Military Review

Anti-tank weapons of the Soviet infantry during the war

64
Anti-tank weapons of the Soviet infantry during the war



Shortly before the war began, the prevailing opinion in the Soviet military leadership was that in the future war with Germany, our troops would have to deal with significant quantities fired tanks enemy, with a thickness of frontal armor up to 100 mm.
Was this a mistake or a consequence of misinformation, but as a result, the work on creating light anti-tank systems was curtailed, the production of the 45-mm anti-tank gun was discontinued, significant resources were spent on the creation of guns capable of fighting heavy tanks, which the Germans had before the 1943 year in significant quantities did not have.

The result of work on the creation of anti-tank artillery systems with high armor penetration was the adoption of 57-mm guns armament. The 1941 of the Year became known later as the ZIS-2 and 107-mm Divisional Guns of the Model 1940 of the Year (M-60).

The release of these gun systems soon after the start of the war was discontinued. ZIS-2 was re-launched into production in the 1943 year, and M-60 was no longer produced.

As a result, our infantry, in the absence of support in the form of anti-tank artillery, was left to itself when it met enemy tanks, which often led to heavy losses.

The 1935 and 1938 soviet "Manual on Small Cases" provided for the use of bundles of hand grenades of the 1914 / 30 and RGD-33. It was they who became the first and often the only anti-tank weapon of the Red Army.



For the manufacture of bundles of grenades obr. 1914 / 30 it was prescribed to use 5 equipped with hand grenades and mounted on a safety platoon. Grenades were tied with string or wire, while four of them turned out to be turned with their arms in one direction, and the fifth - in the middle, in the opposite direction. When throwing a bunch was taken by the handle of an average grenade, located in the middle, it served to undermine the other four, thereby fulfilling the role of a kind of detonator for the whole bunch.



When using RGD-33 grenades, two to four grenades were attached to an average grenade, from which fragmentation shirts were preliminarily removed and the handles were unscrewed. Bundles were recommended to throw from the shelter under the tank tracks.

In 1940, the RPK-40 anti-tank grenade, 1200 gr., Equipped with 760 gr. TNT, with a percussion fuse, created by MI Bubble. However, its production began only with the start of hostilities.


RPG-40


The RPG-40 had a cylindrical thin-walled body, was able to pierce armor with a thickness of up to 20 mm. An inertial instantaneous ignition fuse with a percussion mechanism and a safety check was placed in the handle.

Before the throw, a detonator was inserted into the axial channel of the hull - modeled on the RGD-33 manual fragmentation grenade - through a hole in the lid. On the body was placed instructions for the use of grenades. According to the “armor-piercing” action of the grenade, it soon ceased to meet the requirements of the VET — with an explosion on the surface of armor thicker than 20 mm, it formed only a dent.

In this regard, M.I. Bubble in 1941 year created a more powerful RPG-41 grenade.



The explosive charge was increased to 1400 gr., Which increased the armor penetration by 5 mm. However, the growth of the mass of the grenade led to a decrease in the range of its throw.

High-explosive anti-tank grenades, as well as bunches of grenades, presented a great danger to those who used them. Their relative safe use was possible only from a trench or other shelter. All this, as well as low armor penetration, led to the development of cumulative anti-tank grenades.

In the middle of 1943, a fundamentally new grenade of cumulative action RPG-43, developed by N.P. Belyakov. It was the first cumulative hand grenade developed in the USSR.


Manual cumulative RPG-43 grenade in a cut


The RPG-43 had a body with a flat bottom and a conical lid, a wooden handle with a safety mechanism, a ribbon stabilizer and a shock-igniting mechanism with a fuse. Inside the case there is a bursting charge with a cumulative notch of conical shape, lined with a thin layer of metal, and a cup with a safety spring fixed in its bottom and a sting.

At its front end of the handle there is a metal sleeve inside which the holder is located and the pin holding it in the rearmost position. Outside, a spring is put on the sleeve and fabric tapes are fastened to the stabilizer cap. The safety mechanism consists of a flap and checks. A folding bar serves to hold the stabilizer cap on the grenade handle until it is thrown, not allowing it to crawl or turn in place.

During the throw of the grenade, the flap is separated and releases the stabilizer cap, which, under the action of a spring, slides off the handle and pulls the tapes behind it. The safety stud falls out under its own weight, freeing the holder of the fuse. Due to the presence of the stabilizer, the flight of the grenade took place head-first, which is necessary for the optimal use of the energy of the cumulative charge of the grenade. When a grenade strikes a barrier with a bottom of the body, the igniter, overcoming the resistance of the safety spring, imposes a sting detonator on the sting, which causes a bursting charge to explode. The cumulative RPG-43 charge punched armor with a thickness of up to 75 mm.

With the advent of German heavy tanks on the battlefield, a hand-held anti-tank grenade was needed with greater armor penetration. A group of designers consisting of M.Z. Polevanova, L.B. Ioffe and N.S. Zhitkikh has developed a cumulative RPG-6 grenade.



In October, 1943, the grenade was adopted by the Red Army. The RPG-6 grenade largely repeated the German PWM-1 German anti-tank hand grenade.

The RPG-6 had a drop-shaped body with a charge and an additional detonator and a handle with an inertial fuse, a primer-detonator and a ribbon stabilizer.

Drummer fuse blocked check. The tapes of the stabilizer were laid in the handle and held by the safety bar. The safety pin was removed before the throw. After the throw, the safety bar flew off, the stabilizer was pulled out, the drummer's check was pulled out - the fuse was set.

Thus, the protection system RPG-6 was a three-stage (the RPG-43 - two-stage). In terms of technology, a significant feature of the 6 RLG was the absence of chiseled and threaded parts, the extensive use of stamping and knurling. Compared with the RPG-43, the RPG-6 was more technological in production and somewhat safer to handle. RPG-43 and RPG-6 on 15-20 were rushing in m, after the throw the fighter should have taken refuge.
No less common anti-tank Soviet infantry were incendiary bottles.
It is inexpensive, easy to use and very effective. weapon It became widely known during the years of the Spanish Civil War, where it was first used by the rebels of General Franco against republican tanks.

Later, bottles of fuel were used against the Soviet tanks during the Winter War by the Finns, who called them the "Molotov Cocktail". In the Red Army, they became the Molotov Cocktail.

Initially, these were handicrafts filled with troops with flammable liquids (gasoline or kerosene) glass beer or vodka bottles with a stopper fuse made from tow. Before you throw the bottle at the target, the fuse should be ignited.

When it hits the target, the glass breaks, the flammable liquid spreads and ignites from the fuse. As a thickener, rosin, tar or coal tar were often added to make the flammable liquid sticky and slow down the burning.

Contact with the engine compartment of the tank or armored vehicle of the bottle and leaking of burning liquid inside, usually led to a fire. The burning liquid on the tank’s frontal armor, as a rule, did not set it on fire, but prevented observation, aimed fire, and had a strong moral and psychological effect on the crew.

Soon the production of "fireblocks" was established on an industrial scale. 7 July 1941, the State Defense Committee issued a decree “On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)”, which obliged the Narkomisheprom to organize with 10 July 1941, to equip glass bottles with a mixture according to a specific recipe.


Bottle filling incendiary. Stalingrad, 1942 year


In August, the 1941 of the year was developed and launched into production of an easy-to-use incendiary version. The combustible mixture itself consisted of gasoline, kerosene and ligroin, ignited with the help of a chemical fuse consisting of several glass ampoules with sulfuric acid, potassium chloride and powdered sugar. Which were attached to the sides of the bottle, and ignited when broken, igniting a flammable liquid.

Tula gunsmiths developed and introduced into production (in semi-handicraft conditions of the front line, when almost all equipment was evacuated to the rear) a bottle fuse consisting of 4 pieces of wire, an iron tube with cuts, springs, two ropes and a blank cartridge from a TT pistol . The handling of the igniter was similar to the handling of the ignition for hand grenades, with the difference that the “bottle” igniter only worked when the bottle was broken.


Molotov cocktails were made at the Tula Distillery


At the same time, other fire mixture formulations were developed and produced.
Chemists A. Kachugin and P. Solodovnikov were able to create, on the basis of a phosphorus solution in carbon disulfide, a self-inflammable CS liquid having a good incendiary ability in combination with an optimal burning time.



In addition to “KS”, several more combustible mixtures were created, known as No. 1 and No. 3. These fire mixtures had a lower burning temperature, but they were much cheaper and easier to equip, they better adhered to the metal and emit more dense smoke when burning. As the fuses in bottles with alternative fire mixtures, small ampoules with liquid CS were used. When it hit the target, the bottle broke, the mixture poured out, and the destruction of the ampoule-igniter caused the “KS” to ignite and, as a result, to ignite all the leaked fuel.

Chemist K.M. Saldadze developed a flammable liquid BGS, which was also used to equip bottles.

Anti-tank grenades and bottles with a combustible mixture were used, which is called "point-blank", when enemy tanks were at a throw distance from their positions.

At the beginning of the war, a special rifle mortar-bottle-bottle appeared for firing (with the help of a wooden wad and a blank cartridge) incendiary bottles. Bottles were taken with a thicker and more durable glass. The target range of throwing the bottle with such a mortar was 80 m, the maximum - 180 m, the rate of fire when calculating the 2 of a person - 6-8 rds / min. Under Moscow, the rifle department was usually given two such mortars, the platoon had 6-8 mortars.



Shooting was carried out with the emphasis of the butt into the ground. Accuracy was low, and the bottles were often broken when fired, so the bottle was not widely used.

In service with the Red Army in the 1920-1930-ies consisted muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.



He was a mortar of 41-mm caliber, which was put on the rifle barrel, fixing on the front sight. On the eve of World War II there was a grenade launcher in each rifle and cavalry unit. At the same time, the question arose of giving the "anti-tank" properties to the rifle grenade launcher.



Unfortunately, the development of anti-tank cumulative grenades was delayed. Grenade VKG-40 entered service only in 1944 year. The reduced charge of the blank cartridge allowed firing with a grenade direct fire with emphasis on the butt in the shoulder, at a distance of up to 150 meters.
Normal armor penetration was 45-50-mm armor, which for that time was not enough. Used VKG-40 is very limited, due to the low accuracy of fire and poor armor penetration.

Antitank rifles (PTR) turned out to be much more common weapons. Their design in the USSR began more 30-s. Of the pre-war developments, the most successful was the one developed by N.V. Rukavishnikov under 14.5-mm cartridge self-loading rifle, with a rate of fire to 15 shots / min. In August, 1939, it successfully passed the tests, and in October it was commissioned under the designation PTR-39. But mass production was not adjusted.
The reason for this was the incorrect assessment of the new weapon by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and, above all, the head of the State Agrarian University Kulik. According to G. I. Kulik, in the German army armored forces were re-equipped with tanks with thickened armor. Because of the incorrect assessment of German armored vehicles, it was believed that not only anti-tank guns, but even some types of artillery guns were powerless in front of them.

The war immediately showed the fallacy of this decision. The Soviet infantry was deprived of effective PT melee weapons. An attempt to establish at the beginning of the war a massive release of Rukavishnikov’s guns was not crowned with success. Finishing and putting it on production would require a lot of time.

As a temporary measure in July 1941, at the suggestion of engineer V.N. Sholokhov in the workshops MVTU them. Bauman established the assembly of a single-shot PTR for 12,7-mm cartridge DShK.


12,7-mm PTR Sholokhov


A simple design was copied from the German Mauser PTR of the First World War with the addition of a muzzle brake, a shock absorber on the butt and the installation of light folding bipods. For firing from it were used cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary bullets of B-32 mass 49 gr. with a hardened steel core and BS-41 armor-piercing incendiary bullets weighing 54 gr. with a tungsten alloy core.



Penetration from 300 to 20-mm armor. The 12,7-mm anti-tank rifles were significantly inferior in performance to the 14,5-mm weapons and by the beginning of 1942, they were out of production.

At one of the meetings of the GKO I.V. Stalin proposed to speed up work on an efficient and technologically advanced 14,5-mm PTR to entrust the development to "one more, and for reliability - to two designers." The assignment was issued on July 1941, V.A. Degtyarevu and S.G. Simonov. A month later, ready-to-test constructions appeared - the entire 22 day passed from the moment of receiving the assignment to the first test shots.

August 29 1941, after the demonstration to the members of the State Defense Committee, the self-loading model Simonov and the single-shot Degtyarev were adopted under the designation PTRS and PTRD.
New anti-tank guns were supposed to fight with light and medium tanks, as well as with armored vehicles at a distance of up to 500 meters.



The single-shot anti-tank gun Degtyarev was easier, cheaper and easier to manufacture. The minimum of parts, the use of the butt tube instead of the frame, greatly simplified the production of anti-tank guns, and the automatic opening of the shutter increased the rate of fire. To compensate for the powerful recoil, the PTDD had a highly efficient muzzle brake, and a soft pad on the butt.



Degtyarev's anti-tank rifle successfully combined simplicity, efficiency and reliability. The speed of production production was of great importance in those conditions. The first batch in the 300 units of the PTDD was completed in October and sent to the army in early November. 16 November they were first used in combat. By December 30 1941 released 17 688 anti-tank guns Degtyarev, and during the 1942 year - 184 800 units.
Simonov's self-loading anti-tank rifle worked according to the automatic scheme with removal of powder gases and had 5 ammunition loading.

In 1941, the entire Simonov 77 anti-tank rifles were launched, in 1942, the number was already 63 308 units. The establishment of mass production made it possible to reduce the cost of weapons - for example, the cost of a Simonov anti-tank gun from the first half of 1942 to the second half of 43 decreased almost twice.

From December 1941, the company of PTR (in 27, and later in 54 guns) was introduced into the rifle regiments. Since the fall of 1942, platoons (18 rifles) of the PTR have entered the battalions. In January 1943, the company of PTR was incorporated into the motorized rifle-machine-gun battalion of the tank brigade. Only in March 1944, when the role of anti-tank guns decreased, did the companies disband. By this time, the front edge of our troops was saturated with a sufficient amount of anti-tank artillery.



PTRD and PTRS anti-tank guns proved to be very effective anti-tank weapons in the initial period of the war. At a distance of 300 m along the normal, penetration of 35-mm armor was ensured, and at a distance of 100 m 40-mm armor was penetrated. This ensured the penetration of the side armor of the most massive German medium tank PzKpfw IV, which was used throughout the war. Also from the PTR could be fired at the pillboxes / bunkers and firing points, covered with armor, at distances to 800 m and the planes at distances to 500 m, there are known cases of shelling of enemy railway echelons from PTR.



Having played a significant role in anti-tank defense in 1941-1942, anti-tank rifles by the summer of 1943, with the increase in armor protection of tanks, they lost their importance. The largest number of anti-tank guns was transferred to the army in 1942 year - 249 000 units, and in the first half of 1945 year, the total 800 units.



In addition to domestic PTR, the troops had British 13,9-mm “Boyes”, which were significantly inferior in their capabilities to the Soviet PTR.



Anti-tank guns have eliminated the gap between the "anti-tank" capabilities of artillery and infantry. At the same time, it was the front-line weapon, suffered significant losses - during the war 214 thousand anti-tank guns of all models, that is 45,4%, were lost. The largest percentage of losses was observed in 41 and 42 years - 49,7 and 33,7%, respectively.



Losses of the material part corresponded to the level of losses among the personnel. The presence of anti-tank guns in the infantry units allowed them to increase their resistance in the defense and, to a great extent, get rid of the "tank fear".



During the war in the USSR, anti-tank grenade launchers similar to Panzerfaust or Bazuki were never created.



To some extent this was offset by a significant number of captured German grenade launchers, which at the final stage of the war were very widely used by our infantry.


Based on:
http://vadimvswar.narod.ru/ALL_OUT/TiVOut0204/InPTO/InPTO021.htm
http://guns.arsenalnoe.ru/m/4779
The magazine "Equipment and weapons" Semen Fedoseev "Infantry against tanks"
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  1. Dezzed
    Dezzed 1 March 2014 11: 00 New
    -6
    "Not long before the start of the war, the opinion prevailed in the Soviet military leadership that in a future war with Germany, our troops would have to deal with enemy tanks released in significant quantities, with frontal armor up to 100 mm thick."

    Excuse me, but what was the thickness of the armor it was. tanks start war? more than 100 mm?!?!


    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_tanks_in_World_War_II



    Pz1 7-13 mm

    Pz2 8-13 mm

    Pz3 5-70 mm

    Pz4 10-88 mm

    what problems? the Soviet command had a completely correct idea of ​​German tanks!
    1. stoqn477
      stoqn477 1 March 2014 13: 36 New
      +8
      I would say that you should read the sources a little more thoroughly. Pay attention to the PzIII and PzIV. Your question is about the early days of the war. Talking about the armor of medium tanks (in the understanding of the Wehrmacht) up to a thickness of 70-88mm is ridiculous. I watched the models that Pz 3 start a war of armored 14.5-30mm frontal armor. Pz 4 starts a war with 30mm frontal armor in the "E" version already in 1941 it comes out up to 50 mm.
      Increased armor of German tanks appeared at a later stage after the Germans entered the USSR. I need them. laughing
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 1 March 2014 14: 05 New
        -2
        Quote: stoqn477
        I would say that you should read the sources a little more thoroughly. Pay attention to the PzIII and PzIV. Your question is about the early days of the war. Talking about the armor of medium tanks (in the understanding of the Wehrmacht) up to a thickness of 70-88mm is ridiculous. I watched the models that Pz 3 start a war of armored 14.5-30mm frontal armor. Pz 4 starts a war with 30mm frontal armor in the "E" version already in 1941 it comes out up to 50 mm.
        Increased armor of German tanks appeared at a later stage after the Germans entered the USSR. Need them

        You, Joseph Stalin, in March 1941 give 100% a guarantee that in six months you won’t have B1 bis or DW2 or even VK4501 (H) (Pz.Kpfw.VI) on the eastern front?
        Although yes, 100 mm is a lot)))
        1. Bongo
          1 March 2014 14: 13 New
          +4
          And how many on the eastern front in 41 were B1 bis, DW2 and Pz.Kpfw.VI?
          The practice, as they say the criterion of truth, the mistakes in the development of vocational education before the war, we were very serious.
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 1 March 2014 14: 32 New
            -5
            Quote: Bongo
            And how many on the eastern front in 41 were B1 bis, DW2 and Pz.Kpfw.VI?
            The practice, as they say the criterion of truth, the mistakes in the development of vocational education before the war, we were very serious.

            and who knew about it in 1940?
            they didn’t have a time machine, they were preparing for the worst
        2. Dezzed
          Dezzed 1 March 2014 17: 35 New
          +6
          Char de bataille b1

          spawn of 1 world war. there wasn’t any trophy unit

          Combat weight 31,5 t
          Dimensions:
          length 6520 mm
          width 2500 mm
          height 2790 mm
          4 crew
          Armament 1 x 75 mm gun 1 x 47 mm gun 2 x 7,5 machine guns
          Ammunition
          Booking:
          body forehead 60 mm
          tower forehead 56 mm
          Engine type carburetor "Renault"
          Maximum power 300 hp
          Maximum speed 28 km / h
          Cruising range 150 km

          note: a 75 mm gun is only 17,1 calibres, it is not an anti-tank gun.
          it could only hit enemy fortifications, in addition, horizontal guidance was carried out using the movement of the hull of the tank itself.
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 1 March 2014 17: 54 New
            -2
            spawn of 1 world war. there wasn’t any trophy unit

            Joseph Stalin knew this in the 1940 year?
            Got into the car and rumbled to Berlin 45?
            1. Dezzed
              Dezzed 1 March 2014 18: 35 New
              +6
              "Did Joseph Stalin know this in 1940?"

              Joseph Stalin knew in 1940 the parameters of all German tanks, that’s enough!
              1. Stas57
                Stas57 1 March 2014 18: 59 New
                0
                nothing i'm patient
                Once again, Stalin knew that in half a year or a year the Germans would not go to French trophies?
                1. Dezzed
                  Dezzed 1 March 2014 21: 47 New
                  +4
                  what is the difference in captured or domestic (German) ???
                  both those and those were of worse quality at times than Soviet tanks

                  I'm patient too ...
                  1. Stas57
                    Stas57 2 March 2014 00: 07 New
                    -2
                    And yet, did Stalin know that there would be no French? Well no?
                    Moreover, they had problematic 60mm armor for us and see the post of the Bulgarian, to which I answer.
                    Although you probably purely argue?
          2. Akuzenka
            Akuzenka 1 March 2014 23: 25 New
            -1
            In your reasoning, you can directly hear the notes of rezun. Study, for a start, their combat use, effectiveness against the Fritzes, and then express your FA to the "idiots from the GAU".
    2. Stas57
      Stas57 1 March 2014 13: 37 New
      -6
      it’s not very clear to me what the author wanted to say with this passage

      and here's another

      Was this a mistake or a consequence of misinformation, but as a result, the work on creating light anti-tank systems was curtailed, the production of the 45-mm anti-tank gun was discontinued, significant resources were spent on the creation of guns capable of fighting heavy tanks, which the Germans had before the 1943 year in significant quantities did not have.

      ololo, but what about the means of defeating German tanks with additional armor from F and higher? How is it, for example, shells scattering from poor quality 76 mm shells that should have pierced everything and everything according to all the tables?

      production of the 45-mm anti-tank gun ceased,

      ??

      The result of work on the creation of anti-tank artillery systems with high armor penetration was the adoption of the 57-mm guns arr. 1941 of the year that later became known as the ZIS-2 and 107-mm divisional guns of the 1940 model of the year (M-60). The release of these artillery systems was soon discontinued

      Well, why did ZiS-2 turn off? the answer seems to be known, so why such meaningful conclusions?

      more...
      As a result, our infantry, in the absence of support in the form of anti-tank artillery, was left to itself when it met enemy tanks, which often led to heavy losses.

      oh yes, and so the infantryman would take out of his pocket ZiS-2 and grumble?
      1. Bongo
        1 March 2014 13: 59 New
        12
        Quote: Stas57
        oh yes, and so the infantryman would take out of his pocket ZiS-2 and grumble?

        The article refers to the fact that the production of the 45-mm anti-tank missile and the development of anti-tank missiles, which were much more necessary in the initial period of the war, than powerful anti-tank guns, for which there were no worthy goals, was completely unjustifiably curtailed. The armor thickness of German tanks in 41-m did not exceed 50-mm.
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 1 March 2014 14: 19 New
          -1
          Speech in the article that the production of 45-mm PTO was completely unjustifiably curtailed



          bongo, but can you say when they turned off the production of PTO 45 mm? no, not even reduced, namely
          production discontinued 45 mm anti-tank gun,

          I honestly made a discovery for myself.
          because

          Production of 45-mm PTP in 1937 — 1941
          1938 - 3522
          1939 - 4536
          1940 - 2480
          1941 - 1982
          1. Bongo
            1 March 2014 14: 26 New
            +7
            "Bongo" is written like this.
            The production of 45-mm guns was soon resumed after the outbreak of war.
            Our PTA during the war years is considered in this article:
            http://topwar.ru/33705-protivotankovaya-artilleriya-rkka-chast-1-ya.html
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Akuzenka
      Akuzenka 1 March 2014 23: 19 New
      0
      It's good to be smart like my wife afterwards.
      In general, the more I study the pre-war period, the more confident that a lot of enemies were at the very top. And the IVS did nothing with them. Sorry. Meretskov and Kulik alone were worth what!
    5. badger1974
      badger1974 2 March 2014 14: 50 New
      +5
      I’ll add, and the Soviet specialists of the Red Army did not consider it necessary to develop and adopt 57mm ZiS -4 on 34-kah, although it was short-sighted
      1. Bongo
        2 March 2014 15: 02 New
        +5
        Quote: badger1974
        I’ll add, and the Soviet specialists of the Red Army did not consider it necessary to develop and adopt 57mm ZiS -4 on 34-kah, although it was short-sighted

        In the 41, the standard 76-mm T-34 guns easily hit any German tank, and the high-explosive fragmentation effect of the 76-mm shell was significantly higher than that of the 57-mm, so there was no special need for ZIS-4. In addition, there were significant difficulties with the production of barrels for 57-mm guns.
        The mass production of ZIS-2 was possible to establish only in 43, after receiving metal processing machines from the USA. But even after that, it was not possible to establish the release of these guns in the required volumes, and the 76-mm ZIS-3, which had less armor penetration, were never displaced from anti-tank artillery until the end of the war.
  2. igordok
    igordok 1 March 2014 11: 13 New
    +5
    They remembered the bottle launchers, but forgot about the ampoules.

    A special belt for binding grenades RGD-33 was produced
    1.Appointment of the belt.
    The belt, consisting of a tape with 3 lock cells and a tension bracket, is intended for tying 5 pieces of "RGD-33" hand grenades when throwing them at tanks. At the same time, defensive covers are removed from all 5 grenades, and the handles are unscrewed from 4 of them
    1. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 1 March 2014 17: 16 New
      +3
      igordok "We remembered bottle throwers, but forgot about ampoulo throwers."
      Tady is not a sin to remember about dogs)))
      1. igordok
        igordok 1 March 2014 17: 53 New
        +1
        Quote: Nagaibak
        igordok "We remembered bottle throwers, but forgot about ampoulo throwers."
        Tady is not a sin to remember about dogs)))

        I guess, yes. Only here the dog is not an infantryman’s personal weapon.
        Well, also a flamethrower both a knapsack and a high explosive. In skillful hands and dirt can save a life. soldier
        Quote: Bongo
        The article examined only anti-tank infantry means, the transportation of which did not cause great difficulties. For this reason, in addition to ampoules, the 12.7-mm DShK machine guns, which could fight light armored vehicles, were not included.

        With PTR, it is not much easier to tinker with than with an ampoule. Only here the effectiveness of the PTR was better.
  3. gerafak
    gerafak 1 March 2014 11: 47 New
    +7
    Of course, much of the above was not created from a good life. But do not forget that in the early years of the war there were problems not only with guns, but also with mechanization, often guns simply had nothing to transport. And grenades and PTR were easily carried by infantry. That's what the anti-tank grenade launcher did not create - it's a shame, there was nothing unrealistic about it.
  4. Stas57
    Stas57 1 March 2014 12: 42 New
    0
    Anti-tank rifles PTRD and PTRS proved to be very effective anti-tank weapons in the initial period of the war. At a distance of 300 m, normal penetration of 35-mm armor was ensured, and at a distance of 100 m, 40-mm armor was pierced. This ensured the penetration of the side armor of the most massive German medium tank PzKpfw IV, which was used throughout the war.

    it is very optimistic ...
    I will not say that the forehead and the tower did not break through, but the sides still had to be caught, and often they were hung with "harp" and rollers. Yes, even if you "caught" the board, then for the guaranteed one must still get into a degree (see table)
    But of course this is better than nothing at all.

    1. Stas57
      Stas57 1 March 2014 14: 51 New
      +4
      and here’s another document on the penetration of PTR, as if the ignoramuses were not negative))
      1. Bongo
        1 March 2014 14: 53 New
        +6
        Quote: Stas57
        and here’s another document on the penetration of PTR, as if the ignoramuses were not negative))

        In this I agree with you, I will put the pros.
  5. Takashi
    Takashi 1 March 2014 12: 51 New
    +6
    to summarize, our fathers and grandfathers fought against tanks by the following means:
    1. pomegranate (or bunch of pomegranates)
    2. bottle
    3. anti-tank rifles
    4. anti-tank mines
    5. 45 mm gun

    that grenades, that bottles are weapons of direct contact. That is, 10-15 m to the tank. The chance of survival after the throw was minimal.

    anti-tank rifles - went into production only at the end of 41 years. withdraw tank from it (with one shot) can be considered good luck.

    one can only bow to their courage.

    -------------------
    By the way, how did the Germans set up anti-tank weapons (namely, 41-43 years old) at the platoon / company level?
    1. samoletil18
      samoletil18 1 March 2014 21: 01 New
      +1
      Quote: Takashi
      1. pomegranate (or bunch of pomegranates)
      2. bottle
      3. anti-tank rifles
      4. anti-tank mines
      5. 45 mm gun

      The Poles and the French had about the same thing at their disposal. And about the size of the USSR it was not necessary!
  6. Bongo
    1 March 2014 14: 09 New
    +4
    Quote: igordok
    They remembered the bottle launchers, but forgot about the ampoules.

    The article examined only anti-tank infantry means, the transportation of which did not cause great difficulties. For this reason, in addition to ampoules, the 12.7-mm DShK machine guns, which could fight light armored vehicles, were not included.
    125 mm ampoule
  7. schizophrenic
    schizophrenic 1 March 2014 14: 21 New
    0
    Ours seems to have looked at how the development of their tanks is moving and understanding what this leads to, they developed the ZIS-2 and even installed it on the T-34, besides, there was an agreement with Hitler and they made a prediction about the future armor of the tanks.
  8. Bongo
    1 March 2014 14: 33 New
    +5
    Quote: schizophrenic
    Ours seems to have looked at how the development of their tanks is moving and understanding what this leads to, they developed the ZIS-2 and even installed it on the t-34

    57-mm tank ZIS-4 for installation on the T-34-57 was released during the war in small quantities. In total, about 50 of such tanks were built.
    T-34 with 57-mm gun ZIS-4
  9. Bongo
    1 March 2014 14: 36 New
    +5
    Quote: Stas57
    they didn’t have a time machine, they were preparing for the worst

    And that is why our infantry met German tanks with bundles of grenades.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 1 March 2014 14: 52 New
      0
      Quote: Bongo
      And because of this, our infantry met German tanks with bundles of grenades.

      no, well, Bongo on the couch in 2014 is certainly smarter than the Soviet leadership of the 40 model of the year, no doubt here.))
      to remind that the Germans fought against the Soviet tanks with the same grenades, is it necessary?
      and axes ..
      1. Bongo
        1 March 2014 14: 55 New
        +6
        Quote: Stas57
        no, well, the bongo on the couch in 2014 is certainly smarter than the Soviet leadership of the 40 model of the year, there is no doubt

        If you do not like this article, write yourself. I do not comment on your intellectual level ...
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 1 March 2014 15: 00 New
          -1
          Quote: Bongo
          If you do not like this article, write yourself. I do not comment on your intellectual level ...

          and where does the level? there is a fact, we know what happened in 40, 41, 55, etc., but they are not. that's all.
          Now everyone from the sofa knows what to do, but here’s what to do when completely conflicting data arrives, and you don’t have the time or the resource.
          1. Bongo
            1 March 2014 15: 03 New
            +6
            The article gives an attempt to analyze the development of anti-tank weapons of infantry. If you disagree with something, why go to the individual?
            1. Stas57
              Stas57 1 March 2014 15: 05 New
              +3
              Well, if it hurts you so much, then I sincerely apologize
              1. Bongo
                1 March 2014 15: 07 New
                +7
                It didn’t bother me, but the site already has enough "srach". I urge everyone to be correct and mutually polite hi
                1. Stas57
                  Stas57 1 March 2014 15: 11 New
                  +3
                  Once again I repeat the apology, and immediately repeat the question, what are your suggestions, whether you are at the helm of the country in 40? what do you personally intend to equip a fighter against tanks?
                  1. Bongo
                    1 March 2014 15: 21 New
                    +5
                    I would not want to be at the helm of the country at that time, and even now ...
                    One way or another, the production of PTR did not require large expenditures. Considering which tank fleet the Germans were attacking with 41, it would have spoiled their blood pretty much.
                    In the field of anti-tank weapons, resources spent on excessively powerful and expensive 57-mm and 107-mm guns, in my opinion, it would be better to invest in the creation of 76-mm guns with ammunition from anti-aircraft guns of the 1931 model. and the tank destroyer with this gun based on the T-26. In addition, cumulative ammunition of all calibers was undeservedly ignored; the Germans already had them in 41.
                    1. Stas57
                      Stas57 1 March 2014 15: 38 New
                      +1
                      One way or another, the production of PTR did not require large expenditures. Considering which tank fleet the Germans were attacking with 41, it would have spoiled their blood pretty much.

                      from the point of view of the Soviet leadership, 45mm-76 mm would have spoiled their blood.
                      In the pre-war concept (as well as below), emnip, the main role of the struggle was assigned to the VET, who knew that we would have such losses not only in guns, but also in shells (production subsidence).
                      The Germans, for example, did not particularly like PTR. Although they had.
                      In the field of anti-tank weapons, resources spent on excessively powerful and expensive 57-mm and 107-mm guns

                      I say, without an afterthought, but you have infa about both French tanks that fell to the Germans, and "tanks in 100mm".
                      In addition, cumulative ammunition of all calibers was undeservedly ignored; the Germans already had them in 41.

                      how were you ignored? work was carried out, but like all other ammunition, their quality was at a minimum level.

                      and yet I asked about something else
                      what do you personally intend to equip a fighter against tanks?
                      1. Bongo
                        1 March 2014 15: 45 New
                        +5
                        German PTR did not go in any comparison with ours under the cartridge 14,5-mm. Although they knocked out our light tanks quite a bit, do not underestimate them.

                        French tanks for their intended purpose on the Soviet-German front were practically not used.

                        As an anti-tank infantry weapon in 1941. there was no alternative to PTR.

                        I will not comment on the Soviet cumulative ammunition, there was an article recently:
                        http://topwar.ru/39493-sovetskie-kumulyativnye-protivotankovye-boepripasy-v-gody
                        -voyny.html
                      2. Stas57
                        Stas57 1 March 2014 16: 05 New
                        -3
                        Quote: Bongo
                        French tanks for their intended purpose on the Soviet-German front were practically not used.
                        again, without aftertaste.
                        Do you give 100% guarantee in 1940 that they will not be?
                        I will not comment on the Soviet cumulative ammunition, there was an article recently:

                        the article does not cover the main question - "why"?
                        I doubt that this is a real option in those years (cheap, mass, high quality).
                        Let me remind you the opupei with ammunition for the ZIS-2, but in general the same 76 and 45 mm with their quality.

                        and here is the document (2 paragraph)

                        3 years of work with result = 0

                        Let me remind you that you are a virtual leader of a country with very limited technical potential in some areas.

                        As an anti-tank infantry weapon in 1941. there was no alternative to PTR.

                        Well, the Germans somehow managed without PTR?))
                        And again, you have the afterthought.
                        You now know that we will have troubles with artillery, and in December 1940 who could imagine this?
                        And what, by introducing the PTR we actually remove 2 fighters from the company? remove the machine gun?
                      3. Stas57
                        Stas57 1 March 2014 19: 03 New
                        +3
                        and so I don’t know whether I will answer or the nuclear winter will begin and the USA will hit Russia over Crimea ....

                        correct if
                        Unfortunately, our leadership did not have a time machine, so what we have, then we have ...
                        Before they came up with ATGMs, RPGs and so on, the main type of VET at the beginning of the war (and throughout) was artillery. It was from this point of view that we proceeded before the war.
                        VET artillery was in suitable quantity and in mediocre quality (shells, transportation and training, etc.), i.e. the main means of opposing the tanks we had.
                        Given that: the data arrived / ours thought so /, we had troubles with shells, etc., the caliber 76 mm was preferred.
                        The existing artillery of the PTO fought one way or another with the enemy’s tanks, but there was a nuisance, to say the least disaster.
                        The only possible decision was made - the release of cheap ersatz PTO-PTR, that is, PTR is a replacement for lost artillery, no more.
                        Therefore, the development and production of PTR in commercial quantities before the war was unrealistic.
    2. igordok
      igordok 1 March 2014 15: 30 New
      0
      Quote: Stas57
      to remind that the Germans fought against the Soviet tanks with the same grenades, is it necessary?
      and axes ..

      1. Bongo
        1 March 2014 15: 35 New
        +5
        There were much fewer cases in the 41 when the German infantry appeared face to face with Soviet tanks, or do you disagree with this?
      2. Stas57
        Stas57 1 March 2014 15: 49 New
        0
        yes, yes that’s right, another canister with a grenade.
        and I know one fact of this use of an ax.
        1. igordok
          igordok 1 March 2014 15: 58 New
          +3
          German instruction for the fight against tanks 1942g. - http://yadi.sk/d/C2Kr9DxSJk2pY


  • Leader
    Leader 1 March 2014 18: 02 New
    +4
    For all the reasons correctly indicated above, the reasons for this difficult situation with anti-tank weapons, I want to add the following:

    1) according to numerous recollections of developers of various weapons, many of our samples, which later proved to be excellent during the war, were often inhibited at the stage of development and testing by our military commanders! Kulik alone was worth a fool! How many necessary weapons I put under the cloth ...

    This is happening now - some particular general will like some garbage (or put something in his pocket!) And it's ready - we’ll buy it, put it into service!
    All that Serdyukov took was junk! Italian armored personnel carriers, wheeled tanks, and other French h ...

    2) the level of training of our commanders-chiefs was low. What officers, the same soldiers. Here you and the stupidity of orders, and massive drap, and abandoned weapons (up to howitzers), and meaningless frontal counterattacks (sources - again the memories of soldiers and officers). Less slogans need to be chanted and trampled on the parade ground; and learn more to dig in and shoot.

    Now, by the way, everything is the same. A few years ago, we were introduced to a new unit commander, and this colonel has three medals hanging on his chest - for 10, 15 and 20 years of service. How did he become a colonel? This means that he "was not" anywhere and "did not participate" ... All his military qualities are his readiness to fulfill any whim of his higher superiors and ruthlessness to his subordinates. They served with him - full m ... duck. He left us for a promotion ...
  • igordok
    igordok 1 March 2014 18: 05 New
    +3
    Lost instructions for fighting tanks, for the British, in case the Germans break through the English Channel. From a modern point of view, it was impossible to read without laughing. But if you try to plunge into that time, you will shudder at what "wild" views were on the anti-tank defense.
    The illustration from the American manual, (most likely post-war) raises questions.
  • family tree
    family tree 1 March 2014 18: 35 New
    +3
    Kamikaze in German
  • family tree
    family tree 1 March 2014 18: 51 New
    +6
    Of course, the most radical approach to the problem of delivering explosives to tanks was the Japanese, who massively used self-propelled anti-tank guided mines with a false target selection unit and a highly intelligent guidance system with a capacity of one human force.

    English militias were ordered to form teams of tank hunters, consisting of four people. Each such team should have had a rail (the place where the militias were supposed to get it on their own), a blanket, a bucket of gasoline and a box of matches. The team was to be ambushed on a street along which tanks could move. When an enemy vehicle appeared, two militiamen raised a rail, which, for convenience, was wrapped on one side in a blanket and had to drive it into the undercarriage of the tank, that is, in the gap between the tracks and the hull, closer to the drive wheel, to guarantee that the tank was deprived of mobility. After that, a third bucket of gasoline was poured onto the used blanket from the calculation of the “fighters”, and the fourth calculation number set fire to the blanket with matches in advance.
    http://voennovosti.ru/2013/03/chego-boyatsya-tanki/
  • polkovnik manuch
    polkovnik manuch 2 March 2014 00: 55 New
    +4
    I am grateful for the article and especially for the posts, I honestly didn’t know even half. Although rifles (PTR) played a very large role in defensive battles, as they say: “fish without fish and cancer”, and at a later time they showed themselves well against light armored vehicles, bunkers and bunkers. Veterans often spoke with warmth about their use.
  • Landwarrior
    Landwarrior 2 March 2014 02: 04 New
    +6
    RGD 33 was generally a bad machine. How many times in the search they were found, not to count. Either the fighter did not insert the ampoule, then he fell into the moss (along Zimnaya - in loose snow) - and everything did not work. hi However, the German "beaters" were a little smarter than her.
  • Bongo
    2 March 2014 02: 52 New
    +6
    Quote: Landwarrior
    RGD 33 was generally a bad machine. How many times in the search they found them, do not count. Either the fighter did not insert the ampoule, then it fell into the moss (along Zimnyaya, into the loose snow) - and that's it, it didn't work. However, the German "beaters" were a little smarter than her.

    Soviet RGD-30 / 33 were problematic due to an inconvenient and not too reliable fuse. German M-24 was much more convenient to use and handle. Their advantages were the simplicity and cheapness of production, safety in the event of a fall (including when equipped with a detonator) and the impossibility of accidental operation (due to the need to unscrew the lid to remove the cord necessary to actuate the ignition mechanism), as well as the ability to throw on long distances thanks to a long handle and a good center of gravity. The accurate M-24 mechanism in conditions of dampness or when the cord was not pulled out too sharply often did not lead to ignition of the igniter. This was due to violation of storage conditions. M-24 had a long history of combat use and was used in many post-war conflicts, until the mid-90's a grenade under the name HG-43 was in service with the Swiss army.
    1. Landwarrior
      Landwarrior 4 March 2014 00: 36 New
      +4
      Well Duc 33 is a "restyling" of "Aurora". It was also not the most successful system. laughing Well, they did not know how to do, what to say. When Lemon copied the English, then it went, and before that No.
  • badger1974
    badger1974 2 March 2014 15: 04 New
    0
    as far as the ampoules for the reaction in the Molotov cocktail are known, they did not consist of hay but sulfurous acid, the highly concentrated one had a quick reaction with any organics
    1. Bongo
      2 March 2014 15: 15 New
      0
      Sorry Volodya, but I can't put a "+" on you here, because you're mistaken.
      Sulfuric acid is obtained by dissolving SO2 sulfur oxide in water, this acid is rather weak, sulfuric acid H2SO4 is obtained by the oxidation of sulfuric acid, i.e., another oxygen atom is attached.
      It is one of the strongest acids in nature. You can easily check my innocence by inflicting a conc. sulfuric acid on the head of a match, as you know there, among other things, contains Bertoletova salt.
  • driver
    driver 2 March 2014 16: 25 New
    -3
    today is a forgiven Sunday, I forgive you all, my father fought and it was so that before the battle they gave out ammunition to everyone and our soldier was armed with one rifle for three and any weapon in 1942 was glad not to gnaw the thin armor of German tanks with his teeth
    1. Hudo
      Hudo 2 March 2014 19: 57 New
      +2
      "Minus" for replicating Khrushchev's nonsense about one rifle for three.
  • Riperbahn
    Riperbahn 2 March 2014 19: 54 New
    0
    And did our magnetic mines cling? Or why the Germans began to roll cement on the armor of tanks?
    1. Bongo
      3 March 2014 02: 28 New
      +3
      The Red Army was armed with magnetic anti-tank mines.
  • chenia
    chenia 2 March 2014 21: 31 New
    +1
    Quote: Bongo
    One way or another, the production of PTR did not require large expenditures. Considering which tank fleet the Germans were attacking with 41, it would have spoiled their blood pretty much.
    In the area of ​​anti-tank weapons, the resources spent on excessively powerful and expensive 57-mm and 107-mm guns, in my opinion, would be better to invest in the creation of 76-mm guns with ammunition from


    We are talking about battalion combat vehicles and below. So, that PTR is normal, and when 45 mm appeared in the battalions, it’s generally excellent.

    But the artillery was really limping, and they did not create a normal gun.
    57mm at first was redundant (and it was released a little), and then not powerful enough. The BS-3 is neither a weapon nor a field weapon. D-44 is an excellent, but not lucky system, until the war was launched, it ended and then became insufficient as P T-was transferred to the PA.

    And it was necessary to immediately create a 76 mm PT, and the Germans could rip off the base (which, in fact, they did with the D-44, but rushed to a larger caliber and did not have time).
  • Vitmir
    Vitmir 3 March 2014 18: 31 New
    +1
    We forgot about one direction that did not develop after children (non-recoil and jet guns) were thrown out with water (Kurchevsky’s cannons or dynamo-reactive guns) (something from which Soviet analogs of bazookas, ofenors and panzer shreks could grow):
    "In 1931, the 65-mm Petropavlovsky rocket gun was tested. It was a light tube with a protective disk, firing 65-mm rockets on smokeless pyroxylin-TNT powder. Two years later, we adopted 37-mm" dynamo-rocket anti-tank rifles "Leonid Kurchevsky. True, two years later they were abandoned due to unsatisfactory armor penetration and poor maneuverability."
  • Bongo
    4 March 2014 07: 01 New
    +4
    Quote: Landwarrior
    When Lemon copied the English, then it went, and before that

    The thing went when they adopted a very successful fuse for grenades - UZRG, its modernized version - UZRGM is still widely used.
  • Signaller
    Signaller 28 March 2014 23: 13 New
    +1
    Looking at the photo in the front row. A man with a bunch of pomegranates. Type 5 grenade RGD -33. And you are interested in the weight of this design. 2.5 kilograms. And how far can all this be thrown ??? Well, 10 meters from the force. If the RGD itself is -33 -495 grams and you can throw it at 62-63 meters (I personally threw it), then a bunch? .. some kind of kookid with a photo. The setting frame is unambiguous. but in life, to destroy a caterpillar in a light tank and two would be enough. But anti-tank, then one-for the eyes.
  • aleksandr.g3
    aleksandr.g3 April 13 2014 21: 10 New
    +1
    Quote: Stas57
    and who knew about it in 1940?
    they didn’t have a time machine, they were preparing for the worst


    At the expense of the time machine is understandable. But there are 3 very good articles, in which it is chewed about unpreparedness and large losses in the Red Army during the beginning of the war. It is called "On Unavailability, Shells and Gasoline". It is very clearly described in figures and facts about a huge number of facts of betrayal by the leadership of the USSR and the Red Army at the beginning of the war.
    http://vpk-news.ru/articles/7749
    http://vpk-news.ru/articles/7759
    http://vpk-news.ru/articles/7783