The development of the domestic weapons system is impossible without a theoretical base, the formation of which in turn is impossible without highly qualified specialists and the knowledge generated by them. Today, ballistics pushed into the background. But without the effective use of this science it is difficult to expect success in the field of design and engineering activities related to the creation of weapons and military equipment.
Artillery (then rocket and artillery) armament was the most important component of Russia's military might at all stages of its existence. Ballistics, one of the main military-technical disciplines, was aimed at solving theoretical problems arising in the development of rocket and artillery weapons (RAV). Its development has always been in the zone of special attention of military scientists.
The results of the Great Patriotic War, it would seem, irrefutably confirmed that Soviet artillery is the best in the world, far ahead of the development of scientists and designers of almost all other countries. But already in July, on the personal instructions of Stalin, the Academy of Ministers of the USSR established the Academy of Artillery Sciences (AAN) as a center for the further development of artillery and especially new artillery equipment, capable of providing a strictly scientific approach to solving all the already urgent and newly emerging issues.
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 50-s, the closest circle convinced Nikita Khrushchev, who at the time headed the country, that artillery was a cave technique, which it was time to give up in favor of rocket weapons. A number of artillery design bureaus were closed (for example, OKB-172, OKB-43, etc.) and repurposed others (Arsenal, Barricades, TsKB-34, etc.).
The greatest damage was caused to the Central Scientific Research Institute of Artillery Armament (TsNII-58), located next to the Korolev Design Bureau in the Moscow Region, Podlipkah. Headed by the Central Research Institute-1, chief artillery designer Vasily Grabin. Of the 58 thousands of field guns that participated in the battles of the Second World War, more than 140 thousands are made on the basis of its designs. The famous divisional gun Grabina ZIS-120 was evaluated by the world's highest authorities as a masterpiece of design ideas.
There were several scientific schools of ballistics in the country at that time: Moscow (based on the Central Research Institute-58, Scientific Research Institute-3, VA named for E. Dzerzhinsky, Moscow State Technical University named after N. Bauman), Leningrad (on the basis of the Mikhailovsky Art Academy, Design Bureau Arsenal ”, Naval Academy of Shipbuilding and Armament named after A. N. Krylov, partly“ Voenmekh ”), Tula, Tomsk, Izhevsk, Penza. Line Khrushchev on the "rocketization" of weapons caused all of them irreparable damage, leading to virtually complete collapse and eliminate them.
The collapse of the scientific schools of the ballistic system of the barrel systems took place against the background of a shortage and interest in the speedy preparation of the ballistics of the rocket-space profile. As a result, many of the most famous and talented artillery ballisticists quickly retrained and were in demand by the emerging industry.
Today the situation is fundamentally different. The lack of demand for high-level professionals is observed in the context of a significant shortage of these professionals with an extremely limited list of existing ballistic scientific schools in Russia. To count organizations that still have such schools, or at least their pathetic fragments, the fingers of one hand are enough. The number of doctoral dissertations defended in ballistics over the past ten years is calculated in units.
What is ballistics
Despite the significant differences in modern sections of ballistics from the point of view of their content, besides the internal, common at the time, including the processes of studying the operation and calculation of solid-propellant ballistic missile engines (BR), most of them are united by the fact that the object of study is body movement in various environments, not limited to mechanical connections.
If we leave aside sections of internal and experimental ballistics that are of independent importance, then the list of issues that make up the modern content of this science allows us to distinguish two major areas in it, the first of which is usually called project ballistics, the second is the ballistic support of firing (or otherwise ).
Project ballistics (ballistic design - PB) is the theoretical basis of the initial design phase of shells, rockets, aircraft and spacecraft for various purposes. Ballistic support (BO) of firing is the basic section of the theory of shooting and is essentially one of the most important elements of this related military science.
Thus, modern ballistics is an interdisciplinary in focus and interdisciplinary in its content applied science, without the knowledge and effective application of which it is difficult to expect success in the field of design and engineering activities related to the development of weapons and military equipment.
Creation of promising complexes
In recent years, more and more attention has been paid to the development of both guided and corrected projectiles (UAS and UAN) with laser semi-active GOS, and projectiles using autonomous homing systems. Naturally, the main problems related to the creation of this type of ammunition are the problems of instrumentation equipment, however, many of the BO issues, in particular the choice of trajectories guaranteeing a reduction in missile-throwing errors into the zone of “selectable” miss when firing at extreme ranges, remain open.
We note, however, that UAS and UAN with self-aiming combat elements (SPBE), no matter how perfect they are, are not able to solve all the tasks assigned to the artillery to defeat the enemy. Different firing tasks can and should be solved with a different ratio of high-precision and unguided ammunition. As a result, for highly accurate and reliable destruction of the entire possible range of targets, conventional, cluster, special (target reconnaissance, lighting, EW, etc.) ballistic projectiles with multifunctional and remote firing devices, as well as controlled and corrected projectiles of various types .
All this, of course, is impossible without solving the appropriate BW tasks, primarily developing algorithms for automated input of initial firing and guidance systems, simultaneous control of all projectiles in a volley of artillery batteries, creating universal algorithmic and software for solving problems of hitting targets, and ballistic the provision must meet the conditions of information compatibility with the means of controlling combat operations and reconnaissance assets of any God level. Another important condition is the requirement to implement the appropriate algorithms (including the evaluation of the primary measurement information) in real time.
A rather promising direction of creating new-generation artillery complexes with regard to limited financial capabilities should be considered to increase firing accuracy by adjusting firing settings and firing device response time for unguided ammunition or trajectory correction using executive bodies of an onboard projectile correction system for controlled ammunition.
As is known, the development of the theory and practice of shooting, the improvement of means of warfare leads to the requirement of periodic processing and publication of new rules of fire (FB) and fire control (PF) artillery. As evidenced by the practice of developing modern PS, the level of the existing firing BO is not a limiting factor for improving the PS even given the need to introduce sections on the characteristics of shooting and fire control when performing fire missions with high-precision munitions, reflecting the experience of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus and in the course of fighting in hot spots.
This can be confirmed by the development of BO of various types of active protection systems (SAZ) ranging from the simplest SAZ armored vehicles to SAZ mine launchers of the SRBD.
Development of modern types of high-precision weapons, such as tactical missiles, small-sized aviation, sea and other missile systems cannot be implemented without further development and improvement of the algorithmic support of strapdown inertial navigation systems (SINS) integrated with the satellite navigation system.
The initial prerequisites for the practical implementation of the relevant algorithms were brilliantly confirmed when creating the Iskander-M OTR, as well as during the experimental launches of the RS Tornado-S.
The widespread use of satellite navigation equipment does not exclude the need for the use of optical-electronic correlation-extreme navigation systems (CENS), and not only on OTR, but also on strategic cruise missiles and combat subunits of conventional (non-nuclear) equipment.
Significant disadvantages of CENS, associated with a significant complication of the preparation of flight missions (PZ) for them in comparison with satellite navigation systems, are more than compensated for their advantages such as autonomy and noise immunity.
Among the problematic issues, although only indirectly related to CBS applications, is the need to create special information support in the form of images (orthophotoplans) of the terrain (and the corresponding data banks) that satisfy the rocket’s climatic seasonality, as well as fundamental difficulties associated with the need to determine the absolute coordinates of protected and disguised targets with a marginal error not exceeding 10 meters.
Another problem that is directly related to ballistic tasks is the development of algorithmic support for the formation (calculation) of the PZ and the issuance of coordinate target designation data for the entire range of missiles (including aeroballistic layout) with bringing the results of the calculations to conjugation objects. In this case, the key document for the preparation of the PZ and standards is the seasonal matrix of planned images of the area of a given radius relative to the target, the difficulties of obtaining which have already been noted above. The preparation of the RoW for unplanned targets detected during the combat use of the RoK can be carried out according to aerial reconnaissance data only if there are geolocated satellite images of the target area corresponding to the season in the database.
The provision of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches largely depends on the nature of their home base — either land-based or aboard a carrier-type aircraft or sea (submarine) carrier.
If the ground-based ICBM BO can be considered generally acceptable, at least from the point of view of achieving the required accuracy of delivery to the payload target, then the problems of high-precision launches of submarines (submarines) remain significant.
Among those requiring priority resolution of ballistic problems, we indicate the following:
incorrect use of the WGS model of the gravitational field of the Earth (GPP) for the ballistic support of launches of the submarine launch pad during an underwater launch;
the need to determine the initial conditions of the launch of the rocket, taking into account the actual speed of the submarine at the time of launch;
the requirement to calculate the PZ only after receiving a command to launch a rocket;
taking into account the initial disturbances of the start on the dynamics of the initial segment of the flight of the BR;
the problem of a highly accurate exhibition of inertial guidance systems (SRI) on a mobile basis and the use of optimal filtering methods;
creation of effective algorithms for the correction of ISN on the active part of the trajectory along external reference points.
It can be considered that in fact only the last of the indicated problems received the necessary and sufficient solution.
The final of the issues discussed relates to the problems of developing a rational image of a promising group of space assets and synthesizing its structure for information support of the use of high-precision weapons.
The appearance and composition of the perspective grouping of space weapons should be determined by the needs of information support of the types and kinds of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Regarding the assessment of the level of BW of the tasks of the BP stage, we limit ourselves to an analysis of the problems of improving the BP of launch vehicles of spacecraft (SC), strategic planning and ballistic design of unmanned near-space dual-use space vehicles.
The theoretical foundations of the PSU launcher, laid back in the middle of the 50s, that is, almost 60 years ago, paradoxically, have not lost their significance today and continue to be relevant in terms of their conceptual provisions.
The explanation for this, generally speaking, surprising phenomenon can be seen in the following:
the fundamental nature of the theoretical development of BP methods at the initial stage of development of the national astronautics;
a stable list of target tasks solved by a spacecraft launch vehicle that has not undergone (from the point of view of BP problems) fundamental changes over the past 50-year period;
there is a significant advance in the field of software and algorithmic support for solving boundary-value problems that form the basis of the BP KN spacecraft methods and their universalization.
With the advent of the task of quickly launching communication-type small satellites or satellites or satellite satellites of the Earth’s space monitoring systems into low-altitude or geosynchronous orbits, the fleet of existing launchers was insufficient.
The nomenclature of known types of classical PH of light and heavy classes turned out to be unacceptable from an economic point of view. For this reason, in recent decades (almost from the beginning of the 90-ies) numerous intermediate class RN projects have begun to appear, suggesting the possibility of their air launch to put the payload on a given orbit (such as MAKS Svityaz, CS Burlak, etc.) .
With regard to this type of RN, the problems of PD, although the number of studies devoted to their development, is already in the tens, continue to be far from exhausted.
We need new approaches and compromise solutions.
Separate discussion is deserved by the use in the order of conversion as a RV of spacecraft subject to elimination of heavy-class ICBMs and UR-100Н UTTH.
As is known, on the basis of the P-36M rocket, the Dnepr rocket was created. Equipped with an accelerating unit when launched from the silo from the Baikonur cosmodrome or directly from the positioning area of the Strategic Missile Forces, it is able to put a payload of about four tons into low orbits. The Rokot launch vehicle, which is based on the IBR-UR-100N UTTH and the Breeze upper stage, provides for the launch into two orbits of spacecraft weighing up to two tons.
The payload mass of the Start and Start-1 (based on the Topol ICBM) when launching satellites from the Plesetsk cosmodrome is only 300 kilograms. Finally, a PCM based on sea-based PKs of the RSM-25, PCM-50 and PCM-54 type are able to put into a near-earth orbit an apparatus weighing no more than one hundred kilograms.
It is obvious that the PH of the specified type is not able to solve any significant tasks of space exploration. Nevertheless, as an aid to the development of commercial satellites, micro and mini-satellites, they fill their niche. From the standpoint of assessing the contribution to solving BP problems, their creation was not of particular interest and was based on obvious and well-known developments of the 60 – 70-s level of the last century.
During the years of space exploration, periodically modernized BP methodologies have undergone significant evolutionary changes associated with the emergence of various types of tools and systems put into near-earth orbits. Particularly relevant is the development of power supply systems of various types of satellite systems (SS).
Almost today, the SSs play a decisive role in the formation of a single information space of the Russian Federation. These SS primarily include telecommunication and communication systems, navigation systems, remote sensing of the Earth (RSD), specialized SS operational control, management, coordination, etc.
If we talk about Earth remote sensing satellites, first of all, a satellite of optical-electronic and radar observation, then it should be noted that there is a significant design and operational gap on them from foreign developments. At the heart of their creation lay far from the most effective BP techniques.
As is known, the classical approach to building SS for the formation of a single information space is associated with the need to develop a significant fleet of highly specialized spacecraft and SS.
At the same time, in the conditions of rapid development of microelectronics and microtechnology technologies, and moreover, a transition to the creation of dual-purpose multiservice spacecraft is necessary. Operation of the corresponding spacecraft should be provided in near-earth orbits, within the limits of altitudes from 450 to 800 kilometers with inclination from 48 to 99 degrees. Space tools of this type must be adapted to a wide range of launch vehicles: RN Dnepr, Kosmos-3M, Rokot, Soyuz-1, and also to Soyuz-FG and Soyuz-2. implementation of the dual launch ka scheme.
To all this, in the near future there will be a need for a substantial tightening of the requirements for the accuracy of solving the problems of coordinate-temporal support of motion control of existing and future spacecraft of the types discussed.
In the presence of such contradictory, and partially mutually exclusive requirements, it becomes necessary to revise the existing BP methods in favor of creating fundamentally new approaches that allow finding compromise solutions.
Another direction that is not sufficiently provided by the existing BP methods is the creation of multi-satellite groups based on high-tech small (or even micro) satellites. Depending on the composition of the orbital grouping, such SSs are able to provide both regional and global territorial service, shorten the intervals between observations of a fixed surface area at given latitudes, and solve many other tasks that are currently considered at best as purely theoretical.
Where and what is taught ballistics
It seems that the presented results, even if of a very brief analysis, are quite sufficient to conclude: ballistics has by no means exhausted its capabilities, which continue to be very popular and extremely important from the point of view of the prospects for creating modern highly effective means of warfare.
As for the carriers of this science - ballistics specialists of all nomenclatures and ranks, their “population” in Russia today is endangered. The average age of Russian ballistics with more or less noticeable qualifications (at the level of candidates, not to mention doctors of science) has long exceeded the retirement one. In Russia, there is not a single civilian university in which the department of ballistics would remain. Up to the end, only the department of ballistics at the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, founded as early as 1941 in the year of general and active member of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.E. Slukhotsky, held out. But it also ceased to exist in 2008 as a result of the conversion to the issue of specialists in the field of space activities.
The only organization of higher professional education in Moscow that continues to prepare military ballistics is the Peter the Great Academy of Strategic Rocket Forces. But this is such a drop in the sea, which does not cover the needs of even the Ministry of Defense, and there is no reason to talk about the "defense". Do not make the weather and graduates of higher education institutions of St. Petersburg, Penza and Saratov.
It’s impossible not to say at least a few words about the basic state document regulating the training of ballistics in the country - the Federal State Educational Standard (GEF) of higher vocational education in the 161700 direction (for the qualification "Bachelor" approved by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation 22.12.2009 No. 779, for the qualification "Master" - 14.01.2010 No. 32).
It contains all kinds of competences - from participation in the commercialization of research results (this is for ballistics, then!) To the ability to prepare documentation on the quality management of the implementation of technical processes at production sites.
But in the discussed GEF it is impossible to find such competencies as the ability to compile firing tables and develop ballistic algorithms for calculating installations for firing artillery and rocket launches, calculate corrections, the main elements of the trajectory and the experimental dependence of the ballistic coefficient on the throw angle, and many more, from which ballistics started five centuries ago.
Finally, the authors of the standard have completely forgotten about the presence of an internal ballistics section. This branch of science existed for several centuries. The creators of the FSES for ballistics eliminated it with one stroke of the pen. A natural question arises: if, in their opinion, from now on, such “cave specialists” are no longer needed, and this is confirmed by a state-level document, who will consider the internal ballistics of the barrel systems, who will create solid-fuel engines for operational-tactical and intercontinental ballistic missiles?
The saddest thing is that the results of the activities of such "craftsmen from education" instantly, naturally, will not appear. So far we are still consuming the Soviet reserves and backlogs, both of a scientific and technical nature and in the field of human resources. Perhaps these stocks will be able to hold out for some time. But what will we do in a decade, when the corresponding defense personnel is guaranteed to disappear “as a class”? Who and how will bear the responsibility for this?
With all the unconditional and indisputable importance of the personnel of sites and shops of industrial enterprises, technological and design personnel of the scientific research institute and design bureau of the defense industrial complex, the revival of the defense industry must begin with the education and support of professional theorists who are able to generate ideas and predict the development of promising weapons for the long term. Otherwise, we will be prepared for a long time the role of catching up.