Military Review

The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Part of 2. Preparing Russia for war

30

The war with Japan was apparently one of the most predictable stories. The Japanese armed forces held their final rehearsal during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The Japanese struck a sudden blow to China, the Chinese the fleet. The Japanese army landed in the Korean port of Chemulpo, where it was the most convenient place for landing. The Japanese will land there in 1904.


8 March 1900, Vice-Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, handed over to the Main Marine Headquarters a note “Opinion on the organization of Port Arthur”. In it, he noted the inadequate land defense of Port Arthur, which could lead to dire consequences. Thus, the defense of the fortress required at least 447 guns, and only 200 guns were assigned. Makarov also noted the fact that the Japanese first of all would occupy the Korean Peninsula, and the Russian fleet, torn from its bases, would not be able to prevent their landing. Then the Japanese army will move to the Kwantung Peninsula and will be able to quickly concentrate more forces there than ours. As a result, it will be a war for the possession of Port Arthur. Port Arthur will become a symbol of the Russian-Japanese war. The fall of Port Arthur will deal a terrible blow to the position of Russia in the Far East. Thus, the Russian admiral almost completely predicted the entire course of a future war.

However, in the pre-war period in the Russian society in relation to Japan, there were widespread “capsitive” sentiments. Admiral Pavel Tyrtov, the manager of the Marine Ministry, imposed a long resolution on Makarov’s note, where he accused Makarov of alarmism.

In August 1903, the war minister, Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkin, in a report to the emperor reported that the fortification of Port Arthur is at the final stage and with sufficient garrison and reserves it will be inaccessible from land and sea. The garrison of the Kwantung Peninsula is sufficiently strengthened, an annual reserve has been created. “Now we can not worry that even if most, for example, of the Japanese army, will collapse on Port Arthur. We have the strength and means to defend Port Arthur, even fighting alone against 5-10 enemies ... ”Later, a safe haven was created for the entire Pacific squadron. The squadron can "calmly" measure its strength with the entire Japanese fleet. As a result, Port Arthur, secured from the sea and land, having a strong garrison and supported from the sea by a powerful fleet, is an independent force. The stock in Port Arthur is enough to wait for the moment when our troops in Manchuria will be able to gather their strength and defeat the Japanese army, freeing Port Arthur, considered Kuropatkin. Now you can “not be worried” about the isolation of Port Arthur from Russia and the Amur region, and even reduce the costs of defense of the Far East. As we can see, Kuropatkin was greatly mistaken in his calculations. Makarov's assessment was much closer to the real picture.

The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Part of 2. Preparing Russia for war

Alexey Nikolaevich Kuropatkin (1848 — 1925). In 1898 — 1904 - Minister of War. From 7 February 1904 - Manchurian Army Commander, from October 13 1904 - Commander-in-Chief of all land and naval armed forces operating against Japan

5 in November 1903, Chief of the Provisional Military Headquarters of the Governor of the Far East, Major General V. Ye. Flug, delivered a report to Viceroy Alekseev, where the Japanese offensive scenarios were marked. Japan could:

1) limit the seizure of the Korean Peninsula;
2) after seizing Korea and creating bases there, direct the main attack on the Russian troops in South Manchuria and Port Arthur;
3) deliver the main blow to Vladivostok and the South Ussuri region.

At the same time, the Japanese armed forces could conduct an auxiliary operation to seize Sakhalin and the mouth of the Amur. It was also noted that for the war with Russia, Japan could transfer 10 divisions to the mainland in the first half of the second month: 130 battalions, 46 squadrons, 576 guns (in reality, Japan could put up 13 divisions and 13 reserve brigades, more than 1 thousand guns). Against these forces, Russia could put up (except for the garrisons of the fortresses) 77 battalions, 75 squadrons and hundreds and 184 guns of troops of the Far East, which could be concentrated not earlier than the beginning of the third month. Thus, in the first period of the campaign, the Japanese army gained an advantage. Only by pulling up reinforcements from Western Siberia and European Russia, which could have been done not earlier than the seventh month of the war, could Russia concentrate a superior force.

It was obvious that the Japanese were unlikely to sit in Korea, giving Russia the opportunity to calmly concentrate superior forces and go on the offensive. Only with a vigorous offensive in the first period of the war could Japan have won up over the weaker, not completed concentration of Russian troops. From this report it was clear that if we quickly didn’t significantly strengthen our forces in the Far East, the first period of the war would end badly for Russia. The Japanese generals were not idiots and were not going to sit quietly in Korea for 6-8 for months, while the Russians moved troops from the European part of Russia.

In the report, Flug gave the erroneous conclusion of the Chief of the Provisional Naval Staff that "with the present balance of forces between our and the Japanese fleets, the possibility of defeating our fleet was not allowed." Therefore, it was believed that the Japanese would not be able to land in the West Korean Gulf or Yingkou (modern Chinese province of Liaoning). Rear Admiral Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft believed that the Japanese would be able to land on the western coast of the Korean Peninsula no closer than Jinampo (Tsinampo), or on the southeast and eastern coast of the peninsula.

The “supreme commander in chief”, Emperor Nicholas II, also had a scornful and scornful attitude toward Japan. The head of Russia treated the situation in the Far East lightly, calling the Japanese "macaques". The emperor declared that Japan had no real army, and in the event of the outbreak of war, the Japanese would easily be defeated. The public supported such “patriotic” moods. As a result, while the Japanese were rapidly pursuing the militarization of the country, they rallied the nation into a single fist, created a military-industrial complex, organized the army and navy according to advanced Western European standards, bought the latest squadron battleships and cruisers, in Russia military preparations were sluggish and indecisive. Opponent strongly underestimated.

Preparing Russia for war

In response to the strengthening of the Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region, especially Britain, Russia began to strengthen its forces in the Far East as early as the 1880s. Petersburg had an enormous amount of time to prepare the Russian Far Eastern frontiers for war. By the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Russian forces in the Far East had been increased to 30,5 thousand men and 74 guns. However, a significant part of the troops was the Cossack cavalry.

On the eve of Russia's intervention in the relations of Japan and China, the border districts strengthened with artillery. The Amur Governor-General Dukhovsky received instructions to strengthen local connections and strengthen Vladivostok, Nikolaevsk and the defense of Sakhalin. However, military activities were carried out slowly. First of all, this was due to the fact that the main attention of Russia was focused on the western direction, fixed assets and forces were used to strengthen military power in the European part of Russia, the eastern direction was financed according to the residual principle, it was long considered secondary, if not tertiary. Therefore, by the year 1898 in the Far East, the number of troops reached only about 60 thousand people with 126 guns.

Lack of funds, low population density, lack of roads, the embryonic state of the engineering preparation of the theater of war, the lack of barracks and the general underdevelopment of the military infrastructure of the region delayed the concentration of forces in the Far East. Japan at that time was accelerating the pace of military development, trying to prepare for war before the Russians completed the construction of the Circum-Baikal Railway.

In the 1898 year, when Russia occupied Port Arthur and the relations between the two powers became even more aggravated, a new military construction plan was adopted, which provided for bringing the number of Russian troops in the Far East to 90 thousand people and 184 guns. Russia's participation in military intervention against China, caused by the rebellion of boxers in 1900-1901, led to the transfer of troops from European Russia, the formation of a number of new units. The tense situation in the Far East demanded more attention from St. Petersburg and the governor Alekseev was ordered “to put our combat readiness in the Far East in complete balance with our political and economic objectives in the shortest time and without stopping for necessary expenses.” In accordance with this instruction, it was planned to form two new army corps with a total number of at least 50 thousand soldiers. These corps were to concentrate in the areas of possible landing of the Japanese troops. Strengthening of the army grouping in the Far East was carried out not by sending new units from the European part of Russia, but by re-forming local formations with the inclusion of separate groups of soldiers sent from European Russia.

It was decided to transfer two divisions and one brigade to Kvantunsky Peninsula, and also to strengthen Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Port Arthur received a garrison and a serf artillery. In 1903, two infantry brigades with artillery were transferred to the Far East. The garrison on Sakhalin was also fortified. The cavalry was not transferred to the Far East, they believed that more was needed in the European theater of military operations. In Manchuria, it was decided to limit the Cossack cavalry, concentrated in the border areas.

By the beginning of the war, Russia had in the Far East about 98 thousand soldiers and 272 field artillery guns (there were about 125-150 thousand people in total to the east of Baikal). The Port Arthur garrison numbered 22,5 thousand people, in Manchuria there were about 28 thousand people, in the area of ​​Vladivostok about 45 thousand people. A few thousand more consisted of artillery, engineering and other compounds. In addition, there was still a guard of the CER (railway troops) - about 35 thousand people. Transsib to the beginning of the war acted, but its capacity was low 3 — 4 pairs of trains per day. It took about 1 a month to transfer one army corps from European Russia.

In addition, although Russia had good relations with China, part of the troops needed to be kept on the right flank to the detriment of the grouping in the most important eastern sector of the theater of operations. China was decentralized and provincial governors, local generals did not always obey the center, pursued their policies. Some of them could easily cooperate with Japan. Behind the Pechili border stood the troops of the Chinese generals Yuan Shih-kai and Ma.

The war found the Russian army in a state of reshaping: the two-battalion regiments were deployed into three-battalions, the brigades were transformed into divisions. Engineering training of the Far Eastern theater of operations also went slowly. The question of the development of military infrastructure was raised only when the inevitability of war became obvious to almost everyone. The focus was on strengthening Port Arthur and Vladivostok. In addition, some work was carried out on possible operational lines of attack by the Japanese army. The isolated position of Port Arthur required its powerful fortification, so that the garrison could hold out for quite a long time before the Russian army could deploy a counterattack.

The initial design of the fortifications of Port Arthur of the first stage provided for a two-year construction period. However, various circumstances, such as the Chinese uprising, when workers simply fled, cholera epidemics, the remoteness of Port Arthur, and simply theft, slowed down the work. Construction work was slow. Since 1903, work has proceeded at a faster pace, but time has already been lost, the construction program of the port-arthur fortifications was not fully implemented. They did not even have time to implement the fortification program on the Jinzhou Isthmus (the small town of Jinzhou was located not far from the narrowest point of the Liaodong Peninsula, the most convenient place for the defense of the peninsula). The fortifications of Vladivostok were also not completed. The city could only repel the first attacks.


Port Arthur. General form. Photo from Niva magazine 1904 of the year

Thus, Russia, unlike the Japanese Empire, was not ready for war in the Far East. The strengthening of Port Arthur and the Liaodonsky Peninsula, other fortifications were not completed, the railway did not allow to quickly transfer troops from the European part of Russia. In the Far East, a sufficient army grouping capable of confronting the Japanese army in Manchuria and Korea or even taking up the Korean Peninsula, part of the coast of China and preventing the landing of Japanese forces, was not concentrated in advance.

Did not have time to strengthen the 1-th Pacific Squadron. Rear Admiral Andrei Virenius detachment in 1903 left Kronstadt to the Far East, but with the start of the Russian-Japanese war it had to be returned from the Red Sea to Russia. The detachment could significantly strengthen the 1-th Pacific Squadron. It consisted of: Oslyabya squadron battleship, Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora 1 cruiser Almaz, cruiser 2, Frenzy, Brilliant, Quick, Cruiser, Impeccable ”,“ Poor ”,“ Vigorous ”and“ Bravy ”, four destroyers, three steamers of the Volunteer fleet“ Orel ”,“ Smolensk ”and“ Saratov ”. The Volunteer Fleet steamers could be used as auxiliary cruisers for operations on enemy communications. It should be noted that, if desired, Petersburg could send a large part of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East before the war. Later, the 2 Pacific Squadron was sent, but the decision was belated and led to a catastrophe.

The political situation for the start of the war was also unfavorable. The British Empire openly supported Japan. Full diplomatic, financial, military and material assistance to the Japanese was also provided by the United States. France, the official ally of Russia, took a cold neutral position. St. Petersburg had to look at the position of future allies on the Entente during the Russian-Japanese war and break the alliance with France in order to avoid participation in the First World War as the "cannon fodder" of London and Paris.

Germany was friendly towards Russia at that time, it was beneficial for Russia to get bogged down in Eastern affairs and distract from Europe. True, this did not prevent the Germans from selling Japan weapon and other products, business is business.


The battleship Oslabya ​​leaves Bizerte, December 27 1903.

State of the Russian army

Russian army in the second half of the XIX - early XX centuries. was in crisis, which convincingly confirmed the course of the Eastern war (Crimea), the Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878, the Russian-Japanese war and the First World War.

Claims to the Russian soldier was not. Russian warriors, as in previous times, showed courage and dedication. During the Russian-Japanese war, Russian soldiers and sailors showed exceptional heroism and resilience, which was repeatedly noted by foreign military agents stationed at the headquarters of the Russian and Japanese armies. The Russian noncommissioned officer corps was well prepared. A good level of training was shown by lower and middle level officers.

The main problem was in the top command. The royal generals, with some exceptions, turned out to be completely incapable of displaying creative initiative. The peculiarity of the Russian (and then the Soviet, which confirmed the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War) military education was the overload of theory and the lack of practice. Academic education suppressed common sense. Instead, practitioners brought up doctrinaires who were not able to understand and accept the innovations in military affairs. Conscious, not afraid initiative was suppressed. Future generals, in fact, were not taught to fight. Many of the generals held top commanding positions not so much in skills and merit as in their high birth, connections in high society, the ability to please their superiors. They viewed service not as a service to the Motherland and the people, but as a source of wealth and honors. Such "commanders" did not enjoy prestige in the army. These were the generals of the “peace army”, incapable of innovation, initiative and decisive action.

The Russo-Japanese War fully confirmed the unsuitability of the generals. Partridge accused his generals in disrupting a number of operations. Thus, General Bilderling, during the battle of Liaoyan, having at his disposal considerable forces, did not stop the bypass movement of the Kuroki army. General Stakelberg Kuropatkin blamed for the extreme indecision of actions during the September offensive, as a result of a well-conceived operation failed. General Kaulbars failed the Mukden operation. Despite repeated orders and numerous reinforcements sent to him, he stubbornly did not go on the offensive and presented the enemy with two days.

It is high time that the generals began to serve as soldiers, like Suvorov. When Peter's practice worked, the Russian army was invincible. However, the system broke. As a result, the generals were filled with sycophants, opportunists, careerists, servants who know how to "serve beautifully" in peacetime. The highest positions flooded sons, relatives of generals and aristocrats who did not smell powder. The degeneracy of the "elite" of the Russian Empire fully affected the generals. Suffice it to recall the illegitimate son of Emperor Alexander II, "General-Admiral" Evgeny Alekseev, who was a participant in the so-called. Bezobrazskoy clique, as the chief of the Kwantung Oblast and the imperial governor in the Far East, more than anyone else, contributed to Russia's involvement in the confrontation with Japan. At the beginning of the war, Alekseev was appointed commander-in-chief of all land and sea forces in the Far East and was responsible for the failure of the initial period of the war.

Operational art was based on the doctrine of General Leer, which was based on the military art of the Napoleonic wars. According to the concept of Leer there were "eternal and immutable" principles of the art of war. The military art of the era of the German reunification wars was not well studied. Only in 1907, at the direction of the Chief of the General Staff Palitsyn, did the Academy of the General Staff begin to study the features of the military art of the 1866 and 1870-1871 wars. Thus, Clausewitz’s dialectic was not at all reflected by Leer. In addition to the tenets of Napoleon's art among the higher command personnel of the Russian imperial army, defense tendencies played a large role, which were combined with recognition of the profitability of concentration for action in internal operational areas. The generals, with the exception of a few exceptions, did not study the experience of the Anglo-Boer War and the last Sino-Japanese War, which became a rehearsal of the Russo-Japanese War for the Japanese Empire.


Evgeny Ivanovich Alekseev ((1843 — 1917). From 1899 onwards, the Chief and Commander of the troops of the Kwantung Oblast and the naval forces of the Pacific Ocean. From 1903 onwards, he was appointed deputy head of All Imperial Majesty in the Far East. land and sea forces in the Far East.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. The armed forces of the Japanese Empire
The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Part of 2. Preparing Russia for war
The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Part of 3. Russian army at the turn of the XX century. Theater of war
The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Part of 4. Plans of the Russian and Japanese command
The beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Part of 5. Attack on port arthur
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  1. Silvio
    Silvio 17 February 2014 08: 59
    0
    The war was shameful for Russia, especially for its fleet. With what hopelessness and how mediocre ships were lost. The Japanese are a sea nation, it was not easy to compete with them at sea.
    1. avt
      avt 17 February 2014 09: 47
      +1
      Quote: Silvio
      Japanese sea nation,

      laughing No, well, that’s enough. Perhaps the Japanese, with the active support of the arrogant Saxons, became a sea power. Well, Russia once again, according to the apt and caustic remark of one Soviet general, met a war with lowered pants. As always, they did not finish, finish up, or underdevelop the armed forces in the quite obvious theater of war. The blame for the loss of the war rests entirely with the top political and military leadership of the Empire, no fatal and fatal prerequisites for the loss, and even more so, even taking into account there was no tragic development of the course of hostilities for us, there was no sign of a shameful peace treaty with the cession of territories. This stage of the Big Game, the Angles won outright.
  2. muhomor
    muhomor 17 February 2014 09: 57
    +5
    "Many of the generals held the highest command posts not so much for their skills and merit, but for their high birth, connections in high society, the ability to please their superiors. They saw service not as serving the Motherland and the people, but as a source of material wealth and honors."

    Something surprisingly familiar! In the army of modern Russia, I am also afraid of many generals who became them, because they have a father (father-in-law) general. sad
    1. predator.3
      predator.3 17 February 2014 12: 02
      +3
      Quote: muhomor
      Something surprisingly familiar! In the army of modern Russia, I am also afraid of many generals who became them, because they have a father (father-in-law) general.


      Joke: The son of a general asks his father:
      - Dad, will I be a major?
      -Yes, son!
      - Dad, will I be a colonel?
      -Yes, son!
      - Dad, will I be a general?
      -Yes, son!
      - Dad, will I be a marshal?
      -No, son!
      -And why?
      -And because the marshal has his own son!
    2. vyatom
      vyatom 17 February 2014 13: 57
      +1
      Quote: muhomor
      Something surprisingly familiar! In the army of modern Russia, I am also afraid of many generals who became them, because they have a father (father-in-law) general.

      If only there was no war. We can no longer get involved in any kind of conflict.
    3. anomalocaris
      anomalocaris 17 February 2014 17: 20
      +1
      And modern Russia painfully resembles the very Russia that someone lost ...
      1. avt
        avt 17 February 2014 18: 41
        0
        Quote: anomalocaris
        And modern Russia painfully resembles the very Russia that someone lost ...

        Alas! request You open "Moscow and Muscovites", you start reading and see - if you remove our iPhones, iPads and computers, replace the "reckless" "raspberries", "crayfish" with "gelding" ,,, Klafelinschits ",,, migrant workers "- there is practically no difference!
  3. Drummer
    Drummer 17 February 2014 12: 16
    +3
    At the same time, the Japanese armed forces could carry out an auxiliary operation to seize Sakhalin and the mouth of the Amur. It was also noted that for the war with Russia, Japan could transfer 10 divisions to the mainland in the first half of the second month: 130 battalions, 46 squadrons, 576 guns (in reality, Japan could deploy 13 divisions and 13 reserve brigades, more than 1 thousand guns).

    In reality, in the first two months, the Japanese were able to land only four divisions in Korea, so the assessment of the Governor’s headquarters was too pessimistic. Contrary to pre-war calculations, the advantage from the very beginning of the war was on our side, the problem was only in the dispersal of forces.
    1. anomalocaris
      anomalocaris 17 February 2014 17: 22
      0
      The devastation was not in the closets, but in the heads ... Someone for such miscalculations had to be put to the wall.
    2. The centurion
      The centurion 17 February 2014 18: 48
      +2
      Quote: Drummer
      In reality, in the first two months, the Japanese were able to land only four divisions in Korea

      The most important property of the theater of this war was its connection with the rear, and in this regard the position of both sides was the same. For the Russian army, the only railway from Syzran to Liaoyang served as a link to the rear. Due to its unfinished cargo had to be reloaded through Lake Baikal. The connection of the Japanese army with the metropolis was exclusively maritime and could only be carried out under the conditions of the Japanese fleet’s dominance at sea. Therefore, the first goal of the Japanese military plan was to lock or destroy the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. By the end of January, the Russian fleet suffered significant losses, the Japanese seized the supremacy of the sea and only then secured the possibility of landing the army on the mainland. The army of General Kuroki was the first to land in Korea, followed by the army of General Oka. The Russian army practically did not prevent this. Only after that did the Japanese get a numerical advantage. There was no firm command in the Russian army. The general leadership of the war lay with the governor in the Far East, General Alekseev, and the Manchu army was commanded by General Kuropatkin, i.e. the management system was similar to the management system during the conquest of Black Sea at the end of the 18 century. The trouble was different. Kuropatkin was not Suvorov, Alekseev was not Potemkin, and Nicholas II was not fit even in the shoes of Empress Catherine. Due to the lack of unity and leadership capabilities adequate to the spirit of their time, from the very beginning of the war, operations began to be spontaneous.
  4. avt
    avt 17 February 2014 13: 40
    +3
    Quote: Drummer
    the problem was only a dispersal of forces.

    More precisely, their illiterate disposition, especially in regard to the fleet, the impression is that the admirals were going to fight according to the regulations before Nelson's times, leading the ships on the strings one after another, at once forgot how the ship program was formed for a cruising war. "Peresvet" ,,, Victory "and late, again because of the confusion of the leadership ,,, Oslyabya". Participant of the events Kostenko very well laid it all out in "On" Oryol "in Tsushima" Well, the deblocking of Port Artur in ONE building ?
  5. Moore
    Moore 17 February 2014 13: 58
    +2
    Peacetime generals (commanders) are our everything. They do the greatest harm not even by the fact of their existence, but by the formation, on the basis of personal "experience," of criteria for the advancement of young officers on the military career ladder.
  6. Silvio
    Silvio 17 February 2014 14: 37
    0
    Nevertheless, this war falls at the peak of the naval ambitions of the empire, although almost half of the ships were built at overseas shipyards. Results were achieved in the form of the sinking of two Japanese battleships, which later did not have a repetition in the history of the Russian and Soviet navies. After Tsushima, the admirals of the imperial fleet developed, perhaps, a complex of fear of large naval battles. The main ships of the Baltic Fleet practically did not participate in the WWI. By a strange coincidence, two battleships from the time of the Japanese company opposed the German squadron at Moonsund. Perhaps that is why the opinion of the Navy as an expensive and ineffective toy is rooted in the country's leadership.
  7. avt
    avt 17 February 2014 14: 51
    +3
    Quote: Silvio
    After Tsushima, the admirals of the imperial fleet developed, perhaps, a complex of fear of large naval battles. The main ships of the Baltic Fleet practically did not participate in the WWI.

    You are wrong. Firstly, look when the battleships of the type "Petropavlovsk" appeared in general; secondly, look for the test reports of their armor protection carried out on the Black Sea - you will be very unpleasantly surprised. And finally, after familiarizing yourself with the second point I proposed, estimate the balance of forces in the Baltic and see how, and where, what ships held the minnoartillery position.Well, as old battleships squadron and dreadnoughts dashingly taxied on the Black Sea, this completely refutes your statement. Pikul is a good marine writer, but no historian, it is better to look at documents.
    1. Gray 43
      Gray 43 17 February 2014 19: 23
      0
      For the first time I learned only from the books of Pikul about the fact that Kamchatka and Sakhalin were defending, about the actions of the cruisers of Vladivostok, I admit insufficient documents when writing.
  8. Silvio
    Silvio 17 February 2014 15: 26
    +1
    Quote: avt
    And finally, after reading the second point I have proposed, estimate the balance of forces in the Baltic and see how, yes and where, with which ships they held the mine artillery position. Well, how old the battleships of the squadron and the dreadnoughts famously drove on the Black Sea, this completely refutes your statement.


    In the Baltic, despite the superiority of the Kaiser's fleet, they kept an artillery position behind the mines. It sounds textbook, just like: "For the third of August: We sat in a trench, he was given a bow, around my neck ..". There were no major battles on the Black Sea due to the lack of a modern fleet on the other side. They chased Goeben with the whole company of old battleships, not without success.
  9. avt
    avt 17 February 2014 15: 39
    0
    Quote: Silvio
    the lack of a modern fleet on the opposite side

    request
    Quote: Silvio
    They drove Goeben with the whole company of old battleships, not without success.

    Was it “modern” or was it not? Yes, and the Turks, even though their light cruiser was torn off, were not so armless, for example, destroyers of German construction dashingly jumped into Odessa and the gunboat went out - they had to raise and restore, not turbine ones, but With the appearance of German submarines - yes, a certain fear arose. Yes, and nothing was decided in a single, decisive squadron battle already at that time. By the way, in the Baltic, especially after the death of "Pallada", there was also a fair amount of tremor, though mutual - the Germans, the Angles that broke through to us on the submarine, also bleed and caught up with fear.
    Quote: Silvio
    kept an artillery position behind mines.

    Alas! Not spectacular, but very, very spectacular mine war also put a lot in its place, especially in such a rather problematic reservoir as the Baltic.
  10. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 17 February 2014 16: 01
    +2
    One thing is that we, as always, can only learn from our mistakes. It's good though. After all, after R-Java, the conclusions were still made. Changes began in the army and navy. I don't remember where I read "if it were not for the Russo-Japanese war, and not for the conclusions of that war, Germany could have defeated the Russian army already in 1914"
    1. Dobrokhod Sergey
      Dobrokhod Sergey 17 February 2014 17: 01
      +1
      Quote: Trapper7
      I don’t remember where I read “if it were not for the Russo-Japanese war, and not for the conclusions of that war, Germany could have defeated the Russian army already in 1914.


      It could very well be. Indeed, after such a defeat, much was done to strengthen the army, but all the inertness and shortsightedness of many military officials did not allow the Russian imperial army to be made modern.
  11. avt
    avt 17 February 2014 16: 13
    +1
    Quote: Trapper7
    Changes began in the army and navy. I do not remember where I read "if it were not for the Russo-Japanese war, and not for the conclusions of that war, Germany could have defeated the Russian army already in 1914"

    Yes, a lot has been done. BUT again, the dances on the rake turned out - the Empire collapsed again because of mistakes, and the almost criminal actions of the elite and senior management.
  12. Dobrokhod Sergey
    Dobrokhod Sergey 17 February 2014 16: 56
    0
    In this war, the mediocrity of many military leaders was manifested, including Kuropatkin himself, both a military and an arrogant orthodox Christian. Here is his diary entry:
    ON RELIGIOUS QUESTION
    Tolerance in Japan is very striking. In Tokyo, our father, Nikolai, is one of the most popular people. But the mass of the so-called intelligent society with new reforms began to live in unbelief. In military schools no religious education and upbringing is given. There are no temples at schools. Future officers to the Almighty, who gazes at all nations and all religions equally, do not pray in grief or in joy. The same is in the army. This is a great weakness of the Japanese army. Without religion, without faith in fishing, warriors can endure severe trials, individuals can endure severe losses and hardships, but the masses cannot. In schools, instead of religion, higher morality is taught: love for the homeland, emperor, respect for the family. From the diary of A. N. Kuropatkin
  13. parus2nik
    parus2nik 17 February 2014 17: 00
    +1
    And long before the Russo-Japanese War .. in 1878, the Swede Eric Nordensheld went in one navigation path, circling the northern tip of Eurasia - Cape Chelyuskin (the first reliable voyage past him) and wintered off the coast of Chukotka. The second by Chelyuskin passed in 1893, the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen, and the third in 1901 was the Russian explorer Eduard Toll, the Ostsee baron.
    The experts perfectly understood how the construction of the Northern Sea Route connecting Murmansk and Vladivostok could transform the economic life of remote regions of the country, but the authorities did not understand ... They drove the fleet from the Baltic almost around the world .. But they began to take up the mind only after the Russian-Japanese war ..
    1. anomalocaris
      anomalocaris 17 February 2014 17: 25
      +1
      They took up the mind only during the Soviet Union. Until then, these are just wonderful attempts by enthusiasts.
  14. drop
    drop 17 February 2014 17: 03
    +3
    My grandfather Burunov Mikhail fought with the Japanese. He was a captain. He was wounded, treated and then left for Belarus to live. I found his track record in the archives and am proud of my ancestor. Most people supported the Army and Navy. Remember the country's favorite singer Vyaltseva, who equipped the ambulance train with her money and was among the fighters. True, the root cause was love for his future husband, the general of the tsarist army. But there was also a part of the population, especially the intelligentsia, who wanted Russia's defeat in this war. Just like now, when liberals like Sobchak, Shenderovich want the destruction of our country. Not realizing that if they win, they will have nowhere to live and raise their children. Only a strong and competent government can save the country and win victories, as it was in the Great Patriotic War. My father died defending Leningrad. We and our grandchildren are proud of him. The second father on the line of his wife - the lieutenant captain defended Leningrad, and then fought with Japan, freeing the Kuril Islands. I have the honor.
  15. Cristall
    Cristall 17 February 2014 18: 20
    +1
    Everyone knows about the unpreparedness, poor preparation, and other neglects of the Russian army of 1904. It would be strange if Japan would attack RI at the peak of its power ... and readiness. The enemy was smart, I won’t say that yapi were good everywhere - but they tried their best. We studied, tried, tried to take risks, in general, their risks were higher than those of RI.
    The highest command staff ... yes, problematic - but there were individuals - Makarov, Bely, Kondratenko .. the same Vitgeft (though too indecisive)
    I think the problem was both middle and younger. Poor technical training. The era of the war of engines came - both from commanders and from ordinary sailors needed technical training. HER just was not enough.
    I have a suspicion that the best RI ships were already on the theater. The best crews, too. The military is just not there.
    Do not forget that RI also ordered, preparing for the REV ships - in America (the same Varyag + battleship) Germany (Novik and others) France (the same Cesarevich)
    Russian shipyards were overloaded with work. Kramp was ordered precisely because of the deadlines. All the same, RI was in a hurry with the introduction of new armadillos and cruisers of the ocean zone. Note that all ships of foreign construction immediately on the theater of operations in 1 TE. It was 1 TE that was supposed to decide the debut (which is why the war began suddenly with an attack Pearl Harbor Port Arthur ... the reception was no longer new (trained by the Chinese)
    Also, of course, I think that RI had the Baltic Black Sea North + Vladivostok squadron and 1 TE in the Pa-A, it seems that RI is strong - but in reality you won’t put everything into a fist under different TVDs ... in general, a colossus with clay legs.
    I still believe that the war could have been pulled out if we had been at least a little bit lucky ... But if you believe Peter 1 (they give 1 unbeaten for 2 beaten), then defeat was also needed ... but so many people's lives were in vain ...
    1. Motors1991
      Motors1991 17 February 2014 18: 50
      +2
      It seems to me that the main problem, it’s also an advantage, for Russia: a gigantic territory, it always took time to concentrate the Russian Empire, so at the beginning of almost any war we were defeated, on the contrary, we had an advantage in a long protracted war. As Field Marshal Kutuzov replied to the Napoleonic Ambassador Loriston on peace proposals after the surrender of Moscow: ,, But we didn’t start fighting the blue-footed yet, If the top leadership didn’t flinch, we probably won in the Russian-Japanese war, despite the initial failures. And do not forget that the war was fought alone poorly developed Siberia, from the European part, not a single battalion was sent to the Far East, on a royal whim, was sent.
    2. avt
      avt 17 February 2014 18: 55
      0
      Quote: Cristall
      The highest command staff ... yes, problematic - but there were individuals - Makarov, Bely, Kondratenko .. the same Vitgeft (though too indecisive)

      Mixed in a bunch of people, horses.
      Quote: Cristall
      I think the problem was both middle and younger

      That's just how their preparation was the skate of the imperial army until the 17th, it was noted by everyone, including Zhukov, who passed it.
      Quote: Cristall
      The era of the war of engines came - both from commanders and from ordinary sailors needed technical training. HER just was not enough.

      Again, if you take the fleet, I recommend not sucking it out of your finger, but contacting at least the participant in the events, engineer-Kostenko. He left very sensible memoirs as a direct participant from the Baltic to Tsushima.
      Quote: Cristall
      I have a suspicion that the best ships of RI were already on the theater

      Suspicion is not proof, yes, the first squadron was better prepared, and at the theater of action, it’s another matter that the admirals of the naval squad ordered extremely rare mediocrity. As for the general readiness - look and find how the shipbuilding program was financed, for how long and by whom, and compare with the Japanese - the picture is not very good for decision-making by the political leadership, but Witte’s position generally attracts treason.
      Quote: Cristall
      I still believe that the war could be pulled out if we were just a little bit lucky ...

      It is possible, even with such miscalculations, it was possible .NO - the one who is lucky is lucky, and here again the question is for the country's top leadership.
      Quote: Cristall
      that defeat was also needed.

      request Japanese and Naglo-Saxons? Yes. Russia? "Well, you give a pancake!"
    3. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 17 February 2014 20: 59
      +1
      Quote: Cristall
      Black Sea North

      What ships were in the North?
      Turkey will not pass through the straits, in accordance with the status
      If there hadn’t been Tsushima, they wouldn’t have sent the fleet in a hurry, created a normal railway, could have accumulated strength and dropped the Japs into the sea
      Quote: klim44
      As we see, Kuropatkin was greatly mistaken in his calculations.

      Not a single fortress is designed for perpetual defense - look how long Qingdao and Belgian fortresses lasted. There would be more machine guns and soldiers
  16. Gray 43
    Gray 43 17 February 2014 19: 34
    +2
    This war is hushed up, as shameful, the reason for this defeat was the neglect of the Russian high command to the enemy, which was supported by Europeans and staff members, who then robbed from the grateful descendants of the samurai.
  17. klim44
    klim44 17 February 2014 19: 40
    0
    As we see, Kuropatkin was greatly mistaken in his calculations. Makarov’s assessment was much closer to the real picture. - I was not mistaken, but lied to the tsar-father, as they began to erect fortifications only from the beginning of the war.

    "The time has long passed when generals began to serve as soldiers, like Suvorov. When the Petrine practice worked, the Russian army was invincible. However, the system was broken. As a result, the generals were filled with sycophants, opportunists, careerists, servicemen who know how to" serve beautifully "in peacetime. the posts were filled with sons, relatives of generals and aristocrats who did not smell gunpowder "
    This very practice was that the babies were enlisted in the guard, and they did not serve as soldiers. Family ties have always played a role, in that Suvorov - dad general.
    1. Moore
      Moore 18 February 2014 06: 54
      +1
      Sovramshi, dear.
      The fortifications in Arthur were erected precisely at the time specified in the article.
      As for Suvorov, should you advise you to learn the materiel in order to find out how many years Alexander Vasilievich spent in active military service before receiving his first officer rank?
      I will make it easier for you: from 18 (1748) to 24 years old, he served in ordinary and junior command posts in the Semenovsky regiment. The first officer rank was received in 1754.
      There is a suggestion to read the biographies of the same G.A. Potemkin and P.A. Rumyantsev as well.
  18. Silvio
    Silvio 17 February 2014 20: 06
    +1
    Quote: Cristall
    The enemy was smart, I won’t say that yapi were good everywhere - but they tried their best. We studied, tried, tried to take risks, in general, their risks were higher than those of RI

    The Japanese briskly started. Say what RI did, there was a much more significant military-political experience, and the Japanese had no modern firearms until the mid-19th century. Their cars were inferior to the Soviet production models in the 50s, and in 20 years they left us at an unattainable height. If you study the history of that war in detail without propaganda cliches, it’s rather dreary ... Capitalism undermined the Republic of Ingushetia, destroyed it from the inside. The colossus was supposed to collapse from the serious external shock that the WWI became.
    1. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 17 February 2014 21: 06
      0
      Quote: Silvio
      Capitalism undermined RI

      You listen, both capitalism and socialism have been grind. But they haven’t come up with another yet. There is really anarchism .....
      The state system-monarchy and the elite, which was good and didn’t want to change anything, were undermining. By analogy with today, as long as there is gas, we’ll survive somehow, and it will be clear that the next generation will solve the problems
      1. Silvio
        Silvio 17 February 2014 21: 49
        +1
        Russia is very reminiscent of itself a century ago. We are also divided within ourselves as then, although we ourselves are not fully aware of this. Before the WWII, there was also a raw material economy, railways were built at a frantic pace, just like pipelines now. Corruption was freaky just. They say that 40% of the price of bribes was included in the cost of the battleship. Now probably also significant numbers. Socialism with an inhuman face does not decompose from the inside.
  19. Red Army of the USSR
    Red Army of the USSR 17 February 2014 22: 26
    +1
    The complete degradation of senior command staff, mediocrity, slackness, inability. A simple Russian soldier suffered, it is very disappointing.
  20. cat1973
    cat1973 April 14 2014 06: 25
    0
    All the same, we defeated 1 Pacific Squadron Admiral TOGO recognized this !!