Military Review

Afghan Campaign: Unclaimed Experience

The practice of applying a limited contingent of Soviet troops

A proper analysis of the Afghan campaign has not yet been made. No, and official stories this war, and such should be multivolume, with maps, tables and graphs. At this stage, the weekly MIC offers only some very brief conclusions from this nine-year armed confrontation.

The coup d'état in September 1979, the coming to power of Hafizullah Amin and the elimination and then killing of Nurmuhammed Taraki and them forced the Soviet leadership to come to grips with the Afghan problem. Finding no other solution acceptable to the USSR, the Kremlin considered it necessary to introduce troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). This step was taken mainly to eliminate Amin and create conditions for replacing him with a more progressive leader, which at the time was Babrak Karmal.

This conclusion is supported by such facts as the small initial composition of the Soviet troops, their staffing with reservists, and not personnel officers, the intention of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev to withdraw the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OXF) from Afghanistan in February as having fulfilled its main task .

The inconsistency of the structure of the tasks to be solved

The mobilization of the formations, units and institutions intended for entry into Afghanistan was carried out as an appeal to the registration fees of separate orders (after each time oral instructions of Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov were received) of the General Staff addressed to the commanders of military districts, who in turn gave the established signals troops and military commissariat.

Afghan Campaign: Unclaimed Experience

At the same time, the imperfection and even the deficiency of our system of preparation and accumulation of reserves was revealed.

The situation with the training of reserve officers was very bad. For example, from the number of officers called up for December 1979, more than 70 percent never served in the army at all. They received their titles in the military departments of civilian universities. The vast majority of them showed a complete inability to command units.

Due to the fact that the conduct of active hostilities against irregular opposition groups was not initially envisaged, the formations and units of the TurkME and SAVO intended for entry into Afghanistan were deployed, and then sent to the DRA in a standard organizational structure, the same as in Western theater. Connections with Afghanistan entered Afghanistan tank and anti-aircraft missile regiments, missile and anti-tank divisions, chemical defense battalions. In addition, the army had artillery and anti-aircraft missile brigades.

40-I army in its military composition was ready to repel, if necessary, external aggression against Afghanistan. Instead, she had to be drawn into hostilities with detachments and groups of internal armed opposition that used the principles of guerrilla warfare.

The very first months of the fighting showed that in the OKSV there is an excess of tanks, artillery, anti-tank weapons that are ineffective in mountain conditions. The amount of anti-aircraft missile weapons was unreasonably large (the enemy aviation he didn’t have, and the actions of Pakistani aviation on DRA facilities with violation of its borders were practically excluded). The missile divisions in the divisions were generally only a burden - they did not take part in the hostilities, however, they required additional significant protection.

At the same time, there was a lack of motorized rifle units and guard and service units in the army. Despite the fact that the troops of TurkVO were, in principle, intended for operations in the mountains, they did not have full-scale mountain (alpine) units and almost no mountain equipment (it was not possible to adjust the supply of troops with mountain equipment to the very end) .

The revealed discrepancies between the combat composition and the organizational structure of the troops, the nature of the tasks to be accomplished and the local conditions, the General Staff, the command of TurkVO and the 40 army had to be eliminated already in the course of the combat activity of the OXF. In the first half of 1980, extra units and subunits were withdrawn from Afghanistan — a tank regiment, three missile battalions, three anti-tank battalions, army artillery and army anti-aircraft missile brigades (the withdrawal of these units was also used for propaganda purposes). In different years in Afghanistan, two motorized rifle regiments were reorganized into separate motorized rifle brigades, and the tank regiment of the 108 th motorized rifle division into a motorized rifle division. To fight the insurgent caravans on the territory of the USSR, seven special purpose battalions were formed and brought into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (another one was formed on the spot). For the protection of airfields and the most important objects in the army were introduced ten battalions of protection.

The experience of using OXV in Afghanistan has shown that it is necessary to abandon unified formations and units, to strengthen the elements of specialization in training personnel for operations on certain theaters (European, desert, mountain, mountain-wooded), as well as in organizing, arming and equipping formations and parts.

In Afghanistan, Soviet troops had to solve a variety of tasks, much of which was alien to them. These included, for example, the long-term protection of communications and various objects by posting permanent guard posts, posting transport convoys with military and national cargoes through the territory controlled by the enemy, inspecting caravans to identify those that were transported weapon and ammunition.

These tasks to commanders of all degrees - from the army commander to the platoon commander - were previously unfamiliar, since the process of training officers and subunits did not provide for the Soviet army to perform such functions. There were no recommendations, charters and manuals on these issues. The commanders had to develop appropriate tactics directly in the course of combat activities.

The practice of fighting OCB against detachments and groups of irreconcilable opposition showed that the main tactical unit deciding the fate of the battle was the battalion. Even in large-scale operations in which a significant number of troops took part, the battalions, as a rule, had areas of responsibility and acted in them independently, albeit within a single plan. The role of the battalion commander in Afghanistan was very significant. He had to be able to properly use all the forces and means at his disposal, including artillery, as well as aviation, which he had the right to call to support his battalion. The success of the battle and the operation, the lives of people and the safety of military equipment depended on the preparedness of the battalion commander.

The Soviet troops used the entire arsenal of tactics recommended by our statutes and instructions. Other techniques dictated by local conditions and the nature of hostilities also appeared and were widely used, for example, blocking any objects or zones by Soviet units and their subsequent combing by Afghan units, fighting to destroy the enemy in mountain caves and underground irrigation systems (karezes). The tactics of ambush actions against enemy caravans with weapons and ammunition were further developed: ambushes were planned in regiments and divisions and they immediately blocked the maximum possible number of routes in the corresponding zone.

In the mountains of Afghanistan, military equipment could not be used everywhere. In this connection, such elements of the battle formations of subunits, such as armored groups, appeared and were widely used, not provided for by our charters and manuals. They consisted of military equipment units, as well as tanks and artillery assigned to them (except for portable mortars), brought together under a single command. Operating in areas accessible to technology, armored groups supported their units with fire.

Often, they also performed independent tasks, for example, they used to complete the blocking of enemy objects in certain sections of the environmental ring, protected artillery positions, command posts, logistics points, etc.

The USSR had the opportunity to use Afghanistan as a kind of testing ground to test new positions of tactics, methods of conducting operations and combat in mountain-desert terrain, modern samples of combat and technical means of warfare, including advanced weapons and military equipment and methods of their use. However, the experience of the combat activities of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was summarized and used only in parts of the 40 Army and did not find its use in combat regulations and manuals for combat training of troops in peacetime.

The combat activity of the Soviet and Afghan troops was carried out on the basis of monthly plans, which were developed by the chief military adviser in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the command of TurkVO and the 40 Army and were approved by the USSR Defense Minister. This planning procedure was established by Minister of Defense Ustinov in 1980 and remained unchanged until the very end, which was hardly advisable.

Due to the fact that Soviet units and units performed several tasks at the same time, each of which required continuous leadership, the combat operations were carried out not by state bodies, but by specially created permanently operating control groups (the so-called task forces) led by the commander. They were engaged in the specific planning of each operation, prepared the troops allocated for it, and managed them in the course of the hostilities.

Groups were small in composition. Their positive side is high mobility, the disadvantage is the inability to deploy other control points (control panel, TPU) apart from the command one. True, in the conditions of Afghanistan this was not particularly necessary.

The combat operations of the reinforced battalion, separated from the regiment for any operation, were usually led by the regimental command and control group, and not by the battalion commander themselves, which naturally did not contribute to increasing his responsibility. As a rule, the battalion commanders completely independently led the military operations only during large-scale operations, when they received a certain area of ​​responsibility.

The fighting in Afghanistan, especially in the early years, revealed serious shortcomings in the combat training of personnel. Single training of soldiers and sergeants did not fully meet the requirements of the battle. This was explained both by the imperfection of training programs, the saving of material resources (ammunition, equipment’s motor resources, fuel) and the massive marginalization of trainees for various economic and construction work.

Better trained were sergeants and soldiers of the airborne units, special forces, and reconnaissance units of motorized rifle formations and units.

Revealed deficiencies in the training of officers. Most of them were weak in possession of the weapons of their unit, many did not know how to engage in combat training and education of personnel, could not properly organize the battle and its full support.

In the work of commanders and staffs, there was often a desire to use classical forms and methods of combat operations in combat without taking into account the theater of operations and enemy tactics, which did not bring noticeable results.

There were deficiencies in the organization of interaction and all types of support in the specific conditions of Afghanistan.

Some lessons

The fighting in the DRA showed that in this mountain theater it is too early to give up some types of weapons, considering them to be outdated. This applies, in particular, to tanks with rifled guns, 82-mm mortars, large-caliber DShK machine guns, sniper rifles.

In the conditions of Afghanistan, tanks were mainly used in the uncharacteristic role of direct infantry escort guns. However, the smooth-bore guns of modern tanks could not always effectively hit point targets (the calculation of the DShK machine gun, the entrance to the cave, a small trench) in the unstable weather conditions of the mountains. The best results of firing at such targets were given rifled guns, the shells of which were on the trajectory less exposed to the wind.

The combined-arms units of the OCSV conducted most of the fighting in the mountains in dismounted combat formations. They could not rely on fire support of their own armored groups or howitzer artillery, and this was not always advisable (especially when meeting with single point or small targets). Combat practice proved the need to have heavy infantry weapons directly in dismounted combat systems — large-caliber machine guns, portable mortars, disposable “Fly” type grenade launchers (preferably with a high-explosive or fragmentation grenade).

We have in vain refused in due time from regular snipers, from personal selection of the best shooters and their targeted training. The experience of Afghanistan shows that in many cases, even in the conditions of saturation of subunits with heavy weapons and equipment, single precise fire of small arms continues to play a large role.

The choice of firing positions during the fighting in the mountains for towed artillery presented a serious problem, especially when it was necessary to deploy it on the move for immediate support of the combined-arms units. The best solution is to saturate artillery units and units intended for operations in the mountains with self-propelled installations that can fire from almost any place, even while in columns at reduced distances on a mountain road or trail.

Remembering the hardships experienced by the Soviet soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers in the mountains of Afghanistan, involuntarily become envious of the American troops who took part in the hostilities in the Persian Gulf and in the same Afghanistan. They are equipped with not only powerful modern weapons, a variety of guided munitions, radio-electronic means, but also many details that facilitate the life of soldiers in the mountains and deserts. It is not yet clear that we should learn the relevant lessons from our Afghan experience or the experience of the hostilities of multinational forces.

Due to the difficult natural and geographical conditions, the extremely weak operational equipment of the territory of Afghanistan, the revealed specifics of conducting combat operations against the “fleeing enemy”, the preliminary periods of stay of Soviet troops in the country and the size of the group were repeatedly revised by the leadership of the USSR.

Without front line

During the highest voltage fighting (1983 – 1985), the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan increased and by the 1985 year reached its maximum number - 109 500 people.

Thus, the main grouping of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was deployed in the 1985 year, which made it possible to more effectively carry out large-scale joint military operations, at the same time address issues of protecting important objects from enemy guerrilla actions, and sharply reduce personnel losses.

The war in Afghanistan became a local anti-guerrilla war for the Soviet army, during which hostilities were fought throughout the country without a particular front line, mainly along roads, gorges, in areas of military and air bases, settlements, in areas with underdeveloped communication routes and stationary communications, which hampered the management of troops.

Distinctive features of offensive actions were high aeromobility, the allocation of significant support forces and the desire for a clear interaction. The main way of conducting combat operations was to reveal the concentration points of the rebels, surround them (block them) or suppress them with aviation and artillery with the help of operational reconnaissance groups or other types of intelligence. If the conditions of the situation did not allow to complete the encirclement, then on the escape routes of the gangs they intercepted helicopter assault forces and pursued and destroyed all kinds of weapons. During operations in the green zone and populated areas, assault groups reinforced with mortars were widely used. Without fire support of aviation and artillery, infantry units did not advance and did not engage in close combat, especially at night.

The fighting, as a rule, was carried out in the daytime and most actively in the summer. Several thousand people took part in major operations. The depth of the operation (combat) ranged from 10 to 200 kilometers. After the operation (battle) was completed, the troops returned to the points of permanent deployment.

In defense, the Soviet troops also used a large number of forces and equipment. The basis of the defense was the strong points with a developed system of engineering barriers, surveillance and combat escort using technical means. The fire connection between these points in most cases was absent.

Aviation infantry support has been the subject of constant study and improvement. The number of aviation sorties was directly dependent on the intensity of the hostilities.

The attack of the infantry was preceded by fire treatment of the positions of the rebels, therefore, in addition to aviation, other fire weapons were used - mortars, recoilless guns that struck before and after the direct support aviation attack. This is how the continuity of the fire effect was achieved.

The mobility and maneuverability of helicopters, a variety of weapons and the possibility of direct communication with the commander of a supported unit made aviation support an extremely effective means of combat. Tactical and front-line aviation is more acceptable for attacking enemy stationary targets. The helicopter is able to pursue and fight against maneuverable forces and equipment.

Artillery in the fighting in Afghanistan has been widely used. It was used as one of the most important means of fire support for connections and parts.

One of the most typical tactical tasks performed by artillery is to provide direct support to subunits in order to defeat objects and targets not only in the depth of the insurgents, but also in close proximity to their battle formations. At the same time, there was a desire to establish solid and continuous interaction between motorized rifle and artillery units. To ensure the autonomy of the units operating in divided areas, artillery batteries and divisions were attached to the period of hostilities to motorized rifle units.

Given the nature and characteristics of the counter-guerrilla struggle, the Soviet command paid primary attention to intelligence and used considerable forces and means to conduct it.

Ground tactical intelligence was conducted constantly. In the zones of responsibility of formations and units, reconnaissance was carried out by patrols, patrols, reconnaissance groups, and agent and aviation reconnaissance were widely used.

Technical means that were installed on the routes of movement and in possible areas of concentration of the rebels were very widely used to gather information. These devices - sensors and instruments - received information and periodically transmitted it to receiving stations, which were located, as a rule, at the command post of artillery units, which shortened the time from detection to the opening fire command.

The most characteristic in the use of Soviet troops in a local conflict were the following points.

In the war in Afghanistan, the Soviet military leadership for the first time in practice encountered the use of troops and their comprehensive support in a specific theater of military operations — in conditions of a civil war on foreign territory.

As a result of the experience gained and taking into account the nature of the local conditions that prevented the use of armored and heavy artillery equipment on a large scale, the Soviet military leadership constantly improved the organizational structure of the formations and units, primarily with the goal of creating autonomy for actions in a separate direction.

Their firepower was also increased by artillery and aircraft. In the course of the hostilities, the motorized rifle subunits were highly dependent on the means of support, primarily from aviation. Most often, the Soviet troops acted on isolated lines in the absence of a clearly defined line of military contact. This caused difficulties in the designation of the front line and its battle formations, and in some cases led to erroneous strikes on its troops.

Since the fighting was conducted mainly by small units, the responsibility of the combined-arms commanders for their planning and implementation increased, the role of junior officers and sergeants increased, strict demands were made on the organization of interaction, control and comprehensive support for the actions of the troops.

At the same time, a relatively frequent change of personnel led to a general rejuvenation of the commanding personnel, which made special demands on their training before being sent to the combat areas.

During the fighting, tested various military equipment and weapons, which was equipped with 40-I army. It is possible, in particular, to note the effectiveness of the use of hand-held flame throwers, helicopters, and various radio equipment. Developed new forms and methods of warfare. The experience gained in combat still needs to be studied, analyzed and rationalized for him in combat training, as well as in the peacekeeping activities of the Russian army.
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  1. platitsyn70
    platitsyn70 13 March 2014 14: 57
    During the fighting, tested various military equipment and weapons, which was equipped with 40-I army. It is possible, in particular, to note the effectiveness of the use of hand-held flame throwers, helicopters, and various radio equipment. Developed new forms and methods of warfare. The experience gained in combat still needs to be studied, analyzed and rationalized for him in combat training, as well as in the peacekeeping activities of the Russian army.
    School is school, whatever it is
    1. CALL.
      CALL. 13 March 2014 15: 34
      Afghan war. Who needed it?
      The United States deliberately provoked the USSR to send troops into Afghanistan. Confessions of Z. Brzezinski 25.12.2009/XNUMX/XNUMX

      "Yes, the CIA appeared in Afghanistan before the Russians ..." (Le Nouvel Observateur, France)
      Confessions of a former adviser to US President Carter. Vincent Jauvert
      National Security Assistant to President Jimmy Carter Zbigniew Brzezinski
      Nouvelle Observatory: Former CIA Director Robert Gates writes in his memoirs that American intelligence services began helping the mujahideen in Afghanistan six months before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. At the time, you were US President Carter's national security adviser, and you were in the know. Do you support Gates' words?
      Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version, the CIA began supporting the Mujahideen in 1980, that is, after the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But in reality (this was kept secret until today), everything was different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on providing secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979. And on the same day I wrote him a memorandum explaining that in my opinion this help would entail military intervention by the Soviets.
      - Despite this risk, you were a supporter of this secret operation. But maybe you wanted the Soviets of this war and were looking for ways to provoke it?
      - Not certainly in that way. We did not force the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they did.
      - When the Soviets justified their actions, saying that they intend to fight against US secret intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan, no one believed them. However, the truth was in their words ... Do you regret anything today?
      - Regret about what? That covert operation was a brilliant idea. She let them lure the Russians into an Afghan trap, and you want me to be sorry? When the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: "Now we have the opportunity to secure the USSR for its own Vietnam War." In fact, Moscow had to wage an unbearable war for almost ten years, a conflict that led to demoralization and eventually the collapse of the Soviet empire.
      - Do you regret that you promoted Islamic fundamentalism, armed and advised future terrorists?
      - What is more important for world history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? A few excited Islamists or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
      - "A little horny"? But it has been repeatedly said: Islamic fundamentalism today poses a global threat ...
      - Nonsense! It would be necessary, as they say, for the West to have a common policy towards Islamism. This is stupid: there is no global Islamism. Let's look at Islam rationally and without demagoguery or emotions. It is a world religion with 1,5 billion adherents. But what is common between fundamentalist pro-Western Saudi Arabia, moderate Morocco, militaristic Pakistan, Egypt, or secular Central Asia? Nothing more than what unites Christian countries.
      Original publication: "Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ..."
      Source - InoSMI
    2. Max_Bauder
      Max_Bauder 13 March 2014 15: 39
      As I understand it, from the above we can draw the following conclusion:

      1) In local conflicts, there is no broad front, or even one, there are no clearly defined borders; in battle, a district, quarter, house, cave, ravine, etc. can move from one side to another, which means there is a need for a good means of communication between soldiers and commanders, officers who can report hourly or minutely and situations to respond in a timely manner, for example, to fire artillery or air support with turntables.

      2) there is no need to introduce a large number of army, soldiers, equipment, make them a part that needs to be protected, provide them with supplies, food, ammunition. It is enough to throw a small group of troops for any operation, and then leave. The enemy will not know who to attack, where. Arrived, flew away. And if you protect the place, then supply all types of small arms, thermal imagers, heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, furnish mines, etc. with communication support for air cover.

      3) Focus on just a small number of people, in order to reduce the senseless loss for the first time, to provide quality and not quantity, because there will be professionals, well, to give them all kinds of support during the operation.

      4) the most important thing is that orders are given clear, unambiguous, logical, and moreover delivered quickly, information is exchanged quickly. to respond in a timely manner. then there will be fewer errors. =)
      1. asar
        asar 13 March 2014 18: 04
        we have such special groups, I assure you! i.e., do everything quietly and unnoticed! another thing - without an order, not one saboteur will not go to the "business"!
  2. Boris55
    Boris55 13 March 2014 14: 59
    The hunchback did not need this experience ... sad
  3. Good cat
    Good cat 13 March 2014 15: 00
    From the article I did not understand, they coped with the tasks or not, where are the conclusions? Although short.
    1. Sibiriya
      Sibiriya 13 March 2014 15: 07
      Managed do not hesitate
      1. from punk
        from punk 13 March 2014 15: 11
        Quote: Siberia
        Managed do not hesitate

        America would have dealt with exactly without getting stuck. One is fighting with the majahideen and the Taliban is another
    2. asar
      asar 13 March 2014 18: 43
      conclusions? and this is a separate conversation, maybe unpleasant, but nevertheless! we will judge the reasons for the introduction of troops into Afghanistan later (although - why should we delay!)! talk about something else! you are absolutely right about the unpreparedness of our units for war in a mountainous country! how many fighters just fell and literally died (no deception, guys!) from the load and height! what does it mean to drag yourself at a height of one and a half to two kilometers, or even higher, yourself, ammunition, grub, and so on ... whoever went - he knows! Why the mountain special forces were liquidated in the USSR? who just specialized in similar tasks? recruited guys who already knew what an ice ax, "cats", and could distinguish a "carrot" from a moraine! but! it is what it is! and our guys perished in Afghanistan (they did not know how to pass the glacier, when an avalanche, rockfall, etc. could come down ...), then there was Tajikistan, Karabakh and off we go! In the end, all THIS should have taught something! no shit !!! Chechnya! a few guys have lost there ?! and because of what? again for the same reason: there were no mountain training centers! I had to kill so many guys to come to the conclusion that -YES! WE ABSOLUTELY NEED A MINING TRAINING CENTER! through which, judging by the news feeds, almost all fighters now pass, at least the special forces groups. the army should be engaged in tasks peculiar only to it! do not wash the floors, do not paint or mow the lawns before arrival ... etc., only combat training! that's why she lives! there may be too much snot in the commentary, well, don't blame me - it HAS INCLUDED!
  4. Siberian19
    Siberian19 13 March 2014 15: 02
    I believe that the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was erroneous and served as one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR! The United States spent $ 2 million a day on sponsoring Majahideen, without this support there would have been a completely different picture! By the way on the Maidan, it seems the same figure stood out, one gang works!
    1. Good cat
      Good cat 13 March 2014 15: 16
      By the way, Gorbachev was withdrawing troops at the time, and because of the high cost of maintaining the same. I don’t know what about geopolitics, but he greatly increased his popularity with this step. Not really wanted simple conscripts to serve there. I know very well since he himself was called up in 1988.
    2. Kyrgyz
      Kyrgyz 13 March 2014 19: 18
      Quote: Siberian19
      The United States spent $ 2 million a day on sponsoring Majahideen, without this support there would have been a completely different picture!

      The USSR spent no less, went bankrupt earlier.
    3. asar
      asar 13 March 2014 19: 52
      and zinc in the USSR because of the river - was that also justified? how the "stingers" appeared - the losses increased significantly! so, thank God, they took it out! We saved the guys!
  5. pts-m
    pts-m 13 March 2014 15: 03
    The article is correct. As it has always been concluded that practice on the spot is more quickly assimilated. Than in the classroom. Americans have adopted this principle since the founding of the states. Only in Russia "until the thunder strikes a man crosses himself."
    1. asar
      asar 13 March 2014 19: 33
      that's for sure! already wrote about it! and what did the Americans take ?! judging by the Afghan, then our troops controlled a territory much larger than the Americans and those who came with them! like night - so bases, both amers and others, are locked, literally !!! there are, of course, rare attacks, but very rare! or does Yugoslavia mean when Western special forces installed radio beacons for missile attacks? so, the Americans are not very ready for fighting in the mountainous, and not only terrain! special forces groups - of course! but they have their own specific tasks.
  6. rugor
    rugor 13 March 2014 15: 08
    It was not ours, it was a war.
    1. Beck
      Beck 13 March 2014 18: 03
      Quote: rugor
      It was not ours, it was a war.


      There were no geopolitical interests in the northeast of the Iranian Highland for the USSR, as for country.

      There was no need to drag tribes professing a medieval way of life into communism through socialism through collar.

      There was no threat from Afghanistan in the territorial integrity of the USSR.

      There was only a vicious idea of ​​the Kremlin about the ideological growth of the camp of socialism by any territories and any tribes. Whether it's at least arctic glaciers or hot deserts. Whether it's even Papuans from the coconut islands or even Banderlog in the jungle. And for this "international" idea of ​​its own, the Kremlin was ready to lay down and lay down thousands of souls of our compatriots.

      FOR WHAT???

      By and large, the West did not care about this Afghanistan, those years. If the USSR hadn’t entered the troops, the West would not have climbed into that region. Who needs to have x ... with a screw if there is no tricky f ... s or a fig cunning w ... and if there is no x ... with a screw.
      1. Ingvar 72
        Ingvar 72 13 March 2014 18: 52
        Quote: Beck
        . If the USSR hadn’t entered the troops, the West would not have climbed into that region.

        Do not say the region is interesting. No wonder there pendosy sit longer than us. And if we had not climbed into Afghanistan at that time, they would have done it. It is unlikely that the troops of course, but the advisers and the pro-American government would be accurate. Errors in supporting the Papuans, as you put it, were, I do not argue, but not there. hi
        1. max702
          max702 14 March 2014 13: 41
          We’re sitting there right now because they swelled a lot of money into this region, creating a constant threat there to their main enemy, that is, RUSSIA, but when the USSR got there it’s hard to say or decide otherwise ..
      2. Fiero
        Fiero 13 March 2014 20: 30
        Why isn’t ours? Can all of these be already not yours?
        Do you want to remind you how many drugs die from Afghanistan in Russia per year?
        For the whole company died two times less than now lost a year.
        And on account of the zapada, they never got out of there. Have you heard about the "Big Game"?
        1. Beck
          Beck 13 March 2014 23: 26
          Quote: Fiero
          Why isn’t ours? Can all of these be already not yours?

          NOT OUR.

          What did Vasya from Smolensk, Bekzat from Almaty, and Petro from Donetsk lose in Afghanistan? What is there to lose if you did not go there?

          And what do you share (your) common tragedy.

          Quote: Fiero
          Do you want to remind you how many drugs die from Afghanistan in Russia per year?

          This question is not for Afghanistan, well, not directly. This is a question for us. Yes, plant Afghanistan with poppy seeds forty times forty times, but if the border services, customs, and special services worked NORMALLY on our borders (so as not to divide yours and ours into Russian) then no heroin would go to Kazakhstan and Russia. Afghans would look for other ways of marketing to other countries.

          Quote: Fiero
          And on account of the zapada, they never got out of there. Have you heard about the "Big Game"?

          Tell terrible tales to others. And learn the materiel. Afghanistan is the only country in the Middle East that has never been someone’s colony and there have never been foreign troops there before the Soviet troops entered there.
    2. Sma11
      Sma11 13 March 2014 18: 14
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    3. asar
      asar 13 March 2014 19: 37
      the war will never be ours, except for the liberation! and to those who laid their heads there - ETERNAL MEMORY! AND THE EARTH THEM IN THE FLOW!
  7. mabuta
    mabuta 13 March 2014 15: 19
    The experience of the Afghan war is still being analyzed, and at the moment we are seeing the products of this analysis. For example, the Russian Armed Forces appeared light combat helicopters KA-52, MI-28, the armament of special forces units was strengthened, sniper teams appeared in rifle units, etc. . And by and large, thanks to the feat of soldiers and officers, the onset of drugs and terrorism on our land was delayed. Http://
    1. Sibiriya
      Sibiriya 13 March 2014 15: 26
      Just like this rubbish left and flooded
    2. Dangerous
      Dangerous 13 March 2014 15: 27
      I always thought that the Mi-28 and KA-52 are combat attack helicopters, they are not light at all
    3. The comment was deleted.
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  9. Moga
    Moga 13 March 2014 15: 31
    For me, Afghan is Victor Dubynin. Army General and just a great man! Rest in peace!
  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. konvalval
    konvalval 13 March 2014 15: 47
    Hunchback also gained popularity in the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, not only in the USSR, but in NATO. Cattle.
  12. 4952915
    4952915 13 March 2014 18: 27
    Colleagues! The other day, my brother found on the left-wing websites something like this: "From the 1960s to the 1980s, Soviet special forces conquered 43 countries, and it is not the special forces' fault that Moscow did not take advantage of this. (C) And it became so sad, maybe someone from the knowledgeable will comment ? I mean, well, there are specialists, who knows?
  13. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 13 March 2014 18: 38
    By the time troops were sent to Afghanistan, the USSR had already lost the ability to learn. His command structures were crammed with people who were not capable of not only learning, but also solving their usual problems. Alas, the principle of Peter was rampant in all, no action was taken to overcome the entropy accumulated in the structure of power and management, because senior management was no longer even able to notice the problem, not to set tasks for its solution.
    There are ways to overcome such problems (which are quite common for different countries, but in the USSR which took an exaggerated form thanks to attempts to plan everything "according to the ideas of socialism"), but they must be applied! And this was not done. It is sad that people were wounded and killed, but no conclusions were drawn. Thousands of people returned from across the river with a clear understanding - fools threw them to the slaughter. One of the reasons why the USSR needed to be destroyed.
    1. 4952915
      4952915 13 March 2014 18: 52
      Well, reasoning like that is also decadence and all-inclusiveness. Himself in 1988, when drafted, wrote a report to Afghanistan. The climb was huge. Gorbachev's betrayal is not a topic at all.
    2. Kyrgyz
      Kyrgyz 13 March 2014 19: 17
      Quote: Mikhail3
      Thousands of people returned with a clear awareness from the river - fools threw them to slaughter. One of the reasons why the USSR had to be destroyed.

      Those who returned from the river can hardly be tied to the destruction of the USSR. Considering the duration of the war, the results are like a complete occupation of the country, and reducing the resistance to local partisan centers, the USSR military could not be blamed for anything, there were mistakes, but in general, the level of losses with the then protection capabilities of the personnel could not be called a sending to the slaughter, the Afghan military operation point of view draws on 4+ on a 5-point scale. Well, the fact that their victory was not needed, I'm sorry, the question is not for the army, the army there is impeccable, it is not its task to build an economy and maintain a way of life. Afghanistan is one of the victories of the Soviet Army, although a defeat for the CPSU.
  14. gunter_laux
    gunter_laux 13 March 2014 20: 37
    A very good article, with a good overview of the tactics of the ground forces. It’s a pity, the author forgot about the BTA, and we fed, transported, supplied, armed and watered laughing well with all sorts of drinks laughing Greetings from Bagram and Kabul !!!