of the monetary allowance of servicemen, including soldiers and contract sergeants of the Russian Armed Forces, was carried out as one of the incentives to increase the prestige of military service.
According to military experts, the payroll of officers should be no less than 70 thousand rubles, and the rank and file and non-commissioned officers of contract servicemen must be at least 35 thousand rubles. These indicators are taken as the minimum necessary criterion values of the monetary allowance of servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
With such a level of monetary support for military servicemen, the total expenditures this year will not exceed the budgeted appropriations of 372,1 billion rubles. At the same time, the share of the monetary allowance of servicemen in the expenses for maintaining the RF Armed Forces will be 51,9 percent, and the total expenses for maintaining the RF Armed Forces - 1012,77 billion rubles or 52,8 percent of the construction and maintenance costs of the RF Armed Forces.
By 2017 year with the release of the estimated number of contract servicemen in the RF 421 200 sergeants and soldiers within the allocated expenses for the maintenance of military personnel 454 billion rubles, the average maintenance of officers can be no less than 96 thousand rubles, sergeants and conscripts - two thousand rubles, and contract workers - 38 thousand rubles. At the same time, the share of the total pay for all categories of military personnel will be 56,5 percent of the cost of maintaining the Armed Forces. And 40,8 percent - from the cost of construction and maintenance of the Armed Forces.
By 2021, the officers' salaries can be increased up to 120 thousand rubles, sergeants and conscripts up to three thousand rubles, and contract soldiers - up to 50 thousand rubles. At the same time, the share of the total pay for all categories of military personnel will remain as it was and will amount to 56 percent of the cost of maintaining the RF Armed Forces. And 40,6 percent - from the cost of construction and maintenance of the Armed Forces.
Thus, already by 2016, it is possible to increase the number of sergeants and soldiers under military service under the contract to 420 thousand people with an increase in the prestige of military service and the status of a military man, which is caused not only by the military-strategic feasibility, but also by the financial and economic possibilities of moving to the system of manning the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, based on a mixed method of manning.
In terms of payments to citizens in reserve, it should be noted that in accordance with federal law of December 30 2012 of the year No. 288-ФЗ “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on the Creation of a Human Mobilization Reserve” such a payment. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, in 2014 – 2016, the number of reserves for 5000 people is envisaged. According to the calculations of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense can make 2014 million rubles in 279,4, 2015 million in 288,3, and 2016 million rubles in 324,9 to ensure this reserve. It can be assumed that the monetary content of one “reservist” in the period of 2014 – 2016 will cost 5 – 5,5 thousands of rubles. These expenses in the budget for national defense represent no more than 0,03 – 0,05 percent of other expenses for national defense.
The data on the number and financial parameters of the national mobilization reserve can be taken as benchmarks for conducting an experiment to assess the effectiveness of the performance of the service system in the national reserve. In the future, by the year 2021, it is necessary to fully transfer citizens who are in reserve and credited to the national reserve, to contract service with determining the amount of money for officers - 15 thousand rubles, sergeants and soldiers - 10 thousand rubles. The total annual expenditure on this monetary allowance will be 204,3 billion rubles, or five percent of the costs of national defense.
Information